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Abstract 
This thesis explores land reform, land markets and indigenous mobilisation in 
Highland Ecuador (1964-1994) through the lens of Karl Polanyi’s concept of the 
“double movement”. The concept suggests modern capitalist societies comprise 
two forces: the movement towards the creation, expansion and liberalisation of 
markets (commodification) and the countermovement towards the regulation of 
markets, the strengthening of the state, and the promotion of non-market forms 
of organisation (decommodification). The thesis adopts a radical reading of the 
concept which sees the double movement as a fundamental contradiction in 
modern capitalist societies. The empirical investigation offers support for this 
reading and provides fresh insights into the use of the concept. The value of 
narrowing the lens of the double movement to examine struggles that emerge 
around specific economic issues and involve particular social groups is also 
demonstrated.  
The thesis also sheds new light on Ecuadorian land reform and the role 
indigenous peoples performed in the process.  Greater clarity is provided on the 
impact of land reform in the highland region and the land redistributed to 
indigenous families and communities. One of the central points to emerge from 
the analysis is that the collective organisation and mobilisation of indigenous 
peoples were required to secure land through agrarian reform. The relationship 
between indigenous peoples and land markets is also explored. A new concept is 
developed which provides insights into the opportunities and threats land 
markets created for indigenous peoples.   The thesis places the 1990 and 1994 
indigenous levantamientos within a long-term struggle over land which contrasts 
with accounts that interpret the uprisings as reactions to structural adjustment 
and neoliberal reform.  
The contemporary relevance of the research is demonstrated through the 
analysis of recent developments in Ecuador, concentrating on indigenous and 
peasant attempts to bring the use and distribution of land under social control.  
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Chapter One 
The use of Karl Polanyi’s concept of the “double movement” to 
explore social, political and economic change  
1. Introduction 
Over the last thirty years Latin America has moved towards and against the 
market. The introduction of structural adjustment policies and neoliberal reforms 
accelerated commodification on the one hand and generated widespread social 
and political opposition on the other. The scale of resistance prompted most 
governments to reform or reject the neoliberal model. Some countries have seen 
modest revisions (e.g. Brazil, Chile) while others have witnessed considerable 
changes (e.g. Ecuador, Venezuela). The experiences of individual countries have 
varied enormously but the general trend has seen a break with the extreme 
market fundamentalism of the 1980s and 1990s and a movement towards a more 
heterogeneous mix of social and economic policies in which market regulation, 
redistributive mechanisms, and state activism perform more prominent roles.  
Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” concept provides a rich framework to 
investigate the change in Latin America’s social, political and economic 
landscape.
1
 The concept suggests modern capitalist societies comprise two 
forces: the movement towards the creation, expansion and liberalisation of 
markets (commodification) and the countermovement towards the regulation of 
markets, the strengthening of the state, and the promotion of alternative forms of 
organisation (decommodification). Hence Latin America appears to have 
followed a path that is consistent with the double movement.  The bulk of 
studies that have explored or noted this phenomenon see the double movement 
start when governments introduce structural adjustment policies and neoliberal 
reforms. This thesis offers a different perspective by considering whether the 
double movement can be seen as a phase in a longer-term struggle over the role 
markets perform in societies. This approach comes from reading the double 
movement as a basic contradiction in modern capitalist societies. Viewed 
through this lens capitalism evolves through a continuous and simultaneous 
                                                          
1
 Polanyi develops the double movement in The Great Transformation: the Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time which was first published in 1944.  
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process of commodification and decommodification, movement and 
countermovement.  
The basic theoretical aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the merit of this 
reading of the double movement and identify aspects of the concept that require 
refinement. The double movement is combined with Polanyi’s “fictitious 
commodities” and “forms of integration” concepts to create a richer theoretical 
framework. The exploration and elaboration of Polanyi’s concepts is undertaken 
through the investigation of land reform, land markets and indigenous 
mobilisation in Highland Ecuador (1964-1994).  
Exploring these issues through a Polanyian lens provides a number of 
empirical and theoretical insights. The thesis casts fresh light on the role 
indigenous peoples performed in agrarian reform.
2
   One of the central points to 
emerge from the analysis is that the collective organisation and mobilisation of 
indigenous peoples were required to secure land through agrarian reform. 
Greater clarity is also provided on indigenous and peasant attempts to transform 
land reform and the extent to which land reform legislation reflected indigenous 
and peasant demands. The thesis sheds new light on the links between land 
reform and land markets and indigenous peoples and land markets.  The 
commodification and decommodification dimensions of land reform are 
explained and the opportunities and threats land markets created for indigenous 
peoples are explored through a new concept developed within this thesis. Fresh 
insight is also provided into indigenous mobilisation. The thesis places the 1990 
and 1994 indigenous levantamientos - two of the most potent expressions of 
popular protest seen in Latin America in recent times – within a long-term 
struggle over land which contrasts with accounts that interpret the uprisings as 
reactions to structural adjustment and neoliberal reform.  
                                                          
2
 Agrarian reform involves the redistribution and regulation of agricultural and pastoral land and 
the provision of credit, technical assistance etc. to peasants and small-scale farmers. While land 
reform and agrarian reform are often conflated, strictly, the former relates to measures geared 
towards changes in land tenure and distribution and the latter refers to measures aimed at 
changes in land tenure and distribution as well as the supply of credit, technical assistance etc. 
(El-Ghonemy 2003 p. 34-5) This thesis concentrates on the use, control, and distribution of land 
(i.e. land reform). However, I use the terms “land reform” and “agrarian reform” interchangeably 
to reduce repetition. 
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The empirical investigation provides support for reading the double 
movement as an essential contradiction in capitalist societies. Commodification 
and decommodification and movement and countermovement took place 
simultaneously throughout the period under investigation.  The brief analysis of 
contemporary developments in Ecuador offered in this thesis suggests similar 
forces remain in operation.  
The thesis also illustrates the value of narrowing the lens of the double 
movement to examine struggles that emerge around specific economic issues 
and involve particular social groups. One of the benefits of this approach is that 
careful attention can be paid to the design and implementation of laws and 
policies. The thesis also draws attention to some of the limitations of Polanyi’s 
concepts. The failure of the double movement to capture the complexity of state-
society relations is highlighted throughout. Extending the historical analysis of 
land to current conflicts over water, the thesis also highlights tensions within the 
concept over the relationship between communal and state control of natural 
resources.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The second 
section explains Polanyi’s concepts of the double movement, fictitious 
commodities, and forms of integration. The third section outlines two alternative 
readings of the double movement and examines the recent change in the 
direction of economic policies in Latin America through a Polanyian lens.  The 
methodological approach of the thesis is explained in section four and the 
structure of the thesis is outlined in section five.  
2. Double movement, fictitious commodities and forms of integration 
The concepts of the “double movement”, “fictitious commodities”, and “forms 
of integration” are central components of the wider theoretical framework 
Polanyi develops to explore the changing place of the economy in society.
3
 This 
section outlines the principal features of the three concepts and explains the 
                                                          
3
 The analysis of the double movement, fictitious commodities, and forms of integration 
presented in this section is based on Polanyi’s principal published work as well as a collection of 
unpublished materials sourced from the Karl Polanyi Archive, Concordia University, Montreal 
(archive materials are marked with an asterisk). For valuable insights into the life and work of 
Karl Polanyi see Dalton (1968), Humphreys (1969), Stanfield (1986), Polanyi-Levitt (1990), 
Trigilia (2002), McRobbie & Polanyi-Levitt (2006), and Dale (2010).  
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relationship between them. The strengths and weaknesses of Polanyi’s 
framework are highlighted and the contemporary relevance of his concepts is 
discussed.  
2.1. Double movement: simultaneous movements toward and against the 
market 
Polanyi develops the “double movement” to explain the breakdown of liberal 
capitalism in the 1930s and the transformation of economies, societies and 
polities in the decades that followed.
4
 He argues two opposing forces emerged 
under liberal capitalism: the movement towards the creation, expansion and 
liberalisation of markets (commodification) and the countermovement towards 
the regulation of markets, strengthening of the state, and expansion of non-
market forms of organisation (decommodification). Efforts to reconcile the two 
sides of the double movement proved impossible under liberal capitalism, 
forcing states to develop alternative forms of social, political and economic 
organisation in the 1930s.  
The state’s establishment of the market as the dominant form of economic 
organisation marked the start of the double movement.  The decisive step, 
according to Polanyi, was the integration of land and labour into markets. “The 
rise of the market to a ruling force in the economy”, he explains, “can be traced 
by noting the extent to which land and food were mobilized through exchange, 
and labor was turned into a commodity free to be purchased in the market.” 
(1957 p. 255) The commodification of land and labour, the incorporation of 
isolated markets into market systems, and the idea markets should be free to 
operate with minimal outside interference provided the platform for the market 
to become the dominant form of economic organisation.  But the market’s 
dominance was contested. The exposure of societies to the whims of markets 
triggered protective responses which aimed to increase market regulation and 
protect and expand alternative forms of organisation. The “impulse for social 
protection” came from all quarters: workers, farmers, peasants, landowners, and 
even industrialists mobilised to restrict the market at one time or another. (Putzel 
2002 p. 2) (Dale 2010 pp. 58-62) Polanyi conceptualises these multiple and 
                                                          
4
 Polanyi focuses on the English and European cases. He places the start of the double movement 
in England in the 1830s. 
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diverse responses as a “countermovement” which was unified by a basic, if 
unarticulated, objective: to limit the influence of markets over societies.  
“Precisely because not the economic but the social interests of 
different cross sections of the population were threatened by the 
market, persons belonging to various economic strata unconsciously 
joined forces to meet the danger.” ([1944] 2001 p. 162)  
How were the decommodification demands of the countermovement 
translated into laws, policies and institutions? Polanyi, as numerous authors have 
noted, does not provide an adequate answer to this question (e.g. Martinelli 
1987; Topik 2001; Munck 2004; Levien 2007; Winders 2009; Burawoy 2010). 
He claims universal suffrage transformed the state into the “organ of the ruling 
million” and social and political actors were able to force changes where 
representative democratic institutions were established, respected, and retained.
5
 
(Polanyi [1944] 2001 p. 216) Yet, the mechanisms through which pressure from 
social and political actors were converted into laws, policies, and institutions are 
not explained. The complex relationships that developed between states and 
societies and the tactics states employed to weaken social and political 
movements within democratic settings are also undeveloped. Moreover, 
precisely how sectors of society organised and mobilised is unexplored. (Levien 
2007 pp. 120-1) The lack of attention Polanyi pays to these issues leads him to 
overlook or understate the fact that “even if a movement against the market 
emerges, it may not succeed in gaining protections unless it has adequate 
political power.” (Winders 2009 p. 321)  
The inadequacy of the relationship Polanyi posits between the state and the 
countermovement must be taken into account when investigating social and 
political responses to commodification, especially in the Global South where 
imbalances in economic and political power are considerable.
6
  My analysis of 
the attempts of indigenous and peasant movements to increase the regulation and 
redistribution of land in Highland Ecuador demonstrates this point.  
                                                          
5
 See also Polanyi (1935 p. 367). 
6
 I use the terms “Global South” and “developing countries” interchangeably in this thesis. The 
word “developing” relates here to human development in the broadest sense. No fixed path or 
destination is implied. See Polanyi-Levitt & Mendell (1987 p. 125) and Sandbrook (2011 p. 423) 
for insights into Polanyi’s view of development.   
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One other issue that Polanyi overlooks is the implementation of laws and 
policies and the role countermovements can perform in this part of the 
decommodification process.
7
 I show that the sustained and collective pressure of 
highland indigenous communities, organisations and movements was required to 
implement land reform (albeit partially). In short, the thesis shows that 
countermovements have important roles to perform in the design and application 
of laws and policies.   
The basic outcome of the struggle between the two sides of the double 
movement under liberal capitalism was the establishment of political economies 
that simultaneously promoted commodification and decommodification. 
(Polanyi [1944] 2001 pp. 136-9)  (Neale 1994 p. 154) However, according to 
Polanyi, these regimes were not sustainable, leading to the stalling then collapse 
of liberal capitalism in the early 1930s. As the Great Depression spread, states 
abandoned the central tenets of liberal capitalism (e.g. free trade, gold standard, 
laissez faire) and organised their political economies in radically different ways. 
The rupture involved the expansion of freedom and the promotion of human 
development within democratic settings (e.g. Great Britain, United States) and 
the restriction of freedom and the repression of progressive social and political 
movements within totalitarian regimes (e.g. Germany, Spain). The outcome of 
the double movement was therefore regressive as well as progressive. The 
general trend was towards the escalation of state intervention, the increase of 
market regulation, and the gradual expansion of state redistributive mechanisms. 
(Polanyi [1944] 2001 pp. 231-56)  
2.2. Fictitious commodities: the corollaries of the commodification of 
land and labour 
The significance Polanyi attributes to the incorporation of land and labour into 
markets rests on the numerous and diverse functions they perform in societies. 
Land “invests man’s life with stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is a 
condition of his physical safety; it is the landscapes and the seasons.” ([1944] 
2001 p. 187) Labour, meanwhile, “is only another name for a human activity 
which goes with life itself”. ([1944] 2001 p. 75) The wider significance of land 
                                                          
7
 The lack of attention Polanyi pays to the enforcement of laws and policies leads him to 
exaggerate their decommodification potential in some cases (see Section 4 below).  
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and labour and the fact neither is produced for sale on the market leads Polanyi 
to classify them as “fictitious commodities”.8 The principal objective of the 
countermovement was to prevent, manage or reverse “the transformation of land 
and labour into commodities.” (Li 2007 p. 3)  
The fictitious commodities concept has multiple dimensions.
9
 Three are 
particularly important for this investigation. First, the intrinsic characteristics of 
land and labour mean fictitious commodities will not perform like genuine 
commodities (i.e. items that can be stored, transported, and distributed in 
accordance with changes in market conditions). Labour cannot be separated 
from its owner who herself is enmeshed within a complex web of social relations 
(e.g. family, community) and is dependent on the market price of her labour (i.e. 
wage) for her economic survival and social standing. (Polanyi [1944] 2001 p. 
75) The fact individuals are embedded within social relations means wage 
labourers will not meekly follow where markets lead. Labour markets therefore 
exhibit certain rigidities which are not intrinsic to markets for genuine 
commodities. The same is also true of land markets.
10
 Their most fundamental 
distinguishing characteristic is the supply and location of land is fixed which 
implies, at the limits, they cannot meet increases in demand. The rigidity this 
instills is accentuated by the deep and complex relationship that exists between 
human groups and physical environments and the crucial non-economic 
functions (social, cultural, spiritual etc.) land performs for individuals, families, 
communities, and societies. This aspect of the fictitious commodity concept has 
important implications for the analysis of land reform and land markets. The 
links between humans and habitats mean attempts to overcome local supply 
limits by expanding the agricultural frontier via colonisation – a key agrarian 
policy in twentieth century Latin America - will not necessarily satiate increases 
in demand (i.e. individuals, families, and communities will not necessarilly 
uproot to secure land in new areas even if the economic potential is greater).  
Rural actors with long associations with specific regions and cultural practices 
                                                          
8
 Polanyi also classifies money as a fictitious commodity.  See Polanyi ([1944] 2001) pp. 201-9 
and Dale (2010) pp. 64-7.  
9
 For a recent extension of Polanyi’s fictitious commodities concept see Fraser (2012).  
10
 Polanyi’s fictitious commodity view of land is not limited to land itself. The concept also 
encompasses food, natural resources and nature. This section and thesis focus on the integration 
of land itself into markets. The other dimensions are touched upon but only perform a marginal 
role in the analysis. The decision to focus explicitly on land is outlined in Section 4. 
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linked to land will fight for the redistribution of land where they live rather than 
settle in new zones. Taking into account the social, cultural, spiritual etc. roles 
land performs for some rural actors is important for understanding the 
development and operation of land markets. Even where individuals are 
permitted to exchange land and private ownership is the dominant form of 
tenure, land will not necessarily be universally integrated into markets and 
distributed in accordance with changes in market prices. Non-economic factors 
will influence the decisions of some landowners and the circulation of land 
among these actors will follow a different logic to the distribution of land within 
price-making markets. Tensions emerge between actors who have competing 
understandings of land and political struggles develop as these actors mobilise to 
attempt to impose their vision of land on the state.  
Second, the fictional status of land and labour as commodities ensures states 
perform central roles in the creation and regulation of land and labour markets 
i.e. states and markets are interwoven. States are required to dismantle laws, 
policies, and institutions that restrict market expansion and replace them with 
ones that promote market development. Once land and labour markets are 
established, states are compelled to introduce measures to restrict and regulate 
commodificiation even on the most basic of levels. Chang, who draws on 
Polanyi, identifies a variety of forms of state intervention. (2003c pp. 53-4) 
States determine which actors can participate in markets (e.g. proscribing the 
foreign ownership of agricultural land); which objects are legimitate items of 
exchange (e.g. prohibiting the transfer of communal land); and, stipulate the 
rights and obligations of property owners (e.g. social and environmental 
functions of agricultural land). The synchronicity of the double movement 
comes sharply into focus from this angle. Even on the most basic of levels 
commodification and decommodification take place at the same time. Struggles 
emerge as social and political actors contest the boundaries between the two 
sides of the double movement. States become the focal points of these political 
struggles. 
Third, the incorporation of land and labour into markets involves the 
reconfiguration, dissolution or marginalisation of the redistributive and 
reciprocal mechanisms that regulate the use of land and labour in societies or 
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settings in which markets have not become the dominant form of economic 
organisation. In such settings land and labour, Polanyi explains, “are tied up with 
the organizations of kinship, neighbourhood, craft, and creed – with tribe and 
temple, village, guild, and church.”11  ([1944] 2001 p. 187) (Trigilia 2002 pp. 
98-99) The types of regimes Polanyi refers to were often exploitative and 
repressive but even in these contexts fictitious commodification still caused 
social, cultural, and environmental dislocation as traditional systems were 
marginalised or replaced. More generally, as Harvey notes, the expansion of 
markets sees long-term struggles emerge around “the ways in which 
commodification affects the web of life”. (2006 p. 114)  
Building on the concepts of the double movement and fictitious commodity, I 
construct a new concept to examine the relationship between indigenous peoples 
and land markets in Highland Ecuador. The concept draws an analytical line 
between the “activation” and “development” of land markets. The former refers 
to the occasional engagement of actors within markets to secure land while the 
latter relates to the establishment of price-making markets through which the 
continuous circulation of land between various actors is channelled. Spaces 
widened for indigenous peoples to secure land through activation but narrowed 
through development. Collective pressure was required to broaden the spaces 
open for indigenous peoples to obtain land. I show that while land markets 
presented numerous problems for indigenous peoples they also generated 
opportunities for them to obtain land. The concept therefore supports and 
challenges Polanyi.  
2.3. Forms of integration: market, redistributive and reciprocal 
mechanisms  
Polanyi’s critique of the role markets were entrusted to perform in the 
organisation of land and labour under liberal capitalism raises the question of 
how fictitious commodities were organised in earlier societies. Or, as Schaniel & 
Neale rhetorically ask: “If not exchange, what else could there have been?” 
(2000 p. 91 fn. 4) Polanyi answers this question through the concept of “forms of 
integration”. The concept is not only important for understanding political 
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 For specific comments in relation to land see Polanyi ([1944] 2001) p. 73.  
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economies of the past but also for comprehending and imagining political 
economies of the present and future. Providing a schema to analyse social, 
political and economic organisation across time and space, the forms of 
integration indicate the very broad alternative mechanisms through which 
economic processes and land and labour can be organised. The concept therefore 
provides an indication of how the double movement can be assuaged or 
transcended.  
Polanyi’s analysis of historical and anthropological studies of primitive, 
archaic, feudalist, and capitalist societies leads him to conclude that political 
economies are only organised around three broad patterns: reciprocity, 
redistribution, and market exchange.
12
 (Polanyi [1944] 2001) (Polanyi et al. 
1957 p. xviii) (Polanyi 1957 pp. 250-6) (Dalton 1968 pp. xiv-xv) (Schaniel & 
Neale 2000) Each form of integration involves a distinct distribution process. 
Reciprocity, Polanyi explains, involves “movements between correlative points 
of symmetrical groupings”, redistribution entails “appropriational movements 
toward a center and out of it again”, and exchange relates to “vice-versa 
movements taking place as between ‘hands’”. (1957 p. 250)  
Theoretically and empirically, the three forms coexist but one pattern 
dominates – or “integrates” economic life at the wider level (e.g. national).  To 
become integrative, the particular form of integration requires specific social, 
political and economic institutions or “supporting structures”. (1957 p. 252) 
Reciprocity necessitates symmetrically arranged social groups; redistribution 
requires a central authority; and exchange needs a system of price-making 
markets. (1957 p. 252) Stopping short of stipulating a precise measure, Polanyi 
provides a broad indicator to gauge changes in the forms of integration and 
determine when one pattern dominates another. He states the supremacy of one 
form of integration over another is “manifested in the provision of the daily 
necessities of life”. (1947*) That is, the principal mechanism through which 
people secure food; clothing; shelter; income; land etc. indicates the extent to 
which one particular pattern integrates the economy. I use this indicator to gauge 
the impact of the dissolution of the traditional hacienda complex on indigenous 
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 Polanyi classifies householding as a separate form of integration in The Great Transformation 
but incorporates it into redistribution in his later work. See Schaniel & Neale (2000) and Dale 
(2010). 
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peoples in Highland Ecuador in the 1960s and 1970s. The analytical link Polanyi 
establishes between forms of integration and supporting structures indicates that 
the reconfiguration or transformation of the forms of integration implies the 
reconfiguration or transformation of the social, political, and economic 
institutions that underpin them. (Trigilia 2002 pp. 98-9) Changes in the forms of 
integration therefore entail profound shifts in relations between individuals, 
families and communities as well as between states and societies.  
A crucial point to note about Polanyi’s schema is “emotional” or “attitudinal” 
characteristics must not be affixed to forms of integration a priori. (Schaniel & 
Neale 2000 p. 89 & p. 100) For example, redistributive mechanisms or regimes 
should not be automatically associated with specific attributes or objectives (e.g. 
“equality”). (Dale 2010 pp. 116-7) The redistributive form of integration 
involves the movement of goods, services and resources to and from central 
authorities (e.g. states, community councils). Outcomes may or may not promote 
equity and human development.  Undesirable results may also occur. The 
centralisation of power and the expansion of clientilism are two issues associated 
with redistributive mechanisms in modern political economies. Polanyi, as 
Martinelli notes, understates these issues.   
“In the case of redistribution, Polanyi overlooks problems resulting 
from the centralization of power, which this mode of integration 
promotes. Redistribution can, in fact, degenerate into arbitrary 
despotism and autocratic centralization. It can also encourage the 
development of paternalistic attitudes which do not respect the 
autonomy of the recipients of redistributed goods and create patron-
client networks.” (1987 pp. 145-6)  
The need to avoid affixing labels to particular forms of integration is also true of 
market exchange. The ferocity of the critique Polanyi launches against markets 
in The Great Transformation obscures the fact he also recognised the role 
regulation can perform in alleviating problems associated with 
commodification.
13
 He makes this point clearly in the plan of the book.  
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 Polanyi adopts a similar position in his polemic Our Obsolete Market Mentality. ([1947] 1968)  
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“There is no reason to regard a regulated market-system as utopian. 
While interference with a self-regulating system must lead to the loss 
of self-regulation and to a new interference, there is no reason why 
the market should not discharge its unique functions in the 
framework of a set of regulations.” (1943*) 
Here Polanyi hints at the varieties of capitalism which fit within the market 
exchange bracket, ranging from lightly to heavily regulated market economies, 
with reciprocal and redistributive mechanisms performing minor or major 
supporting functions.
14
 Though Polanyi devotes little attention to the issue, the 
mechanisms through which markets are regulated and the extent to which 
regulation is enforced come sharply into focus from this angle. Leaning on 
Polanyi, Harriss-White stresses the importance of taking these factors into 
account when analysing markets in developing countries. She warns that 
researchers must be cognizant of “differences between procedure and practice – 
of the existence of incomplete, inconsistent and/or inconsistently amended law, 
and of the varying scope for improvisation in the practice of regulation, such that 
regulation takes on a local character moulded by interests of political and social 
elites.” (2003 p. 487) The analysis I offer in this thesis indicates that careful 
attention must also be paid to the structure and functioning of regulatory bodies. 
The attempt to create space for the involvement of indigenous and peasant 
representatives within the agencies charged with the task of regulating and 
redistributing land in Ecuador was central to the concerns of indigenous and 
peasant movements throughout the period under investigation. The issue, as I 
will explain in the concluding chapter, remains central to indigenous and peasant 
concerns in Ecuador.  
One final point about Polanyi’s concept that is important for this investigation 
is how the forms of integration interact. The tensions and contradictions that can 
emerge between the different forms are not fully explored by Polanyi, 
particularly in capitalist societies. My analysis sheds some light on this issue. I 
show land reform performed an important role in extending private property and 
expanding land markets in Highland Ecuador. The expansion of private property 
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 Polanyi-Levitt argues one of Polanyi’s key insights was his “insistence on reciprocity and 
redistribution as mechanisms of economic integration which both sustain and contain the play of 
market forces”. (2006a p. 11)  
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rights did not automatically translate into the expansion of land markets and the 
redistribution of land supported communal rather than private control of land in 
some cases. Yet land reform still performed a crucial role in stimulating land 
commodification. The finding presents some challenges to Polanyi’s framework 
as redistribution accelerated as well as contained commodification. The 
complexity and contradictions of land reform emphasise the importance of 
investigating the operation and impact of decommodification mechanisms.   
3. Double movements in the wake of Polanyi 
Polanyi hints the double movement ceased as liberal capitalism collapsed. 
([1944] 2001 p. 136) (Dale 2010 p. 226) He does not posit the concept as a law 
that rigidly applies to capitalist societies across time and space (Section 4 
below). Yet, as numerous authors have noted, forces similar to the ones Polanyi 
identifies have been discernible since the demise of liberal capitalism. Broadly, 
two alternative readings of the double movement have emerged.
15
 The first sees 
the double movement as a sequential process which starts when states embark on 
programmes of economic liberalisation. The second reads the concept as a 
simultaneous process which is a basic contradiction in modern capitalist 
societies. The former suggests problems associated with commodification can be 
overcome through reforms while the latter proposes more radical solutions. This 
thesis, as previously noted, follows the second reading. The aim of this section is 
not to refute the first reading of the double movement but to explain the two 
broad interpretations of the concept and indicate the value of examining social, 
political and economic issues through a radical Polanyian lens.  
The rest of this section is divided into two parts. The first explains the 
alternative readings of the double movement that have emerged since Polanyi 
first developed the concept. In doing so, the section creates a dialogue between 
various authors who have considered, evoked or applied the double movement in 
a variety of contexts. The second briefly examines the recent change in the 
direction of economic policies in Latin America through a Polanyian lens, 
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 While based on a different literature, I broadly follow the “soft” and “hard” categories 
Szelenyi (1991) develops to classify alternative readings of Polanyi, with the first reading of the 
double movement falling within the “soft” camp and the second sitting within the “hard” group 
(see Dale 2008a pp. 14-27). Szelenyi’s classification is not employed here because of the 
potentially pejorative interpretation of the term “soft” (e.g. weak, invalid). 
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returning to some of the theoretical issues discussed in the previous section and 
signalling some of the contributions this thesis makes to the literature.   
3.1. Alternative readings of the double movement  
The reading of the double movement which has been most widely applied or 
evoked in the Global South sees the process kick into gear when states embark 
on programmes of economic liberalisation (e.g. Robinson 1999; Stewart 2006; 
Silva 2009; Sandbrook 2011).
16
  The authors included within this group offer 
their own particular twists on the double movement but follow a broadly similar 
reading of the concept. The liberalisation of markets and the intensification of 
commodification cause widespread socioeconomic dislocation and 
environmental destruction. Countermovements emerge which attempt to (re) 
regulate markets, strengthen non-market forms of organisation, and bolster the 
state. Their basic aim is to temper and manage capitalism. Effective 
countermovements force states to break with economic liberalisation and 
introduce laws, policies and institutions that promote decommodification. 
Countermovements then dissipate only to re-emerge if states dismantle 
protective mechanisms and liberalise markets. Hence when the full cycle of the 
double movement is completed political economies pass through distinct stages 
of commodification and decommodification. One side of the double movement 
(commodification) follows the other (decommodification) in a successive 
pattern.   
Three very broad interrelated stages are discernible when the historical 
evolution of capitalism is viewed through this lens: commodification (c. 1830-
1930); decommodification (c. 1930-1980); and commodification (c. 1980-).
17
  
The first corresponds with the period of liberal capitalism that collapsed in the 
early 1930s. The second relates to the stage of state-directed capitalism that 
emerged in the wake of the breakdown of liberal capitalism. The third refers to 
the phase of neoliberal capitalism that began to develop in the late 1970s. 
Indicating that there is nothing predetermined about the outcome of the double 
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 This section engages with studies which investigate social, political and economic issues 
through a Polanyian – or Neo-Polanyian – lens (e.g. Silva 2009; Sandbrook 2011) as well as 
those which only make passing reference to Polanyi’s ideas and concepts (e.g. Almeida 2007; 
Acre 2010).  
17
 For a similar but alternative Polanyian historical classification see Burawoy (2010) pp. 307-12.  
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movement, the final phase remains open.
18
 The decommodification stage only 
comes into effect if social and political opposition to commodification is 
sufficiently powerful to force states to change the direction of economic policies. 
While some authors within this group see a new wave of decommodification 
emerging (e.g. Silva 2009), others are less sanguine (e.g. Fraser 2013).   
Taking up where Polanyi left off, Stewart, who examines broad changes in 
economic policies and socioeconomic conditions in developing countries 
through a Polanyian lens, captures the broad mix of policies introduced during 
the first wave of decommodification (c. 1930-1980).
19
  
“The state was given a major role in determining economic priorities 
via price and import controls, investment planning and sometimes as a 
producer, with the adoption of a strategy of import-substituting 
industrialisation. Formal sector labour markets were subject to 
regulations, including minimum wages…Thus developing countries 
virtually skipped Polanyi’s unregulated market phase, moving straight 
into a situation of extensive regulation and a large public sector, with 
markets, again, playing a subordinate role.” (2006 p. 6) 
Silva, who uses the double movement to investigate social and political 
responses to neoliberalism in Latin America, casts the “national populist” 
regimes that emerged in the region during this period in similar light. However, 
he sees them as reactions to “the original experiment with market society in the 
region during the long nineteenth century”, implying Latin America passed 
through an earlier phase of commodification. (2009 p. 19)  Silva acknowledges 
national populist states were limited in numerous areas but argues they were 
broadly successful in promoting decommodification.
20
 (2009 pp. 19-23) 
Focusing on Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, he contends the 
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 Polanyi’s epistemology is discussed in Section 4.  
19
 Stewart focuses on Polanyi’s notion of the “Great Transformation” which she equates with the 
countermovement. (2006 p. 22) She notes that Polanyi actually describes two transformations: 
the establishment of liberal capitalism in the 1800s and the break with the liberal capitalism in 
the 1930s.  Stewart describes this second transformation (i.e. the countermovement) as “the 
succession of changes that were provoked by the predominance of the market model.” (2006 p. 
2)  
20
 For non-Polanyian accounts of the political economies that emerged in Latin America during 
this period see Thorp (1998) and Bulmer-Thomas (2003). See Love (1994) for insight into the 
economic ideas that underpinned these regimes.  
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regimes “decommodified labor and land for urban and rural popular sectors and 
many middle-class social groups”. (2009 p. 41)  
Neoliberalism marked the end of this wave of decommodification and the 
start of new phase of commodification (c. 1980-). The first major step in this 
direction in Latin America came in the wake of the 1982 debt crisis when 
governments across the region introduced structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank.
21
 The programmes sought to reduce public debt, balance government 
budgets, alleviate balance-of-payments problems, reduce inflation, and create 
conditions conducive for the repayment of overseas debt to international 
institutions and investors.
22
 Viewing the impact of SAPs through a Polanyian 
lens, Udayagiri and Walton, who examine the cases of Mexico and India, claim 
the programmes contributed to the unravelling of the “moral economy” of the 
previous regimes. (2003 pp. 314-5)  Silva offers a more precise assessment, 
contending the introduction of SAPs constituted the “first step toward the 
recommodification of labor and land because they dismantled or weakened 
institutions and bargaining mechanisms that protected people, especially the 
popular sectors and the middle classes, from the market.” (2009 p. 24) That is, 
SAPs caused a rupture in the historical evolution of markets for fictitious 
commodities in Latin America. Neoliberal reforms, which overlapped with 
structural adjustment, then accelerated the move to the market. Silva sees the 
overall shift as analogous of the attempt to construct “market society” in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. (2009 pp. 16-19) He claims Latin 
American states “sought to build an entire new order that, as in market societies, 
subordinated politics and social welfare to the needs of an economy built on the 
logic of free-market economics.” (2009 p. 3) Robinson draws a similar 
conclusion, contending neoliberalism enabled the market to become the “sole 
organizing power in the economic and social sphere” in Latin America. (1999 p. 
43-4) Stewart sees a similar shift take place on a global scale.    
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  Chile was the clearest exception to this general trend. The country embarked on a widespread, 
though far from universal, programme of economic liberalization in the 1970s under the 
conservative dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.  See Cypher (2004) and Silva (2009) for insights 
into the historical trajectory of the country from a Polanyian perspective.  
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 The extent to which Latin American governments implemented SAPs varied significantly. See 
Thorp (1998) and Bulmer-Thomas (2003) for details on SAPs in Latin America and Conaghan & 
Malloy (1994) in the Andean region. See also Kaplan (2013). 
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“Interpreting and analysing these changes in Polanyist-terms, we can 
see that in developing countries, the changes might be best interpreted 
as being parallel to the move to the market in Europe in the nineteenth 
century…it was not so much, therefore, the reintroduction of a market 
for labour or land, or money, but the introduction of these markets in 
more-or-less pure form for the first time.” (2006 p. 8)  
The authors within this camp agree that neoliberalism created the conditions 
for the emergence of countermovements but offer different interpretations of 
their strength, character, and objectives.
23
 The defensive nature of the 
countermovements that emerged during this period is frequently, though not 
universally, highlighted. For example, extrapolating from the cases of Mexico 
and India, Udayagiri and Walton claim: 
“The case studies suggest a pattern in these global countermovements. 
Actors are confronted abruptly with threats to their well-being; typically 
economic threats (jobs, wages, subsidies, protections) but also 
environmental, political, and symbolic threats…The threatened value in 
each case is a former entitlement, typically a form of protection ensured 
by the state (e.g. food subsidies, labor legislation, environmental 
protection).” (2003 pp. 335-6)  
Countermovements are therefore characterised as defensive reactions to the 
breakdown of the political-economic regimes that preceded neoliberalism. 
Almeida, who uses the double movement to frame his analysis of popular 
protests in Latin America, offers a similar interpretation.
24
  He claims the 
transition to neoliberalism “creates a countermovement of social forces that 
mobilize to protect groups whose safety nets are threatened and contest the pace 
and logic of the transition process.” (2007 p. 127) Silva casts Latin American 
countermovements in similar light.
25
 He describes the waves of social and 
political mobilisations that engulfed Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
as “Polanyian defensive reactions to the imposition of market society or the 
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 Compare, for example, Robinson (1999), Stewart (2006) and Levien (2007).   
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 See Eckstein ([1989] 2001) for theoretical and empirical insights into the popular 
protests/social movements that occurred/developed in Latin America during the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s. See also Escobar & Alvarez (1992), Foweraker (1995), Potero & Zamosc (2005) and 
Foweraker (2005).  
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 On “Polanyi-like” defensive mobilisations in Latin America see also Acre (2010).   
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threat of doing so.” (2009 p. 18) Elaborating on the nature of these mobilisations 
in a later study, he explains: 
“The point…is not to defend the economic inefficiencies and political 
instability of the national populist period…Instead, it is to establish a 
benchmark of protections from the market (decommodification) created 
by national populist governments, for much mobilization against market 
liberalization was a defensive reaction to recommodification of those 
protected spaces.”26 (2012 p. 8) 
Silva claims the countermovements that emerged in these countries forced 
regimes to break with the neoliberal orthodoxy, increase the regulation of 
markets, and expand the role of the state. He sees a new phase of 
decommodification emerging in Latin America, echoing the earlier cycle he 
claims the region passed through after the collapse of liberal capitalism (the 
current conjuncture is discussed in the next section).  
The second reading of the double movement offers a different version of 
events (e.g. Bernard 1997; Lacher 1999; Polanyi-Levitt 2006b). This 
interpretation, which is implicit or explicit in the writings of the small group of 
authors who take a radical view of Polanyi, suggests capitalism evolves through 
a continuous and simultaneous process of commodification and 
decommodification, movement and countermovement. Capitalist societies 
perpetually reinvent themselves but without resolving the underlying 
contradiction between the two sides of the double movement. Viewing the 
concept as a contradiction stresses commodification and decommodification take 
place at the same time, emphasises basic continuities in capitalist development, 
and points toward long-term struggles over the role markets perform in societies. 
The reading therefore offers a different interpretation of the historical evolution 
of capitalism and provides an alternative lens through which to explore 
contemporary social, political and economic issues.  Polanyi-Levitt – the 
daughter of Karl Polanyi – captures the basic thrust of this take on the double 
movement. In effect, she extends the contradiction Polanyi saw in liberal 
capitalism to the variants of capitalism that followed in its wake. 
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“A longer historical perspective reveals that Polanyi’s ‘double 
movement’ is not a self-correcting mechanism to moderate excesses of 
market fundamentalism but an existential contradiction between the 
requirements of a capitalist market economy for unlimited expansion 
and the requirements of people to live in mutually supportive relations 
in society.” (2006b p. 385) 
Lacher adopts a similar position. He claims Polanyi’s thesis should be seen as “a 
social and cultural contradiction between the disembedded market and the 
conditions which make society, and social relations between human beings, 
possible.” (1999 p. 315) Restricting his argument to advanced capitalist 
economies, he argues the capitalist political economies that emerged after the 
breakdown of liberal capitalism failed to resolve the fundamental problems 
associated with fictitious commodification. (1999 pp. 323-6) Bernard, who 
approaches Polanyi from a political ecology perspective, makes this point 
forcefully, arguing that it was “precisely in the world order characterised by 
‘embedded liberalism’ in the advanced capitalist world that ecological 
disembedding increased exponentially in intensity and came to subsume literally 
all corners of the planet.”27 (1997 p. 87) These authors therefore question the 
degree of decommodification achieved during the state-directed cycle of 
capitalism (c. 1930-1980) and suggest some of the conflicts that emerged under 
neoliberalism (c. 1980-) were phases in longer-term struggles over the role 
markets perform within societies. Cast in this light some of the 
countermovements that emerged or evolved under neoliberalism can be seen as 
“offensive” (i.e. aimed at establishing laws, policies, and institutions that were 
never implemented) rather than “defensive” (i.e. aimed at protecting laws, 
policies, and institutions that were introduced during earlier stages of 
capitalism). I use this offensive/defensive framework to analyse indigenous 
mobilisations in Ecuador and consider the implications of these past struggles 
for contemporary developments in the country.  
Different policy implications flow out of the two readings of the double 
movement. From a radical perspective, Bernard demands “a reorganisation of 
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 Drawing loosely on Polanyi, Ruggie (1982) develops the “embedded liberalism” concept to 
analyse the political economies that emerged in the advanced capitalist world in the post-1945 
period.  
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work, a democratisation of state structures, and the socialisation of decision 
making about technology and the relationship between economic activity and 
local, regional and national ecological carrying capacities.”28 (1997 p. 87) The 
need to break decisively with existing forms of political, social and economic 
organisation is also advocated by Adaman et al. who claim “a system of 
participatory democratic planning, based on negotiated coordination, provides 
the most developed and promising framework for reinstituting economic activity 
and embedding the economy in society”. (2007 pp. 108-9) Lacher, meanwhile, 
argues the problems Polanyi identifies in relation to fictitious commodities 
demand nothing less than “some form of socialism in which land, labour and 
money are no longer thought of as commodities”. (1999 p. 325) From a less 
radical standpoint, Sandbrook also emphasises the importance of establishing 
laws, policies and institutions that promote the decommodification of fictitious 
commodities but argues less dramatic changes are required. Sensitive to the 
historical experiences and current realities of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, he frames his proposals as “dilemmas” rather than providing rigid 
solutions to varied and complex issues. (2011 pp. 417-8) He expresses a 
preference for social democracies over socialist solutions, arguing the former 
regime types "have shown themselves to be far more astute in handling the 
contradiction between market efficiency, on the one hand, and social equity, 
justice, and stability, on the other, than Polanyi foresaw.” (2011 p. 417) 
Sandbrook acknowledges, however, that the establishment and maintenance of 
social democratic regimes may be impossible in countries “with fragile states, 
mass poverty and societies driven by ethnic, religious or regional cleavages.” 
(2011 p. 433) Silva offers less concrete proposals but claims the principal 
movements that emerged in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela “sought 
to reform neoliberal capitalism, demanding a return to the mixed economy and a 
larger welfare role for the state, rather than replace it with an alternative 
‘socialist’ or other model”.29 (2009 p. 3, emphasis retained) Stewart points in a 
similar direction but is more forward looking, proposing a number of policies 
that have never been properly or partially implemented in developing countries 
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 He goes on to assert: “But none of this is possible without a shift in power relations and 
ideologies at the local and global levels.” (1997 p. 87) 
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 Silva discusses very broad policy alternatives in the conclusion of his book. (2009 pp. 266-84) 
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(e.g. universal welfare provision, universal minimum income guarantees). (2006 
p. 12) Viewed through the defensive/offensive framework elaborated above 
Stewart therefore casts effective countermovements in largely offensive rather 
than primarily defensive light.  
The discussion of the policies and regimes the literature see emerge out of the 
double movement provide a useful benchmark to consider recent political and 
economic changes in Latin America.  
3.2. The shift in Latin America’s social, political and economic landscape 
through a Polanyian lens 
Over the last fifteen years Latin American governments have clearly, if not 
universally, broken with the “extreme liberal policy stance” of the 1980s and 
1990s.
30
 (Taylor 2000 p. 26-7) The changes individual countries have 
experienced have varied enormously but three broad groups have emerged.  
The first group, which includes Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, has seen 
significant revisions to their political economies. New constitutions have revised 
political systems and granted new social, political, environmental, and economic 
rights; states have taken more active roles in regulating markets and directing 
economic change; free-trade agreements have been eschewed (especially with 
the United States); participation in new regional political and trade agreements 
and forums has been encouraged (e.g. ALBA); and, state redistribution, 
underpinned by revenues from non-renewable natural resource extraction, has 
performed prominent roles in public spending and social provisioning.  
The second camp, which includes countries like Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, 
has seen more modest breaks with neoliberalism. Working within existing 
constitutions, governments have expanded welfare programmes (e.g. cash 
transfer schemes), retained or expanded full or partial state control of strategic 
sectors (e.g. oil, mining), and promoted a somewhat larger role for the state in 
regulating markets and directing economic change.  
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 Taylor foresaw this policy shift. Echoing the first reading of the double movement presented 
above, he posits “the initial outcomes of liberalization suggest that a ‘double movement’ á la 
Polanyi, first towards and then away from an extreme liberal policy stance, could be forthcoming 
in the not-so-distant future.” (2000 pp. 26-7)  
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The third group, which includes countries like Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, 
has remained true to the central tenets of neoliberalism. No serious attempts 
have been made to extend the role of states in regulating markets and directing 
economic change; free-trade agreements with the United States, European 
Union, and other countries and custom unions have been retained or agreed; new 
regional political and trade agreements and forums have been eschewed; and, the 
expansion of state redistribution has been modest or non-existent.  
Viewing these developments through a Polanyian lens, Silva posits the 
changes that have taken place in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and 
Venezuela “suggest the dawning of a Polanyian countermovement to 
contemporary market society in Latin America.” (2009 p. 267) “This 
countermovement”, he continues, “reasserts the legitimacy of principles that 
decommodify labor and land and advocates a greater degree of state intervention 
to achieve those goals.” (2009 p. 267) What degree of decommodification has 
actually been achieved? While a full answer to this question is outside the 
boundaries of this investigation, a cursory glance at developments within the 
countries that have experienced the most substantive reforms (i.e. Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela) provides some indication.
31
   
Limiting the discussion to land, one of the most contentious aspects of the 
economic and political programmes that have emerged in these countries has 
been non-renewable natural resource extraction (e.g. oil, minerals).
32
 No serious 
attempt has been made to stop extraction. Indeed, states have generally moved in 
the opposite direction and accelerated the development of extractive industries. 
The principal changes have come in revisions to the ownership and regulation of 
the companies that operate within these sectors. In general, state-owned 
enterprises have taken on a larger role and governments have been able to obtain 
a greater share of revenues. The most innovative scheme to emerge within this 
sphere was the Yasuní/ITT environmental intiative.  Under the agreement, the 
Correa government pledged not to extract approximately 850 million barrels of 
oil located under the Yasuní National Park on the condition the international 
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 The following governments have overseen reforms in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela: 
Morales (2005 to date); Correa (2007 to date) and Chávez-Maduro (1998 to date). 
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 To recall, Polanyi’s fictitious commodity concept includes land, food, natural resources and 
the environment. This section touches on these various dimensions.  
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community provided substantial compensation for leaving the oil underground. 
In Polanyian terms, the scheme aimed to prevent the commodification of the 
national park, preserve the natural habitat, and protect the indigenous 
communities who live in the region. With the initiative failing to secure 
significant financial backing from overseas governments and international 
agencies, President Rafael Correa axed the programme in 2013. The government 
has announced the development of the oil fields will be undertaken by the 
national state-owned enterprise Petroamazonas.
33
  
Some efforts have been made to decommodify land through changes in 
agrarian policies and practices. However, progress has been mixed. The most 
significant changes have come in Bolivia where the Evo Morales government 
has developed a new agrarian reform programme and provided indigenous and 
peasant communities with greater control over natural resources (excluding non-
renewable resources which remain the preserve of the state).
34
 Land reform has 
also been undertaken in Venezuela. The regulation and redistribution of land has 
increased. However, little space has been created for social involvement in the 
reform and the programme has been only partially implemented.
35
 No serious 
attempt has been made to transform the agrarian structure in Ecuador. Although 
the Correa regime has promised to unleash a “Revolución Agraria”, it has failed 
to deliver on its pledge.
36
 The failure of the government to support indigenous 
and peasant calls for the introduction of a law to bring land under social as 
opposed to market control is one example of the lack of interest it has shown in 
substantive reforms. Some effort has been made to support small-scale farmers 
but the agricultural model remains overwhelmingly orientated towards export 
production and little progress has been made on enhancing food sovereignty.
37
 I 
assess the struggle over the land law and explain the contributions this thesis 
makes to current agrarian debates in Ecuador in the concluding chapter. 
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 See Pleno declaró de interés nacional la explotación petrolera responsable de los bloques 31 
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 On land reform in Bolivia under Evo Morales see Bottazzi & Rist (2012) and Fabricant 
(2012).  
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 See Delong (2005), Wilpert (2006), Page (2010) and Kappeler (2013) for analyses of land 
reform under Hugo Chávez.  
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 On food sovereignty in Ecuador see Clark (2013) and Peña (2013).  
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While the overall change in direction of economic policies in Latin America 
over the last fifteen years provides basic support for Polanyi’s thesis, 
developments in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela also presents some challenges 
to his framework and the way it has been applied. One area is the role the state. 
Silva sees the bolstering of the state as a central feature of the 
countermovements that he claims have emerged in these countries. (2009 p. 267) 
Yet the strengthening of the state has been problematic on numerous levels. The 
role states agencies and enterprises have performed in undertaking and 
promoting extractivism has been a source of tension, especially in Bolivia and 
Ecuador where the Morales and Correa governments have repeatedly clashed 
with environmental organisations and indigenous and peasant movements and 
communities.
38
 The bolstering of the state has caused conflicts linked to natural 
resources in other areas. The attempt of the Correa government to establish a 
new water regime in Ecuador is one example.  Indigenous and peasant 
organisations and movements launched a series of mobilisations against the 
proposal in 2009 and 2010, forcing the government to undertake a prelegislative 
consultation on the issue. While the possible privatisation of water was a fear for 
indigenous and peasant organisations and movements, the increased role the 
state was expected to perform in the regulation and redistribution of water was 
the more immediate concern as this threatened communal control of the 
resource. One of the central solutions to the market within Polanyi’s framework 
was therefore one of the principal problems for indigenous and peasant 
organisations. The issue is not that Polanyi does not recognise the importance of 
communities. Indeed, he is often criticised for reifying communal customs, 
practices and life. But the interface between the state and the community is not 
clear within the double movement. The water case illustrates increasing state 
control and protections can undermine as well as support communal customs and 
practices. I come back to these issues in the concluding chapter of the thesis.  
The conflict draws attention to the simplistic way in which  the relationship 
between the state and the countermovement is presented in the double movement 
and the need to scrutinise the mechanisms through which decommodification is 
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attempted or achieved. My analysis of the relationship between land reform and 
indigenous peoples casts further light on these issues. I show indigenous and 
peasant organisations and movements attempted to bring the use and distribution 
of land under social and communal control throughout the period under 
investigation.  The aim was not so much to bolster the state but to transform the 
relationship between the state and society. The issue remains central to the 
concerns of social movements in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
39
 The 
potential for social involvement in directing and regulating the economy has 
increased in some directions. For example, Ecuador’s 2008 constitution enables 
organised groups within society to submit legislative proposals directly to the 
legislature and demand plebiscites on particular issues (e.g. Yasuní/ITT).  
However, the strengthening of the state has also restricted spaces for social 
participation in other areas. Viewing changes in Venezuela through a Polanyian 
lens Sandbrook claims the Chávez regime has exhibited “a continuing top-down 
orientation with evident authoritarian tendencies”. (2011 p. 428)  The Correa 
government has also demonstrated authoritarian traits, overseeing the 
criminalisation of social protest and restricting the spaces for social movements 
to operate.
40
 The active role the state performed in preventing a referendum on 
Yasuní/ITT also demonstrates the limitations of the mechanisms the 2008 
constitution established for social participation in regulating and directing 
economic change.
41
 Recent events in Ecuador show that democratic states can 
react positively as well as negatively to social mobilisation over 
commodification. The simple relationship Polanyi posits between the 
countermovement and the state does not capture the complexity of state-society 
relations in contemporary capitalist societies. I return to these points later in this 
thesis.  
If nothing else, recent events in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela illustrate the 
difficulties regimes have faced in attempting to accommodate the demands of 
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the various and diverse social and political movements that have challenged the 
direction of economic change during earlier phases of capitalist development. 
This calls into question Silva’s assertion that the demands of the principal 
movements that emerged in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela were 
limited to the reform of neoliberalism and the (re) establishment of state-directed 
capitalist economies. While measures introduced over the last decade have been 
broadly successful in discouraging the (re) formation of broad-based 
countermovements, struggles over commodification have continued.
42
  Echoing 
radical readings of Polanyi, the interpretation of the double movement I adopt 
within this thesis suggests that this will remain the case until more fundamental 
changes are made to tackle problems associated with the incorporation of 
fictitious commodities into markets. 
4. Methodology  
The discussion in the previous section indicates the double movement has been 
generally evoked or applied at the global (e.g. Stewart), regional (e.g. Almeida), 
and multi-country (e.g. Silva) levels to explore changes across entire economies, 
societies and regions.
43
 Moreover, the vast majority of the existing literature has 
followed the first reading of the concept, which sees contemporary double 
movements start when states introduce structural adjustment policies and 
neoliberal reforms. Hence there is a gap in the literature for a study that narrows 
the lens of the double movement to explore a specific economic issue within a 
single country while following a radical reading of the concept. This thesis aims 
to fill that gap by investigating the evolution of land reform, land markets, and 
indigenous mobilisation in Highland Ecuador between 1964 and 1994. The value 
of extending the time period and narrowing the topic is that it allows for the 
analysis of the long-term evolution of land reform and land markets and the 
detailed investigation of a particular economic issue and specific social group.  
The approach allows for close attention to be paid to the design and application 
of laws and policies, continuities and discontinuities between different phases of 
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capitalism, the impacts of economic changes on specific social groups, and the 
role particular actors perform in supporting and challenging commodification.  
Taking a radical reading of Polanyi, I argue the double movement operated 
throughout the period under investigation. The laws and policies introduced in 
Ecuador in the decades prior to neoliberalism failed to resolve the issues at the 
heart of the double movement and the countermovement that emerged around 
land reform, land markets, and indigenous peoples was largely offensive (i.e. 
attempting to transform the existing framework) rather than primarily defensive 
(i.e. attempting to protect the existing framework).  
 The remainder of this section explains the methodological approach I have 
adopted to undertake the research and produce the thesis. The initial sections 
explain the origins of the thesis, the limits of the case, and the role of Polanyi’s 
concepts within the project. The later sections outline the principal source 
materials I have used and the steps I have taken to elaborate and analyse the 
data.  
4.1. Evolution of argument, case selection and research question 
The original idea for this thesis came in 2005 when I first read Karl Polanyi’s 
The Great Transformation. I was in Ecuador as the Lucio Gutierrez government 
began to unravel. Protests, demonstrations, and street battles were the backdrop 
of everyday life. Discontent with the president and the government was palpable. 
Taxi drivers, shopkeepers, teachers, and students told me the president had 
reneged on his promise to follow a different economic path and instead 
continued with the neoliberal policies of discredited past regimes. The Great 
Transformation, as Joseph Stiglitz notes in the foreword to the 2001 edition of 
the book, appeared to speak directly to current issues and events. The idea that 
social and political struggles would emerge around the creation, expansion, and 
liberalisation of markets seemed particularly apposite. The decision of Lucio 
Gutierrez to turn to the IMF – the global cheerleader of free-market economics – 
was one of the principal factors behind the widespread discontent with his 
regime.  I appeared to be witnessing another phase in protests against 
neoliberalism. The victory of Rafael Correa at the 2006 presidential elections 
seemed to reinforce this interpretation of events. The president pledged to end 
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Ecuador’s “long dark night of neoliberalism”. The tide appeared to be turning. 
The double movement seemed like the perfect framework to explore Ecuador’s 
predicament.  
On returning to England, I searched for studies that had drawn on Polanyi’s 
ideas and concepts to explore issues in developing countries and discovered that 
I was not alone in noting the contemporary relevance of his ideas and concepts. 
Yet there was a gap in the literature for a thorough investigation of the double 
movement at the country level. I decided to fill that gap by using Ecuador as a 
case study to explore Polanyi’s thesis. My original aim was to contribute to the 
emerging double movement debate and examine problems associated with the 
introduction of structural adjustment and neoliberal policies. My initial 
hypothesis therefore coincided with the bulk of the literature that uses or evokes 
the double movement in developing countries i.e. I saw the double movement 
emerge in Ecuador as structural adjustment and neoliberalism advanced.  
I began to question this position, however, as I delved deeper into Polanyi’s 
work, the Polanyian literature, and Ecuador’s social, political, and economic 
history. Insights from authors who espouse a radical reading of Polanyi 
contributed to this shift (e.g. Bernard 1997; Lacher 1999). Their claim that the 
capitalist states which emerged under embedded liberalism did little to resolve 
problems associated with the commodification of land and labour seemed to 
extend to Ecuador. The insight prompted me to examine the historical 
development of land and labour markets in Ecuador in greater depth. Economic, 
historical, and anthropological sources pointed towards the acceleration of land 
and labour commodification in the 1960s as the traditional hacienda complex 
unravelled and the capitalist modernisation of agriculture accelerated.  The 
change was most dramatic in the highland region where traditional haciendas 
continued to dominate the social, political, and economic landscape in the 1960s. 
The impact of the transformation of the agrarian structure was particularly great 
on indigenous families and communities as they were widely, if not universally, 
enmeshed within the traditional hacienda complex. The investigation of the 
relationship between land and labour commodification and highland indigenous 
peoples appeared to provide fertile ground to explore whether the roots of the 
double movement I initially believed had started in the 1980s extended further 
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back into Ecuador’s social, political, and economic history. Focusing on 
indigenous peoples was particularly appealing as indigenous movements 
performed a pivotal role in the protests that swept across Ecuador from the 
1980s onwards. Through a closer reading of Polanyi’s thesis and Ecuador’s 
history, the central research question became: was it possible that some of the 
double movements witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s were phases in longer-term 
struggles linked to the role markets perform within societies?  
Moving the starting point of the investigation back to the 1960s demanded 
narrowing the focus of the empirical investigation to answer this question. My 
decision to focus on land reform, land markets, and indigenous mobilisation was 
based on three basic factors. First, issues related to the use, control, and 
distribution of land are central to indigenous peoples and movements. I decided 
to focus on these issues rather than the other dimensions of land 
commodification (e.g. food, agriculture) because of the primordial importance of 
land to agricultural production and indigenous livelihoods. Second, land reform, 
land markets, and agrarian issues are underanalysed in the existing double 
movement literature.
44
 Three, issues related to land are central to academic and 
political debates about development in Ecuador, Latin America and elsewhere in 
the Global South. The time period of the investigation – 1964 to 1994 – was 
selected to enable the investigation of the entire period of agrarian reform and 
the transition to neoliberalism in historical perspective. While the research is 
situated within Ecuador’s past, the thesis is orientated towards improving our 
understanding of the country’s present and future.  
4.2. Peculiarities of the case and limits of the claims and contributions of 
the thesis 
The previous section indicated Ecuador became the setting for this investigation 
through a personal journey rather than a careful consideration of possible cases. 
The country was not selected as a “typical” or “extreme” case to explore the 
double movement. (Blaikie 2000 pp. 222-3) However, the peculiarities of the 
case must be taken into account when considering the claims and contributions 
made within this thesis. With this in mind, this section very briefly outlines the 
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trajectory of Ecuador’s political economy in the twentieth century, highlighting 
some of the principal similarities and differences with other Latin American 
countries, with emphasis given to dimensions related to the topic under 
investigation. The objective of the section is strictly methodological. No attempt 
is made to provide a detailed or comparative historical analysis of Ecuador’s 
political economy.
 45
  
One basic characteristic Ecuador shares with other Latin American countries 
is the centrality of primary export production to its political economy.
46
 The 
country has been heavily reliant on the export of primary goods for economic 
growth, government revenues, and foreign exchange since the nineteenth 
century. The primary export model has important implications for the use and 
distribution of land as well as for economic performance, political stability and 
human development. Following the general trend in Latin America, Ecuador 
experimented with import substituting industrialisation (ISI) in the 1960s and 
1970s but, contrary to the experience in Brazil and the Southern Cone, the 
model, which was only very loosely implemented, failed to break the country’s 
reliance on primary exports. The introduction of neoliberal reforms embedded 
and extended primary export production, as was the case elsewhere in the 
region.   
The path Ecuador followed to neoliberalism resembled the route taken by 
other Latin American nations. SAPs, which were introduced in the aftermath of 
the 1982 debt crisis, provided the foundation for neoliberal reforms, which were 
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s.  However, the pace and extent of 
neoliberal restructuring was less pronounced than in some other cases (e.g. 
Bolivia). Moreover, the limited progress Ecuador made in terms of 
socioeconomic development in the 1960s and 1970s ensured the country 
experienced a less dramatic rupture in the 1980s and 1990s than some other 
Latin American countries (e.g. Mexico).  
The waves of popular protest that swept across Ecuador in the 1980s and 
1990s were among the largest in Latin America. One element which 
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distinguished Ecuador from most other Latin American countries was the 
prominent role indigenous movements performed in the protests.
47
  On the most 
basic of levels this reflected a) the relative size of the indigenous population; b) 
the strength of ethnic identity; and, c) the capacity of indigenous organisations 
and movements. These factors supported indigenous efforts to mobilise against 
the state from the 1960s onwards.   
Like in most other Latin American countries, land reform performed a 
prominent role in Ecuador’s social, political and economic history.48 Broadly 
speaking, the reform was at the lower end of the spectrum in terms of the 
amount of land redistributed and the number of households involved. The 
relative weakness of the reform suggests it decommodified land to a lesser 
extent than the reforms implemented in some other Latin American countries. 
While a detailed comparative analysis would be required to draw firm 
conclusions, this suggests it is easier to detect long-term struggles linked to land 
markets in Ecuador than it is in countries that experienced comprehensive 
reforms.  
The peculiarities of the historical trajectory of Ecuador’s political economy 
have important implications for the theoretical contributions and claims made 
within this thesis. The extent to which it is possible to theorize from single case 
studies has been long-debated in the social sciences. (Blaikie 2000 pp. 213-25) 
Some authors propose the use of “extreme” or “deviant” cases to evaluate or 
modify concepts and theories. Others posit the use of “typical” cases, claiming if 
cases exhibit a number of common characteristics the likelihood of similar 
processes and outcomes materialising in other settings is greater. However, 
gauging the extent to which cases are typical or extreme is highly problematic, 
especially when investigating meso or macro events. Social scientists do not 
work in “laboratory-like conditions” and cases “vary on many dimensions of 
relevance”. (Dobbin 2005 pp. 28-9) The position I adopt is that the case at the 
heart of this thesis is “appropriate” rather than typical or extreme. (Blaikie 2000 
p. 222) While following this approach allows the thesis to make theoretical 
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claims, the peculiarities of the case set clear limits on the scope and strength of 
these assertions. The limitations of the source materials, which I will explain 
below, should also be taken into account.  
4.3. The role of Polanyi’s concepts within the research and thesis 
Polanyi does not propose the double movement as a universal law that rigidly 
applies to capitalist societies across time and space. He believed, as Dale 
explains, “the quest for a formal, rule-governed economic theory was a futile 
enterprise, that the economy is determined not by given and unchanging natural 
laws but by social norms and conventions that are malleable over time”.49 (2010 
p. 14)  The reading of the concept I adopt in this thesis suggests double 
movements are basic contradictions in modern capitalist societies but are 
contextually and historically contingent. Social, political, and economic 
conditions influence actors and processes and outcomes are multiple and 
mutable. (Neale 1994 p. 165)  
The specific roles Polanyi’s concepts perform in the investigation are 
fourfold. First, I use the double movement concept to examine the 
commodification and decommodification dimensions of land reform legislation 
introduced in Ecuador between 1964 and 1994. The wider analysis focuses on 
the social and political struggles that emerged around these two dimensions. I 
also examine the indigenous-peasant legislative proposals tabled in 1973 and 
1993 through a Polanyian lens. Second, I draw on the forms of integration 
concept to examine the changes in the mechanisms used to distribute land in the 
highland region. The analysis concentrates on market and redistributive 
mechanisms which simultaneously expanded under land reform. Third, I use the 
countermovement concept to analyse indigenous struggles over the use, control 
and distribution of land. The activities of the countermovement are split into 
three interconnected groups: i) attempts to transform land reform legislation; ii) 
efforts to enforce existing land reform legislation; and iii) attempts to force 
landowners to sell land to indigenous families and communities. Fourth, I draw 
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on the double movement and fictitious commodity concepts to construct a new 
conceptual framework to analyse the relationship between indigenous peoples 
and land markets. I call the concept the activation/development framework. In 
addition, I use the defensive/offensive framework I elaborated through the 
review of the Polanyian literature to analyse indigenous mobilisations and 
demands.  
4.4. Primary and secondary source materials: collation, elaboration and 
analysis 
I draw on a wide range of primary and secondary source materials published in 
English and Spanish as well as seventeen interviews I conducted during two 
fieldwork trips to Ecuador (the source materials are summarised in Table 1.1 
below).
50
 This section explains the source materials; the roles these materials 
performed within the thesis; the problems I encountered undertaking the 
research; and the steps I took to overcome or mitigate these problems.  
4.4.1. Land reform data, archives and reports 
Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC) data sourced 
from Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Agrario (INDA) in Quito are utilised to 
analyse land redistribution in the highland region of Ecuador. The raw data were 
supplied in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. The figures, which cover the period 
1964-1994, include the amount of land redistributed and the number of 
recipients. The data are reported at the provincial, regional, and national levels. 
IERAC-INDA divide the aggregate data into five categories: 1) privately owned 
land (land transferred to IERAC via reversion, negotiation, and expropriation 
and redistributed to beneficiaries (peasant families, communities, cooperatives 
etc.); 2) state owned land (Asistencia Social land transferred to IERAC and 
redistributed to beneficiaries (peasant families, communities, cooperatives etc.); 
3) liquidation of huasipungo (land redistributed to peasants who worked under 
the outlawed semi-feudal practice of huasipungo); 4) liquidation of precarious 
forms of employment (land redistributed to peasants who worked under 
proscribed “forms of precarious employment”); and, 5) liquidation of arrimado 
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lojano (land redistributed to peasants  who worked under the outlawed semi-
feudal practice of arrimado lojano).  
In the first instance, I took two steps to transform the raw data. First, I used 
the amount of land and the number of beneficiaries to calculate the average 
amount of land redistributed per recipient. Second, I calculated the amount of 
land, the number of beneficiaries, and the average amount of land per recipient 
for three periods: i) 1964-1979; ii) 1980-1994; and iii) 1964-1994. Dividing the 
data into different time periods enabled me to examine the reach and 
composition of land redistribution during the different phases of capitalist 
development under investigation as well as during the entire period of land 
reform.  The dataset also includes details of land transferred via colonisation at 
the provincial, regional and national levels. I used these figures to gauge the 
impact of colonisation on the land distribution reported in the 1974 and 2000 
agricultural censuses. Having access to these data also enabled me to evaluate 
the claims politicians made about land reform during the 1990 levantamiento 
(land reform and colonisation were conflated to exaggerate land redistribution).  
The main limitations of the IERAC-INDA data in relation to this thesis are 
threefold. First, the ethnicity of the recipients of land is not disclosed. Second, 
the type and quality of redistributed land are not revealed. Third, the relative 
scale of redistribution at the provincial and regional levels is not indicated. I 
mitigated these problems by taking the following steps. To gauge the amount of 
land redistributed to indigenous peoples, I cross-referenced indigenous 
demographic and land redistribution data. Estimates of the size of the indigenous 
population in each of the highland provinces were sourced from Zamosc (1995). 
The analysis provided an approximation of the links between indigenous peoples 
and land redistribution at the provincial level. To obtain some indication of the 
type and quality of land redistributed, I consulted a wide range of secondary 
sources and unpublished official documents (these sources also provided insight 
into the ethnicity of beneficiaries in some cases). I also cross-referenced the 
amount of land redistributed and the prevalence of páramo (high altitude 
grassland) within each highland province. Examining these two variables was 
valuable because of the amount of páramo distributed through land reform and 
the strong links between indigenous peoples and the high-altitude grassland. To 
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gauge the relative impact of land redistribution, I combined land redistribution 
and agricultural census data. This provided an indication of the proportion of the 
agriculture land surface redistributed at the provincial and regional levels.  
Over and above these limitations the IERAC-INDA data are likely to include 
numerous errors as a result of inputting mistakes, deliberate misreporting etc. 
The analysis presented in this thesis therefore provides a rough approximation 
rather than a precise measurement of land redistribution.  
To gain insight into the application of land reform at the local level, I 
reviewed reports, letters, and documents related to the division and redistribution 
of Hacienda Pesillo, a state-owned estate located in the northern highland 
canton of Cayambe. I accessed the information at the IERAC archive at the 
MAG head office in Quito. I selected this particular case as I was able to connect 
the archive materials with anthropological and historical studies related to the 
division of the hacienda (e.g. Crespi 1971) and published and unpublished 
materials related to land redistribution in Cayambe (e.g. MAG 1977c; Martínez 
1995). The workforce of the hacienda was also primarily indigenous which 
made it particularly relevant to this investigation. I had planned to examine the 
archives of two other haciendas located in different highland zones. However, 
the entire IERAC archive was being rehoused and renovated while I was 
undertaking fieldwork and access to materials was very limited.
51
  
I mitigated the impact of not being able to gain full access to the archive by 
sourcing a number of published and unpublished reports on land reform at the 
INDA and MAG head offices in Quito.  These materials, which were produced 
by the IERAC and MAG, include official figures related to the division of 
specific haciendas (e.g. hectares of land redistributed, number of recipients, 
price of land) as well as aggregate data on land redistribution in different regions 
(e.g. cantons, provinces).  The reports also include detailed qualitative analysis 
of the division of a small number of haciendas in the provinces of Chimborazo 
and Pichincha. 
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4.4.2. Legislation and legislative proposals 
I examine the principal pieces of land reform legislation issued between 1964 
and 1994. These include large and complex laws that established the overriding 
legal and institutional framework for agrarian reform as well as smaller pieces of 
legislation that modified or extended existing laws. I used three main sources to 
identify reforms to existing laws. First, the librarians at the National Assembly 
in Quito provided me with lists of reforms to agrarian legislation from the 1960s 
onwards. Second, I consulted numerous historical editions of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) publication Land Reform which lists reforms 
introduced in specific countries in particular years. Third, I consulted printed 
press coverage of legislative changes and secondary literature on agrarian 
reform. In addition to legislation passed into law, I also analysed land reform 
proposals tabled by indigenous and peasant movements, including the Frente 
Unido de Reforma Agraria (FURA) in 1973, Coordinadora Agraria Nacional 
(CAN) in 1993 and the Red Agraria Nacional (RAN) in 2012. The laws I 
consulted were sourced from the Registro Oficial archives at the National 
Assembly in Quito. The CAN and RAN legislative proposals were also sourced 
from the National Assembly. The FURA proposal was taken from Barsky 
(1988). 
The main advantages of examining the content and evolution of agrarian 
legislation are threefold. First, the laws provide a detailed picture of the legal 
and institutional frameworks established to regulate and direct land reform. 
Second, the legislation provides a window into the state’s position towards 
agrarian reform. Third, focusing on legislation allows for the precise comparison 
of the proposals tabled by indigenous-peasant movements and the laws 
introduced by governments. This enabled me to gauge the extent to which the 
demands of the indigenous countermovement were translated into law.  
There are pitfalls, however, with focusing on the legislative dimension of land 
reform. Legislation, though vital for understanding the evolution of land reform, 
only provides one part of a bigger story. I gained insight into the wider land 
reform programme by analysing numerous documents and reports published by 
IERAC and MAG as well as consulting a wide range of secondary literature. 
Furthermore, laws have to be enforced to become effective.  The temptation is to 
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“read-off” actual changes from legal changes or assume once laws are passed 
they are enforced. I avoided this problem by paying very close attention to the 
implementation of land reform, particularly the redistributive component. 
In addition to land reform legislation, I reviewed the 1968, 1979, 1998, and 
2008 constitutions, paying particular attention to declarations on agrarian issues 
and indigenous peoples. I also consulted laws related to agricultural 
cooperatives, peasant communities, water, and labour, including the Ley de 
Cooperativas (1966), Ley de Comunas (1937), Ley de Aguas (1972), and the 
Código del Trabajo (1961). These materials supported my analysis of land 
reform, indigenous organisation, and the wider political economy. These laws 
were also sourced from the Registro Oficial archive at the National Assembly in 
Quito.   
4.4.3. Agricultural censuses 
I utilised the 1954, 1974 and 2000 national agricultural censuses to analyse the 
evolution of the agrarian structure of the highland region, focusing on land 
distribution, tenure, and use.
52
 I sourced the data from the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Censos (INEC) in Quito. The 1954 and 1974 censuses were 
supplied in printed format. The 2000 census data were provided in Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheets. I gained insight into the methodology and content of the 
censuses by interviewing INEC employees who were responsible for compiling 
and reporting official agricultural data. I also secured from INEC unpublished 
notes on the 2000 agricultural census which provided valuable insight into the 
classification of land formally distributed via agrarian reform and colonisation. 
The level of detail varies between censuses but each survey reports figures for 
most categories at the provincial, regional, and national levels.
53
 I digitised the 
censuses then analysed the data through descriptive statistics. I also cross-
referenced agricultural census and indigenous demographic data to estimate the 
positions indigenous peoples occupied within the land distribution.   
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 In addition to agricultural census data, I also used population censuses to 
analyse the evolution of the economically active population. The information 
was also sourced from INEC in Quito.
54
   
Censuses incorporate a vast array of information. Their focus is often whole 
sectors of economies or entire populations. The data provide researchers with the 
opportunity to investigate a wide range of social and economic phenomena at the 
meso and macro levels. The range of the data makes them particularly useful for 
a study of this type which aims to identify and explain broad social and 
economic patterns. Yet censuses only provide fleeting and partial glimpses of 
complex and evolving pictures. The census data I have utilised do not fully 
reflect Ecuador’s social and economic reality. This is especially true of the 
agricultural data.
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 I was advised during the interview I conducted with INEC 
employees that landowners frequently tried to misreport facts during the 2000 
census (e.g. the size of landholdings). (Interview 13) Similar incidents 
undoubtedly took place during earlier surveys when landowning elites exerted 
considerable influence over public officials. The geographic categories used 
within the censuses are also problematic. Broadly, the censuses follow the 
administrative division of Ecuador.
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 During the period under investigation the 
highland region comprised ten provinces but these provinces included land 
located in the sierra as well as in subtropical zones situated at lower elevations 
on the western and eastern slopes of the Andes. The administrative highland 
region does not therefore correspond with the geographic highland region.  I 
make every effort to highlight the impact of the inclusion of land located outside 
of the sierra on the analysis. However, the census data do not allow for precise 
estimates. Differences in coverage and methodology also present challenges. 
Technological advancements and methodological differences between the 
censuses reduced the comparability of the data.
57
  Two countervailing trends 
further complicated matters. On the one hand, the colonisation of the subtropical 
lowland regions of highland provinces expanded the agricultural frontier. On the 
other, the amount of land removed from the agriculture sector and converted into 
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urban land increased as towns and cities expanded and the commodity view of 
land spread. In short, the agricultural frontier simultanously expanded and 
contracted between 1950s and the 2000s. Wherever possible I highlight the 
impact of these changes on the data and analysis.  
Table 1.1 – Summary of principal source materials 
Type Brief description Primary use 
IERAC-INDA 
data 
Official land reform data 
reported at the provincial, 
regional and national levels. 
Estimate the location, extent, and 
timing of land redistribution in the 
highland region.  
IERAC and MAG 
reports 
Official details and reports on 
the application of land reform 
at the local and regional 
levels. 
Deepen analysis of agrarian reform 
and the links between land 
redistribution and indigenous 
peoples. 
Agrarian reform 
archive 
Official documentation on the 
division of Hacienda Pesillo. 
Strengthen investigation of the 
division and redistribution of state-
owned haciendas and indigenous 
involvement in land reform.  
Agrarian  
legislation 
Principal agrarian reform and 
development laws and reforms 
introduced between 1964 and 
1994. 
Investigate the evolution of the legal 
framework of agrarian reform and the 
wider reform programme.   
Agrarian 
legislative 
proposals 
Legislative proposals tabled 
by indigenous and peasant 
movements in 1973, 1993 and 
2012. 
Examine indigenous and peasant 
visions of land reform and the extent 
to which agrarian legislation reflected 
indigenous and peasant demands.  
Agricultural 
censuses 
Official agricultural data from 
1954, 1974 and 2000 reported 
at various levels.  
Analysis of the evolution of land 
tenure and land distribution in the 
highland region.  
Newspaper 
archives 
Printed news coverage of land 
reform and indigenous and 
peasant mobilisation.  
Examination of the political struggles 
that emerged around agrarian reform 
and indigenous and peasant 
mobilisations and demands.  
Interviews Interviews with indigenous 
and peasant organisations, 
indigenous communities, 
NGOs and state agencies.  
Detailed and background information 
on land reform, land markets and 
indigenous organisation, mobilisation 
and development. 
Socioeconomic 
data 
Economic growth, inflation, 
and labour market indicators.  
Report broad socioeconomic trends.  
Secondary 
literature 
Economic, historical, political 
and anthropological studies.  
Support empirical analysis of land 
reform, land markets and indigenous 
mobilisation and enable the 
construction of the 
activation/development concept.  
Karl Polanyi 
archive 
Lecture notes, unpublished 
notes, letters and book plans 
written by Polanyi and 
materials related to his work.  
Insight into Karl Polanyi’s method, 
theory and intellectual mission.  
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4.4.4. Newspaper archives 
The investigation draws on printed press coverage of land reform and indigenous 
mobilisation between 1960 and 1994. To facilitate the analysis I focused on 
three timeframes: i) 1960-64; ii) 1970-74 and iii) 1990-94. I selected these 
periods so I could follow the conflicts and debates that emerged around the 
introduction of agrarian laws in 1964, 1973 and 1994. Important indigenous 
mobilisations also took place during each of these periods. Reviewing press 
coverage of the mobilisations enabled me to gain insight into grievances and 
demands of indigenous peoples as well the tactics indigenous and peasant 
movements used to influence agrarian debates.  
I consulted the archives of four Ecuadorian newspapers: El Comercio, Hoy, 
El Mercurio and El Espectador. El Comercio, Hoy and El Espectador were 
reviewed at municipal libraries in Quito and Riobamba while El Mercurio was 
consulted at the head office of the newspaper in Cuenca.  
The publications perform different roles in the research. El Comercio, one of 
Ecuador’s leading daily newspapers, features most prominently. I selected the 
newspaper because of the important role it performed in influencing public 
opinion and political debates during the period under investigation. I consulted 
various editions of the publication, focusing on the three periods outlined above. 
Hoy, which entered into circulation in the 1980s, was used to provide additional 
information on the 1990 and 1994 indigenous levantamientos and the agrarian 
debate that took place during that period. The paper provided a different 
perspective on these events and issues than El Comercio. Whereas El Comercio 
was overtly biased towards landowning elites, Hoy was more balanced in 
coverage and opinion. El Mercurio and El Espectador perform less prominent 
roles. El Mercurio was used to provide information on the 1960-64 agrarian 
reform debate. I selected the publication as it focused on news and debates in the 
southern and central highland region. Furthermore, the newspaper is not widely 
used in the existing literature so I was also able to gain fresh insight into the 
agrarian debate. El Espectador was used to secure information on land reform 
and indigenous mobilisation in the central highland province of Chimborazo, the 
geographic focus of the newspaper. Due to gaps in the archive and time 
pressures I was only able to review a relatively small number of editions of the 
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paper in the 1970s. In addition to the printed press archives, I also consulted the 
online editions of El Comercio, El Telégrafo, El Universo, Hoy, and La Hora. 
The information I derived from these sources was used to analyse contemporary 
developments in Ecuador, focusing on agrarian debates and conflicts.  
One of the principal problems with using press reports to analyse social, 
political and economic issues is the bias of the coverage and the distortion of 
details and facts. The issue is particularly problematic in Latin America as the 
mainstream private press is often closely associated with elites.
58
  Wherever 
possible I corroborated incidents and events with other sources and contrasted 
the coverage of one newspaper with another to obtain a more balanced 
interpretation of events. Yet the bias towards elites remained and the extent to 
which the newspaper coverage I consulted reflected the demands and concerns 
of indigenous peoples was limited, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. 
In terms of referencing, the name and date of the publication and the page 
number of the article are provided for information sourced from printed press 
archives. The name and date of the publication and full title of the article are 
provided for information secured from online editions.  
4.4.5. Interviews and discussions 
I conducted seventeen interviews with four main groups of actors: 1) indigenous 
and peasant organisations; 2) indigenous communities; 3) non-governmental 
organisations, 4) and state agencies.
59
 The basic aim of this aspect of the 
research was to augment the information I was able to derive from primary and 
secondary source materials and identify areas that warranted additional 
investigation. The roles the interviews perform within the thesis vary. In some 
cases they provide crucial primary information (e.g. interviews conducted with 
FEPP and INEC). In others they provide useful background material (e.g. 
interviews with MAG and Heifer). 
The first group includes representatives of local, provincial and national 
indigenous and peasant organisations. I conducted six interviews within this 
group. I had planned to interview representatives of organisations in the 
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highland provinces of Azuay, Cañar, Cotopaxi, Chimborazo, Imbabura, and 
Pichincha as well as leaders of the principal highland and national indigenous 
movements. However, I was only able to secure interviews with representatives 
of organisations in Pichincha, Chimborazo, and Loja and one of the principal 
national indigenous-peasant movements, the Confederación Nacional de 
Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas and Negras (FENOCIN). Despite 
numerous visits, letters, and phone calls over a two-month period (November-
December 2011), I was unable to arrange interviews with representatives of the 
principal highland indigenous movement, Ecuarunari, or the national indigenous 
movement, Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
(CONAIE). Upon reflection, I underestimated the importance of developing trust 
and building relationships with indigenous leaders and organisations prior to 
seeking interviews. My task was complicated by the tense relationship that 
existed between indigenous organisations and the Correa government and the 
internal problems indigenous movements faced when I was undertaking 
fieldwork. These factors are likely to have made indigenous leaders more wary 
of giving interviews to academic researchers.  
Despite the small number of interviews I conducted within this group, I still 
extracted some valuable information. On a general level, I was able to gain 
insight into the historical evolution, organisational structure, functions and 
objectives of local-level indigenous organisations. The interviews I conducted in 
the northern highland canton of Cayambe provided important information on the 
role indigenous organisations have performed in the regulation of high-altitude 
grassland (páramo) and the problems the expansion of flower exporters have 
posed for indigenous peoples. I was also able to secure important information 
from the interview I conducted with the president of the powerful local-level 
water committee, CODEMIA. The interview provided insight into indigenous 
and peasant concerns over the changes the Correa government proposed to the 
water regime and the role water committees performed in mobilising against the 
initiative. These insights also helped me to identify tensions in Polanyi’s 
framework between state and communal control and between the state and the 
countermovement. The CODEMIA interview also illustrated the need to take 
careful consideration of the composition and operation of decommodification 
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mechanisms which supported the findings of my analysis of land reform and 
land markets.   
The second group comprises two indigenous communities in the canton of 
Guamote, Chimborazo. I targeted communities in this zone because of the 
intensity of the struggle over land and the prevalence of indigenous peoples. The 
contacts I made with a local NGO (Inti Sisa) facilitated my work with the 
communities. The interviews comprised visits to the communities and 
discussions with various community members. The visits and interviews took 
place over a single day. The primary aim was to learn about the relationship 
between indigenous peoples and land reform and land markets at the local level. 
I had attempted to arrange group meetings with both communities but only the 
first interview followed this form. The discussion was conducted in Spanish and 
Kichwa with around 30 members of the community.
60
 I was accompanied by a 
bilingual (Spanish-Kichwa) representative of the NGO who translated and 
facilitated the dialogue. I lost a degree of control by using a translator. I 
mitigated this problem by clearly explaining the nature of my research and the 
purpose of the interview in advance of the meeting. Over and above translating 
from Spanish to Kichwa, the translator performed a vital role in the interview, 
teasing-out additional information from participants and encouraging community 
members to contribute to the discussion. The interview provided fascinating 
insight into land reform, land markets, and indigenous mobilisation in the 
region. I glimpsed, for example, how land reform and indigenous mobilisation 
combined to prise open land markets in the zone in the early 1970s and gained 
some understanding of the opportunities that emerged for indigenous peoples to 
secure land. I then compared this information with the findings of other studies 
to see whether similar patterns appeared elsewhere in the region. Through this 
process I developed the activation/development concept to examine the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and land markets.  The interview 
therefore performed a crucial role in the construction of the concept. The second 
interview I conducted performs a less prominent role in the thesis. It took the 
form of individual informal discussions with members of a nearby community 
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and only provided background information on indigenous access to land and 
indigenous development in the region. 
The third group includes NGOs in different regions of the highlands. I 
conducted four interviews within this group. The most important interview was 
with a representative of the Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP), 
a religious NGO that has operated in Ecuador since the 1970s. I targeted the 
FEPP because of the important role it performed in supporting the attempts of 
indigenous peoples to purchase land in the 1990s. The interview enabled me to 
gain a better understanding of the land purchases. I was also able to gain insight 
into the social and political context the land purchases took place within. This 
was important for understanding the role indigenous pressure performed in 
prising open land markets in the 1990s. The interview therefore provided 
additional support for the construction of the activation/development conceptual 
framework. The interviews and discussions I conducted with representatives of 
Heifer in Riobamba and Cayambe and Sendas in Cuenca and Cañar perform less 
important roles. However, I was still able to obtain useful background 
information on land, agriculture and indigenous development. For example, the 
discussions with representatives of Heifer provided insight into the challenges 
the expansion of flower exporters has presented for indigenous peoples in the 
northern highlands. I was able to cross-reference this information with the 
details I secured from the interviews I conducted with indigenous organisations 
to obtain a better understanding of this issue.  
The fourth group comprises representatives of state agencies. I conducted 
four interviews within this camp. Out of this group the interview with INEC was 
the most useful. The aim of the discussion was to provide insight into the 
methodology of the agricultural censuses and the principal differences between 
the 1954, 1974, and 2000 surveys. I was able to sharpen my analysis of land 
tenure and land distribution on the back of information I derived from this 
interview. I was also able to obtain a clearer understanding of the limits of 
agricultural census data. I also conducted interviews with Ministerio de 
Agricultura y Ganadería (MAG) employees who had worked on agrarian reform 
and land titling as well as a Ministerio de Ambiente (MA) representative in the 
canton of Cayambe. The interviews with MAG provided useful background 
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information on agrarian policies and agricultural development while the 
discussion with MA cast light on conflicts over the use of páramo in the 
northern sierra.  
In addition, I also conducted an interview with an academic researcher who 
had worked in the canton of Guamote, Chimborazo. The interview provided 
additional insight into land struggles and indigenous development in the region, 
supporting the interviews I conducted with indigenous communities and NGOs 
in the zone.  
I also had conversations with academic researchers who have investigated 
rural issues in Highland Ecuador, including Luciano Martínez, Liisa North, 
Emilia Ferraro, and Carmen Diana Deere. These discussions gave me valuable 
insights into economic, social, and political issues in Ecuador as well as 
guidance on how to undertake empirical research in the country.  
4.4.6. Socioeconomic data 
I consulted the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Banco Central del Ecuador 
(BCE), and Comisión Económica para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) 
statistical databases to secure data on a range of socioeconomic phenomena (e.g. 
economic growth, consumer price inflation). The data were sourced from the 
online databases of the three organisations. Elaboration of the data was limited 
to grouping figures for particular periods and reporting them in charts.
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4.4.7. Economic, political, historical, sociological and anthropological 
secondary literature 
I drew on a wide array of secondary literature on Ecuador, including economic, 
historical, sociological, anthropological, and demographic studies to 
complement the primary source materials. The analysis of a wide range of 
secondary literature was particularly important given the length and breadth of 
the investigation. Though I was able to gain valuable insight into land reform, 
land markets, and indigenous mobilisation by analysing the sources outlined 
above, I was reliant on secondary literature to provide a more rounded analysis. I 
was also dependent on the literature to elaborate the activation/development 
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conceptual framework. The investigation of a number of cases from different 
historical periods and geographic settings increased the robustness of the 
concept. The secondary literature therefore performs empirical and theoretical 
functions within the thesis.  
Land reform, land markets, and indigenous mobilisation are often not the 
main focus of the studies I consulted. Hence I approached the sources from a 
fresh angle. For example, Lentz’s (1997) illuminating anthropological 
investigation of migration and ethnicity in a small indigenous community in the 
province of Chimborazo includes details on land sales and purchases which 
provided considerable insight into the operation and evolution of land markets at 
the local level. Local level studies that place greater emphasis on land reform 
and land markets provided valuable insights into the struggles that emerged in 
different highland zones (e.g. Martínez 1985; Thurner 1989). The review of a 
number of local level studies enabled me to connect macro data with micro 
events, explore similarities and differences between cases, and develop a more 
complete picture of land reform, land markets, and indigenous mobilisation. The 
macro level studies I consulted provided greater clarity on land reform and 
indigenous peoples and movements. For example, Barsky’s (1988) analysis of 
the opening decades of agrarian reform casts considerable light on the role 
landowning elites performed in resisting reform. Cosse’s (1980) investigation of 
land reform in the 1960s and 1970s also sheds light on the evolution of land 
reform, especially on the financing of the IERAC. Zamosc’s (1995) 
sociodemographic study of highland indigenous peoples was another valuable 
resource. I use his indigenous population density indicators throughout this 
thesis.
62
 Sánchez-Parga’s (1989; 2010) studies of highland indigenous 
organisations and movements were other important sources. The CEPAL annual 
economic surveys of Latin America (1965-1995), which include country level 
analysis of economic trends and policies, provided very useful background 
information.  
The widespread use of secondary literature is not without drawbacks. The 
basic problem is that another layer is added between the researcher and the 
subject and the studies are the product of the original author’s own aims, 
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research questions, and analytical lens. Subjectivities inevitably infiltrate social 
inquiries. Furthermore, the researcher is often unable to access the underlying 
data and materials or understand the precise methodology employed to obtain 
and analyse the data. Hence the robustness of the analysis is not possible to 
determine.  (Blaikie 2000 pp. 183-5) In some cases I was able to access the 
underlying materials or data (e.g. legislation, censuses) and thereby increase my 
control over the research and analysis. However, this was not possible with the 
majority of the secondary literature I consulted. While I went to considerable 
lengths to take into account the subjectivity of the studies and check the strength 
of the analyses, these issues remained. The empirical and theoretical claims I 
make in this thesis should be taken in light of these limitations as well as the 
shortfalls of the other source materials discussed in previous sections.  
4.4.8. Karl Polanyi archive materials 
The final group of materials I consulted came from the Karl Polanyi Archive at 
Concordia University, Montreal. I visited the archive in December 2008. The 
materials included letters, manuscripts, notes, and lecture plans written by 
Polanyi as well as materials related to his published body of work. To facilitate 
the collection and analysis of materials I concentrated on sources related to 
Polanyi’s seminal works: The Great Transformation and Trade and Market in 
the Early Empires. Materials sourced from the archive are marked with an 
asterisk (*) when cited in the thesis.   
The materials cast fresh light on the ideas and concepts Polanyi develops in 
these books as well as the methods he employs to construct his arguments and 
the motivation for his academic pursuits.  Three insights were particularly useful 
for this investigation. First, as noted in Section 2, the plan Polanyi produced of 
The Great Transformation shortly before publication provides greater clarity on 
his critique of markets. The regulation of markets comes into sharper focus from 
this angle. These insights influenced my own thinking on the relationship 
between land reform and land markets and the attempts of indigenous and 
peasant movements to bring the use and distribution of land under social control 
in Ecuador.  Second, the detailed notes the English economic historian G.D.H 
Cole provides on a manuscript of The Great Transformation highlight the extent 
to which Polanyi overstates the enforcement of existing laws and policies in 
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nineteenth century England. Cole claims, for example, Polanyi’s assertion that 
labour markets only really emerged after the promulgation of the Poor Law in 
1834 was a “monstrous exaggeration.” He notes that “there was a highly 
competitive labour market in the coal fields and in the textile areas long 
before”.63 (Cole 1943) Cole’s insights highlight Polanyi’s tendency to understate 
continuities in socioeconomic change and exaggerate the actual 
decommodification potential of laws and policies. These points are not only 
useful for clarifying Polanyi’s claims in The Great Transformation but also for 
considering the application of his concepts and ideas in contemporary settings. 
Third, the notes Polanyi produced in the 1940s and 1950s on the project which 
resulted in Trade and Market in the Early Empires provide greater clarity on the 
forms of integration concept. The notion that the supremacy of one form of 
integration over another is “manifested in the provision of the daily necessities 
of life” was useful for understanding historical changes as well as considering 
current developments through a Polanyian lens. (Polanyi 1947*)  
5. Thesis structure 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into nine further chapters. Chapter Two 
summarises the existing state of knowledge on Ecuadorian land reform and 
explains the contributions this thesis makes to the literature. The case study is 
then presented in Chapters Three to Nine. The opening chapter of the study 
explains the positions indigenous peoples occupied in the rural highland 
economy prior to the start of land reform and examines the political struggle 
over the drafting of land reform legislation between 1960 and 1964. The next six 
chapters examine land reform, land markets and indigenous mobilisation 
between 1964 and 1994. The analysis is split between 1964-1979 and 1979-1994 
with the return to democratic rule in 1979 marking the dividing line. The line is 
drawn to facilitate the analysis rather than to indicate a decisive break in social, 
political and economic change. The two periods include chapters dedicated to 
political struggles over the design of land reform (Chapters Four and Seven), 
land redistribution and indigenous peoples (Chapters Five and Eight) and land 
markets and indigenous peoples (Chapters Six and Nine). The main empirical 
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and theoretical contributions of the thesis are summarised in the conclusion 
(Chapter Ten). The concluding chapter also examines contemporary struggles 
over land and natural resources in Ecuador and demonstrates the contemporary 
relevance of the research. 
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Chapter Two  
Ecuadorian land reform (1964-1994): existing state of knowledge and 
new contributions  
1. Introduction 
Ecuador was one of a number of Latin America nations that embarked upon land 
reform under the Alliance for Progress.
64
 The United States foreign policy 
initiative, which was launched in 1961, provided loans to Latin American 
governments on the condition they introduced a series of measures, including 
land reform. The Alliance for Progress accelerated a debate which was well 
underway in Ecuador. In the late 1950s, indigenous, peasant and leftist 
organisations started to increase pressure on the state to redistribute land while a 
growing number of landowning and political elites began to see land reform as a 
route out of the agrarian crisis and a mechanism to accelerate capitalist 
development. Land reform started with the introduction of the Ley de Reforma 
Agraria y Colonización in 1964 and ended with the promulgation of the Ley de 
Desarrollo Agrario in 1994.  The end of reform in Ecuador coincided with the 
general shift from “state-directed” to “market-based” reforms in Latin 
America.
65
  
The aims of this chapter are to explain the existing state of knowledge on 
Ecuadorian land reform and indicate the contributions this thesis makes to the 
literature. Emphasis is given to studies that focus explicitly on land reform and 
those that consider the relationship between land reform and indigenous peoples. 
The indigenous focus narrows the geographic boundaries of the chapter as 
indigenous engagement in land reform was largely restricted to the highland 
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region.
66
 The bulk of the rest of the indigenous population lived in the eastern 
lowlands where colonisation rather than reform was implemented.
67
 While the 
chapter focuses on the highland region, it provides a broad overview of the 
wider land reform.  
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. The next section 
examines political struggles over the design of land reform. The implementation 
of land reform is examined in section three. The overall reach, geographic 
distribution, and timing of the reform are explained and other important 
dimensions are discussed. The fourth section briefly considers the impact of land 
reform on peasant organisation, land markets, and land distribution. The 
contributions this thesis makes to the existing literature are explained throughout 
the chapter and summarised in the closing section. 
2. Political struggles over the design of land reform 
Political debates over agrarian reform started to simmer in Ecuador in the 1930s 
but did not come to the boil until the 1960s. Numerous external and internal 
factors drove the issue up the political agenda. There is broad consensus in the 
literature on the principal external drivers. The start of the Cuban Revolution and 
the launch of the Alliance for Progress are widely cited as the main factors (e.g. 
Handelman 1980; Guerrero 1984a; Barsky 1988). The role the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) performed in shaping political debates in 
Ecuador in the early 1960s is also noted in some cases (e.g. Velasco 1979; 
Guerrero 1984a). There is less agreement on the internal causes. Barsky, who 
provides the most detailed account of the opening decades of agrarian reform in 
Ecuador, claims the diffusion of new technology and the expansion of domestic 
markets encouraged some highland landowning elites to upgrade their 
landholdings in the 1940s and 1950s. (1988 pp. 62-87) The “modernising” 
landowners who emerged out of this process became less dependent on semi-
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feudal labour and more receptive to the idea of agrarian reform. Meanwhile, the 
“traditional” segment of the landowning elite failed to transform their 
landholdings and remained reliant on semi-feudalist practices and opposed to 
reform. The farms of the former were located close to expanding domestic 
markets in the northern highlands while the landholdings of the latter were 
situated in the more isolated central and southern sierra. Guerrero, by contrast, 
emphasises the broader social and political context of the late 1950s and early 
1960s. (1984a pp. 9-25) Taking issue with Barsky’s “economistic” interpretation 
of events, he claims indigenous, peasant and leftist mobilisation rocked 
landowning and political elites and propelled land reform up the political 
agenda. Class struggle rather than economic forces were the primary drivers of 
social change. (1984a pp. 86-105) Guerrero underscores the role the Cuban 
Revolution performed in catalysing popular protest in Ecuador, highlighting how 
external and internal factors fused to create an opening for reform.  Cosse, who 
analyses the relationship between the state and agrarian reform in the 1960s and 
1970s, also stresses the importance of rural unrest in fuelling the agrarian debate 
but posits another internal factor: the emergence of a technobureaucratic 
segment of the political elite that started to push for socioeconomic reforms in 
the 1950s. (1980 p. 56)  He therefore argues demands for agrarian reform came 
from inside as well as outside the state apparatus.
68
 While Cosse fails to mention 
the role the Comisión Económica para America Latina (CEPAL) performed in 
orientating political elites towards reform, Blankstein and Zuvekas highlight the 
influence of the agency in stimulating political debates over land reform. (1973 
p. 77) The change in attitude of the Catholic Church towards reform is also 
mentioned in some cases (e.g. Lyons 2006). Despite the widespread 
expropriation of ecclesiastical land in the early twentieth century, the Catholic 
Church remained an important landowner in the 1960s. Liberation theology, 
which spread across Latin America in the 1960s, encouraged progressive sectors 
of the Catholic Church to call for the redistribution of land to peasant families 
and communities. 
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Once land reform had been propelled to the top of the political agenda, 
highland and coastal landowning elites drew on a variety of mechanisms to 
influence the debate (e.g. Cosse 1980; Handelman 1980; Guerrero 1984a; 
Barsky 1988). Handelman highlights four: 1) regional branches of the Cámaras 
de Agricultura; 2) representation within presidential commissions; 3) influence 
in the Congress; and, 4) mainstream media. (1980 p. 68) He does not provide 
detailed empirical evidence but other studies support his claims. Barsky, for 
example, indicates the use the Cámaras de Agricultura made of newspapers (e.g. 
El Comercio) to influence political actors and shape public opinion (e.g. 1988 p. 
133). He also hints at the importance of strong links with political parties (e.g. 
Partido Liberal), which afforded landowning elites the potential to submit 
agrarian reform proposals and influence the legislature. (1988 pp. 139-65) Cosse 
provides additional insight into the influence landowning elites exerted over the 
legislature, claiming two broad camps emerged within the military government 
that seized power in 1963 to oversee the promulgation of agrarian reform 
legislation: modernising landowners who aligned with the former liberal 
president Galo Plaza (placistas) and traditional landowners who affiliated with 
the former conservative president Camilo Ponce (poncistas).
69
 (1980 pp. 57-61) 
The two groups wrestled for control over the legislature, placistas pushing for 
reforms to stimulate national capitalist development and poncistas attempting to 
minimise changes to the agrarian structure. One factor Cosse overlooks is the 
impact of the Alliance for Progress on the conflict between the two camps. The 
modernising vision of agrarian reform favoured by placistas chimed with the 
variant espoused by the Alliance for Progress which enabled them to leave a 
larger imprint on the legislation that emerged out of the debate: the Ley de 
Reforma Agraria y Colonización (LRAC). The prospect of securing overseas 
loans through the Alliance for Progress also undoubtedly supported the efforts of 
the military government to see off the poncista counter-coup which Cosse claims 
was launched in a desperate attempt to stop the introduction of the law. (1980 p. 
59) I highlight the link between the completion of the drafting of the legislation 
and the disbursement of Alliance for Progress loans and provide some indication 
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of the composition of the funds by drawing on press reports and other source 
materials.  
The LRAC outlawed semi-feudal practices (e.g. huasipungo, arrimado 
lojano), provided the basis for the redistribution of state owned haciendas, 
established the grounds for the expropriation of privately owned land, and 
promoted the colonisation of unutilised and untitled land.
70
 The weakness of the 
law is widely acknowledged in the literature (e.g. Albornoz 1971; Handelman 
1980; Barsky 1988). Feder, for example, notes the weakness of the expropriation 
clauses and the considerable mark landowning elites were able to leave on the 
law. (1965 p. 659) The FAO’s assessment provides a glimpse of the basic 
orientation of the reform in its initial phase: 
“When the process of agrarian reform started, much more attention was 
given to those measures tending to guarantee the traditional right to 
private property in land than to those leading to a change in agricultural 
structure. Furthermore, two years after the reform started the 
government was changed. The government which followed was pledged 
to continue the reform but pressure groups and vested interests actually 
stopped it by simply reducing its economic support and turning over the 
programme to people who were not capable and did not have the desire 
to carry it out.” (1980 p. 92) 
The inadequacies of the people placed in charge of land reform and the 
frequent changes in leadership at the IERAC are noted elsewhere in the literature 
(e.g. Blankstein and Zuvekas 1973; FAO 1980; Handelman 1980). The lack of 
financial support the reform received in the late 1960s is also widely recognised 
(e.g. Blankstein and Zuvekas 1973; Cosse 1980; Griffin 1981).
71
 Cosse provides 
the clearest indication of the resources committed to reform at this stage. (1980 
pp. 75-77) Using official data, he differentiates between the resources the 
Instituto Ecuatoriana de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC) was 
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budgeted to receive and the resources the institute was actually allocated.
72
 
Significant differences between the former and the latter were registered 
throughout the period. Griffin reports similar findings. (1981 p. 214) Cosse also 
distinguishes between the level of funding the IERAC received and the amount 
of resources the institute actually spent. Clear gaps between these two variables 
were also evident throughout the period. That is, the IERAC failed to make full 
use of the economic resources it had at its disposal.  Why was that the case? The 
control landowning elites exerted over the IERAC provides one explanation. 
North notes that the steering committee of the institute provided space for 
representatives of the Cámaras de Agricultura but no genuine room for 
representatives of the peasantry. (1985 pp. 433-43)  Landowning elites, as I will 
indicate later, also exerted considerable influence over the local branches of the 
IERAC, reinforcing the control they exercised at the national level in the 
opening years of the reform. I also show the structure of the agencies and 
committees charged with the task of regulating and redistributing land became a 
key battle ground in the political struggle over land reform. The conflict 
provides insight into the application of Polanyi’s concepts as well as 
contemporary debates over land reform in Ecuador and Latin America. 
The grip landowning elites exerted over agrarian reform in the late 1960s 
momentarily weakened in the early 1970s as the political landscape shifted. 
Three main factors are posited for the change. The comprehensive land reform 
the Velasco military government was undertaking in Peru is cited as the primary 
external driver (e.g. Redclift 1978; Rosero 1983; Barsky 1988). The apparent 
success of the reform in Peru encouraged a growing number of political elites to 
call for the radicalisation of reform in Ecuador.  The interest Ecuadorian 
politicians and technocrats showed in the Peruvian agrarian reform came at a 
time when oil revenues were transforming the fiscal capacity of the state (e.g. 
Cosse 1980; North 1985; Barsky 1988). Ecuador’s new-found oil wealth 
provided the state with greater economic potential to radicalise reform.  The 
upsurge of indigenous and peasant mobilisation is posited as another important 
factor. Numerous studies note an increase in rural unrest in the coastal and 
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highland regions in the late 1960s and early 1970s (e.g. Crespi 1971; Redclift 
1978; Chiriboga 1984a; Sylva 1986). There is some dispute, however, over the 
capacity of indigenous and peasant organisations and movements at this stage. 
While some authors highlight the general strengthening of indigenous and 
peasant organisation in the wake of agrarian reform (e.g. Bretón 1997; Zamosc 
1994; Zamosc 1995; Korovkin 1997), others emphasise the basic weakness of 
indigenous and peasant organisations and movements (e.g. Blankstein and 
Zuvekas 1973; Griffin 1981; Velasco 1979; FAO 1980). I contribute to this 
debate by exploring the historical evolution of indigenous organisations in the 
highland region and providing further evidence of the pressure indigenous 
peoples placed on the state to accelerate land reform. The finding supports the 
first group of authors who draw attention to the strengthening of indigenous and 
peasant organisation in the opening decade of reform.  
The first real indication of a change in the dynamics of reform came in 1970 
when the populist Velasco Ibarra government (1968-72) brought the IERAC 
under the control of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (MAG). Writing 
at the time, Blankstein and Zuvekas argue the subordination of the IERAC to the 
MAG had potentially negative and positive implications for reform. (1973 pp. 
85-6) On the one hand, the conservative orientation of agricultural ministries in 
developing countries suggested the move might prevent rather than promote 
reform. The change also increased the potential for counterreformist presidents 
and governments to block reform.  On the other hand, the move provided the 
government with greater control over the execution of reform, giving it 
increased potential to overcome the weaknesses of the IERAC. The Velasco 
Ibarra government issued three new substantive pieces of agrarian reform 
legislation in 1970: Ley 255-CLP, Decreto 373, and Decreto 1001. Only the last 
two receive meaningful attention in the literature.
73
 Decreto 373 and Decreto 
1001 were orientated towards eliminating semi-feudal relations and accelerating 
the capitalist modernisation of agriculture but both laws provided new 
opportunities for the peasantry to obtain land. The former provided opportunities 
for highland and coastal peasants working under semi-feudal practices to secure 
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land, while the latter proscribed semi-feudal relations in rice producing zones in 
the southern lowland and coastal regions. The laws were closely related. 
Zevallos explains the links between the two. 
“In response to Decreto 373, many landowners in the Guayas Basin 
tried to evict tenants from their estates and refused to grow rice. Faced 
with the prospects of a rice-production crisis and a widespread 
confrontation between landlords and tenants, the government issued 
Decreto 1001, a more radical and effective measure.”74 (1989 p. 61)  
The Velasco Ibarra government therefore showed some capacity to accelerate 
reform. Yet, as some studies note, landowning elites limited the impact of the 
measures the administration introduced by forcing regressive legislative changes 
(e.g. Velasco 1979; Barsky 1988). I provide additional insight into the evolution 
of land reform under the Velasco Ibarra government by explaining the principal 
features of the Ley 255-CLP and illustrating elite and indigenous responses to 
the legislation. I also indicate the amount of land redistributed in the highlands 
via Decreto 373, a segment of the reform which receives relatively little 
attention in the existing literature.  The analysis provides further evidence of the 
mounting indigenous and peasant pressure that was exerted on the state to 
accelerate reform in the early 1970s.  
The more dramatic change in the political climate came in 1972 when the 
Rodriguez Lara military government (1972-76) seized power and signalled its 
intention to transform the agrarian structure. A new land reform debate erupted 
as the regime announced its plans to create a new legal basis for reform. Echoing 
the earlier agrarian reform debate (1960-64), various groups presented reform 
proposals. Rosero provides insight into the competing visions of land reform that 
existed in Ecuador at that time by comparing the principal features of seven 
proposals introduced in 1972 and 1973. (1983 pp. 259-73) With landowning 
elites unable to use political parties to channel their proposals, the Cámaras de 
Agricultura provided the principal mechanism to transmit their demands. Two 
proposals were submitted by the Cámaras de Agricultura and another was 
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submitted by the Banco del Pacifico, which was closely associated with coastal 
landowning elites. Three proposals were drafted by commissions within the 
government and one was tabled by peasant organisations. Rosero does not 
provide any details about the platform from which peasants launched their 
agenda. Becker provides greater clarity, noting indigenous and peasant 
organisations established a coalition in 1972 to influence the agrarian reform 
debate. (2008 pp. 162-3)  The Frente Unido de Reforma Agraria (FURA) 
organised a series of mobilisations before submitting its proposal in 1973. In 
contrast to the debate of the early 1960s, indigenous and peasant organisations 
were therefore able to present their own programme, indicating rural social 
movements were not as weak in the early 1970s as suggested by some authors 
(e.g. Blankstein and Zuvekas 1973; Griffin 1981). Rosero’s concise comparative 
analysis reveals significant differences between the seven proposals. (1983 pp. 
259-73) For example, the FURA demanded tighter limits on the size of 
landholdings than the government while the Cámaras de Agricultura opposed 
limits altogether. The Cámaras de Agricultura also called for the repeal of 
Decreto 1001 and the promotion of colonisation. Barsky provides greater detail 
on the political struggle over the introduction of the new agrarian reform law, 
showing the pressure the Cámaras de Agricultura exerted on the Rodriguez Lara 
regime to respond to its demands and incorporate aspects of its proposals into 
the new law. (1988 pp. 201-17) 
The law that emerged out of this debate – the Ley de Reforma Agraria (LRA) 
– is widely seen as being weak and modernising in spirit (e.g. Redclift 1978; 
Rosero 1983; Barsky 1988; Zevallos 1989; Bretón 1997). The LRA replaced the 
LRAC and provided the legal basis for agrarian reform until 1994.
75
 The 
principal measure introduced to accelerate the capitalist modernisation of 
agriculture was the stipulation that privately owned land that failed to reach 
certain levels of utilisation and productivity would be liable for expropriation. 
Rosero notes that this aspect of the law posed the greatest threat to the traditional 
highland landowning elites who had failed to modernise their landholdings. He 
argues the period of grace included within the legislation (the clauses related to 
utilisation and productivity were not due to come into effect until 01 January 
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1976) was introduced to avoid confrontation with traditional landowners and 
allow time for the conversion of traditional haciendas into capitalist enterprises. 
(1983 p. 282) Other concessions to landowning elites are also highlighted in the 
literature, including the omission of restrictions on the size of landholdings, one 
of the principal demands of the Cámaras de Agricultura during the build-up to 
the introduction of the law (e.g. Griffin 1981; North 1985; Barsky 1988; FAO 
1995). Though there is broad agreement on the basic weakness of the LRA, there 
is some disagreement over the size of the imprint indigenous and peasant 
organisations were able to leave on the law. For example, Rosero claims the law 
was the result of “the compromise that the developmentalist military dictatorship 
aimed to reach between the landowning elite and the supporters of a peasant 
agrarian reform” (1983 p. 279) while North argues the indigenous and peasant 
proposal was “virtually ignored”. (1985 p. 440)  
I throw fresh light on this issue by providing a detailed examination of the 
FURA proposal and a comparative analysis of the principal features of the 
proposal and the LRA. The analysis provides insight into the extent to which the 
state responded to indigenous and peasant demands in the 1970s as well as 
indigenous and peasant visions of agrarian reform at that stage. My comparative 
analysis of the FURA and LRA reveals considerable differences, providing 
support for authors who emphasise the small imprint indigenous and peasant 
movements were able to leave on the legislation.  
It is widely acknowledged that the political struggle over the LRA did not 
cease with the promulgation of the law (e.g. Cosse 1980; Rosero 1983; Barsky 
1988). Landowning elites continued to lobby the Rodriguez Lara government, 
winning additional legislative concessions and stalling the introduction of the 
supplementary legislation required to implement the law. The elite offensive also 
forced prominent politicians and technocrats from office and contributed to the 
downfall of the Rodriguez Lara regime in 1976. The conservative Alfredo 
Burbano military government (1976-79) that followed in its wake distanced 
itself from agrarian reform. While the LRA remained on the statute, the regime 
showed little interest in implementing it. The government’s attitude toward 
reform was reflected in the resources assigned to the IERAC in the late 1970s. 
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Cosse reports dramatic declines between 1976 and 1977 (1980 pp. 76-80) while 
Handelman notes sharp falls between 1978 and 1979.
76
  (1980 p. 72)   
The state’s retreat from agrarian reform was not uncontested. The literature 
provides glimpses of indigenous and peasant resistance. For example, Cosse 
notes large-scale mobilisations took place immediately after the introduction of 
the LRA. (1980 p. 71) Becker shows indigenous and peasant organisations 
continued to pressure the state to implement land reform in the late 1970s. (2008 
pp. 159-63) He also provides some insight into the factors that limited the ability 
of indigenous and peasant organisations to prevent the change in the direction of 
agrarian policies. He claims the LRA “partially realized” the demands of the 
FURA and the alliance dissolved soon after the introduction of the law. (2008 
pp. 162-3) He also suggests internal frictions contributed to its decline as 
tensions emerged between peasant movements and leftist political parties. 
Velasco points in a similar direction, claiming indigenous and peasant 
organisations were hindered by reformist strategies that hinged on introducing 
new agrarian reform legislation and forging a coalition with the state. (1979 pp. 
112-7) The alleged subordination of indigenous and peasant movements to the 
state left them exposed and unable to react when the Rodriguez Lara government 
changed course under pressure from landowning elites. Velasco contends the 
fragmentation and isolation of highland indigenous and peasant organisations 
further limited their ability to force radical changes in the agrarian structure. 
Becker hints at another factor: state and landowner repression (e.g. 2008 p. 160). 
Griffin also emphasises this point, reporting the pro-elite involvement of the 
police and army in land disputes, the killing of protestors, and the suppression of 
peasant organisations (e.g 1981 p. 188 & p. 213).  
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 There is little evidence in the literature to suggest land reform received significant financial 
assistance from overseas in the 1960s and 1970s. One partial exception was the provision of 
USAID loans to support a scheme which enabled peasant cooperatives to purchase land in the 
Guayas Basin in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Blankstein and Zuvekas 1973; Redclift 
1978; and Redclift 1979).  Redclift (1978) reports USAID and IDB loans were also channelled 
into agriculture modernisation schemes in the region in the late 1960s and early 1970s. On a 
regional level, Adams argues international development agencies provided little funding for land 
reform in Latin America in the 1960s. (1970 pp. 423-5) He claims, for example, the vast 
majority of USAID loans were targeted towards colonisation, agricultural credit, and land titling. 
He also notes IDB loans were “almost entirely” directed towards colonisation. (1970 p. 424) 
Without providing conclusive proof, the evidence I present in this thesis strongly suggests this 
was the case in Ecuador.  
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The Ley de Fomento y Desarrollo Agropecuario (LFDA), which the 
conservative military government introduced months before the return to 
democratic rule in 1979, accelerated the movement away from land reform. The 
LRA remained in effect but the LFDA obstructed the implementation of reform, 
primarily by increasing protection for private property rights. Once again, 
landowning elites were able to leave a considerable mark on the legislation. 
Barsky compares the proposal presented by the Cámaras de Agricultura with the 
approved version of the LFDA and reports 40 of the 111 articles of the proposal 
were inserted into the law without changes and another 23 were incorporated 
with modest revisions. (1988 pp. 246-8) Haney and Haney suggest the 
introduction of the law signalled the end of “agrarian reformism via land 
reform” and the start of “agrarian reformism via rural development projects”.77 
(1989 p. 73) Under integrated rural development (IRD) emphasis was placed on 
granting land titles, enhancing productivity, strengthening links with markets, 
and improving infrastructure rather than providing peasants with opportunities to 
secure land through state intervention. According to Bretón the switch to IRD 
implied “giving up the utopia of structural change in favour of projects with 
immediate and narrowly focused effects” (2008b p. 596) and casting aside the 
“inconclusive and unresolved question of land ownership and concentration of 
wealth”. (2008b p. 585) External as well as internal actors supported the change 
in the direction of agrarian policies.  The organising efforts of politicians, 
technocrats and international agencies (e.g. USAID) were reflected in the 
creation of the Fondo de Desarrollo del Sector Rural Marginal (FODERUMA) 
in 1978 and the Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural Integral (SEDRI) in 1980.
78
 
While some studies suggest land reform effectively drew to a close in the late 
1970s (e.g. FAO 1995; Bretón 2008b), others indicate the reform continued into 
the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Barsky 1988; Rosero 1990). The period has received 
far less scholarly attention than the 1960s and 1970s but aspects of the conflict 
have been documented. Barsky provides some insight into events in the opening 
years of the civilian Roldós-Hurtado government (1979-84). (1988 pp. 280-7) 
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 Haney and Haney take these terms from de Janvry’s influential study on agrarian reform in 
Latin America (see de Janvry 1981).  See Forster (1989), Zevallos (1989) and Thurner (2000) for 
comments on de Janvry’s study in relation to Ecuador. 
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 On rural development projects in Ecuador see Chiriboga (1984a), Korovkin (1997) and 
Bebbington & Perrault (1999).  
79 
 
The reestablishment of democratic institutions provided the opportunity for 
political parties to push for legislative changes. Barsky notes that efforts were 
made to repeal the LFDA but the balance of power within Congress worked 
against the intiative. Becker shows that demands for agrarian reform also came 
through informal political channels. (2008 pp. 163-4) Indigenous and peasant 
organisations organised a series of conferences and marches in the early 1980s 
to exert pressure on the government. IERAC remained underfunded during the 
opening years of democratic rule. Chiriboga reports the institute received only 
44% of the funds it was programmed to receive between 1980 and 1983, 
continuing the general trend that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.
79
 (Chiriboga 
1984a pp. 107-8) One important point to note is the underfunding of the IERAC 
was not specific to structural adjustment and neoliberalism but a constant feature 
of land reform.  
The literature indicates the potential for indigenous and peasant organisations 
to exert pressure on the state decreased under conservative Febres Cordero 
government (1984-88) then increased under the centre-left Borja administration 
(1988-92). During this period (1984-92), the demands of indigenous 
organisations began to exhibit clearer ethnic dimensions. The Confederación de 
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), which was established in 
1986, provided the principal mechanism through which indigenous peoples 
channelled their demands. Most studies note land remained a central issue for 
indigenous families, communities and organisations in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. 
Rosero 1990; Martínez 1992b; Korovkin 1997). Korovkin argues the 
continuation of the struggle over land flew in the face of authors who predicted 
conflicts over land would give way to struggles over labour as the capitalist 
modernisation of agriculture advanced.
80
 (1997 pp. 26-7)  Indigenous 
involvement in the fight over land also challenged Velasco’s claim that highland 
indigenous communities and organisations seemed destined to perform an 
“essentially conservative” role in rural conflicts. (1979 p. 167)  The 1990 
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 Chiriboga notes the programmed budget related to agrarian reform while the allocated revenue 
covered land reform and colonisation, meaning the IERAC was left with even less resources to 
commit to land redistribution than originally expected. (1984a pp. 107-8)  
80
 Korovkin cites Paige (1975) as a proponent of such views. See Goodman and Redclift (1981) 
for broad debates around the impact of capitalist modernisation on the peasantry in Latin 
America at this stage. See Martínez (1984) in relation to the Ecuadorian case.  
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levantamiento¸ which included hunger strikes, building occupations, land 
invasions, road blocks, and street protests, provided the clearest indication of the 
willingness of indigenous groups to resort to contentious forms of political 
action to drive land reform and land issues up the political agenda.
81
 Indicating 
the scale of the levantamiento, Korovkin reports that in the central highland 
province of Chimborazo alone approximately 150,000 to 200,000 people 
participated. (1997 p. 43)  While there is some disagreement over the weight of 
particular causal factors, most studies highlight the importance of land to the 
uprising (e.g. Rosero 1990; Martínez 1992b; Korovkin 1997). The role land 
reform performed in the crisis is highlighted by Rosero. (1990 pp. 33-51) He 
documents over 100 land conflicts in Ecuador, the majority of which were 
related to land reform in one form or another.
82
 (1990 pp. 73-95) The resolution 
of land conflicts was one of the demands the CONAIE presented the Borja 
administration during the mobilisation. The government entered into 
negotiations with the CONAIE but failed to respond decisively to indigenous 
demands to accelerate land reform. Korovkin claims that in Chimborazo, for 
example, “little progress was made with regard to either land redistribution or 
community projects.” (1997 pp. 43-4)  She also notes the militarization of 
indigenous communities in the wake of the levantamiento, a state response other 
authors report (e.g. Barrera 2001).   
I provide additional insight into the 1990 uprising by placing it within the 
long-term struggle indigenous communities, organisations, and movements 
engaged in under land reform. Viewing the levantamiento within this light 
emphasises the “offensive” character of the mobilisation. My interpretation 
contrasts with accounts offered by authors who view the uprising as a 
“defensive” reaction to structural adjustment and neoliberal reform (e.g. Zamosc 
1994; Silva 2009). This insight is important for understanding historical 
indigenous mobilisations as well as ongoing disputes between indigenous 
movements and the Correa government.   
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 There is a voluminous body of work on the 1990 levantamiento. The most comprehensive 
studies are Almeida et al. (1991) and Almeida et al. (1992). Both volumes include first-hand 
accounts of actors involved in the mobilisation. See also Rosero (1990), Martínez (1992), 
Zamosc (1994), Barrera (2001), Selverston-Scher (2001) and Whitten & Whitten (2011).  
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 See also Dubly and Granda (1991). Land conflicts in the highland region are examined later in 
this thesis (Chapters 8 and 9).  
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The FAO note the 1990 levantamiento drove the issue of land back up the 
political agenda. (1995 p. 25) While the FAO do not connect the two events, a 
new land reform debate emerged in the wake of the uprising. Echoing earlier 
episodes of heightened conflict and debate (1960-64 and 1970-73), various 
actors presented proposals to attempt to influence the legislature. The episode 
has received relatively little attention in the literature but Waters provides some 
insight into the debate. He claims there was basic agreement on the 
ineffectiveness of state-directed land reform but considerable divergence on 
solutions to the agrarian crisis. (1995 pp. 1-2) Of the numerous legislative 
proposals introduced between 1990 and 1994, the landowning elite and 
indigenous-peasant programmes exhibited the greatest variation. (1995 pp. 5-8) 
The former was developed by Instituto de Estrategias Agropecuarias (IDEA), a 
think tank with strong links to the Cámaras de Agricultura and USAID, while 
the latter was advanced by the Coordinadora Agraria Nacional (CAN), a 
national coalition of indigenous and peasant organisations. Treakle provides 
greater clarity on the role external actors performed in shaping the debate and 
legislature. (1998 pp. 242-44) Drawing on conversations with US government 
officials and IDB employees, she claims an IDB loan was conditional on the 
conservative Durán Ballén administration (1992-96) introducing a law that 
liberalised the agriculture sector. The author argues the IDEA proposal “was 
given a great deal of weight by the IDB in its design of the agriculture sector 
loan.” (1998 p. 243) Waters claims the IDEA programme was “based on the 
concept that land is a commodity like any other” while the CAN proposal was 
orientated towards “protection of the integrity of the indigenous community and 
communal land ownership.” (1995 pp. 6-7) Hence, as I will emphasise later in 
this thesis, there were clear Polanyian undertones to the conflict.  
The decision of President Sixto Durán Ballén to approve a law – the Ley de 
Desarrollo Agrario (LDA) - which closely resembled the IDEA proposal 
sparked another indigenous levantamiento in 1994. Following a two-week 
protest and a state response which included what Sawyer describes as the 
“impressive militarization of Ecuador’s urban and rural landscapes” state 
officials and indigenous and peasant movements formed a commission to revise 
the LDA.  (2004 p. 182) Once again, there are divergent opinions on the imprint 
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indigenous and peasant movements were able to leave on the final legislation. 
Whereas Waters suggests the CAN proposal provided the benchmark for the 
revised law (1995 p. 15), Sawyer claims the overall thrust of the original 
legislation remained intact. (2004 pp. 207-8) Bretón provides additional insight 
into the issue by comparing aspects of the first and final versions of the LDA. 
(1997 pp. 69-70)  He echoes Sawyer by claiming the revised version of the law 
remained overwhelmingly neoliberal in orientation.  
I shed new light on the conflict by providing a more systematic analysis of 
the changes introduced through the negotiations, a detailed examination of the 
CAN proposal, and a comparative analysis of the proposal and the LDA. I also 
briefly examine the content of the LDA (which remains on the statute in Ecuador 
today).  My analysis provides a clearer picture of the legislative outcome of the 
1994 levantamiento. I show the primary aim of indigenous and peasant 
mobilisation was not to limit neoliberal restructuring but to transform the already 
existing land reform framework. I therefore stress the “offensive” character of 
the mobilisation. Though social, political and economic conditions have changed 
significantly in Ecuador since the early 1990s, the finding suggests changes in 
agrarian laws and policies will need to transcend the rolling back of neoliberal 
reform to assuage indigenous and peasant concerns and grievances.  I return to 
this point in the concluding chapter of the thesis when I analyse the land law 
indigenous and peasant movements are currently attempting to introduce in 
Ecuador.   
3. Implementation of land reform  
The vast majority of the studies which examine the implementation of land 
reform in Ecuador concentrate on the opening two decades (1964-1984). This 
was when the general level of interest in the issue was highest and the bulk of 
official figures were published. Barsky provides a broad indication of the reach 
of reform at this stage. (1988 pp. 307-18) On a national level, he reports 718,110 
hectares of land were redistributed to 78,088 beneficiaries between 1964 and 
1983. In addition, 90,611 hectares were transferred in the coastal region via 
Decreto 1001.
83
 The total amount of land redistributed amounted to 
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 See Redclift (1978) and Redclift (1979) on the application of Decreto 1001.  
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approximately 9% of the national agricultural land surface in 1984.
84
 Other 
studies report similar figures. For example, Zevallos states approximately 8% of 
the agricultural land surface (744,395 hectares) was redistributed between 1964 
and 1985 (1989 pp. 50-1) while Chiriboga reports around 10% of the agricultural 
land area (685,863 hectares) was transferred between 1964 and 1982.
85
 (1984a p. 
111) Data collated by Thiesenhusen suggest the reach of agrarian reform in 
Ecuador was among the most limited in Latin America at this stage.
86
  (1989 pp. 
10-11) Out of nine Latin American countries, Ecuador ranked third from bottom 
in terms of the percentage of land redistributed and fourth from bottom in terms 
of the proportion of the rural population involved.  
There are very few studies that explore land redistribution at the regional or 
national levels between 1964 and 1994.
87
 Gondard and Mazurek provide a broad 
indication of the overall reach of the reform; indicating approximately 900,000 
hectares of land were redistributed between 1964 and 1992.
88
 (2001 pp. 17-22) 
This implies approximately 100,000-150,000 additional hectares were 
transferred in the last decade of the reform. The relative figure Gondard and 
Mazurek report (3.4%) relates to the entire land surface of the country rather 
than the agricultural land surface which means it is not comparable with the 
estimates reported above and provides little indication of the actual reach of 
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 Barsky arrives at this estimation by adding the total amount of land allocated via colonisation 
between 1975 and 1984 to the national agricultural land surface recorded in the 1974 agriculture 
census. He argues the figure provides a rough approximation of the actual size of the national 
agricultural land surface in the early 1980s. (1988 p. 317) One limitation of this approach is that 
it fails to subtract the land that was removed from the agriculture sector through urbanisation 
after 1974 (see Chapter 1).  
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 Chiriboga’s estimate is based on the combined agricultural land surfaces of the highland and 
coastal regions reported in the 1974 agriculture census. He excludes land located in the 
Amazonian region and does not make any adjustments for colonisation. This explains why he 
reports a higher relative figure than Barsky based on a lower amount of redistributed land. 
Zevallos takes his figure directly from the IERAC and does not explain how it is derived.  The 
estimates provided by Barsky, Chiriboga and Zevallos differ significantly from figures reported 
by Borras and McKinley. (2006 p. 2) The authors indicate 34% of the national agricultural land 
surface was redistributed between 1964 and 1985 but do not explain how they arrived at this 
estimate. The most likely explanation is the figure is based on land reform and colonisation. 
Estimates reported above and later in this thesis suggest as a measure of land reform the figure is 
erroneous. The data are reproduced in Borras et al. ([2008] 2011) p. 10.  
86
 Thiesenhusen uses Barsky’s data to gauge the extent of land redistribution in Ecuador. (1989 
pp. 10-11) Differences in the timing and quality of the data mean cross-country comparisons of 
land reform are very approximate. See also Dorner (1992) pp. 33-5. 
87
 Gondard and Mazurek (2001) and Jordán (2003) examine the implementation of the entire 
cycle of reform but neither study provides a detailed analysis of land redistribution. 
88
 Gondard and Mazurek report that they were unable to obtain IERAC data for 1993 and 1994. 
(2001 p. 16) 
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agrarian reform. (2001 p. 22) I shed additional light on the impact of the reform 
by reporting the overall amount of land redistributed in the highland region 
between 1964 and 1994 and expressing the total as a proportion of the 
agricultural land surface reported in the 2000 agricultural census. The analysis 
provides a much clearer picture of the amount of land incorporated into the 
reform sector over three decades of reform.  
The literature shows land reform was not implemented uniformly across 
Ecuador.  The data collated by Barsky indicate 62% of land redistribution was 
undertaken in the sierra, 38% in the coast, and less than 1% in the oriente. (1988 
p. 315) Haney and Haney report similar ratios based on land redistributed 
between 1964 and 1982. (1989 p. 73) The relative scale of land redistribution 
was also greatest in the highlands. Between 1964 and 1982, 16% of the 1974 
agricultural land surface was redistributed in the sierra while 6% was transferred 
in the coast, according to Chiriboga. (1984a p. 111) Zevallos offers a twofold 
explanation for the variance between the two regions.  (1989 pp. 50-1) First, the 
capitalist modernisation of agriculture was weakest in the sierra so a larger 
proportion of land was liable for expropriation and redistribution. Second, 
peasant demands for land were strongest in the highlands.  While he does not 
explore the issue in depth, Zevallos therefore implies peasant pressure was not 
only crucial in driving land reform up the political agenda but also important in 
implementing reform. He also claims these two factors influenced redistribution 
within the highland and coastal regions. (1989 pp. 50-1) In relation to the sierra, 
for example, he asserts “land was awarded mainly in the southern provinces of 
Chimborazo and Loja, where the development of capitalist agriculture had been 
slowest and peasant movements had been strongest.”89 (1989 p. 51) Chiriboga 
provides basic support for this claim. (1984a pp. 111-2) He also notes agrarian 
reform had the biggest impact in southern and central highland provinces (e.g. 
Cañar, Chimborazo and Loja) where traditional agricultural practices dominated. 
In these regions, Chiriboga claims, “peasant economies managed to access land 
to a greater extent than in the provinces of the north.” (1984a p. 112) He 
provides further evidence of the geographic unevenness of reform by reporting 
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 Chimborazo is referred to throughout this thesis as a central rather than southern highland 
province. See Appendix 1 and 2.  
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the amount of land redistributed between 1964 and 1982 as a percentage of the 
1974 agriculture land surface in each of the highland and coastal provinces. 
(1984a p. 111) The data reveal significant differences. In relative terms, land 
redistribution was strongest in the highland provinces of Cañar, Chimborazo and 
Loja (between 25-30%) and weakest in the coastal provinces of Esmeraldas and 
Manabí (less than 1%).  
I throw additional light on this issue by reporting the amount of land 
redistributed between 1964 and 1994 as a percentage of the agricultural land 
surfaces of each of the highland provinces as well as the region as whole. I 
complement the data analysis with a detailed investigation of indigenous 
attempts to secure land from the 1960s to the 1990s. The analysis illustrates the 
crucial role indigenous families, communities and organisations performed in 
implementing land reform, a factor which is not given sufficient attention in the 
existing literature. The need for indigenous peoples to pressure the state to 
enforce laws and policies also illuminates current debates over water and land 
laws in Ecuador as well as discussions over the use of Polanyi’s concepts to 
explore social, political and economic change.  
The literature also shows land reform was also not implemented evenly across 
time. Barsky provides a gauge of the rhythm of the reform between 1964 and 
1983, indicating land redistribution accelerated under military rule in the 1970s 
and remained elevated under civilian rule in the early 1980s. (1988 pp. 308-12) 
Cosse reports a similar pattern in the 1960s and 1970s but provides a clearer 
picture by indicating the amount of land redistributed in the highland and coastal 
regions in every year between 1964 and 1977. (1980 p. 65)  He reports a 
noticeable uptick between 1975 and 1977.  Chiriboga notes a similar spike, 
claiming the increase was primarily attributable to rising rural unrest. (1984a pp. 
102-3). Highlighting the methodological difficulties of attempting to gauge the 
actual rate of reform, he claims peasant pressure increased state interventions 
between 1972 and 1975 but the bulk of the land was not formally redistributed to 
peasants until 1974 and 1976. The increase in the late 1970s was therefore a 
reflection of earlier events.  The FAO provide support for this claim by noting a 
considerable amount of land was awaiting formal transfer in 1976. (1980 p. 93) 
Barsky also acknowledges the general lag between state intervention and legal 
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distribution. (1988 p. 308) Chiriboga claims the overhang of land that existed in 
the late 1970s continued to mask the real rate of redistribution in the early 1980s 
as the number of new IERAC interventions remained limited. (1984a pp. 107-8)  
Gondard and Mazurek, who chart the amount of land redistributed in every 
year between 1964 and 1992 at the national level, indicate agrarian reform 
remained on a general downward curve into the 1990s. (2001 p. 17) This trend is 
at odds with some accounts of the activities of the IERAC around the 1990 
levantamiento. For example, according to Selverston-Scher, the IERAC claimed 
to have resolved “1.5 million hectares of land disputes, with 1.2 million of those 
in favor of indigenous communities” between 1988 and 1992. (2001 pp. 63-4) 
Yet Gondard and Mazurek indicate only approximately 60,000 hectares of land 
was redistributed during this period. (2001 p. 17) I provide greater clarity on this 
issue by examining the amount of land transferred via agrarian reform and 
colonisation and cross-referencing the figures with the claims made by the 
IERAC and President Rodrigo Borja. The analysis shows reform and 
colonisation were conflated to exaggerate the amount of land redistributed.  The 
finding sheds new light on the factors behind the levantamiento and the attitude 
of political elites towards indigenous peoples.  
Other dimensions of the implementation of land reform are highlighted in the 
literature. A small number of studies delve into the IERAC data to examine the 
composition of the land redistributed in the first two decades of reform. For 
example, following IERAC classifications, Chiriboga indicates the total amount 
of land redistributed between 1964 and 1984 according to the type of 
intervention. (1988a pp. 44-5) He reports 56% was privately owned land 
incorporated into the reform sector via negotiation, expropriation and reversion, 
31% was land worked under semi-feudal practices, and 13% was state-owned 
land.  Chiriboga therefore draws attention to the important role state-owned land 
performed in agrarian reform in Ecuador. He does not, however, explain the 
composition or location of the land. CIDA’s influential study of Ecuador’s 
agrarian structure in the decade before the start of land reform indicates the bulk 
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of the land was located in the highlands.
90
 (1965 p. 116) Various other authors 
have noted the concentration of state-owned land in the region and the important 
role it performed in the reform (e.g. Crespi 1971; Guerrero 1984b; Weismantel 
1988; Becker 2008). Returning to Zevallos’ comments about the reasons behind 
the geographic unevenness of land reform, the prevalence of state-owned land in 
the sierra was another factor that explained the greater impact of the reform in 
the region.  
I throw greater light on this issue by examining the redistribution of state-
owned land at the local level and indicating the extent of redistribution at the 
provincial and regional levels between 1964 and 1994. I also compare the total 
amount of state-owned land redistributed by IERAC with the stock of state-
owned land reported in the early 1960s to gauge how much state-owned land 
was actually redistributed. The analysis reveals a significant shortfall which 
provides another indication of the role the state performed in the reform. I also 
examine the other intervention types for the entire period which provides greater 
clarity on the implementation of land reform and its impact on landowning 
elites. 
The identities of the beneficiaries of land reform are reported by some 
studies. Investigating this element of the reform presents methodological 
challenges as official data provide few details about the recipients of land 
redistributed via the IERAC. On a broad level, the literature indicates land was 
redistributed to three groups: i) individuals/families; ii) cooperatives and iii) 
communities. Macro-level studies of the reform give little additional 
consideration to the characteristics and identities of beneficiaries.
91
 Greater 
insight comes from authors who examine the implementation of agrarian reform 
at the local level or explore the role of specific social groups within the reform. 
Numerous studies point towards the high level of indigenous participation in the 
highland region (e.g. Crespi 1971; Velasco 1979; Guerrero 1984b; Bretón 1997; 
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 The Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola (CIDA) was the Alliance for Progress 
agency charged with the task of investigating rural issues and providing agrarian policy advice to 
Latin American states. The CIDA undertook a number of influential studies in the early 1960s. 
See Barraclough (1973). 
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 See for Herrera (2007) for short testimonies/oral histories of a selection of land reform 
beneficiaries.  
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Lentz 1997; Korovkin 1997; Martínez 2002a; Cervone 2012).
92
 The widespread 
integration of indigenous peoples into the traditional hacienda complex and the 
strong links that existed between indigenous peoples and land are commonly 
cited factors for the high degree of indigenous involvement in agrarian reform.  
Some studies indicate that some segments of the indigenous population were 
better placed to secure land than others (e.g. Guerrero 1984b; Martínez 1995; 
Lyons 2006). Indigenous peoples tied to haciendas via the semi-feudal practice 
huasipungo were generally more successful than those linked via other semi-
feudal relations (e.g. arrimados/apegados, yanapa). The fact land reform 
legislation created a framework for the dissolution of huasipungo but not for 
other semi-feudal practices is noted in some cases (e.g. Albornoz 1971). Zamosc 
highlights the basic link between indigenous peoples and land reform.  (1995 pp. 
37-9) Drawing on secondary sources, the author reports the reach of land reform 
was greatest in cantons with high indigenous population densities.
93
  
I provide additional evidence of the links between indigenous peoples and 
land reform by cross-referencing and reporting demographic and land 
redistribution data at the provincial and regional levels. I complement the data 
analysis with the investigation of a wide range of local-level cases which allows 
for a clearer picture of the land redistributed to indigenous peoples and the role 
they performed in the redistribution process.  
The size and type of land redistributed is examined in some cases. Simple 
averages of the amount of land redistributed per recipient are widely reported for 
the first two decades of reform. For example, according to Chiriboga, on a 
national level the average amount of land redistributed between 1964 and 1984 
was eight hectares. (1988a p. 44) He indicates the average increased over time: 
the amount of land redistributed per recipient was six hectares in the first decade 
and nine hectares in the second. Barsky reports similar findings. (1988 pp. 309-
13) Cosse provides greater detail on the evolution of the average in the 1960s 
and 1970s, indicating the upward trend was strongest in the sierra where the 
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ethnic minority group – afroecuatorianos. See RAPOPORT (2009) for some insight.  
93
 The secondary sources Zamosc draws upon gauge the level of land redistribution by 
calculating the percentage of landholdings above 100 hectares affected by agrarian reform at the 
cantonal level. (1995 p. 39) The methodology Zamosc employs to gauge indigenous population 
densities is explained in the next chapter.  
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average climbed from three to seventeen hectares between 1964 and 1977. (1980 
pp. 63-4) 
These authors do not offer explanations for the trend other than to note the 
rise reflects the acceleration of land reform and land titling in the 1970s. My 
analysis suggests the increase was largely due to a change in the composition of 
redistributed land, with the transfer of high-altitude grassland (páramo) skewing 
upwards the average in the highland region. While other studies have indicated 
the important role páramo performed in the land reform in the highland region 
(e.g Thurner 1989; Forster 1989; Ramón 1993; Korovkin 1997), this thesis 
throws additional light on the issue. In addition to indicating the transfer of 
páramo to a large number of indigenous communities I also cross-reference 
agricultural census and land redistribution data to indicate the relationship 
between the two variables at the provincial level. My analysis of land reform 
legislation also shows that the redistribution of páramo performed a prominent 
role in the state’s strategy to alleviate pressure on land in the highlands from the 
late 1960s onwards. Drawing on interviews with local-level indigenous and 
peasant organisations, I also show the important role indigenous organisations 
and communities have recently performed in preserving the páramo, 
complementing the more detailed research which has been undertaken on the 
issue (e.g. Mena et al. 2011).  
The implementation of the wider dimensions of agrarian reform (e.g. credit, 
technical assistance) is also explored by some studies. These aspects of the 
reform took on greater importance in the 1970s when the oil boom provided the 
state with greater fiscal capacity to invest in agriculture and rural development. 
Zevallos provides an indication of the greater state resources committed to 
agriculture at this stage. (1989 pp. 46-9) He reports state expenditure in the 
sector increased from 1.4% to 7.5% of total spending or ninefold in real terms 
between 1970 and 1979. Most studies argue peasants benefitted little from the 
rapid increase in state spending in the 1970s (e.g. FAO 1980; Chiriboga 1984a; 
Zevallos 1989).
94
 Zevallos, for example, claims MAG technical assistance was 
“focused on commodities produced predominantly on medium and large farms 
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 Blankstein and Zuvekas (1973) p. 83 suggest this was also the case in the 1960s.   
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and was generally ill adapted to most small-farmer needs.” (1989 p. 47) He also 
contends agricultural credit channelled through the Banco Nacional de Fomento 
(BNF) and Banco Central del Ecuador (BCE) was primarily directed towards 
medium and large producers. (1989 pp. 47-8) The FAO paint a similar picture, 
claiming “small and medium farmers have had practically no access at all to 
credit”. (1980 p. 95)  
4. Wider impacts of land reform 
The effects of land reform were numerous and diverse. Among other areas the 
reform contributed to changes in gender relations, political structures, production 
patterns, ethnic identity, and ecological practices. While a full analysis of the 
impact of the reform is outside the scope of this chapter, a cursory glance at 
three areas which perform important roles within this thesis is beneficial.  
The first relates to the link between land reform and peasant and indigenous 
organisation. Zamosc provides an indication of the quantitative impact of the 
reform on local-level organisation in the highland region by tracing the historical 
evolution of communities, cooperatives and associations.
95
 (1995 pp. 45-71) He 
shows a sharp rise in the number of organisations in the region in the opening 
decade of reform: whereas 303 organisations were registered between 1955 and 
1964, 717 were listed between 1965 and 1974. The total number of local-level 
organisations continued to increase, with another 1,171 registered between 1975 
and 1992.
96
 (1995 p. 62) Zamosc reports stronger organisational growth in zones 
with high indigenous densities. The expansion of communities was particularly 
rapid in these areas, indicating the importance of traditional communal 
organisation for indigenous peoples. Korovkin highlights the strength of this 
process in the central highland province of Chimborazo. (1997 pp. 27-32) 
Reporting the emergence of 356 new communities in the decades after the start 
of agrarian reform (1964-1991), she claims “this organizational explosion 
demonstrated the extraordinary vitality of the indigenous communal tradition, 
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 The impetus land reform gave to indigenous and peasant organisation in the highland region is 
widely noted. See, for example, Sánchez-Parga (1989), Zamosc (1993), Guerrero (1996), Bretón 
(1997), Korovkin (1997), Bebbington and Perrault (1999), Martínez (2002a), Pallares (2002), 
Yashar (2006), Becker (2008), and Cervone (2012).  See Redclift (1978) for the development of 
peasant organisations in the coastal region in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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 Zamosc stresses his data relate to the number of registered not active organisations. (1995 p. 
47)  
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rooted in the precolonial past as well as in the colonial and hacienda 
experiences.” (1997 p. 29) Without explaining the links between the different 
levels of organisation, Korovkin indicates the provincial - Movimiento Indígena 
de Chimborazo (MICH) – and regional – Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui 
(Ecuarunari) – indigenous movements emerged on the back of the outgrowth of 
indigenous communities. (1997 p. 30) The space the dissolution of the 
traditional hacienda complex provided for communal and political organisation 
leads Korovkin to claim land reform was an “economic defeat” but “political 
victory” for the indigenous peoples of Chimborazo. (1997 p. 27) “The 
communities lost the game in terms of access to economic resources”, she 
claims, “but they won an impressive victory in political and organizational 
terms.” (1997 p. 32)  
I provide additional insight into the links between land reform and indigenous 
organisation by explaining the evolution of the various levels of the highland 
indigenous movement and indicating the organisational impact of the reform 
across a number of cases. Building on the insights of other studies (e.g. Martínez 
1995), I show that conflicts sometimes emerged between the organisational 
forms imposed by the state (cooperatives) and the organisational forms favoured 
by indigenous peoples (communities). The finding suggests Zamosc’s 
organisational density data should be treated with a degree of caution i.e. the 
stronger growth of local-level organisations in zones with high indigenous 
densities can be seen as a sign of weakness as well as strength.  
The second area relates to the relationship between land reform and land 
markets. It is widely acknowledged that land reform stimulated land market 
activity in the highland and coastal regions (e.g. Preston 1976; Martínez 1985; 
Thurner 1989; Zevallos 1989; Zamosc 1994). Zevallos explains the basic link. 
“While the threat of expropriation and the new economic conditions 
created by the oil boom provided the incentives for some landowners to 
modernize, they inspired others to subdivide and sell all or part of their 
farms. The division of haciendas into medium and small units, which 
were then sold to local merchants or rich peasants, was a common 
phenomenon both in the highlands and on the coast.” (1989 p. 54)  
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Zamosc suggests the opening of land markets also provided opportunities for a 
wider sector of rural population to purchase land, including highland indigenous 
communities. (1994 pp. 42-3) The point is emphasised by a number studies 
which examine agrarian issues at the local level (e.g. Martínez 1985; Haney & 
Haney 1987; Thurner 1989; FAO 1995). While these studies provide valuable 
insights into indigenous participation in land markets at the local-level, the wider 
opportunities and threats land markets created for indigenous peoples are not 
clear in the existing literature. The precise relationship between land reform and 
land markets is also underanalysed.  
The analysis I offer in this thesis provides greater clarity on these issues. I 
examine a number of indigenous attempts to purchase land on the market and 
develop a new concept to analyse the relationship between land markets and 
indigenous peoples. I show the opening of land markets created spaces for 
indigenous peoples to secure land in some cases but restricted them in others. I 
stress collective organisation and mobilisation were required to broaden the 
opportunities open to indigenous peoples to purchase land on the market which 
augments other research undertaken on the issue in Ecuador (e.g. Thurner 1989) 
and informs studies on the construction of markets elsewhere in Latin America 
(e.g. Topik 1999). I also provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between 
land reform and land markets. Working within a Polanyian framework I explain 
the commodification and decommodification dimensions of land reform. The 
analysis indicates the impetus land reform provided land markets on the one 
hand and the restrictions it imposed upon them on the other.  Viewing land 
reform through a Polanyian lens provides fresh insight into the historical 
evolution of the reform and contributes to contemporary land debates in Ecuador 
and Latin America.  
The third area relates to the link between land reform and land distribution. 
Gauging the impact of the land reform on land distribution is complicated by the 
timing of the three full agriculture censuses undertaken in Ecuador (1954, 1974 
and 2000). The issue was particularly problematic in the 1980s and 1990s 
because of the considerable changes the agrarian structure underwent after the 
93 
 
completion of the 1974 census.
97
 Studies that examine the evolution of land 
distribution between the three censuses provide the best indication of the impact 
of the entire land reform (e.g. FAO 2002; Herrera 2007; Brassel et al. 2008). 
Bretón, for example, indicates the changes in the bottom, middle and top tiers of 
the national land distribution between 1954, 1974 and 2000. (2008b pp. 591-3) 
He reports a significant increase in the number of farms in the middle range (20 
to 100 hectares) but argues the apparent improvement in the land distribution 
was primarily due to the extensive colonisation of previously untitled lands. 
Brassel et al. also draw attention to the increase in the prevalence of medium 
size farms between the three censuses. (2008 pp. 21-6) In addition, the authors 
highlight the increase in the number of units of less than one hectare and the 
decrease in the amount of land controlled by landholdings of greater than 500 
hectares. According to their calculations the overall changes translate into a 
decline in the Gini coefficient from 0.86 in 1954 to 0.80 in 2000. Zamosc 
provides some indication of the position highland indigenous peoples occupied 
within the land distribution in the 1990s. (1995 pp. 33-5) He reports a higher 
incidence of landholdings below one and half hectares in cantons with high 
indigenous population densities, suggesting land reform provided relatively few 
opportunities for indigenous peoples to climb the land distribution ladder.  
I provide new insights into the link between land reform and land distribution 
by providing a detailed analysis of the evolution of the land distribution in the 
highland region between the 1954, 1974 and 2000 censuses and indicating the 
impact of land reform on the bottom, middle and top tiers of the land 
distribution. Greater clarity on the impact of colonisation on the land distribution 
in the highland region is also provided. I offer greater insight into the position 
indigenous peoples occupied within the land distribution by cross-referencing 
indigenous demographic and agricultural census data. I also examine the ethnic 
composition of the agricultural producers reported in the 2000 agricultural 
census which casts further light on indigenous access to land and indigenous 
participation in agriculture at the provincial and regional levels. In addition, I 
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provide a detailed analysis of the changes in the land tenure structure in the 
sierra between 1954 and 2000. 
5. Summary: new contributions to our understanding of Ecuadorian 
land reform  
Ecuadorian land reform has been the subject of a great deal of scholarly 
attention, especially during the opening two decades of the reform when political 
and academic interest in the topic was greatest.  The new insights this thesis 
provides comes from examining the whole cycle of reform (1964-1994), 
focusing on the relationship between indigenous peoples and land reform, and 
analysing land reform through a Polanyian lens. The main contributions fall into 
three broad camps.  
The first relates to political struggles over the design of land reform. I provide 
greater clarity on this issue by examining the attempts of indigenous and peasant 
organisations and movements to transform land reform from the 1960s onwards. 
I offer a detailed analysis of the FURA and CAN proposals and a comparative 
analysis of the proposals and the LRA and LDA (Chapters 4 and 7). My analysis 
provides a clearer picture of indigenous and peasant visions of land reform and 
the extent to which the state responded to indigenous and peasant demands. 
Drawing on Polanyi, I characterise indigenous struggles over land reform as 
attempts to increase the social control of land in the face of mounting 
commodification. Taking a long-term view of these struggles emphasises the 
“offensive” as opposed to the “defensive” character of the 1990 and 1994 
levantamientos. I also provide fresh insight into the content and evolution of 
land reform legislation from the 1960s onwards (Chapters 4 and 7).  
The second relates to the implementation of land reform. My investigation of 
land redistribution in the sierra is more detailed and complete than the analysis 
currently provided in the existing literature. I report the absolute and relative 
scale of land redistribution at the provincial and regional levels between 1964 
and 1994 and analyse the amount of land redistributed through different 
intervention types (Chapters 5 and 8). The analysis provides a clearer picture of 
the extent and composition of land redistribution in the highland region. I also 
provide approximations of the relationship between indigenous peoples and land 
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redistribution at the provincial levels. My analysis of land redistribution at the 
local level also throws fresh light on the implementation of land reform 
(Chapters 5 and 8). One important point that emerges is the crucial role 
indigenous families, communities, and organisations performed in implementing 
land reform from the 1960s onwards.   
The third relates to the relationship between land reform and land markets. 
Working within a Polanyian framework, I provide a systematic treatment of the 
relationship between land reform and land markets and indigenous peoples and 
land markets (Chapters 4 and 7 and 6 and 9). I develop a new concept to explore 
the links between indigenous peoples and land markets. A clearer picture of the 
opportunities and threats land markets created for indigenous peoples emerges 
from the analysis. I also examine the commodification and decommodification 
dimensions of land reform and illustrate the links between land reform and land 
markets through the investigation of a number of local-level cases.  The analysis 
provides insight into historical agrarian change in Ecuador and also contributes 
to contemporary debates over land reform and land markets in Latin America.  
In addition, I also offer a detailed analysis of the changes in land tenure and 
land distribution in the sierra in the second half of the twentieth century and 
approximate the positions indigenous peoples occupied in the land distribution 
(Chapters 6 and 9). Fresh light is also thrown on the link between land reform 
and indigenous organisation and the evolution of the highland indigenous 
movement (Chapters 4-5 and 7-8). 
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Chapter Three  
Indigenous peoples in the traditional rural highland economy and the 
land reform debate of the early 1960s 
1. Introduction 
Ecuador entered the second half of the twentieth century with one foot firmly in 
the past.
98
 Over 70% of the population lived in rural areas; industrial production 
was limited to a small group of basic enterprises; trade unions were small and 
fragmented; consumer and producer markets were circumscribed; haciendas, 
plantations, and landowning elites dominated the agriculture sector; and, 
thousands of peasants were enmeshed within semi-feudal practices. Rural 
capitalist development was strongest in the coast where virtually all of Ecuador’s 
exports were produced and weakest in the sierra where traditional haciendas 
dominated the social, political, and economic landscape and agricultural 
production was orientated towards the domestic market. The pace of social, 
political, and economic change began to hasten in the highlands in the 1950s and 
1960s as the capitalist modernisation of the wider economy accelerated and the 
battle to dismantle the traditional rural economy intensified. The escalation of 
rural unrest and the launch of the Alliance for Progress drove land reform up the 
political agenda in the early 1960s. The initial battle over agrarian reform had 
commenced, culminating in the introduction of the LRAC in 1964. This chapter 
explains the positions indigenous peoples occupied in the highland economy in 
the decade before the start of the reform and examines the land reform debate of 
the early 1960s. The analysis focuses on issues that are crucial for understanding 
the evolution of land reform, land markets and indigenous mobilisation between 
1964 and 1994.  
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. The next section 
outlines the size and distribution of the highland indigenous population in the 
early 1960s.  The roles indigenous peoples performed within the traditional rural 
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 Mainland Ecuador covers a land mass of approximately 248,360 km
2
. The mainland is divided 
into three broad geographic regions (from east to west): the Amazonian region (or oriente); the 
highland region (or sierra); and the coastal region (or costa). The country borders Colombia to 
the north and Peru to the south and east. The estimated population of Ecuador in 1950 was 3.3 
million of which around 58% lived in the sierra. Today Ecuador is home to approximately 15.5 
million people.  See Appendix 1 and 2 for physical and administrative maps of Ecuador.  
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economy are then explained in section three. The principal constraints the 
traditional agrarian structure placed on the development of land markets are also 
outlined. The fourth section explains the contours of the land reform debate of 
the early 1960s and analyses the drafting and introduction of the LRAC in 1964. 
The fifth section summarises the main points discussed in the chapter.  
2. The highland indigenous population in the early 1960s 
The indigenous peoples of Highland Ecuador have their roots in the ethnic 
groups that were integrated into the northern reaches of the Inca Empire in the 
late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Kichwa, the lingua franca of the Inca 
Empire, became the common language of the indigenous peoples under Inca and 
Spanish rule. The highland indigenous population comprises various cultural 
groups which are united by a single language and similar set of customs, habits 
and beliefs. (INEC 2006 pp. 14-5) No precise measure exists of the size and 
distribution of the highland indigenous population in the decade before the start 
of land reform. However, sociodemographic studies undertaken by Knapp and 
Zamosc provide good approximations.  Using Kichwa speakers as a proxy for 
indigenous peoples, Knapp estimates the rural highland indigenous population in 
1950 was 417,892 or around one third of the total rural highland population.
99
 
(1987 p. 11) Illustrating the close links that existed between indigenous peoples 
and land, Knapp estimates only 23,102 Kichwa speakers resided in urban areas. 
(1987 p. 11) He identifies the parishes where at least 33% of the population were 
Kichwa speakers to estimate the areas of the highlands where indigenous 
peoples were the main ethnic group  (he sets the threshold at 33% rather than 
50% to correct for biases in the 1950 census which he claims underestimate the 
size of the indigenous population). In doing so, Knapp identifies a “strong 
spatial segregation” of rural indigenous peoples with two-thirds of Kichwa 
speakers concentrated in only 88 of 403 highland parishes. (1987 p. 13)  Zamosc 
then uses Knapp’s classifications to identify the “predominantly indigenous 
areas” (API) and “predominantly mestizo areas” (APM) of the rural highland 
region.
100
 (1995 pp. 20-23)  Using the 1962 population census, Zamosc 
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they generally spoke within their families.  
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 The API is used throughout this thesis to estimate the size and distribution of the highland 
indigenous population. Two important points need to be taken into account when interpreting the 
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estimates the size of the API population in 1962 was 557,800 or 35% of the rural 
highland population. Figure 3.1 shows the API population in relation to the total 
rural population of the province as well as the API population of the province in 
relation to the total API population of the highland region.
101
 The data indicate 
the regions with highest indigenous population densities were the central and 
northern provinces of Chimborazo, Cañar, Imbabura, Cotopaxi, and Tungurahua. 
The largest indigenous populations in absolute terms were located in 
Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, and Pichincha. Over 40% of the total API population 
was situated within these three provinces.  
The data collated by Knapp and Zamosc provide a rough approximation of 
the potential size of the indigenous base of the countermovement that emerged 
in the wake of land reform. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
data. First, the API is derived from the linguistic groups identified in the 1950 census. The 
indicator therefore overlooks the wider and dynamic dimensions of ethnicity. Second, the API 
includes people of various ethnicities. The measure therefore only provides a rough 
approximation of the composition, size, and distribution of the rural highland indigenous 
population.  
101
 The highland region is divided into ten provinces: Azuay, Bolívar, Cañar, Carchi, Cotopaxi, 
Chimborazo, Imbabura, Loja, Pichincha and Tungurahua. Each province is divided into various 
cantons and each canton is subdivided into numerous parishes.   
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Figure 3.1 - Geographic distribution of  the highland 
indigenous population in the early 1960s 
API as % of province API as % of total API
Source: My own elaboration based on Zamosc (1995) p. 23. API = predominantly indigenous area.   
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3. Indigenous peoples in the rural highland economy in the decade 
before the start of land reform 
The traditional rural economy of Highland Ecuador exhibited the classic traits of 
the latifundia-minifundia complex.
102
 Haciendas, which ranged from less than 
100 to over 20,000 hectares, dominated the social, political, and economic 
landscape. The landholdings stretched across various ecological zones which 
enabled the production of a variety of crops and the pasture of livestock. 
Haciendas controlled the bulk of the most productive land located in the lower 
reaches of the Inter-Andean Valley as well large tracts of woodland and high-
altitude grassland or páramo.
103
 The monopolisation of land and the 
accumulation of social, political, and economic power enabled landowners 
(hacendados) to tie indigenous and mestizo peasant families and communities to 
haciendas through semi-feudal practices. The traditional rural economy 
embodied two broad patterns of land use: the low intensity systems of haciendas 
and the high intensity systems of peasants. (Bebbington 2004 p. 405) The 
dominance of haciendas ensured vast tracts of land were left underutilised. 
Highland haciendas, farmers, and peasants supplied the bulk of basic foodstuffs 
for the national domestic market. The principal link between Ecuador’s 
agriculture sector and world markets was found in the coastal region where the 
country’s principal exports – bananas, cacao, and coffee - were produced, 
packaged, and shipped. 
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 See CIDA (1965), Barraclough (1973), and King (1977) for overviews of the latifundia-
minifundia complex in Latin America.  
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 Vertically, the highland region comprises a series of belts with distinct climatic and 
geographic characteristics. The high altitude belt runs from approximately 5,000 to 6,300 metres 
a.m.s.l. and includes the glaciers and rocky peaks of western and eastern cordilleras of the 
Andes. The zone is effectively outside of the agricultural frontier. The páramo – durable and 
diverse, tracts of grass interspersed with patches of bare soil – is located between 2,800 to 5,000 
a.m.s.l.  (Mena et al. 2011) Within clear ecological constraints, the lower sections of the páramo 
are suitable for the production of a small number of crops (e.g. potatoes, barley). The higher 
areas are largely restricted to the pasture of livestock (e.g. sheep, llama). The páramo is also a 
vital source of water for consumption as well as irrigation. The most fertile and productive land 
in the sierra is located in the relatively flat series of closed valleys that undulate between 
approximately 2,200 and 3,100 a.m.s.l along the floor of the Inter-Andean Valley. These zones 
are suitable for the cultivation of a wide range of crops (e.g. maize, barley) as well as the 
production of cattle and dairy. The outer slopes of the cordilleras of the Andes are covered by a 
variety of forests, vegetation and soils and are suitable for the production of a wide variety of 
agricultural produce as well for foraging for fruit, nuts, firewood etc. 
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3.1  – Land tenure, Highland Ecuador, 1954 
Land tenure Units % of total 
units 
Land surface 
(hectares) 
% of total 
land surface 
Privately owned 174,023 67.0 2,233,200 73.9 
Rented 8,012 3.1 341,800 11.3 
Partidario 12,885 5.0 54,000 1.8 
Huasipungo 19,665 7.6 60,200 2.0 
Comunero 4,863 1.9 18,300 0.6 
Mixed 40,121 15.4 312,900 10.4 
Total 259,569 100.0 3,020,400 100.0 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1954). 
Private ownership was the dominate form of land tenure in the highland 
region in the decade before the start of land reform (see Table 3.1 above). Over 
two-thirds of total landholdings and nearly three-quarters of the agricultural land 
surface were under private ownership, according to the 1954 agricultural census. 
Privately owned land covered the entire spectrum of landholdings located in the 
highland region. Indigenous peoples were represented within this group but were 
often still linked to haciendas through semi-feudalist practices (the practices are 
explained below). The extent of private ownership suggests land markets were 
well developed prior to the start of agrarian reform. However, Polanyi’s concept 
of the fictitious commodity suggests the privatisation and commodification of 
land should not be conflated. While land market activity increased in the 1950s, 
the crucial non-economic roles land performed for landowning elites and peasant 
families placed definite limits on commodification.
104
  Land was a source of 
political power and social prestige as well as income and wealth for elites and a 
place to live, maintain communal relations, and reproduce cultural practices for 
indigenous and mestizo peasants. While the bulk of landowners had the right to 
sell land, many elected not to do so because of the wider functions it performed 
in the rural economy and society.   
State-owned land placed further restrictions on the development of land 
markets.  The bulk of the land was under the stewardship of the state welfare 
                                                          
104
 Numerous studies indicate an uptick in land market activity in the highland region in the 
1950s. See, for example, Preston & Taveras (1977), Martínez (1985b), Haney & Haney (1987), 
Forster (1989), and Thurner (1989). Activity increased earlier in some areas (e.g. Otavalo). See, 
for example, Salomon (1981).   
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institution the Asistencia Social (AS).
105
 The AS owned seventy seven haciendas 
in the highland region which it leased to landowning elites. Rental revenues 
were then channelled into welfare programmes. CIDA report the combined stock 
of AS land was 132,853 hectares or 4.4% of the 1954 agricultural land surface 
(the landholdings are included within the rented category in Table 3.1). (1965 p. 
112)  
The widespread existence of semi-feudalist practices, communal land, and 
mixed tenures further limited the reach of land markets. The remaining 
agricultural land was operated under these tenure types. Huasipungo, which will 
be explained in greater depth below, involved the exchange of labour for land; 
partidario entailed the exchange of payment or produce for land; and, comunero 
involved the redistribution of usufruct rights to peasants within indigenous and 
peasant communities. The census understates the amount of communally owned 
land, especially páramo, but the data indicate the limited amount most 
indigenous and peasant communities had at their disposal. Other sources point in 
the same direction. The FAO, for example, estimate that in 1961 the average 
amount of land available to community members was less than half a hectare.  
(1980 p. 91) Mixed tenures included a variety of private, semi-feudal, 
traditional, and communal practices as well as colonos who worked previously 
uncultivated land in the remoter areas of the highland region.  The gap between 
the relative size of units and relative amount of land incorporated into these 
tenures (i.e. 30% versus 15%) illustrates the preponderance of minifundia (< 5 
hectares) and microfundia (< 1 hectare) within these groups.  
One important point to take from the land tenure data is land reform would 
have to incorporate considerable amounts of privately owned land if it was to 
have a significant bearing on the distribution of land in the highland region. 
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state expropriated from the Catholic Church in the early 1900s. Nevertheless, the Catholic 
Church remained a prominent landowner in the sierra in the 1960s.  
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Table 3.2 - Land distribution, Highland Ecuador, 1954
106
 
Farm size 
(hectares) 
Units % of total 
units 
Land surface 
(hectares) 
% of total 
land surface 
< 1 83,714 32.2 40,400 1.4 
1 > 4.99 128,439 49.5 301,300 10.0 
5 > 9.99 22,443 8.6 154,700 5.1 
10 > 19.99 10,570 4.1 142,000 4.7 
20 > 49.99 7,722 3.0 220,000 7.3 
50 > 99.99 3,594 1.4 218,700 7.2 
100 > 199.9 1,377 0.5 178,600 5.9 
200 > 499.99 991 0.4 292,500 9.7 
500 > 999.99 330 0.1 228,300 7.6 
1000 > 2499 251 0.1 363,700 12.0 
2500 > 138 0.1 880,200 29.1 
Total 259,569 100.0 3,020,400 100.0 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1954). 
The distribution of land in the 1950s was the epitome of the latifundia-
minifundia complex.  Over 65% of agricultural land was incorporated into 
approximately 3,000 landholdings of over 100 hectares, while less than 12% of 
land was incorporated into more than 200,000 units of less than 5 hectares (see 
Table 3.2 above). The land distribution reflected the historical incorporation of 
land into the traditional hacienda complex.
107
 The process exhibited a clear 
ethnic dimension with white and mestizo landowners taking control of the bulk 
of the agricultural land surface.
108
  Indigenous families and communities were 
able to pursue broadly or wholly autonomous economic strategies in some zones 
(e.g. Otavalo, Saraguro). However, the bulk of the highland indigenous 
population was linked to the traditional hacienda complex to varying degrees.  
The internal organisation of highland haciendas reflected this historical 
process. The general pattern was as follows. White and mestizo proprietors and 
renters of haciendas (hacendados or patróns) either operated haciendas directly 
or lived in towns and cities and recruited white or mestizo administrators 
(administradoras) and managers (mayordomos) to manage their properties.
109
  
                                                          
106
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The landowner and administrative and management staff then employed 
bilingual (i.e. Spanish-Kichwa) indigenous or mestizo foremen (mayorales or 
kipus) to run teams of indigenous and mestizo workers (e.g. huasipungueros). 
(Pearse 1970 p. 23) (Casagrande 1981 pp. 265-7) (Thurner 2000 pp. 354-7) 
(Lyons 2006 pp. 73-99) One important point to note about the division of labour 
on haciendas is that the hierarchy ensured some members of the hacienda 
workforce (e.g. mayordomos) were better placed to take advantage of the 
division and sale of haciendas than others (e.g. huasipungueros).  
No data exist that enable the ethnicity of workers linked to haciendas to be 
determined with absolute certainty. However, historical and anthropological 
sources suggest the semi-feudalist workforce was primarily, though by no means 
wholly, indigenous.
110
 This sector of the indigenous population was broadly split 
between “internal” and “external” families and communities. (Murra 1946 pp. 
819-20) (CIDA 1965 pp. 76-7)  
The bulk of the “internal” indigenous peasant population was incorporated 
into the semi-feudal practice huasipungo.
111
 The practice involved the 
asymmetrical exchange of land, natural resources, and labour between 
landowning elites and indigenous families. Landowners provided families with 
usufruct rights to small plots of land and access to pastoral land and woodland 
for their combined labour power. The tasks indigenous peoples performed for 
landowners varied but typically involved cultivating and harvesting crops, taking 
animals to pasture, and guarding against the theft of livestock and the damage of 
crops. Female members of the huasipungo family were also often obligated to 
work as domestic servants (huasicamas) for landowning elites, usually in towns 
and cities. (Becker & Tutillo 2009 pp. 62-3)  
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Technically, huasipungo was regulated by the Código del Trabajo, the legal 
framework that had regulated feudalist and capitalist labour relations in Ecuador 
since the 1930s. (RO 356 1961) Practically, however, the practice was 
negotiated between hacendados and huasipungueros at the local level and scant 
regard was paid to the legal framework.  Landowners provided huasipungueros 
with access to land, water, and firewood but the full or partial payment of wages 
was less common. Wages were frequently withheld and set against the “debts” 
incurred by indigenous families. Typically landowners retained ledgers for 
huasipungueros, detailing debts, costs, work, wages, and so on.  In order to 
achieve the status of huasipunguero, indigenous families often received suplidos 
or advances from the landowner, thereby starting their lives as huasipungueros 
in debt. Over time indigenous families often incurred additional debts (e.g. to 
fund weddings) which increased their reliance on landowners and decreased 
their ability to purchase land and other assets. The practice therefore resembled a 
form of debt peonage which enabled landowners to tie indigenous families to 
haciendas and ensure a constant supply of cheap labour.  
Table 3.3 –  Size distribution of huasipungos , Highland Ecuador, 1954 
Size  
(hectares) 
Units % of total 
units 
Land surface 
(hectares) 
% of total land 
surface 
<1 2,110 10.7 1,100 1.8 
1 > 4.9 14,945 76.0 36,800 61.1 
5 > 9.9 2,015 10.3 12,800 21.3 
10 > 19.9 435 2.2 5,400 9.0 
20 > 49.9 160 0.8 4,100 6.8 
Total  19,665 100.0 60,200 100.0 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1954).  
The plots granted to huasipungueros varied in size within and between 
haciendas. The 1954 census records around 600 plots of between 10 and 49.9 
hectares and approximately 2,000 of less than 1 hectare (see Table 3.3 above).
112
  
The majority, however, were between 1 and 4.9 hectares in size (i.e. minifundia). 
The average plot was 3.1 hectares. The majority of huasipungueros were 
therefore located at the lower end of the land distribution. The practice was most 
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widespread in the central and northern highlands (e.g. Chimborazo, Pichincha) 
where the bulk of the indigenous population was located (see Table 3.4 below).  
Table 3.4  –  Geographic distribution of huasipungos,                     
Highland Ecuador, 1954 
Province Units % of total units  Size (hectares) % of total land 
surface  
Azuay 1,050 5.3 3,900 6.4 
Bolívar 230 1.2 1,700 2.8 
Cañar 690 3.5 1,900 3.2 
Carchi 1,110 5.6 2,900 4.8 
Chimborazo 3,975 20.2 11,100 18.4 
Cotopaxi 2,380 12.1 11,000 18.3 
Imbabura 1,890 9.6 4,400 7.3 
Loja 1,350 6.9 3,700 6.2 
Pichincha 6,440 32.8 18,400 30.6 
Tungurahua 550 2.8 1,200 2.0 
Total  19,665 100.0 60,200 100.0 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1954).  
The 1954 census suggests there were 19,665 huasipungos in the highland 
region which accounted for 7.6% of total landholdings. The practice was far 
more important for indigenous peoples, however, as it encompassed the 
extended family of huasipungueros.  The wider huasipungo family was 
multigenerational. The children or dependants of the parents of the household – 
arrimados or apegados – usually remained directly connected to the huasipungo 
until they acquired usufruct rights to a new plot of land or to the family plot 
through the death of the huasipunguero. (Casagrande 1981) (Guerrero 1984b) 
Once the apegado/arrimado received a plot of land they obtained the title of 
huasipunguero and the cycle started anew.  Prior to the ceding of land, 
arrimados/apegados worked on haciendas as temporary wage labourers (peones 
sueltos), carried out unpaid obligatory tasks for landowners (ayudas), and 
contributed to agricultural production on the huasipungo and the pastoral land 
available to indigenous families linked to the hacienda. Depending on the 
location and demands of the hacienda, arrimados/apegados also spent periods 
away from the estate, working as labourers on farms and plantations in the sierra 
and the coast.  Members of the extended huasipungo family were therefore often 
enmeshed in feudalist and capitalist labour relations. This was also sometimes 
the case for huasipungueros who spent periods away from haciendas working as 
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wage labourers in the highlands or coast. Huasipungueros and 
arrimados/apegados sometimes used the income secured through wage labour to 
purchase land from landowning elites. (Martínez 1984 p. 76-7) In some cases 
purchasing land enabled them to free themselves from the obligations of 
huasipungo, renegotiate their relationship with landowners, and obtain a greater 
deal of autonomy.
113
   
The data collated in Table 3.5 provides an indication of the structure of the 
extended huasipungo family. In both cases, thirteen people were connected to 
one huasipungo plot. If thirteen is taken as the average number of people linked 
to one huasipungo and 19,665 is taken as the total number of huasipungos, the 
approximate total huasipungo/arrimado/apegado population was 255,645 or 
around 61% of the total rural indigenous population (taking Knapp’s estimate of 
the rural indigenous population in 1950 as a guide).  This estimate almost 
certainly overstates the size of the extended huasipungo family population but 
provides an indication of the wider significance of the practice. The important 
point to note about the structure of the extended family is land reform largely 
overlooked the arrimado/apegado population. Land was often, though not 
always, redistributed to huasipungueros but the shadow population behind them 
was generally excluded. This accelerated the minifundización and 
microfundización of indigenous landholdings, increased the reliance of 
arrimados/apegados on markets to secure land, and contributed to the social and 
political struggles that emerged around land reform and land markets from the 
1960s onwards.  
Table 3.5 – Huasipungo-arrimado-apegado population distribution on 
two haciendas in Highland Ecuador in the 1960s 
 Hacienda A Hacienda B 
Huasipungo families 23 29 
Huasipungo population 97 141 
Arrimado/apegado families 46 54 
Arrimado/apegado population 199 223 
Huasipungo-arrimado-apegado population  296 364 
Average number of people linked to huasipungo  13 13 
Source: My own elaboration based on Barsky (1988) p. 59 & Guerrero (1984b) p. 222. 
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The “external” indigenous population comprised smallholders who 
exchanged their labour for access to the land, water, firewood and roads located 
on haciendas (yanaperos or sitiajeros) as well as those who eked out livings by 
renting (arrendatarios) or sharecropping (partidarios or aparceros) small plots 
of land. (CIDA 1965 pp. 69-79) (Velasco 1979 p. 35-40) (Casagrande 1981 pp. 
265-70) (Martínez 2002a p. 100)  The ties that linked this sector of the 
indigenous population to haciendas were looser and the opportunities to organise 
were greater. Typically, though not universally, the external indigenous 
population organised into communities. The legal framework for communities 
was established by the Ley de Organización y Régimen de las Comunas, which 
was introduced in 1937 to facilitate the administration of the indigenous and 
peasant population.
114
 (RO 558 1937) The law dictated that every community 
should have a cabildo (council) formed of five community members. The 
cabildo was responsible for taking decisions on behalf of the community and 
representing the community to government officials and state agencies. While 
the actual organisational structures of communities varied enormously (i.e. the 
legal framework was not universally followed), most included a central authority 
which provided a basis for collective decision making. This basic organisational 
structure performed a crucial role in indigenous mobilisations that took place in 
the decades after the start of land reform.  
4. The land reform debate of the early 1960s and the drafting of the 
Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colonización  
Cracks started to emerge in the traditional rural highland economy in the 1950s 
as the gears of social, political, and economic change began to shift in 
Ecuador.
115
 The “banana boom”, which propelled Ecuador to the top of the 
world’s banana exporters in the 1950s, triggered a series of social and economic 
changes that stimulated the capitalist modernisation of agriculture in the 
highlands. The state, which started to take a greater role in directing economic 
change under the aegis of CEPAL, supported national capitalist development.  
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New opportunities emerged for highland landowning elites as domestic markets 
widened and towns and cities expanded. Increased demand for meat, dairy, and 
basic foodstuffs encouraged some hacendados to modernise their landholdings 
and loosen semi-feudal ties with peasant families and communities. New 
opportunities also emerged for highland peasants to secure temporary 
employment on the coast which decreased their reliance on traditional haciendas 
and reduced the supply of labour and placed upward pressure on wages in the 
sierra. The problems some highland landowning elites experienced securing 
cheap labour were accentuated by the upsurge in rural unrest in the 1950s. The 
expansion of rural unions and federations provided a platform for peasants to 
increase pressure on the elite and the state to improve living and working 
conditions on haciendas. Strikes and protests erupted across the highlands as 
peasants challenged traditional power relations. The Cuban Revolution provided 
additional support for indigenous, peasant, and leftist mobilisation at the end of 
the decade. The dissolution of the traditional rural economy had begun but it was 
not until the start of land reform that the transformation took hold. The land 
reform debate of the early 1960s had a considerable bearing on the 
transformation of the agrarian structure and the double movement that emerged 
in its wake.  
4.1. Wider political context 
Following twelve years of democratic rule (1948-60), the military returned to the 
forefront of Ecuadorian politics in the early 1960s.
116
  Jose María Velasco Ibarra 
won a convincing victory at the 1960 presidential elections, defeating former 
president and prominent landowner, Galo Plaza Lasso, into a distant second 
place. Promising to lower the cost of living, introduce land reform, and expand 
the public sector, the president and his party, the Federación Nacional 
Velasquista (FNV), secured support from the urban and rural poor as well as 
from sectors of the middle classes. Taking a conciliatory position towards Cuba 
also attracted support from elements of the left. Having failed to break 
diplomatic relations with Cuba and assuage mounting political and social unrest, 
the president was ousted by the military in November 1961. His vice-president, 
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Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, took office after receiving sufficient support 
from the military. Cuba continued to dominate the political agenda as the 
president came under increasing pressure from the right, military, and US 
government to break diplomatic relations with the Fidel Castro regime. Though 
Arosemena Monroy broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1962, concerns 
remained over leftist influences within his government.  Unable to drive through 
the reforms necessary to quell social unrest and secure Alliance for Progress 
funding, the president was removed from office by the military in 1963. Colonel 
Gándara, one of the principal actors behind the coup, argued that a “long series 
of defects and errors obliged the armed forces…to assume not only the 
responsibility to end the chaos and rectify mistaken paths but also the 
responsibility to promote a new socioeconomic structure.” (Fitch 1977 p. 66) 
The military junta (1963-66) remained in power to oversee the promulgation of 
land reform legislation as well as the introduction of a number of other reforms. 
4.2. Contours of the land reform debate  
President José Maria Velasco Ibarra lacked the political power to fulfil his 
election promise to introduce land reform.
117
 However, his short-lived 
government (1960-61) took the first real steps to translate land reform debates 
into concrete legislative proposals. (Barsky 1988 pp. 124-5) The Comisión 
Especial para Estudiar la Reforma Agraria was created in late 1960 and the 
Comisión Nacional de Reforma Agraria was formed in early 1961 to oversee the 
drafting of agrarian reform legislation. (Velasco 1979 p. 91) (Guerrero 1984a p. 
107) The commission comprised representatives of state agencies and the bodies 
charged with the task of representing and defending the interests of the nation’s 
landowning elites, Cámaras de Agricultura, but excluded representatives of the 
indigenous and peasant population. (Barsky 1988 p. 142) This, as will be 
explained in subsequent chapters, set the tone for the composition of the bodies 
charged with the task of designing and implementing land reform between 1964 
and 1994.  
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The launch of the Alliance of Progress in August 1961 accelerated the land 
reform debate. The US foreign policy initiative conditioned the provision of 
overseas loans to Latin American governments on the introduction of a series of 
social and economic reforms, including agrarian reform.  The stated objective of 
the Alliance of Progress was to promote “programs of comprehensive agrarian 
reform leading to the effective transformation…of unjust structures and systems 
of land tenure and use, with a view to replacing latifundia and dwarf holdings by 
an equitable system of land tenure”. (Taffet 2007 p. 207) However, the US 
government had little interest in promoting radical variants of land reform, 
fearing the widespread redistribution of land would stoke rather than calm 
revolutionary fervour. The overriding aim of the Alliance for Progress was to 
accelerate capitalist modernisation in Latin America.
118
 The variants of land 
reform favoured by US government supported capitalist modernisation by 
dissolving semi-feudal practices, commercialising agriculture, commodifying 
land and labour, and widening consumer markets.   
The prospect of overseas loans provided the Arosemena Monroy government 
(1961-63) with a powerful economic incentive to promote land reform. The 
bifurcation of the highland landowning elite facilitated its agenda (see Chapter 
2). While traditional elites were opposed to changes in the agrarian structure, 
modernising elites were supportive of a variant of land reform that dissolved 
semi-feudal practices and stimulated capitalist development. Viewing this split 
through a Polanyian lens sees the former maintaining a non-commodified view 
of land and the latter embracing a commodified vision which prioritised the 
economic functions of land. Casting the division of the highland landowning 
elite in this light helps understand traditional landowner resistance to land 
reform: it threatened their social, cultural and political interests as well as their 
economic standing. Faced with the prospect of disappearing as a social class and 
transforming their way of life, traditional landowning elites vociferously 
opposed reform. The point draws attention to the fact that within the double 
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movement framework countermovements can be regressive as well as 
progressive.
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While traditional landowning elites continued to oppose land reform, the 
launch of Alliance of Progress altered the balance of political power and the 
debate shifted to when reform would be introduced and what type of reform 
would be enacted. Guerrero argues highland landowning elites used two broad 
tactics to shape the debate once the introduction of land reform had become 
inevitable. (1984a pp. 102-4) First, prominent landowners, congressional 
counterreformers, and the Cámaras de Agricultura attempted to limit the debate 
over agrarian reform to the abolition of huasipungo.  With huasipungos 
accounting for less than 5% of the highland agricultural land surface, the 
redistribution of the plots of land to huasipungueros would leave the overall 
distribution of land in the highland region broadly unchanged. (Bretón 1997 p. 
58) Second, counterreformers obstructed and blocked the introduction of new 
legislation to provide hacendados with more time to unravel semi-feudalist 
practices without having to conform to new regulations imposed by land reform. 
(El Mercurio 08/01/1962 p. 5) (Sylva 1986 p. 77) (Handelman 1980 p. 68)  
The blocking of reform and the absence of a regulatory framework enabled 
landowners to negotiate individual settlements with indigenous peasant families 
and dissolve huasipungos on favourable terms. This provided space for 
landowners to resettle indigenous peasant families on to smaller and/or inferior 
plots of land; sell land to huasipungueros; and in some cases evict indigenous 
families altogether. Barsky argues that the relocation of huasipungueros to 
smaller and/or inferior plots of land was the “dominant” pattern between 1959 
and 1964. (1988 p. 71) The sources examined in Chapter 5 provide support for 
this claim but also stress the staunch resistance of indigenous families and 
communities to resettlement.  
While some outcomes favoured huasipungueros, the general pattern clearly 
benefitted hacendados. The Ministerio de Previsión Social y Trabajo (MPST) 
oversaw 3,019 cases between 1959 and 1964 which accounted for around 12% 
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of the total number of huasipungos recorded by the 1954 census (see Table 3.6 
below). The average size of the plots distributed during this period was 3.1 
hectares. While this corresponded with the overall size distribution captured by 
the census, the widespread resettlement of huasipungueros meant indigenous 
families were often left with private property rights to less productive plots of 
land. Moreover, the cessation of huasipungo blocked – or closed – semi-
feudalist avenues of securing land for arrimados/apegados, which increased 
their reliance on the plots huasipungueros obtained through the dissolution of 
the practice and on land markets (in the absence of the state redistributive 
mechanisms which were introduced with the introduction of land reform in 
1964). 
Table 3.6 – Private redistribution of huasipungos prior to the start of land 
reform, Highland Ecuador, 1959-1964 
Province Huasipungueros % Land        
(hectares) 
% Average size 
(hectares) 
Pichincha 1,760 58.3 4,955 53.2 2.8 
Carchi 498 16.5 2,672 28.7 5.8 
Imbabura 452 15.1 1,073 11.5 2.4 
Cotopaxi 158 5.2 474 5.2 3.0 
Chimborazo 134 4.4 116 1.2 0.9 
Bolivar 17 0.5 14 0.2 0.8 
Total 3,019 100.0 9,303 100.0 3.1 
Source: My own elaboration based on Barsky (1988) p. 73.  
Newspaper coverage of the land reform debate indicates the two tactics 
identified by Guerrero – the attempt to restrict the debate to the abolition of 
huasipungo and the blocking of the legislative process to allow hacendados  
time to dissolve semi-feudal practices - were combined with sustained efforts to 
discredit and undermine comprehensive land reform. A significant amount of 
energy was expended on attacking the feasibility and desirability of placing 
limits on landholdings and redistributing privately owned land (i.e. infringing 
private property rights). With the regulation and redistribution of land putatively 
unable to resolve the agrarian crisis in the highlands, the colonisation of the 
western and eastern lowlands was offered in their place. This would, of course, 
leave the overriding distribution of land, wealth, and power in the sierra largely 
unchanged. Both traditional and modernising landowning elites supported this 
approach. Galo Plaza Lasso, prominent modernising landowning elite and 
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former president of Ecuador, expressed this position clearly in his address to the 
Congreso de Agricultores de la Sierra y Oriente in January 1962. 
“Suppose the limit of 200 hectares is applied to each property, 
without exceptions, knowing that there are many crops that cannot be 
produced economically on that amount of land, and that there is not 
an agrarian reform law in Latin America that fixes such a limit, that 
would only leave 36,000 hectares, which according to the minimum 
size of a family property established in the anteproyecto would reach 
3,000 families. I ask myself whether Ecuador can withstand this 
disruption in order to resolve the problem of 3,000 families, leaving 
the majority of the small landowners the same as they are now…the 
land of Asistencia Publica and the land inefficiently exploited in the 
sierra can make a small contribution to the resolution of our problem 
but the grand solution is in the new and fertile lands which for the 
luck of Ecuador exist at the foot of the cordillera and closer to the 
sea.” (El Mercurio 25/01/1962 p. 8, emphasis added) 
The attempts of landowning elites to restrict the land reform debate to 
huasipungo, state-owned haciendas, and colonisation were in contradistinction 
to the efforts of peasant, indigenous, and leftist organisations to broaden the 
discussion to consider the wider distribution of land, wealth, and power in 
Ecuador. The local-level organisational base from which indigenous peoples 
engaged in this struggle comprised communities, unions, and federations. The 
power hacendados wielded at the local level set definite limits on indigenous 
organisation. Communities and unions were often banned on haciendas but 
landowners were unable to prevent collective organisation and mobilisation. The 
spaces open for indigenous peoples to organise widened in the 1950s as the 
stranglehold of landowning elites weakened. The organisational efforts of the 
Partido Comunista Ecuatoriano (PCE) were particularly influential, especially 
on state-owned haciendas.  (CIDA 1965 pp. 90-7) (Crespi 1971) (Albornoz 
1971) (MAG 1977c) (Becker 2008) The PCE was influential in proliferating 
indigenous unions and federations in various highland regions (e.g. Chimborazo, 
Pichincha) from the 1930s onwards. The principal organisation channel through 
which this was achieved was the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI), the 
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indigenous peasant federation the PCE helped establish in 1944. The FEI 
stopped short of being a movement – the base of the organisation incorporated a 
relatively small proportion of the highland indigenous population and the local-
level organisations affiliated with the federation remained relatively isolated. 
Nonetheless, the general strengthening of indigenous organisation at the local 
and regional levels and the change in the national and international environment 
in the early 1960s enabled indigenous communities and organisations to shift the 
focus of their demands away from improving living conditions on haciendas 
towards dissolving semi-feudalist practices, fragmenting haciendas, and 
redistributing land. The establishment of the Unión de Organizaciones de 
Campesinas Indigenas del Cantón Cayambe (UNOCC) reflected this general 
shift. The descendants of the huasipungueros who formed the union in 1960 told 
me the primary motivation for forming the organisation was simple: the “lucha 
por la tierra” (“the fight for land”) and “reforma agraria” (“agrarian reform”).  
(Interview 8) Indigenous demands went from working within existing 
institutional, legal and power structures to attempting to bring about their 
transformation.  
With few formal political channels open to them, indigenous families, 
communities, and organisations resorted to more contentious forms of political 
action to attempt to achieve this end.
120
 This was evident at the local and 
national levels. Locally, indigenous and peasant communities and organisations 
undertook a series of invasions, strikes, and protests, reconfiguring patron-
peasant relations, bringing the viability of the semi-feudal practices into doubt, 
and transmitting local conflicts over the use and control of land to national 
audiences. (CIDA 1965 pp. 93-4) (Crespi 1971 p. 233) (Albornoz 1971) 
(Velasco 1979 135-6) (Handelman 1980 pp. 68-9) Regions with long histories of 
organisation and militancy, such as the northern highland canton of Cayambe, 
witnessed some of the most vociferous and sustained protests. (FIPRR 1993 p. 
35) (Becker 2008 pp. 126-7) However, invasions, protests, and strikes took place 
in other highland regions, particularly in the central and southern provinces of 
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Chimborazo and Loja. Nationally, coming one month after the overthrow of 
Velasco Ibarra, the historic FEI-organised 12,000-person march on Quito 
increased the pressure on the Arosemena Monroy government to promulgate 
agrarian reform and raised awareness of the conditions and demands of 
indigenous peoples. (El Mercurio 17/12/1961 p. 1) (Velasco 1979 p. 94) 
(Guerrero 1984a p. 97) (Becker 2008 pp. 131-2)  
Indigenous, peasant, and leftists organisations were able to exert considerable 
pressure on the elite and the state through contentious forms of political action 
but they were unable to exercise real influence over the legislature. (Handelman 
1980 p. 68) (Barsky 1988 p. 139) CIDA emphasise this point: “The peasant 
sectors…were especially absent…no project that originated from these groups 
was seriously discussed.”121 (1965 p. 495) Although the exclusion of the 
indigenous and peasant population from the formulation of laws and policies 
was in keeping with the past, the intensification of the Cold War further limited 
the opportunities for indigenous, peasant, and leftists to shape the land reform 
debate.  The change in the geopolitical climate facilitated the efforts of political 
parties aligned to landowning elites to marginalise and weaken groups who 
advocated the expropriation, redistribution, and regulation of land. This 
manifested at the national and local level. Nationally, political parties associated 
with landowning elites, especially traditional hacendados, linked land reform to 
communism to narrow the debate and discredit reformers. This was evident from 
the outset when the Partido Conservador, the political party most closely 
associated with the traditional highland landowning elite, claimed the 
establishment of the Comisión Nacional de Reforma Agraria and the delivery of 
the first agrarian reform bill to Congress was “proof of communist infiltration” 
of the Velasco Ibarra government.
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 (Pyne 1975 p. 125) (Velasco 1979 p. 91) 
The “virulent anticommunist campaign” against the government intensified 
under Arosemena Monroy, prompting the Vice President Colonel Reinaldo 
Varea Donoso to assure the Congreso de Agricultores in January 1962 that 
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 Notably, as explained below, CIDA’s observation did not stop the Alliance for Progress 
endorsing the law that emerged out of this debate.  
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 Agee, who operated as a CIA agent in Ecuador in the early 1960s, claims the US agency 
performed a crucial role in raising the perceived threat of communism and turning the civilian 
and military governments of the early 1960s against leftist organisations and leftist overseas 
governments (especially the Cuba). ([1975] 1978) See also Fitch (1977) pp. 117-28.  
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“there would be no free distribution of land nor would communism be 
established”. (El Mercurio 22/01/1962 p. 1) (Cosse 1980 p. 59) The apparent 
threat of communism was one of the principal factors behind the decision of the 
military to oust Arosemena Monroy and establish a military government in May 
1963. (Fitch 1977) The military junta embarked upon a “vigorous anti-leftist 
sweep” soon after it was established. (Crespi 1971 p. 233) This involved the 
imprisonment of indigenous leaders, the closure of indigenous schools, the 
outlawing of the PCE, and the clampdown on strikes and protests. (RO 223 
1964) (El Mercurio 27/04/1964 p. 1) (Becker 2008 p. 137)  Locally, Cold War 
rhetoric legitimised elite and state repression of indigenous and peasant strikes, 
protests, and invasions. (El Mercurio 15/01/1962 p. 1) (Cosse 1980 p. 56) 
(Becker 2008 pp. 126-137) The links between the FEI and the PCE facilitated 
the efforts of landowning elites to link rural unrest to communist insurrection.  
These factors, combined with the limited reach and capacity of indigenous, 
peasant and leftist organisations, restricted the ability of indigenous and peasant 
population to influence the land reform debate which ensured the legislative 
proposals that emerged between 1961 and 1963 largely, though not wholly, 
reflected landowning elite interests.  
4.3. The drafting of the Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colonización 
The first land reform proposal that emerged in the early 1960s was formulated 
by the Comisión Nacional de Reforma Agraria and submitted to Congress in late 
1961.
123
 (Barsky 1988 pp.130-1 & 142-5) (El Mercurio 25/01/1962 p. 8)  The 
initiative was primarily limited to the abolition of huasipungo; the redistribution 
of AS haciendas; the colonisation of untitled land; and the redistribution of 
páramo. However, the draft legislation also proposed a minimum family farm 
size of twelve hectares which implied a significant change in the distribution of 
land and meaningful restrictions on the operation of land markets. Consequently, 
the bill was vociferously challenged by the Cámaras de Agricultura and 
categorically rejected by Congress. (Pyne 1975 p. 125) (Velasco 1979 p. 92) 
(Barsky 1988 p. 131)  
                                                          
123 My analysis of the land reform proposals in this section draws heavily on Barsky (1988) pp. 
134-65. 
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The rejection of the bill, the overthrow of Velasco Ibarra, the launch of the 
Alliance for Progress, the escalation of rural unrest, and the FEI march on Quito 
accelerated the legislative process. Various groups tabled legislative proposals in 
1962 and 1963.  
The decision of President Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy to address the 
historic FEI march hinted that his government was prepared to adopt a more 
radical position on land reform. (El Mercurio 17/12/1961 p.1) (Guerrero 1984a 
p. 98) (Barsky 1988 p. 127) While the president’s New Year address pointed 
towards a more moderate position, the proposal that emanated from the 
executive branch of his government still stipulated a minimum landholding size 
of 12 hectares in the highlands and 15 hectares in the coast and a maximum 
landholding size of 600 hectares. (El Mercurio 01/01/1962 p. 12)  (Barsky 1988 
pp. 162-3) The proposal contrasted sharply with the other projects tabled 
between 1962 and 1963, especially those from parties or coalitions with strong 
links to traditional and modernising landowning elites. For example, the 
initiatives advanced by the Partido Liberal Radical and Bloque Centro-
Derechista excluded lower and upper limits on landholdings. The proposals also 
exhibited differences in relation to the abolition of semi-feudal practices. The 
executive branch of the government demanded the abolition of all semi-feudalist 
practices, the Partido Liberal Radical proposed the eradication of huasipungo 
and yanapa, and the Bloque Centro-Derechista suggested only the dissolution of 
huasipungo. The aim of the government to abolish all forms of semi-feudal 
relations reflected its desire to accelerate the capitalist modernisation of 
agriculture while the aim of the Bloque Centro-Derechista to limit the 
prohibition of semi-feudalist practices to huasipungo reflected its wish to 
preserve elements of the traditional agrarian structure. The proposals also 
exhibited marked differences in relation to the potential for the expropriation of 
privately owned land. The general emphasis was placed on the expropriation and 
redistribution of underutilised land. However, the projects proposed different 
thresholds for the measurement of underutilisation and different expropriation 
limits. For instance, the initiative sponsored by the Partido Liberal Radical 
excluded all landholdings of up to 100 hectares in the sierra and 200 hectares in 
the coast from expropriation and limited the total amount of land liable for 
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confiscation above these thresholds to 10% of the size of the landholding. Hence 
it set very clear limits on the amount of privately owned land that could be 
redistributed. The redistributive reach of the proposal advanced by the executive 
branch of the government was also limited. However, the initiative provided 
greater scope for expropriation and redistribution than the proposals tabled by 
the parties most closely associated with landowning elites.   
The ousting of Arosemena Monroy and the formation of the military junta 
effectively removed the proposal advanced by the executive branch of the 
government from the table and provided landowning elites with increased space 
to influence the drafting of agrarian reform legislation. Within a narrow political 
arena modernising landowning elites aligned to Galo Plaza and traditional 
landowning elites linked to Camilo Ponce dominated proceedings (see Chapter 
2). (Cosse 1980 pp. 57-61) (Montúfar 2011 p. 38) The law that emerged out of 
this process, the LRAC, was a compromise between these two groups, state 
bureaucrats, and military officials. Placistas (i.e. those aligned with Plaza) were 
able to leave a bigger imprint on the legislation than poncistas (i.e. those aligned 
with Ponce), however, as their modernising vision of agrarian change chimed 
with the cepalistas within the state bureaucracy (i.e. those supportive of ideas 
and proposals of CEPAL), modernising elements of the military, and, crucially, 
the Alliance for Progress.   
The endorsement of the legislation by the Alliance for Progress was swift and 
emphatic. Within a few weeks of announcing the law, the military regime was 
promised US$ 39,000,000 in loans.
124
 (El Mercurio 13/05/1964 p. 5 & 
27/05/1964 p.1) The disbursement was the largest in Ecuador’s history. Carlos 
Sanz de Santamaría, the chairman of the Comité Interamericano de la Alianza 
para el Progreso (CIAP), described the collaboration as “a singular example of 
the type of effective multilateral cooperation that is required to reach the 
objectives…of the Alliance for Progress”.  (El Mercurio 27/05/1964 p. 1)  
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 The financial disbursements were channelled through the World Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank, and USAID. The majority of the loans were directed towards the 
construction of roads and infrastructure. (El Mercurio 27/05/1964 p. 1) (World Bank 1965) 
(Taffet 2007 pp. 53-7) According to IERAC the only overseas financial support it received was a 
US$2,600,000 IDB loan (BID-52-TF-EC). (1977 p. 37) The loan was channelled into 
colonisation. The disbursement of overseas loans for colonisation rather than land reform was 
consistent with the trends Adams (1970) reports for Latin America as a whole (see Chapter 2).  
119 
 
The LRAC may well have supported the principal objective of the Alliance 
for Progress. However, as the next chapter will show, it provided very few 
opportunities for indigenous families and communities to secure land.  
5. Summary: empirical and theoretical findings 
This chapter has shown that the vast majority of the highland indigenous 
population lived in rural areas in the 1950s and 1960s, indicating the strong links 
that existed between indigenous peoples and land and agriculture. Most 
indigenous families and communities were enmeshed within the fabric of the 
traditional hacienda complex. Huasipungo was the most important semi-feudal 
practice for indigenous peoples. One important aspect of the practice was the 
size of the wider huasipungo family linked to the plots of land granted to 
huasipungueros. No precise conclusions can be drawn about the size of the 
wider huasipungo population but the chapter has shown that extended families 
of thirteen were reported on some highland haciendas in the 1960s.  The private 
redistribution of huasipungos to indigenous families (i.e. the conversion of 
usufruct rights into private property rights) started to gather pace in the late 
1950s. The process terminated the huasipungo relation and restricted the 
possibilities of arrimados/apegados obtaining land through semi-feudal 
mechanisms. This increased the pressure on the plots of ex-huasipungueros and 
the reliance of ex-arrimados/apegados on markets to secure land.  
The partial closure of semi-feudal mechanisms was one of a number of 
factors that stimulated land market activity in the 1950s. However, the 
traditional rural economy placed definite limits on commodification. The 
fictitious commodity concept draws attention to some of the obstacles. Land 
performed crucial non-economic functions for peasants and traditional 
landowning elites, meaning non-economic factors influenced decision making 
over its use and distribution. The widespread existence of private landholdings 
in the 1950s did not therefore translate into the widespread existence of land 
markets.  Semi-feudal practices and state and communal land placed further 
restrictions on commodification. The fictitious commodity concept also provides 
insight into the reaction of traditional landowning elites to land reform and land 
commodification, emphasising that within the double movement framework 
countermovements can be regressive as well as progressive.   
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The traditional agrarian structure restricted indigenous organisation but 
spaces started to open in the 1950s as the grip of hacendados weakened and 
indigenous and leftist activists strengthened. The FEI performed a crucial role in 
bolstering indigenous organisation and supporting the efforts of indigenous 
peoples to improve working conditions and stake claims for land. Yet the 
federation incorporated a relatively small proportion of the highland indigenous 
population. No regional or national indigenous movement existed in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  
The absence of a broad-based indigenous movement was one of a number of 
factors that limited the imprint indigenous peoples were able to leave on the land 
reform proposals that emerged between 1960 and 1964. The law that emerged 
out of land reform debate – the LRAC – largely reflected the interests of the 
sector of the rural society most heavily involved in drafting the legislation: 
landowning elites.  The Alliance for Progress agency charged with the task of 
investigating rural issues (CIDA) noted the absence of peasant involvement in 
the design of the LRAC but the central committee of the initiative (CIAP) 
disbursed a number of overseas loans to the military junta shortly after the final 
version of the law was agreed. The disbursement of loans to the government 
indicates the influence the Alliance for Progress exerted over the land reform 
debate of the early 1960s (see Chapter 2).  
The following chapters show that while landowning elites were able to set the 
basic parameters of land reform legislation in the early 1960s they were unable 
to control the social and political struggles that emerged in the decades that 
followed.   
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Chapter Four  
Movements towards and against reform: political struggles over the 
design of land reform (1964-1979) 
1. Introduction  
While the gears of social, political, and economic change began to shift in 
Highland Ecuador in the 1950s, it was not until land reform started that the 
dissolution of the traditional hacienda complex accelerated and the capitalist 
modernisation of agriculture advanced. The weakness of the Ley de Reforma 
Agraria y Colonización (LRAC), both in terms of design and application, 
ensured its impact was neither instant nor universal. Nevertheless, the law 
provided the foundation for the gradual reconfiguration of the mechanisms 
through which land was distributed in the sierra. The semi-feudal channel was 
closed; the state redistribution avenue was opened; and the market mechanism 
was enlarged. The double movement around land reform emerged out of this 
transformation. On the one side, indigenous communities, organisations and 
movements attempted to increase the regulation, redistribution and social control 
of land while on the other side, landowning elites resisted infringements on 
private property rights and restrictions on the ownership and exchange of land. 
Traditional highland landowners offered the staunchest resistance to the 
implementation of land reform but formed a united front with modernising 
landowners against attempts to increase the regulation and redistribution of land. 
The state oscillated as social, political and economic conditions shifted but only 
made modest efforts to increase regulation and redistribution before retreating 
from land reform in the late 1970s. The outcome was a framework that primarily 
promoted the commodification rather than decommodification of land.   
This chapter examines the political struggle over the design of land reform in 
the 1960s and 1970s, focusing on the evolution of land reform legislation and 
indigenous and peasant attempts to transform land reform. The organisational 
base from which highland indigenous peoples engaged in this struggle is also 
explained. The implementation of the redistributive component of land reform 
and the role indigenous peoples performed in the process is examined in the next 
chapter.  
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The rest of the chapter is divided into six sections. The second section 
provides the wider political and economic context by sketching the evolution of 
Ecuador’s political economy in the 1960s and 1970s. The third section explains 
the commodification and decommodification dimensions of the LRAC. 
Indigenous and peasant attempts to transform land reform are then analysed in 
section four. The section outlines the evolution of highland indigenous 
organisation in the opening decade of reform, explains the change in the state’s 
position towards reform in the early 1970s, and analyses the land reform 
proposal indigenous and peasant movements presented in 1973. The fifth section 
compares the indigenous-peasant proposal with the new agrarian reform law 
introduced in 1973 and outlines the commodification and decommodification 
dimensions of the legislation. The evolution of land reform legislation and the 
political struggle over land reform between 1973 and 1979 is then examined in 
section six. The seventh section summarises the main empirical and theoretical 
findings of the chapter.   
2. The evolution of Ecuador’s political economy in the 1960s and 1970s 
The double movement around land reform, land markets, and indigenous 
peoples emerged amid profound social, political and economic change in 
Ecuador.
125
 The military junta that came to power in 1963 to oversee the 
introduction of land reform performed an important role in this process (see 
Chapter 3). In addition to land reform, the regime also promulgated labour and 
tax reforms. The Código del Trabajo was modified to extend worker rights (e.g. 
increase paid annual leave, expand worker profit shares) while the tax regime 
was adjusted to broaden income taxes and centralise tax collection. (RO 365 
1964) (Schodt 1987 pp. 83-5) The military also introduced new measures to 
stimulate industrialisation, expanding the basic ISI framework established by the 
Velasco Ibarra (1952-56) and Camilo Ponce (1956-60) governments. (Pacheco 
1983 p. 118) (Conaghan 1988 pp. 42-4)  
The military relinquished power in 1966 when a Constituent Assembly was 
established to rewrite the constitution. Following the approval of the new 
constitution, Jose María Velasco Ibarra returned to office, winning a narrow 
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 See Appendix 3 for broad economic trends during the 1960s and 1970s.  
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victory at the 1968 presidential elections. The opening years of the last Velasco 
Ibarra government (1968-72) were chaotic. (Schodt 1987 pp. 86-8) Grappling 
with the deterioration of the public finances and the erosion of political and 
public support, the president spent the first two years in office implementing 
austerity measures and reorganising the state bureaucracy. The fiscal problems 
Velasco Ibarra experienced were indicative of the general weakness of the public 
finances in the 1960s. While modifications to the tax system and overseas loans 
generated fresh revenues, the budget registered deficits in every year between 
1965 and 1969 as expenditure outpaced revenues. (CEPAL 1969 p. 161)  
The influence elites exerted over the state apparatus set definite limits on 
reform. Personal, regional, economic, political and ideological cleavages 
ensured elites frequently clashed but compromises were often reached to dilute 
or prevent the introduction of reforms that threatened their economic interests 
and social standing. The principal channels through which elites translated their 
economic power into political power was through representation within political 
parties and national governments.
126
 The Cámaras de Producción (Agricultura, 
Comercio and Industria) also performed a crucial role. The chambers, which 
were divided into coastal and highland divisions and subdivided into various 
regional branches, were established in the 1930s to create formal channels 
between the private sector and the state. (De la Torre 2006 p. 253) The Cámaras 
de Producción exerted direct influence over the legislature through 
congressional representatives as well as over the design and implementation of 
economic policies through representation within state agencies. (Conaghan 1988 
p. 85)  They also provided a solid platform for elites to launch broad and 
coordinated offensives against laws and policies (e.g. land reform, tax reform).   
The influence elites were able to exert over the state apparatus was aided by 
the relative weakness of labour, peasant, and leftist organisations in the 1960s. 
Urbanisation and industrialisation supported the expansion of the organised 
labour movement in the 1960s. However, the size of the industrial base and the 
prevalence of small-scale and artisan producers set limits on the development of 
a broad-based labour movement. Ideological and political differences between 
the three main trade unions further weakened the labour movement. The 
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 See Pyne (1975), North (1985), Schodt (1987), Conaghan (1988) and Montúfar (2011).  
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Confederación de Trabajadores del Ecuador (CTE) was linked to the Partido 
Comunista Ecuatoriano (PCE) and Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano (PSE); the 
Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL) was 
aligned to the pro-US Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores 
(ORIT); and the Confederación Ecuatoriana de Obreros Católicos (CEDOC) 
was associated with the Partido Conservador and Catholic Church. (Corkill 
1987 p. 138) (Becker 2008 p. 157) Ecuador therefore lacked the powerful 
organised labour movements that emerged elsewhere in Latin America. The 
same was also true of indigenous and peasant movements at this stage (see 
Chapter 3). Leftist political parties provided the rural and urban poor with a 
degree of political representation. However, reflecting trends elsewhere in Latin 
America, the left split into various factions in the 1960s which limited the ability 
of leftist parties to exert influence inside or outside the state apparatus. The 
franchise, which restricted the right of illiterates to vote, further limited the 
formal political channels open to the rural and urban poor.   
The discovery of substantial oil deposits in the northern Amazonian region in 
the late 1960s transformed Ecuador’s political economy in the 1970s. Substantial 
oil revenues did not start to flow into the public purse until the infrastructure 
required to export oil was completed in 1972. However, the revenues Jose María 
Velasco Ibarra extracted from the oil sector helped his government stabilise the 
public finances and introduce a number of social and economic reforms between 
1970 and 1972. The Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social (IESS) was 
created to improve access to welfare to formal sector workers and new 
legislation was introduced to increase opportunities for highland and coastal 
peasants to secure land (Section 4 below). Reflecting the uneasy relationship 
between the government and the labour movement, labour reforms moved in 
opposite directions. Employee entitlements to company profits were increased 
but the right to strike was restricted and the potential for workers to form trade 
unions was limited. (RO 420 1970) (RO 278 1971)  
The possibility of the divisive leader of the Concentración de Fuerzas 
Populares (CFP), Assad Bucaram, winning the 1972 presidential elections; 
growing concern over the management of oil revenues; and, the escalation of 
rural and urban unrest prompted the military to seize power in February 1972. 
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Once in office the Rodriguez Lara military government (1972-76) quickly 
announced its intention to establish a new economic model. (Conaghan 1988 p. 
81) The regime proceeded down three broad paths. The first involved the 
expansion of incentives for private industrial enterprises to operate and the 
extension of trade protection. The Ley de Fomento Industrial was broadened and 
the Ministerio Industria, Comercio y Integración was established. (CEPAL 1973 
p. 180) While foreign investment was still promoted, the accent of industrial 
policy was tilted towards national enterprises. (Fernandez 1982 pp. 64-5)  The 
second involved the creation of state-owned and mixed-ownership enterprises. 
(Conaghan 1988 pp. 84-6) (Montúfar 2011 p. 39) The most important state-
owned firm to emerge was the Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana 
(CEPE) which enabled the state to take a more active role in the oil sector. 
(CEPAL 1971 pp. 122-3) (CEPAL 1972 p. 79) The third involved the 
strengthening of the regulative and redistributive capacity of the state and the 
bolstering of state agencies. For example, the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo 
(FONADE) was established to redirect excess oil revenues into economic and 
social programmes; the Superintendencia de Precios was created to regulate the 
prices of basic consumer goods (e.g. food, milk); the Ley de Reforma Agraria 
was introduced to expand the redistribution and regulation of land (Section 5 
below); the Ley de Aguas was promulgated to increase the state control of water; 
and the staffing and funding of state agencies were significantly increased. 
(CEPAL 1973 pp. 180-1) (CEPAL 1975 pp. 200-1) (Conaghan 1988 p. 87)  
Though aspects of the new economic model were consistent with the existing 
framework, the role the state was expected to perform in the economic sphere 
was radically different. The Rodriguez Lara regime went to great lengths to 
assure economic elites the private sector would remain the central pillar of the 
economy. (Conaghan 1988 p. 82) Yet the new model still threatened elite control 
of the state apparatus and imposed new regulations on private enterprise. 
Moreover, surging oil revenues gave the Rodriguez Lara government the fiscal 
potential to undertake widespread reform. Conaghan notes: 
“The sudden rejuvenation of the state’s fiscal position drew all 
relevant political actors into serious reconsiderations of how this 
change could affect their relationships to the state”. (1988 p. 77)  
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The threat to elites was heightened by the strengthening of labour, peasant, and 
indigenous movements in the early 1970s. While the labour movement remained 
fragmented, with the three main trade unions accounting for one half of union 
membership and numerous small trade associations accounting for the other, 
industrialisation and urbanisation lent support to  trade union expansion and 
activism. (Corkill 1987 p. 138) Peasant and indigenous movements, as will be 
explained below, also strengthened.  
Faced with the prospect of the government establishing alliances with labour, 
indigenous, and peasant movements to drive socioeconomic change, elites 
launched a broad-based offensive, forcing the regime to dilute or shelve reforms 
and preventing the full implementation of the new economic model. The 
stagnation of oil production and downturn in world oil prices in 1975 support the 
elite offensive as the fiscal position deteriorated. (CEPAL 1975 pp. 200-1) 
(Pacheco 1983 pp. 140-42) Labour, leftist, peasant and indigenous movements 
exerted counter-pressure on the government to accelerate reforms. The last throw 
of the dice came in November 1975 when the Frente Unitario de Trabajadores 
(FUT), which united the CTE, CEDOC and CEOSL into a single alliance for the 
first time, organised a national strike.
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  The FUT tabled a nine-point 
programme that included demands to overturn anti-labour legislation, increase 
labour representation within state agencies, nationalise strategic enterprises, raise 
the minimum wage, and, highlighting the alliances indigenous and peasants 
movements established with trade unions, radicalise agrarian reform. (Corkill 
1987 pp. 140-1) (Schodt 1987 pp. 126-7) (Conaghan 1988 pp. 113-4)   
Rather than respond to the FUT’s demands, the military forced Rodriguez 
Lara from office in January 1976 and established a conservative military 
triumvirate government (1976-79) that moved in the opposite direction.
128
 The 
implementation of the Rodriguez Lara economic model was halted and reversed 
and the repression of labour, indigenous, and peasant activists and movements 
was increased.  (Pacheco 1983 pp. 123-31) (Corkill 1987 pp. 140-1) The 
cleavages that had emerged within the military and the lack of space open to 
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 CEDOC moved away from its conservative roots in the late 1960s and early 1970s and 
became known as the Central Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Clasistas (CEDOC) in 1972.  
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 The government was labelled a “triumvirate” as it represented the three branches of the 
military – i.e. the army, navy and air force. 
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social movements to operate provided elites with the opportunity to exert 
considerable influence over the legislature as the return to democracy 
approached.  (Conaghan 1988 pp. 115-19) (Montúfar 2011 p. 43-4)  The door 
that had opened to substantive reform in the early 1970s had been slammed shut 
by the end of the decade.  
3. Commodification and decommodification dimensions of the Ley de 
Reforma Agraria y Colonización  
The LRAC was part of the wider set of reforms the military government (1963-
66) introduced to accelerate capitalist development and secure Alliance for 
Progress funding (see Chapter 3). The law promoted the commodification of 
land on the one hand and the decommodification of land on the other. Drawing 
on Polanyi’s concepts of the double movement, fictitious commodities, and 
forms of integration (see Chapter 1), this section explains these two dimensions 
of the law. The structure and remit of the agency charged with the task of 
directing land reform is also briefly examined.  
The LRAC created the IERAC to oversee land reform and colonisation in 
Ecuador. Within a wider remit, the IERAC was responsible for regulating land 
markets and redistributing land. Indicating the dual role the institute performed 
in the double movement, the IERAC was also charged with the task of 
promoting “the free trade of agricultural land with a view to creating land 
markets and promoting changes in private tenancy”. (Art. 164 RO 297 1964) 
The Consejo Directivo, the steering committee of the IERAC, comprised various 
state officials as well as one representative from the coastal and highland 
branches of the Cámaras de Agricultura and one representative of agricultural 
workers from the coast and the sierra. No representation was given to 
indigenous, mestizo, or afroecuatoriano peasants. (Arts. 9 & 10 RO 297 1964) 
The lack of influence indigenous, peasant, and leftist organisations were able to 
exert over the drafting of the LRAC was therefore reflected in the composition 
of the committee responsible for directing and enforcing agrarian reform. The 
imbalance between landowning elites and indigenous peoples within the Consejo 
Directivo was accentuated by the links hacendados established with the regional 
branches of the IERAC. For example, the Director of the Riobamba division of 
IERAC in the mid-1960s was Dr. Alfonso Cordero who was also a prominent 
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landowner in the region. (El Espectador 05/06/1972 pp. 1-3) The influence 
landowning elites exerted over the IERAC at the regional and national levels 
limited the ability of the institute to regulate and redistribute land. Enjoying 
close links with the IERAC also enabled landowning elites to secure favourable 
financial terms for the land they sold to the institute, reducing the impact of 
agrarian reform on the redistribution of wealth and income.  
The LRAC encouraged the expansion of land markets in a variety of ways. 
Linking private property rights to the economic use of land and threatening the 
expropriation of unproductive and underutilised land encouraged landowning 
elites to rationalise haciendas and offer land for sale on the market. The 
prohibition of semi-feudalist practices ruptured the peasant-patron relationship 
and reduced the non-economic functions land performed for traditional 
landowning elites. Economic factors came to perform a greater role in 
determining the use, value and distribution of land and the amount of land 
circulated within markets increased. The outlawing of semi-feudalist practices 
increased the reliance of peasants on land markets which stimulated market 
demand. The conversion of usufruct rights into private property rights, the 
proliferation of private property titles, the bolstering of rural cadastres and the 
protection agrarian reform provided for private property rights to utilised and 
productive land supported market activity and development.    
The considerable influence landowning elites exerted over the drafting of the 
LRAC ensured the components of the law that regulated land markets and 
redistributed land were limited.  
Land market regulation was largely restricted to the peasant and reform 
sectors. The law stipulated that no landholding was permitted to be divided 
below the “unidad agrícola familiar” (which was provisionally set at 5 hectares) 
and that no landholding redistributed via agrarian reform (individual or 
collective) was allowed to be transferred without prior approval from the 
IERAC. (Arts. 42, 47 & 48 RO 297 1964) The law imposed an upper limit of 
1,800 hectares (800 cultivable, 1,000 pastoral) on the size of a single 
landholding in the sierra but “efficiently exploited” farms were exempt. (Arts. 33 
& 34 RO 297 1964) No definition of “efficient exploitation” was provided so the 
impact of the limit was limited. The legislation placed no meaningful restrictions 
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on the ownership or monopolisation of land. Few measures were therefore 
introduced to reduce existing inequalities in the distribution of land or stopping 
new inequalities from emerging. Polanyi notes that “regulation both extends and 
restricts freedom; only the balance of freedoms lost and won is significant.” 
([1944] 2001 p. 262) The scales of the regulatory dimension of the LRAC were 
tipped firmly towards landowning elites.  
The same was broadly true of the redistributive dimension of the law.  Three 
broad categories of redistribution were established: i) huasipungos; ii) state-
owned land; and iii) privately owned land incorporated into the reform sector via 
expropriation, reversion, and negotiation.  
The framework established to oversee the redistribution of huasipungos 
provided greater protection for huasipungueros than the private intiative that 
took place between 1959 and 1964 (see Chapter 3). (Arts. 67-77 RO 297 1964) 
Yet the legislation still allowed landowners to resettle and in some cases evict 
huasipungueros. The law did not therefore demand the direct conversion of 
usufruct rights into private property rights.  Indigenous workers who had worked 
for ten or more years for the same landowner as huasipungueros were entitled to 
receive land without cost while huasipungueros who had worked for less than 
ten years for the same landowner were obligated to purchase land and repay the 
landowner within five years. No upper or lower limits on land redistributed to 
huasipungueros were established. No explicit provisions were provided for 
members of extended huasipungo families (e.g. arrimados-apegados) to secure 
land (see Chapter 3). The legal framework therefore provided no explicit 
mechanisms for a significant and expanding section of the rural highland 
indigenous population to secure land. 
The provisions the law created for the redistribution of state-owned land 
related to the stock of AS haciendas (see Chapter 3). The law implied the land 
should be redistributed without cost to indigenous peoples, stating “the 
adjudication of land to indigenous groups traditionally located in each zone will 
be undertaken in forma gratuita y directa when the land is owned by the state.” 
(Art. 50 RO 297 1964)  However, the supplementary legislation issued to 
regulate the division and redistribution of AS haciendas reversed this 
commitment and provided the IERAC with license to sell the land to indigenous 
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families, cooperatives, and communities.  (Art. 13 RO 502 1965) Legal grounds 
were also provided for the relocation of peasants who worked on state-owned 
land.  
The rest of the land potentially available for redistribution was privately 
owned land transferred to the IERAC through reversion, negotiation and 
expropriation. (Arts. 23-40 RO 297 1964)  Land that had been left idle for 10 
years or worked by peasants without a contract with the landowner was to be 
reverted to the IERAC. The potential for IERAC to purchase land from 
landowners through negotiation was also established. The primary grounds 
established for expropriation were “underutilisation” and “inefficient 
exploitation”. Land was considered to be underutilised if it had not been 
exploited for three consecutive years and inefficiently exploited if it had 
“notoriously inferior” levels of productivity.  Landowners were allowed three 
years to upgrade their landholdings, providing them with time to sell unwanted 
land on the market or to the IERAC. The emphasis the law placed on the 
expropriation of underutilised and inefficient land, as Feder notes, biased 
agrarian reform towards the redistribution of the least productive land. (1965 p. 
657) The other important basis established for expropriation was “great 
demographic pressure”. With rural population growth accelerating in the 1960s, 
especially in areas with large indigenous populations, the demographic clause 
was potentially highly significant, especially as the law allowed for the 
expropriation of productive landholdings. However, the explicit preference the 
clause stated for resettlement and colonisation and the lack of clarity it provided 
over what actually constituted demographic pressure reduced the power of the 
provision. Providing landowners with ample room to negotiate favourable 
prices, the law stated expropriation should be based on the cadastral value and 
the economic capacity of the landholding. (Art. 124 RO 297 1964) No direct link 
between the price the IERAC paid for the land and the price the institute charged 
beneficiaries was established.  
The law enabled the IERAC to redistribute individual and collective land 
titles, expressing preference for the redistribution of land to cooperatives. (Arts. 
41-59 RO 297 1964)   The proliferation of collective land titles placed some 
restrictions on land market expansion. However, the redistribution of land to 
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beneficiaries who formed cooperatives was undertaken on an individual and 
collective basis. No meaningful upper or lower limits were placed on land 
redistributed via agrarian reform. Few measures were therefore included to stop 
new inequalities emerging through land redistribution.   
Table 4.1 – Commodification and decommodification dimensions of                                            
the Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colonización, 1964                              
Dimension Key aspects 
Land  
commodification 
 Private property rights conditioned on the economic use of land 
 Threat of expropriation of underutilised and unproductive land 
 Protection of private property rights to utilised and productive land 
 Proscription of semi-feudalist practices (e.g. huasipungo) 
 Proliferation of private property titles 
 Bolstering of rural cadastres 
Land   
decommodification 
 Redistribution of underutilised and unproductive privately owned 
land 
 Redistribution of utilised and productive land in areas of “great 
demographic pressure” but explicit preference for resettlement and 
colonisation 
 Redistribution of Asistencia Social haciendas 
 Redistribution of huasipungos 
 Proliferation of collective land titles  
 Maximum size of landholdings: 1,800 hectares  
 Minimum size of landholdings: none 
 Transfer and division of landholdings: regulation of peasant and 
reform sectors 
 Monopolisation restrictions: weak and undefined 
Source: My own elaboration based on  Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colonización, RO 297, 23 July 1964 
and Decreto 168, RO 502, 18 May 1965. 
To sum up, the LRAC simultaneously promoted the commodification and 
decommodification of land (see Table 4.1 above). However, its 
decommodification dimensions were highly circumscribed. Few measures were 
introduced to regulate land markets and limited provisions were provided to 
redistribute land. The break between the commodification and 
decommodification dimensions of land reform was not as clean as Table 4.1 
might suggest. The conversion of usufruct rights into private property rights and 
the redistribution of individual land titles supported the development of land 
markets. The fact beneficiaries were obligated to secure permission from IERAC 
before transferring land reduced the commodifying potential of this aspect of the 
reform. But the proliferation of land titles still lent support to market 
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development. This draws attention to some tensions within Polanyi’s conceptual 
framework. It shows that redistributive mechanisms can promote the expansion 
of market mechanisms. It also indicates the line between the two sides of the 
double movement is less clear empirically than it is theoretically.  
The next section analyses indigenous and peasant attempts to expand the 
regulative and redistributive dimensions of land reform and examines the 
political struggle that emerged between indigenous and peasant movements, 
landowning elites, and the state.   
4. The indigenous countermovement and indigenous and peasant 
attempts to transform land reform  
The victory of Jose María Velasco Ibarra at the 1968 presidential elections 
marked the start of a change in the dynamics of agrarian reform. The initial 
implementation of reform had concentrated on the dissolution of 
huasipungo/arrimado lojano and the division and redistribution of a handful of 
state-owned haciendas. No effort had been made to expropriate and redistribute 
privately owned land. The privately owned land that had been transferred to the 
IERAC was done so through negotiation. IERAC was starved of funding and 
subject to frequent personnel changes and revisions to the legal framework were 
generally regressive. (RO 167 1967) (Blankstein and Zuvekas 1973 pp. 81-3) 
(FAO 1980 p. 92)  
The change in the dynamics of agrarian reform between 1968 and 1973 left 
most of these basic patterns unaltered. However, the state showed greater 
willingness to expand the regulative and redistributive components of the 
reform, particularly in the early 1970s. Three interrelated factors contributed to 
the shift in the state’s position. First, the oil boom sent state-society relations 
into flux. The influence landowning elites exerted over the state apparatus was 
momentarily diminished and the state was provided with greater economic 
potential to accelerate reform. Second, the comprehensive agrarian reform 
programme the Velasco military regime had started in Peru provided inspiration 
for some political elites.  (Redclift 1978 p. 28) (Hidrobo 1992 pp. 119-20) Third, 
the strengthening of indigenous and peasant organisation provided a stronger 
platform for the rural poor to pressure the state to redistribute and regulate land.  
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The next section explains the organisation base from which highland 
indigenous peoples engaged in the struggle to increase the regulation, 
redistribution, and social control of land. Indigenous and peasant attempts to 
transform land reform are then examined.  
4.1. The indigenous countermovement 
Land reform reconfigured the forms of integration of the rural highland economy 
and the social and political relations that underpinned them. The modern 
highland indigenous movement emerged out this milieu. The abolition of semi-
feudal institutions; the conversion of huasipungos into private landholdings; and, 
the dismantling of traditional haciendas created “power vacuums” at the local 
level which increased the space open for indigenous organisation and 
mobilisation. (Zamosc 1994 pp. 53-4) Local-level organisations strengthened 
and expanded which provided indigenous peoples with a platform to challenge 
landowners and construct a wider indigenous movement. The creation of a 
central authority charged with the task of regulating and redistributing land 
shifted indigenous land claims towards the IERAC and encouraged the 
formation of a regional and national movement capable of influencing the 
institute and the state.  
Indigenous peoples became increasingly reliant on markets as land reform 
advanced. The dissolution of semi-feudalist practices and the weakness of land 
redistribution increased their dependence on markets to obtain land. The limited 
amount of land available to indigenous families, the weakening of peasant-
patron relations and the widening of opportunities to secure wage labour in 
urban areas increased indigenous engagement within labour markets, especially 
indigenous men. The need to secure income to purchase land, agricultural inputs, 
and consumer goods and the expansion of consumer markets encouraged 
indigenous families to orientate a greater share of their agricultural output 
towards the market. Meanwhile, the income they received from wage labour and 
agricultural production increased their engagement in consumer markets. In 
short, indigenous peoples became increasingly dependent on markets for the 
“provision of the daily necessities of life” as land reform advanced. (Polanyi 
1947*) Viewed through a Polanyian lens the modern highland indigenous 
movement can therefore be seen as a countermovement that emerged in the 
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wake of mounting commodification.
129
 The countermovement, which will be 
examined throughout this thesis, attempted to i) transform land reform (Chapters 
4 and 7), ii) enforce existing land reform legislation (Chapters 5 and 8), and iii) 
pressure landowners to sell indigenous peoples land (Chapters 6 and 9).  
The rest of this section explains the organisational base of the indigenous 
countermovement. The analysis then turns to the first dimension of the 
countermovement: the attempt to transform land reform.  
4.1.1. The organisational core of the countermovement  
Communities formed the base of the indigenous countermovement. The number 
of communities established in the highlands increased during the first decade of 
agrarian reform as the space and motivation for collective organisation increased. 
Figure 4.1 indicates the quantitative impact of the reform on communal 
organisation: 360 communities were registered between 1964 and 1973, 162 
more than had been registered between 1954 and 1963.
130
 (Zamosc 1995 pp. 90-
4)  Zamosc reports the growth of communities was strongest in regions with high 
indigenous population densities, indicating a general strengthening of communal 
organisation among the highland indigenous population. (1995 pp. 54-75) 
(Korovkin 1997) (Yashar 2006 pp. 194-5) The Ley de Comunas was often 
adapted to conform to local customs and traditions or ignored altogether (see 
Chapter 3). Hence the internal structures of indigenous communities exhibited a 
high degree of variation. One common feature, however, was a central committee 
or council (cabildo) which provided a forum for community members to discuss 
communal affairs and make collective decisions. Decision making was not 
without conflict but did provide “a firm basis for collective action once 
achieved.” (Macas et al. 2003 p. 224) (De la Torre 2006 p. 252) (Sánchez-Parga 
2010 pp. 35-41) 
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(1989; 2010), Zamosc (1994; 2005), Guerrero (2000), Lentz (2000), Martínez (2002a), De la 
Torre (2006), Becker (2008) and Cervone (2012). On the array of struggles not included within 
the double movement framework see Fraser (2013) pp. 127-9. 
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Communities provided the foundation for the development of local-level 
organisations which brought together indigenous families and communities from 
across parishes, cantons, and provinces. This included second-grade 
organisations, which incorporated numerous communities, and provincial 
organisations, which united various second-grade organisations. For example, in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Union de Campesinos de San Pablo (UCSP) 
was established in the northern province of Imbabura; the foundations of the 
Federación Interprovincial de Indígenas Saraguros (FISS) were laid in the 
southern province of Loja; and, the roots of the Movimiento Indígena y 
Campesino de Cotopaxi (MICC) were planted in the northern province of 
Cotopaxi. (Sánchez-Parga 1989 pp. 249-68) (MICC 2003 pp. 31-2) (Interviews 7 
and 9)  
The FEI remained the most powerful voice for indigenous concerns in the late 
1960s, providing support for indigenous land claims and pressuring the state to 
transform agrarian reform. However, the federation was unable to respond to the 
wave of new indigenous organisations that emerged in the wake of agrarian 
reform and the gap between the base and the leadership of the organisation 
started to widen. (Becker 2008 p. 148-52) (MAG 1977c pp. 50-2) (Korovkin 
1997 p. 30) (MICC 2003 p. 48) The FEI was further weakened by the emergence 
of rival organisations in the 1960s and 1970s. The Catholic Church helped 
establish the Federación Ecuatoriana de Trabajadores Agropecuarios (FETEP) 
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Figure 4.1 - Peasant communities registered in                 
Highland Ecuador, 1960 -1973 
Source: My own elaboration based on Zamosc (1995) pp. 90-4.  
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in 1965 with the basic aim of limiting the reach of the FEI and PCE. The FETEP 
was then transformed into the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones 
Campesinas (FENOC) in 1968. Mirroring the evolution of its sister trade union, 
the CEDOC, the FENOC broke with its conservative roots in 1972 as the base of 
the movement demanded more radical solutions to the agrarian crisis. The 
radicalised movement, Becker explains, called for “a unity of worker and peasant 
struggles, a role for peasants in crafting agrarian policies, respect for indigenous 
cultural forms, and the construction of a revolutionary party that would struggle 
for the construction of a socialist society.”  (2008 p. 157) The development of a 
national classist peasant movement was accompanied by the emergence of a 
regional ethnic movement: Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (Ecuarunari).
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(Sánchez-Parga 1989 p. 221) (FIPRR 1993 pp. 33-4) (Becker 2008 pp. 159-62) 
(Ecuarunari 2012 p. 1) (Huarcaya 2012 pp. 24-5) The movement was established 
in 1972 with the support of religious activists inspired by liberation theology. 
Indicating the crucial non-economic functions land performed for indigenous 
peoples, Ecuarunari placed the battle for land at the centre of a wider struggle for 
the defence of indigenous language, customs, and practices.  
“Faced by the lack of land, inhuman and slave-like 
treatment…Ecuarunari emerged to group together all of the 
indigenous population of the sierra…to develop a strong 
organisation to establish and defend rights…the fundamental point 
was the battle for land, from there emerged the slogan “only the 
fight for land”, from that, naturally, emerged the defence and 
respect of identity, culture, language, traditions, and customs.” 
(FIPPR 1993 p. 34)  
With Ecuarunari, FEI, and FENOC each having their own ideologies, strategies 
and objectives, tensions and conflicts soon emerged between the three 
organisations. Yet the organisations still provided a platform for indigenous 
peoples to increase the pressure on the state to transform land reform in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. 
  
                                                          
131
 The Kichwa phrase Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui translates to “awakening of the 
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4.1.2. The broadening of the countermovement constituency  
Indigenous efforts to mobilise for land were supported by the basic traits 
indigenous peoples held in common. As Korovkin notes “ethnic values can 
inform rural collective action, providing it with both cultural defined goals (e.g. 
the acquisition of land) and institutional means (e.g. communal organization).” 
(1997 p. 27) A common language and a similar set of customs, habits, and beliefs 
underpinned indigenous organisation at the local, provincial and regional levels. 
The similar social and economic realities indigenous peoples confronted 
provided additional support for collective organisation and mobilisation. These 
factors limited the problems associated with building and maintaining a broad 
and diverse Polanyian constituency.
132
 Yet highland indigenous peoples only 
accounted for a relatively small segment of the national population and needed 
the support of other actors to develop a movement capable of challenging the 
elite and the state. Reaching out across geographic, ethnic, social, and political 
frontiers brought fresh challenges but the alliances highland indigenous peoples, 
organisations, and movements formed with other actors, institutions, and 
movements were fundamental to the development of the countermovement.  
The network of indigenous and peasant organisations that emerged in the 
wake of land reform provided a platform for indigenous peoples to establish links 
with highland and coastal mestizo peasants. Relationships that stretched across 
the ethnic frontier were established at the second-grade, provincial, regional, and 
national levels. The FEI connected highland indigenous peoples with coastal 
peasants through its association with the Federación de Trabajadores Agrícolas 
del Litoral (FTAL). The FENOC went further by creating a movement of coastal 
and highland indigenous and mestizo peasants. While relationships between 
highland and lowland indigenous communities were not fully formed until the 
late 1970s, the creation of Ecuarunari provided a basis for strengthening links 
with indigenous organisations in the Amazonian region. The threats colonisation 
                                                          
132
 On the difficulties of establishing and maintaining broad-based countermovements capable of 
challenging commodification see Levien (2007) and Burawoy (2010).  
138 
 
posed lowland indigenous communities meant indigenous peoples from both 
regions had grievances with the IERAC and the state.
133
  
Religious activists inspired by liberation theology lent valuable support to 
indigenous organisation and mobilisation. Their influence was particularly strong 
in Chimborazo, where the charismatic Bishop of Riobamba, Leonidas Proaño, 
supported indigenous attempts to secure land, but was also evident in Cotopaxi 
and other highland provinces. Religious activists raised awareness of agrarian 
reform, assisted land claims, participated in mobilisations, and exerted pressure 
on religious authorities to redistribute church-owned land to indigenous families 
and communities on favourable terms. Yet, at the same time, religious authorities 
also sold land to the IERAC at elevated prices (which increased the cost of 
obtaining land for indigenous peoples) and relocated indigenous families and 
communities to protect their economic interests. (Lyons 2006 pp. 264-68) 
Religious activists also performed a conservatizing role in some cases. Rural 
development projects were promoted as an alternative to land reform while 
colonisation - the preferred option of the state and the elite - was sometimes 
offered as a route out of the agrarian crisis in the sierra. (Sánchez-Parga 1989 pp. 
217-8) (FIPRR 1993 p. 30) (Korovkin 1997 pp. 29-30) (Martínez Novo 2008 pp. 
204-5) 
The promotion of rural development as opposed to land reform was also at the 
heart of the work of Misión Andina del Ecuador (MAE), a development agency 
which was created by the United Nations in 1956 and incorporated into the state 
apparatus in 1964. (UN 1966 pp. 1-2) Bretón claims MAE programmes were 
“doomed to failure because the concentration of land ownership was never 
questioned…[and]…little or nothing was done to facilitate peasant access to 
plots of land or challenge the hacienda system.”134 (2008a p. 587) Yet MAE 
employees appeared to support the efforts of indigenous families and 
communities to secure land via IERAC in some cases. (Martínez 2002b) The 
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MAE, as Bretón notes, also performed an important role in supporting communal 
organisation in the highland region.
135
 (2008a p. 587-8) 
Leftist activists and organisations continued to support indigenous attempts to 
secure land, especially state-owned land. The FEI, though weakened, exerted 
pressure on the state to transform agrarian reform as well as challenge the 
IERAC at the local level. Factionalism within the left limited the possibilities of 
indigenous organisations and movements forming strong alliances with leftist 
parties. Conflicts between religious and leftist activists also caused tensions 
within the indigenous and peasant movement. (Lyons 2006 p. 262) The 
fragmentation of the organised labour movement also placed definite limits on 
the formation of broad-based worker-indigenous-peasant alliance. However, 
trade unions supported indigenous and peasant attempts to radicalise land reform 
in some cases (see Section 2 above). Support from other urban sectors was 
limited by the effort landowning elites invested into discrediting land reform in 
the mainstream media. Particular attention was paid to the putative impact of 
agrarian reform on the production, distribution and price of food (e.g. El 
Comercio 03/03/1970 p. 1). (Barsky 1988 p. 227) The mainstream media 
sometimes resorted to racist stereotyping of indigenous peoples which also 
undermined support from urban sectors. (Handelman 1980 p. 76)  
To sum up, the alliances the indigenous organisations and movements 
established with other actors, institutions, and movements provided them with 
greater ability to pressure the state and the elite. However, the overriding social, 
political, and economic structure set definite limits on a broad-based 
countermovement emerging. The tactics landowning elites used to undermine 
land reform created additional barriers.  
4.2. Reform, counter-reform and indigenous-peasant attempts to 
transform land reform 
Indigenous and peasant efforts to transform land reform started soon after the 
LRAC was introduced. The initial charge was led by the FEI which called for 
“an authentic agrarian reform…under the direction of a popular government” at 
its Fourth Congress in October 1966. (El Comercio 22/10/1966 p. 17) Particular 
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attention was paid to deficiencies of the IERAC, claiming the institute was run 
by “oligarchs and latifundistas”. (El Comercio 23/10/1966 p. 17) The FEI called 
for the integration of members of the federation and the FTAL into the institute 
to counter the influence of landowning elites. (El Comercio 23/10/1966 p. 17) 
(Becker 2008 pp. 140-1) The demand marked the start of a prolonged - and 
ongoing - attempt to create room for indigenous and peasant involvement in the 
state agencies charged with the task of regulating and redistributing land in 
Ecuador.  
Mounting pressure from below was also discernible in a series of reforms 
Velasco Ibarra introduced in 1969 and 1970 (see Chapter 2).  The first wave 
came in August 1969 when the government brought land reform under the direct 
control of the executive, subordinated the IERAC to the MAG, and reduced the 
power of landowning elites within the IERAC.  (RO 245 1969) The second phase 
came in March 1970 when the government promulgated Ley 255-CLP. (RO 397 
1970) The law reinforced and extended the bureaucratic changes introduced in 
1969. The Consejo Directivo was renamed the Consejo de Coordinación y 
Asesoramiento, the number of Cámaras de Agricultura representatives were 
lowered from three to two, and the responsibilities of the new council were 
reduced.
136
 (Arts. 5-6 RO 397 1970) The law also provided grounds to transfer 
underutilised páramo to IERAC with the aim of allowing “ex huasipungueros, 
minifundistas, and agricultural workers” to use the land.  (Arts. 14-16 RO 397 
1970) The measure provided evidence of the state’s desire to release pressure on 
land by increasing the utilisation of the high-altitude grassland rather than 
providing widespread opportunities for peasants to secure more productive land 
at lower elevations.
137
 Yet the change still created new opportunities for 
indigenous families and communities to secure land.  The third wave came in 
September 1970 when the government introduced Ley de Abolición del Trabajo 
Precario en la Agricultura (LATPA). (RO 54 1970) The overall thrust of the law 
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was geared towards the elimination of semi-feudal practices but it also provided 
fresh opportunities for indigenous peoples to obtain land. Peasants who had 
worked land under precarious tenure arrangements (e.g. aparcería) for a 
minimum of three years were entitled to demand IERAC expropriate the land and 
sell it to them at the cadastral value. (Art. 2 RO 54 1970) Reinforcing these 
legislative changes, IERAC was also assigned significantly higher levels of 
funding between 1970 and 1971. (Cosse 1980 p. 76) 
Landowning elites contested the attempts of Velasco Ibarra to accelerate 
reform. Exchanges between government officials and landowning elites 
illustrated growing antagonism between the two groups. The Cámaras de 
Agricultura claimed the Ley 255-CLP was “unconstitutional and disadvantageous 
to the interests of the agricultural class” and would allow the IERAC to 
expropriate high-altitude land whether or not it was actually páramo. (El 
Comercio 06/03/1970 p. 1)  Stoking fears over rising food prices, the Cámaras 
de Agricultura also claimed the law would undermine the production of staple 
goods, continuing the tactic landowning elites had used to limit wider support for 
land reform in the 1960s. (El Comercio 02/03/1970 p. 1) Illustrating how the 
state used agrarian reform to encourage the economic rationalisation of land on 
the one hand and protect the private property rights of productive land on the 
other, the Minister of Agriculture, Rubén Espinosa Román, responded by 
declaring “efficiently exploited land that performs its social function will merit 
full support and guarantee”. (El Comercio 13/03/1970 p. 1) Despite the counter-
protests of the FEI, elite attacks met with some success. For example, the 
LATPA was diluted to enable landowners to secure higher prices for 
expropriated land. (Velasco 1979 pp. 103-4) (Barsky 1988 p. 184)  Yet the 
redistributive reach of land reform was still moderately expanded.  
The ousting of Velasco Ibarra and the formation of the Rodriguez Lara 
military government in February 1972 intensified the political struggle over land 
reform. Emboldened by surging oil revenues, the regime promptly announced its 
intention to undertake radical agrarian reform. (Redclift 1978 p. 29) (Barsky p. 
206) Echoing changes underway in Peru, the shift implied a transformation of 
relations between the state, the peasantry, and the landowning elite.  
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“To complete its political project, the Rodriguez Lara dictatorship 
proposed the corporatist mobilisation of the significant sectors of 
Ecuadorian society, like the subproletariat and the peasantry. This 
was explained, in one part, by the demographic weight of these 
sectors of the population and, in another part, by the aspiration of 
forming a significant social base to realise certain reforms, like 
agrarian reform.” (Rosero 1983 p. 257) 
With the possibility increasing of the military regime forming alliances with 
indigenous and peasant communities and movements, landowning elites viewed 
the government’s declarations as an existential threat. Luis Barahona Sáez, 
President of the Cámara de Agricultura de la Primera Zona, made this clear 
when he declared:  
“The basic objective of agrarian reform is to destroy the landowning 
class…and replace it with another class of agriculturalist aligned to a 
certain political doctrine”. (El Comercio 18/06/1972 pp. 1 & 2) 
Elite responses to the military government’s proposals were typically 
vociferous. (Cosse 1980 p. 76) (Barsky 1988 p. 206) Under the heading 
Realidades del Campo Ecuatoriano, the Cámaras de Agricultura run a series of 
publicity pieces in the mainstream press denouncing the regime’s radical 
proposals. (El Comercio 16-18/06/1972) Illustrating the links that existed 
between landowning and business elites, the Cámaras de Agricultura and the 
Cámara de Industria y Comercio also issued a joint statement which “left no 
doubt that the private sector considered any encroachment on private property 
unacceptable and called for a halt on land invasions and plans for state-
sponsored expropriations.” (Conaghan 1988 pp. 96-7) Within this context, the 
emergence of draft legislation that proposed minimum landholding limits of 10 
hectares and maximum thresholds of 100-200 hectares in the highlands, 
restrictions on total landholdings in the whole country of 600 hectares, and the 
expropriation of land based on moderately inflated cadastral values 
understandably provoked a strong response. The strength of the elite attack was 
reflected in a significant change in the stance of the military regime in 1973. 
(Barsky 1988 pp. 212-3) The Anteproyecto de Ley de Reforma Agraria, which 
was tabled by the government in early June 1973, excluded the most radical 
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features of the initial proposal. (Rosero 1983 p. 259-79) Yet the increased 
possibilities the legislation provided for the expropriation of land still caused 
consternation among landowning elites. The response was the drafting of a 
document outlining the concerns of the Cámaras de Agricultura and the demand 
that the LRAC  remained in effect until an agrarian reform law had been drafted 
with the full consultation and participation of the landowning elite (i.e. like the 
LRAC). (Rosero 1983 p. 277) The government responded by submitting a 
revised version of the legislation in late June which responded to some of the 
principal demands of the Cámaras de Agricultura (e.g. the effective removal of 
upper limits on landholdings).  
The strengthening of indigenous and peasant organisation in the wake of land 
reform enabled the indigenous and peasant population to exert considerable 
counter-pressure on the state.  The primary mechanism through which this was 
achieved was the Frente Unido de Reforma Agraria (FURA), a national network 
of indigenous and peasant organisations and movements, which was established 
in 1972. The FURA coordinated a series of marches and rallies across the sierra 
and the coast in late 1972 and early 1973, including important mobilisations in 
Guayaquil, Quito, Cuenca, Riobamba, and Cañar. (Becker 2008 pp. 162-3) The 
Rodriguez Lara regime’s volte face prompted the FURA to convene the Primer 
Encuentro Nacional Campesino por la Reforma Agraria in August 1973.  (El 
Comercio 21/08/1973 p. 13) The conference was organised to pronounce the 
“fundamental points that should be incorporated into Ley de Reforma 
Agraria”.138 (Quoted in Barsky 1988 p. 263) Illustrating the links that existed 
between the military government and indigenous and peasant movements, the 
Minister of Agriculture, Guillermo Maldonado Lince, attended the conference, 
assuring the delegates that he would support the inclusion of the FURA’s 
principal demands in future drafts of land reform legislation. (El Comercio 
21/08/1973 p. 13)  
The principal features of the FURA legislative proposal were as follows (see 
also Table 4.2 below): i) expropriate inefficiently exploited and underutilised 
land; ii) establish upper limits of 100 hectares on landholdings in the highlands, 
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 My analysis of the FURA proposal primarily draws on the Pronunciamiento del Primer 
Encuentro Campesino por la Reforma Agraria a las Autoridades Gubermentales which is 
reproduced in its entirety by Barsky (1988) pp. 263-72. See also Rosero (1983) pp. 259-73. 
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150 in the coast, and 200 in the oriente; iii) revert land from which peasants have 
been forcefully removed; iv) prioritise the communal distribution of land; v) 
establish lower and upper limits of 5 and 20 hectares on land redistributed to 
individuals; vi) incorporate representatives of peasant organisations into state 
agencies directly and indirectly involved in the direction and implementation of 
land reform; vii) proscribe the foreign ownership of agricultural land and 
transfer foreign-owned landholdings to peasant organisations; and, viii) 
expropriate land using 1964 cadastral values.  
Placing the proposal within the commodification/decommodification 
framework elaborated above, the FURA called for the expansion of the 
regulative and redistributive dimensions of land reform.  Limits on the size of 
landholdings and the proscription of foreign ownership of land set clear limits on 
the operation of land markets. Combined with the grounds the proposal provided 
for the expropriation of privately owned land at outdated cadastral values these 
measures aimed to rupture the economic power of landowning elites and 
establish and maintain a more equal land distribution. Upper and lower limits on 
redistributed land supported this objective by slowing the proliferation of 
minifundia and preventing inequalities between peasants emerging through land 
redistribution. The explicit preference for the redistribution of land in collective 
form pointed in the same direction and supported the communal rather than 
individual control of land. Using 1964 cadastral values as expropriation values 
explicitly rejected the commodity view of land which demands the exchange of 
land at market prices.  
The proposal also aimed to transform the mechanisms through which land 
was regulated and redistributed. The FURA argued “the participation of peasant 
organisations in the planning and execution of agrarian reform at the local, 
regional, and national level is indispensable”. (Quoted in Barsky 1988 pp. 269-
70) Seemingly aware of the risk of co-optation, the alliance demanded 
participation on the basis of “irrenunciable autonomía”. (Quoted in Barsky 1988 
p. 269) The FURA therefore demanded the integration of indigenous and 
peasant representatives into the agencies charged with the task of regulating and 
redistributing land, following and extending the demands of the FEI in 1966. 
Taken together, the FURA aimed to create a framework that combined 
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communal, social and state control of land. The proposal left space for the 
market but within a new set of regulations that restricted its reach and influence.  
The next section analyses the agrarian reform law introduced by the 
Rodriguez Lara government in late 1973, contrasts the law with the FURA 
proposal, and sketches the evolution of land reform and indigenous organisation 
between 1973 and 1979.  
5. Commodification and decommodification dimensions of the Ley de 
Reforma Agraria   
Following eighteen months of acrimonious debate, the Rodriguez Lara 
government introduced Ley de Reforma Agraria (LRA) in October 1973. The 
legislation superseded the LRAC but remained within the basic parameters of the 
existing framework. Hence it was far removed from the radical proposals the 
military regime had announced in 1972.  
To what extent were the demands of indigenous and peasant movements 
reflected in the law? 
 
Table 4.2 (below) shows that there were considerable 
differences between the LRA and the FURA proposal. Whereas the latter 
stipulated upper limits on the size of landholdings and proposed maximum and 
minimum limits on land redistributed via agrarian reform, the former included no 
limits on landholdings or redistributed land. While the grounds the legislation 
and the proposal provided for the expropriation of privately owned land 
exhibited some similarities, the provisions the law provided were more 
favourable to landowning elites.  For instance, the stipulation that expropriation 
was based on 1964 cadastral values plus investments provided hacendados with 
scope to negotiate favourable prices for land. Furthermore, the two-year grace 
period the law granted landowners to upgrade their landholdings provided them 
with time to divide their landholdings without fear of expropriation. The FURA 
proposal demanded the inclusion of indigenous-peasant representatives within 
the agencies involved in agrarian reform at the local, regional, and national levels 
while the law provided no space for indigenous-peasant involvement.  
In short, despite the increased pressure indigenous-peasant organisations were 
able to exert over the state in the early 1970s, the LRA omitted the central 
demands of the FURA. 
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Table 4.2 – Comparative analysis of the Ley de Reforma Agraria and the  
FURA land reform proposal, 1973 
No. Dimension LRA FURA  
1  Expropriation  Private property 
conditioned on economic 
use via “affectation” 
 Min. of 80% of landholding 
“efficiently” exploited by 
01/01/1976 
 Min. of “average 
productivity” by 
01/01/1976 
 Efficient landholdings in 
areas of “great 
demographic pressure” 
 Land worked under 
“precarious” conditions 
 Min. of 80% of 
cultivable land cultivated 
 Min. of “average 
productivity” 
 Efficient landholdings in 
areas of “great 
demographic pressure” 
 Land worked under 
“precarious” conditions 
 Land that exceeds 
landholding limits 
 Foreign-owned land 
2 Expropriation value  1964 cadastral value plus 
compensation for 
investments on land (before 
1975) 
 10-year old cadastral values 
plus investments (from 
1975) 
 1964 cadastral value 
3 Redistributed land  Price of land no greater 
than price paid by the 
IERAC 
 Redistribution to legally 
registered peasant 
organisations prioritised 
 Price of land based on 
1964 cadastral value 
 Communal redistribution 
prioritised 
 Lower & upper limits on 
redistributed land to 
individuals 
4 Landholding sizes  No limits  Max. of 100 hectares 
(sierra) 
5 Land ownership   No limits  Max. of 100 hectares 
(sierra) 
6 Representation   No indigenous or peasant 
representation within state 
agencies involved in 
direction and 
implementation of agrarian 
reform 
 Indigenous and peasant 
representation within all 
state agencies involved 
in the direction and 
implementation of 
agrarian reform 
7 Foreign ownership  No restrictions  Foreign ownership of 
agricultural land 
proscribed  
Source: My own elaboration based on Ley de Reforma Agraria, Registro Oficial 410, 15 October 1973; 
Pronunciamiento del Primer Encuentro Campesino por la Reforma Agraria a las Autoridades 
Gubermentales, Barsky (1988) pp. 263-72, and Rosero (1983) pp. 259-73 
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What was impact of the LRA on the commodification and decommodification 
dimensions of land reform outlined in Section 3? The concept of “afectación”, 
which involved “the total or partial limitation of the right to property of rural 
land that does not fulfil its social function”, was introduced to strengthen the link 
between private property rights and the economic use of land. (Art. 22 RO 410 
1973) The social functions included within the law were virtually the same as 
those incorporated into the LRAC but placed greater emphasis on economic use. 
This was achieved by providing greater clarity over what was deemed to be 
efficient and productive land. The law stipulated that no less than 80% of the 
agricultural land surface of the landholding had to be exploited in an 
economically efficient manner and productivity levels had to reach levels 
stipulated by the MAG. (Art. 25 RO 410 1973) Strengthening the relationship 
between private property rights and economic use encouraged the economic 
rationalisation of land and the fragmentation of haciendas. Semi-feudalist 
practices remained outlawed which reinforced the commodity view of land and 
ensured peasants remained reliant on markets to secure land. The combination of 
a tighter law, stronger state, and bolder indigenous-peasant movement ensured 
the law had a significant impact on stimulating land market activity (see Chapter 
6).  
The omission of upper or lower limits on landholdings - one of the principal 
demands of the Cámaras de Agricultura – ensured the land markets that 
emerged in the wake of the law were able to develop without overriding 
restrictions on land ownership.  Vague references to the expropriation of 
privately owned land on the grounds of monopolisation provided little safeguard 
against the concentration of land. The IERAC continued to regulate the transfer 
of land within the reform sector: recipients of land were not permitted to divide 
or transfer land without prior authorisation from the institute. (Art. 70 RO 410 
1973) The IERAC was also responsible for overseeing the transfer and division 
of minifundia as well as supervising the fragmentation of agricultural land to 
ensure the division of landholdings did not “contravene the spirit of the law”. 
(Art. 52 & Arts. 92-5 RO 410 1973)  The potential regulatory oversight of the 
IERAC was therefore significantly expanded.  
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Increased grounds were provided for the expropriation of underutilised and 
inefficient privately owned land. Expropriation based on the deficient use of 
land was not, however, scheduled to come into effect until 01 January 1976. The 
legislation therefore provided landowners with at least two years to increase 
utilisation or sell or transfer plots of land to avoid expropriation. The revised 
“great demographic pressure” clause omitted earlier preferences for resettlement 
and colonisation which provided increased legal grounds for peasants to secure 
productive land located close to their communities. (Art. 30 RO 410 1973) The 
emphasis the legislation placed on utilisation, productivity, and efficiency 
ensured the LRA embodied the same geographic bias as the LRAC i.e. the 
legislation encouraged the redistribution of the least productive land located in 
the higher and remoter areas of the highland region. Reflecting the productivist 
spirit of the LRA, the law promoted the formation and redistribution of land to 
“enterprises, cooperatives, associations, and other forms of agricultural 
organisations”. (Art. 54 RO 410 1973)  
A new bureaucratic structure was established to oversee and implement land 
reform. While the IERAC was still responsible for executing the reform, the 
Consejo de Coordinación Agraria (CCA) and the Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Ganadería (MAG) were charged with the task of directing the process. (Arts. 1-
4 RO 410 1973) The CCA, which was overseen by the MAG, comprised 
representatives of various state agencies. No room was provided for 
representatives of the Cámaras de Agricultura or indigenous and peasant 
organisations.  The law also established Comités Regionales de Apelación 
(CRA) to “facilitate the process of change in the ownership of land”. (Art. 4 RO 
410 1973) The CRA, which operated at the regional level, reported into the 
CCA. The IERAC and the CRA were responsible for assessing the afectación of 
land and therefore whether land was liable for expropriation. However, the CCA 
was charged with the task of assessing claims for expropriation on the grounds 
of monopolisation and other state agencies were required to assist decision 
making. Splitting decision making between various agencies and committees 
slowed-down the processing of land claims and provided opportunities for 
landowning elites to influence decisions related to expropriation, especially 
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within the CRA. The outcome was a bureaucratic structure that prevented the 
swift resolution of land claims and provided opportunities for elites to block 
redistribution. (Redclift 1978 pp. 29-31)   
Table 4.3 – Commodification and decommodification dimensions of                                            
the Ley de Reforma Agraria, 1973                              
Dimension Key aspects 
Land  
commodification 
 Private property rights conditioned on the economic use of land 
through afectación 
 Threat of expropriation of underutilised and unproductive land 
 Protection of private property rights to utilised and productive land 
 Proscription of semi-feudalist practices (e.g. huasipungo) 
 Proliferation of private property titles 
 Bolstering of rural cadastres 
Land   
decommodification 
 Redistribution of underutilised and unproductive privately owned 
land  
 Redistribution of utilised and productive privately owned land in 
areas of “great demographic pressure” 
 Redistribution of Asistencia Social haciendas 
 Proliferation of collective land titles  
 Maximum size of landholdings: none  
 Minimum size of landholdings: none 
 Transfer and division of landholdings: i) regulation of peasant and 
reform sectors and ii) regulation of the division of rural landholdings 
 Monopolisation restrictions: weak and unenforceable  
Source: My own elaboration based on Ley de Reforma Agraria, RO  410, 15 October 1973 
To sum up, the LRA remained within the basic parameters of the existing 
framework, ensuring land reform continued to promote the commodification and 
decommodification of land (see Table 4.3 above). The decommodification 
dimensions of the new framework were moderately expanded. However, as will 
be explained below, reforms to the law reduced its regulative and redistributive 
potential, moving the LRA ever further away from the FURA proposal.  
6. Weakening the decommodification potential of the Ley de Reforma 
Agraria: the state’s retreat from land reform   
While indigenous and peasant movements failed to persuade the Rodriguez Lara 
government to incorporate their principal demands into the LRA, they continued 
to pressure the state to radicalise land reform in the mid-to-late 1970s.  The 
communal base from which indigenous families and communities engaged in this 
struggle continued to expand. Between 1973 and 1979, 154 new communities 
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were registered in the highlands, taking the total number of legally recognised 
communities to above 1,000. (Zamosc 1995 pp. 90-4) Zamosc reports stronger 
growth in areas with high indigenous population densities, continuing the trend 
that emerged in the opening decade of reform. (1995 p. 62) The proliferation of 
communities provided a platform for the further expansion of second-grade and 
provincial indigenous organisations.
139
 (Interviews 7 and 9) The FENOC and the 
Ecuarunari supported the scaling-up of indigenous organisation at the local level 
as the two movements set about establishing, strengthening, and institutionalising 
their bases. The FEI, though weakened, remained influential at the local and 
national levels, especially in the early 1970s.  
Indigenous organisations and movements were able to exert pressure on the 
Rodriguez Lara regime in the months after the introduction of LRA. Drawing on 
the support of religious activists and trade unions, the FEI and FENOC organised 
a mobilisation in Riobamba in late 1973 which called for the full implementation 
of the law. (Barsky 1988 p. 229) Yet the ability of the indigenous 
countermovement to maintain pressure on the state was constrained by a number 
of factors. First, the three principal indigenous-peasant movements active in the 
highlands – the Ecuarunari, FEI, FENOC – experienced internal problems which 
limited their effectiveness. Ecuarunari, for example, underwent a “profound 
ideological, political and organisational crisis” between 1974 and 1978 as the 
movement expanded and the political environment shifted. (Ecuarunari 2012 p. 
3) (Huarcaya 2012 p. 27) Second, rivalries between Ecuarunari, FEI, and 
FENOC intensified which created strains and tensions within the wider 
indigenous and peasant movement. Second-grade and provincial organisations 
affiliated with either Ecuarunari or FENOC started to emerge. For example, 
within the province of Imbabura the provincial Federación de Indígenas y 
Campesinos de Imbabura, which was established in 1974, was aligned to 
Ecuarunari while the cantonal Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas Indígenas 
de Cotacachi, which was created in 1977, was aligned to FENOC. (Sánchez-
Parga 1989 pp. 249-50) Third, state and landowner repression restricted the 
spaces open to indigenous organisations and movements to engage in contentious 
forms of political action, especially in the late 1970s. (Griffin 1981 p. 213) 
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 See Sánchez-Parga (1989), Bebbington & Perrault (1999) and MICC (2003).  
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Examples of state repression include the deaths at the hands of the police of 
Lázaro Condo, the leader of Ecuarunari, in 1974 and Rafael Perugachi, an 
indigenous activist from the northern highland canton of Cotacachi, in 1977. 
(Becker 2008) (Ecuarunari 2012) State repression also restricted religious and 
labour activists which limited the support indigenous peoples and movements 
were able to draw upon to exert pressure on the state.  
The challenges indigenous and peasant organisations and movements faced in 
the mid-to-late 1970s supported landowning elite efforts to weaken the 
regulative and redistributive components of the LRA. The attack manifested in 
what the out-going Minister of Agriculture, Guillermo Maldonado Lince, 
described as a “lavish campaign to impede social change”. (El Comercio 
19/03/1974 p. 1-3) The minister explained: 
“Traditional groups of power attach the blame for all of the 
shortcomings of the agriculture sector to the agrarian reform 
law…these small but powerful groups have continued their attack on 
the Ministry of Agriculture…passing all limits of tolerance that are 
imaginable.” (El Comercio 19/03/1974 p. 1-3) 
The “lavish campaign” landowning elites launched against land reform was 
reflected in legislative changes introduced in 1974. Reforms introduced in 
February dictated that land expropriated on the grounds of “great demographic 
pressure” would be based on current cadastral values (rather than outdated 
cadastral values stated in the original version of the LRA) and the payment of 
cash to the landowner. (Arts. 1-4 RO 502 1974) The revision reduced the 
possibility of the clause being enforced and provided elites with greater 
economic protection. One of the most potentially powerful redistributive 
elements of land reform was therefore significantly weakened. Despite the new 
Minister of Agriculture, Colonel Raúl Cabrera Sevilla, declaring the introduction 
of the legislation marked the start of a “new and positive stage of agrarian 
reform”,  the reglamento issued to enable the implementation of the LRA, which 
was introduced in September, included a number of provisions favourable to 
landowning elites. (El Comercio 12/09/1974 p. 1) For example, while the basic 
criteria for the utilisation and efficiency of land were retained, the measure of 
efficiency was set at 80% of average productivity which provided additional 
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room for owners of unproductive and underutilised farms to maneuver. (Arts. 7-8 
RO 642 1974) Moreover, the application of the law was dependent on 
productivity levels being determined by the MAG.
140
 Importantly, the regional 
branches of the IERAC were also granted the right to authorise the fragmentation 
of landholdings. (Arts. 32-3 RO 642 1974)  This significantly weakened the 
regulation of land markets as landowning elites were able to exploit the close 
relationships they enjoyed with the heads of the regional offices of IERAC to 
circumvent the legislation. The change opened the door to the development of 
what the civilian Roldós-Hurtado government (1979-84) later described as a 
“highly speculative rural land market” (see Chapters 6 and 9). (RO 48 1981)  The 
potential of the IERAC to implement the law was further reduced by the scaling 
back of staffing and the slashing of funding for the institute. (MAG 1977b p. 95) 
(Cosse 1980 p. 86) 
Elite attacks continued unabated despite the introduction of the reforms. 
Some weeks after a failed coup attempt against Rodriguez Lara in 1975, the 
Cámaras de Agricultura requested the postponement of the introduction of the 
efficiency expropriation clauses of the LRA. (Barsky 1988 p. 242-3) (Conaghan 
1988 pp. 108-12)   The president rejected their demand, stating the clauses 
would be implemented as planned. With the internal and external pressure on 
Rodriguez Lara mounting the president resigned on 11 January 1976, ten days 
after the efficiency expropriation clauses were due to come into effect.  
If the legislative changes introduced in 1974 weakened the LRA, the 
establishment of the conservative military triumvirate in 1976 signalled a 
decisive break in agrarian policy. The shift was indicated by the Minister of 
Agriculture, Colonel Oliverio Vásconez, who announced the priorities of the 
new government were: a) the colonisation of the Amazonian region; b) the 
commercialisation of agriculture; c) the promotion of agroindustry; d) the 
education of the peasantry; and, e) the increase of production. (Barsky 1988 p. 
245) The military regime demonstrated its commitment to colonisation by 
introducing Ley de Colonización de la Región Amazonica Ecuatoriana in 
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 MAG noted in 1977 that the productivity levels required for expropriation on the grounds of 
productivity and efficiency and measurement of monopolisation had not been established and 
these aspects of the law could not be implemented. (1977b p. 430) Zevallos claims the levels 
were never established. (1989 p. 46)  
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January 1978. Restating the long-held preference of the state and the elite to 
alleviate pressure on land through colonisation rather than redistribution, the 
law promoted “the displacement of persons from the most populated zones in 
the highlands and on the coast to the Amazonian region.” (RO 504 1978)  
As the return to democracy approached, the military regime set about 
providing a legal basis for the other dimensions of its agrarian programme. The 
FEI, FENOC, and Ecuarunari united with other peasant organisations to form 
the Frente Unico de la Lucha Campesina e Indígena (FULCI) to exert 
influence over the military government and the political parties that participated 
in the 1978-79 general elections. (El Espectador 14/03/1979 p. 5) (Becker 2008 
p. 163) However, mirroring the period 1963-64, landowning elites took 
advantage of the limited space open to indigenous, peasant, and leftist 
organisations to seize control of the drafting of new agrarian legislation. 
(Barsky 1988 pp. 246-7) (Montúfar 2011 p. 43) The Ley de Fomento y 
Desarrollo Agropecuario, the law that emerged out of this process, was 
introduced in March 1979, shortly before the military triumvirate was dissolved 
and the civilian Roldós-Hurtado government (1979-84) was established. The 
law, which will be analysed in Chapter 7, reduced the regulative and 
redistributive potential of the LRA and providing the legal basis for the further 
weakening of land reform under structural adjustment and neoliberalism.  
7. Summary: empirical and theoretical findings 
This chapter has examined the political struggle over the design of land reform 
in the 1960s and 1970s and the commodification and decommodification 
dimensions of the land reform legislation introduced during the period. The 
analysis has shown that indigenous and peasant movements pressured the state 
to increase the regulation and redistribution of land but failed to translate their 
vision of land reform into law. The decommodification potential of land reform 
was limited throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  
The inability of indigenous and peasant movements to force comprehensive 
legislative changes was demonstrated by the outcome of the land reform debate 
of the early 1970s.  The LRA omitted the most radical features of the FURA 
proposal. The decommodification potential of the law was then further reduced 
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through reforms. The role landowning elites performed in blocking indigenous 
and peasant attempts to expand land reform provides support for authors who 
draw attention to the lack of attention Polanyi pays to asymmetries in political 
and economic power (e.g. Munck 2004; Levien 2007; Burawoy 2010). 
Winders’ assertion that “even if a movement against the market emerges, it may 
not succeed in gaining protections unless it has adequate political power” 
resonates in the case of indigenous and peasant movements in Ecuador in the 
1960s and 1970s.  (2009 p. 321) The analysis of the conflict also provides 
support for authors who highlight the divergence between indigenous and 
peasant visions of land reform and the legislative framework established in the 
early 1970s (see Chapter 2).  
Examining the commodification and decommodification dimensions of land 
reform has highlighted the line between the two sides of the double movement 
is less clear empirically than it is theoretically. The analysis showed 
redistribution promoted commodification to some degree. The role traditional 
landowning elites performed in the political struggle over land reform also 
illustrates this point. During the opening decade of reform traditional 
landowners resisted commodification but also united with modernising 
landowners to oppose regulation and redistribution. Hence they appeared on 
both sides of the double movement at the same time.  
The chapter has also demonstrated the importance of examining the structure 
of the agencies established to undertake the regulation and redistribution of 
fictitious commodities. The influence landowning elites exerted over the design 
of the LRAC was reflected in the steering committee of the IERAC. No space 
was provided for indigenous and peasant representatives. The changes 
introduced by the Velasco Ibarra and Rodriguez Lara governments limited the 
influence elites were able to exercise over the IERAC at the national level. 
However, landowning elites continued to exert considerable influence over the 
regional branches of the IERAC as well as the CRA and the MAG. Civilian and 
military governments consistently ignored demands from indigenous and 
peasant movements to create genuine space for indigenous and peasant 
representatives within the agencies charged with the task of regulating and 
redistributing land. This issue, as will be explained in Chapter 10, remains a 
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central point of conflict between the state and the indigenous movement in 
Ecuador. 
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Chapter Five 
Land redistribution and indigenous peoples (1964-1979) 
1. Introduction  
This chapter analyses the implementation of one of the decommodification 
components of agrarian reform: land redistribution. The analysis shows that 
concerted and sustained indigenous pressure was required to activate the 
mechanism and influence the conditions of the transfer of land. The chapter 
illustrates the importance of examining the application of decommodification 
mechanisms and provides fresh insight into the relationship between land 
redistribution and indigenous peoples.  The analysis is restricted to the 1960s 
and 1970s. Land redistribution in the 1980s and 1990s is investigated in Chapter 
8. The entire cycle of redistribution (1964-1994) is also examined in that 
chapter. Hence what follows is the first of a two part study of land redistribution 
in the highland region.   
The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. The second section 
provides a snapshot of land redistribution in the sierra in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The third section analyses the transfer of huasipungos to indigenous peoples. 
The fourth section examines the redistribution of state-owned land, 
concentrating on the northern highland canton of Cayambe, Pichincha. The fifth 
section analyses the redistribution of privately owned land, focusing on three 
cases in the central highland province of Chimborazo. The sixth section 
summarises the main empirical and theoretical findings of the chapter.  
2. Snapshot of land redistribution in the 1960s and 1970s 
The total amount of land formally redistributed in the sierra between 1964 and 
1979 was around 399,213 hectares which equated to approximately 8.4% of the 
agricultural land surface of the region.
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 The land was redistributed to around 
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 The regional and provincial agricultural land surfaces captured by the 2000 agricultural 
census are used to illustrate the relative impact of agrarian reform as this allows for greater 
consistency between the data presented in this and subsequent chapters. The changes that took 
place in the decades after the introduction of the LRA in 1973 means the 2000 census only 
provides a rough indication of the actual agricultural land surface in the 1960s and 1970s. Using 
the 2000 census data as a point of reference rather than the 1974 census reduces the relative 
amount of land redistributed. The 1974 data indicates 13.0% of the total agricultural land surface 
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50,000 beneficiaries (e.g. families, communities, cooperatives). Land 
redistribution varied markedly across the sierra. Table 5.1 shows the greatest 
amounts of land were redistributed in the southern province of Loja (31.7%), the 
central province of Chimborazo (22.3%), and the northern provinces of 
Pichincha (12.0%) and Cotopaxi (11.2%). In relation to the size of the 
agricultural land surface, land redistribution had the largest impact in 
Chimborazo (18.9%), Loja (12.7%), and Cañar (12.3%).  
Table 5.1 –Land redistributed via agrarian reform by province,                                      
Highland Ecuador, 1964-1979  
Province IPD* Land 
redistribution 
(hectares) 
Average  
amount per 
beneficiary   
(hectares) 
Proportion of 
total land 
redistribution  
(%) 
Proportion 
of  land 
surface ** 
(%) 
Azuay 22.69 14,053 6.23 3.52 2.30 
Bolivar 34.77 2,889 5.60 0.72 0.76 
Cañar 50.56 31,724 12.01 7.95 12.28 
Carchi 0.00 15,242 5.44 3.82 8.75 
Chimborazo 59.97 88,846 8.07 22.26 18.85 
Cotopaxi 46.11 44,548 7.29 11.16 9.74 
Imbabura 47.83 11,455 5.65 2.87 4.04 
Loja 4.73 126,500 11.61 31.69 12.72 
Pichincha
142
 39.91 47,920 4.65 12.00 5.18 
Tungurahua 43.62 16,037 7.16 4.02 7.86 
Total 35.44 399,213 7.86 100.00 8.38 
Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA, Zamosc (1995) & INEC (2000). * IPD = 
Indigenous Population Density - population of “predominantly indigenous area” (API) as % of total rural 
population of the province/region in 1962 (Zamosc 1995 p. 23). ** % of total agricultural land surface in 
2000.  
The data indicate a general, if not universal, link between the relative scale of 
land redistribution and the relative size of the indigenous population. Figure 5.1 
maps the relationship between the two variables across the ten highland 
provinces. The link was strongest in Chimborazo but also clearly discernible in 
Cañar and Cotopaxi. The three provinces – Cañar, Chimborazo, and Cotopaxi - 
accounted for around 45% of the “predominantly indigenous area” (API) 
                                                                                                                                                            
of the highland region was redistributed as opposed to 8.4%. The basic pattern at the provincial 
level reported in Table 5.1 is the same when using the 1974 data. 
142
 The agrarian reform data related to Pichincha should be interpreted with caution as the 
province includes significant amounts of land in subtropical lowland regions. This 
underestimates the impact of land redistribution in the highland region of the province. The data 
compiled by Zamosc relate to the highland region of Pichincha so the two indicators are not 
strictly comparable (see Chapter 3).  
158 
 
population in 1962. (Zamosc 1995 p. 23) The relative impact of land 
redistribution was weakest in Azuay and Bolívar, two provinces with the low 
indigenous population densities. The clearest outlier was the southern province 
of Loja where the semi-feudal practice arrimado lojano predominated (see 
Chapter 3).
143
 The data indicate the impact of land redistribution was modest, 
not rising above 20% of the agricultural land surface in any of the ten highland 
provinces.  The impact of agrarian reform was even more limited in real terms as 
the land channelled through the redistributive mechanisms tended to be the least 
productive and most marginalised in the sierra.  The cases and data analysed in 
this and subsequent chapters provide support for this claim. The important point 
to note at this stage is the redistribution of páramo skewed upwards the average 
amount of land redistributed as large tracts of the high-altitude grassland, which 
were primarily used for pasture but also for cultivation, were redistributed to a 
relatively small number of families, usually grouped together within 
communities or cooperatives. Hence the average amount of redistributed land 
indicated in Table 5.1 in no way reflects the cultivable plots of land individuals, 
families, communities and cooperatives secured via land reform between 1964 
and 1979. 
 
                                                          
143
 See Belote & Belote (1981), Barsky (1988) and Quintero & Silva (1991) for comments on 
land redistribution in the province.  
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Land redistribution as % of agricultural land surface** 
Figure 5.1 - Land redistribution  & indigenous peoples,                          
Highland Ecuador, 1964-1979  
Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA, Zamosc (1995) & INEC (2000). * Population of 
“predominantly indigenous area” as % of total rural population of the province in 1962 (Zamosc 1995  p. 
23).  ** Land redistribution between 1964 and 1979 as % of provincial agricultural land surface in 2000.  
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Figure 5.2 (below) indicates land redistribution proceeded at an uneven pace 
between 1964 and 1979.
144
  The data provides some insight into the formation 
and operation of the indigenous countermovement (see Chapter 4). First, the 
chart provides support for the claim that the lack of land redistributed in the 
opening years of the agrarian reform contributed to the strengthening and 
widening of indigenous organisation. Between 1964 and 1972 redistribution 
primarily comprised the transfer of huasipungos and distribution of some state-
owned land. The opportunities for indigenous families and communities to 
secure land through redistribution were extremely limited, especially in zones 
without AS haciendas.  Second, the chart indicates that indigenous pressure was 
able to expand the redistributive reach of agrarian reform, albeit to a small 
degree. The uptick in redistribution in the late 1970s primarily reflected the 
heightened pressure the indigenous countermovement brought to bear on the 
state to expand agrarian reform in the early 1970s. That is, the acceleration of 
redistribution between 1975 and 1979 was not based on the widespread 
incorporation of new land into the reform sector but the formal redistribution of 
private and state-owned land already transferred to the IERAC. (MAG 1977a p. 
28) (FAO 1980 p. 93) (Handelman 1980 p. 72) (Chiriboga 1984b p. 102) (Haney 
& Haney 1987 pp. 79-81) (Barsky 1988 pp. 308-18) The attempt of indigenous 
organisations to enforce existing legalisation in the early 1970s was 
demonstrated by an important protest in June 1972. Indicating the opening the 
arrival of a military regime ostensibly committed to radicalising agrarian reform 
provided for indigenous mobilisation, the FEI and the CTE organised a 50,000 
people strong indigenous march in the town of Palmira, Chimborazo to exert 
pressure on the Rodriguez Lara government to expand land redistribution. (El 
Espectador 05/06/1972 pp. 1-3) The movements presented the local 
representatives of the military government with a list of ten demands which 
centred on the application of existing agrarian reform legislation (e.g. Art. 14 
Ley 255);
145
 the prosecution of prominent local landowners accused of peasant 
                                                          
144
 The actual pace of land redistribution is impossible to determine because of the delays in 
providing formal titles to recipients of land and the unreliability of the agrarian reform data (see 
Chapters 1 and 2).  Figure 5.2 only provides an approximation of the actual pace of land 
redistribution.  
145
 The reference to Ley 255-CLP shows indigenous communities and organisations used the 
measures introduced by the Velasco Ibarra government to attempt to increase land redistribution 
in the highland region (see Chapter 2).  
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repression (e.g. Pablo Thur de Koos); and, investigation of the alleged corruptive 
activities of the IERAC in the sale and purchase of land in Chimborazo (e.g. 
Hacienda Galte). (El Espectador 05/06/1972 pp. 1-3) (MAG 1977a) Indigenous 
organisation and mobilisation, as will be explained below, also performed a 
crucial role in expediting and expanding the redistribution of state-owned land in 
the early 1970s.  
 
Demographic, ethnographic, and historic studies suggest relatively few 
highland indigenous peasants opted for the alternative route to secure land in the 
1960s and 1970s: the colonisation of untitled land in the western and eastern 
lowlands of Ecuador (i.e. the “grand solution” proposed by Galo Plaza in the 
early 1960s).
146
 The bulk of indigenous peoples and families elected to remain 
close to their communities and fight for land in the highlands. The state actively 
encouraged the colonisation of untitled, though not necessarily unutilised, land 
from the 1950s onwards. The Alliance for Progress provided additional support 
by providing a US$2,600,000 loan (BID-52-TF-EC) to accelerate settlement in 
and around Santo Domingo de los Colorados in the subtropical western 
lowlands. (El Mercurio 27/05/1964 p. 1) (MAG-IERAC 1977 p. 33) (Taffet 
2007 p. 53-7) The preference the state, the elite and the Alliance for Progress 
expressed for colonisation over agrarian reform was reflected in the amount of 
                                                          
146
 See, for example, Knapp (1987), Thurner (1989), Weismantel (1988), Bebbington (1992), 
Zamosc (1995), Lentz (1997), Lyons (2006) and Cervone (2012).  
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Figure 5.2 - Land redistributed via agrarian reform by year,   
Highland Ecuador, 1964-1979 
Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA.  
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land distributed via colonisation in the highland provinces between 1964 and 
1979. The overall amount of land allocated via colonisation totalled 418,819 
hectares, around 20,000 hectares more than the total amount of land redistributed 
via agrarian reform.
147
 (IERAC-INDA) The important point to note about 
colonisation in relation to this investigation is that impact it had on the land 
distribution data reported in the 1974 and 2000 agricultural censuses. Whereas 
the average amount of land redistributed via agrarian reform was 8 hectares, the 
average size distributed via colonisation was 38 hectares. Colonisation, as will 
be explained in Chapters 6 and 9, performed a significant role in increasing the 
number of medium and large size landholdings registered in the highlands, 
masking the actual degree of land inequality in the region.  
3. Huasipungo 
The LRAC proscribed huasipungo and established a framework for the 
dissolution of the practice (see Chapter 4).
148
 While the wider rural indigenous 
population was able to secure land via other dimensions of agrarian reform, the 
redistribution of huasipungos provides the clearest indication of the transfer of 
land to the highland indigenous peoples because of the ethnic dimension of the 
practice (see Chapter 3).  
The data presented in Table 5.2 (below) indicate the law generalised the 
dissolution and redistribution of huasipungos across the sierra (excluding the 
southern highland province of Loja where the practice of arrimado lojano 
predominated). Whereas the transfer of huasipungos was concentrated in the 
northern highland provinces between 1959 and 1964, the transfer of land under 
agrarian reform was spread across the highlands between 1964 and 1979 
(broadly corresponding with the geographic distribution of huasipungos 
captured by the 1954 agricultural census). Land officially redistributed to 
huasipungueros between 1964 and 1979 totalled 64,542 hectares or 16.8% of the 
total amount of land redistributed during the period. The majority of the land 
                                                          
147
 The difference between the scale of land reform and colonisation in the country as a whole 
was much larger because of the extensive colonisation of the western and eastern lowlands in the 
1960s and 1970s. (IERAC-INDA)  
148
 This section concentrates on the redistribution of huasipungos on privately owned haciendas. 
The liquidation and redistribution of huasipungos on state-owned land is analysed in the next 
section. The data presented in this section include some huasipungos on state-owned land but the 
exact amount cannot be accurately determined from the IERAC-INDA data.  
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was formally redistributed between 1964 and 1969 but the liquidation of the 
practice was still ongoing in the 1970s and the formal transfer of land was still 
taking place in the 1980s and 1990s. (IERAC-INDA) The number of families - 
or generally the male heads of households - who secured private property titles 
to huasipungos via agrarian reform between 1964 and 1979 was 18,125.  
Table 5.2 – Comparison of huasipungos redistributed under MPST  & 
IERAC, Highland Ecuador, 1959-1979 
 MPST  
(1959-1964) 
IERAC  
(1964-1979) 
Province Huasipungo   
(hectares) 
Average size 
(hectares)  
Huasipungo       
(hectares) 
Average size 
(hectares) 
Azuay 0 0.00 4,085 2.94 
Bolivar 14 0.82 609 2.87 
Cañar 0 0.00 3,301 3.62 
Carchi 2,672 5.81 2,195 2.40 
Chimborazo 116 0.87 14,272 3.40 
Cotopaxi 474 3.00 18,188 4.73 
Imbabura 1,072 2.37 6,069 4.76 
Loja 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Pichincha 4,955 2.82 15,019 3.11 
Tungurahua 0 0.00 804 1.44 
Total 9,303 3.12 64,542 3.56 
Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA & Barsky (1988) p. 73. 
Comparing the transfers undertaken between 1959 and 1964 and 1964 and 
1979, suggests the framework established by LRAC allowed for slightly more 
favourable outcomes for huasipungueros, enabling them to secure average plots 
of 3.6 as opposed to 3.1 hectares. The data provide some indication why 
landowning elites attempted to stall the introduction of agrarian reform 
legislation to create time to dissolve semi-feudal relations (see Chapter 3). The 
scale of land redistributed to huasipungueros was significantly below the level 
the IERAC had anticipated, according to unpublished IERAC documents 
reprinted by Blankstein and Zuvekas.  (1973 p. 81) The data suggest the institute 
had expected to redistribute 235,000 hectares of land to 19,459 huasipungo 
families, implying an average plot size of 12 hectares. This corresponded with 
the initial land reform proposals that emerged under the Velasco Ibarra (1960-1) 
and Arosemena Monroy (1961-63) governments (see Chapter 3).  
163 
 
The aggregate IERAC-INDA data do not allow for the analysis of individual 
transfers of land to huasipungueros. However, the numerous studies that have 
examined the issue suggest the conditions of transfer varied significantly across 
the region. As land reform placed no upper limits on the redistribution of 
huasipungos, the differentiation that existed between the sizes of plots was often 
reflected in the land redistribution process. For example, Martínez notes that on 
the Hacienda Rasuyacu in the northern province of Cotopaxi the distribution in 
the size of huasipungos on the hacienda was reflected in the redistribution of 
land to huasipungueros. (1984 pp. 134-6) Existing inequalities between families 
were embedded and opportunities for younger generations to access land were 
restricted. The case analysed by Martínez shows some huasipungueros exited 
the traditional hacienda complex with relatively large plots of land. Other 
authors have reported similar outcomes (e.g. Thurner 1989; Waters 2007). The 
more common pattern, however, was the relocation of indigenous families on to 
smaller and/or less productive land.
149
  
Resettlement was often staunchly opposed by indigenous families and 
communities. This point was emphasised in my interview with César Andrango, 
the president of the Unión de Organizaciones Populares de Ayora y Cayambe 
(UNOPAC), whose father was a huasipunguero. (Interview 16) He explained 
hacendados attempted to relocate huasipungueros to the “páramo” but through 
the “lucha” (“fight”) indigenous families were able to secure cultivable plots of 
land located at lower elevations. Lyons’ analysis of the dissolution of the 
Catholic Church owned Hacienda Monjas Corrals in Chimborazo also 
highlights the resistance indigenous families and communities mounted to 
relocation. (2006 pp. 265-72) The author reports the religious authorities 
disputed the amount and location of the land that should be redistributed to 
huasipungueros. Advisors to the influential Bishop of Riobamba, Leonidas 
Proaño “were especially opposed to giving up the relatively flat and fertile lands 
on the eastern side of the estate, where most of the resident laborers lived.” 
(2006 p. 265) After some deliberation, the religious authorities proposed 
                                                          
149
  See, for example, Preston (1976) p. 23, Taveras (1977) pp. 8-12, Handelman (1980) p. 70, 
Preston & Redclift (1980) p. 61, Martínez (1984) p. 75, Martínez (1985b) p. 136, Barsky (1988) 
p. 373, Lentz (1997) pp. 55-6, Martínez (2002) p. 33, Waters (2007) pp. 134-5, Becker & Tutillo 
(2009) p. 215-6, and Huarcaya (2012) p. 212-3. 
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granting each huasipungo family 10 hectares of land on the western side of the 
hacienda. However, the indigenous families “did not want to give up their 
houses and the fertile plots they had been working on the eastern side in order to 
relocate in the more frost-prone, rocky, and sloping land on the west, where they 
would have to break up the tough páramo grass and start anew.” (2006 p. 265) 
The families resisted but most ultimately agreed to relocate, leaving the best 
quality land in the hands of the Catholic Church. The case highlights the 
complex role religious activists performed in indigenous struggles for land. 
While Leonidas Proaño performed a crucial role in supporting indigenous efforts 
to secure land (e.g. attending protests, supporting Ecuarunari), he was also 
seemingly complicit in the relocation of indigenous families on church-owned 
land.  
Relocation was accompanied by the outright sale of land to 
huasipungueros.
150
 Lentz reports one indigenous worker on a traditional 
hacienda in Chimborazo recalled: “We have not received justice according to 
agrarian reform. We did not know the laws at that stage, we were not organised. 
Because of that they did not give us huasipungos only selling, selling, and 
selling”. (Lentz 1997 pp. 54-5) The testimony illustrates two important features 
of land reform in the highlands: i) the failure of the civilian and military 
governments of the 1960s and 1970s to promote and implement the 
programme
151
 and ii) the lack of indigenous organisation at the local level 
supported the efforts of landowning elites to circumvent the law.  
The problems caused by the resettlement and eviction of indigenous families 
were exacerbated by the lack of explicit provisions agrarian reform provided 
members of extended huasipungo families to secure land. Chapter 3 showed the 
size of the extended huasipungo family varied significantly in the 1950s and 
1960s but extended families of thirteen were reported on some haciendas. The 
transfer of huasipungos centred on the conversion of the usufruct rights of the 
huasipunguero into private property rights, paying little attention to the 
                                                          
150
  The relocation of indigenous families and sale of land to huasipungueros was accompanied 
by outright eviction in some cases. See, for example, Preston (1976) p. 23 and Taveras (1977) 
pp. 10-8. 
151
 See Cant (2012) for insight into the efforts the Velasco military regime invested into 
communicating its land reform programme to the peasantry in Peru.  See King (1977) for other 
historical examples.  
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arrimado-apegado population. (Quintero & Silva 1991 p. 54) This was also true 
of indigenous (and mestizo) peasants integrated into the hacienda complex by 
other semi-feudalist practices (e.g. yanapa). For example, of the 194 former 
highland hacienda workers Preston and Taveras interviewed between 1975 and 
1976 only 28% received land through agrarian reform. (Taveras 1977 pp. 8-9)  
In effect, agrarian reform closed the traditional, semi-feudalist route of 
securing land for arrimados-apegados without providing adequate measures for 
them to obtain land either at the point of the liquidation of the huasipungo or in 
the years after the start of the reform. With limited possibilities of securing land 
through the IERAC, arrimados-apegados were left with two other primary 
routes to secure land: the market or the family. While the market provided an 
avenue for some to acquire land, many were integrated into family plots. The 
incorporation of the arrimado-apegado population into huasipungo plots 
contributed to the acceleration of mini and microfundización of landholdings as 
well the acceleration of temporary and permanent migration into towns and 
cities (see Chapters 6 and 9). The lack of provisions provided for this segment of 
the indigenous population also stimulated indigenous organisation and 
mobilisation.  
4. State-owned land 
The transfer of AS haciendas to IERAC opened another avenue for indigenous 
families and communities to secure land in the 1960s and 1970s.  The estates 
were concentrated in the central and northern provinces of Cañar, Chimborazo, 
Cotopaxi, and Pichincha. The total stock of AS land registered in the highlands 
prior to start of agrarian reform was estimated at 132,853 hectares (see Chapter 
3). However, as will be explained in Chapter 8, not all of this land was actually 
redistributed. State-owned land accounted for 17.8% of the total amount of land 
redistributed between 1964 and 1979.  
The data collated in Table 5.3 (below) show the redistribution of the state-
owned land was concentrated in a small number of provinces. Over 80% of the 
land was adjudicated in Cañar, Chimborazo, and Pichincha.
152
 The opportunities 
                                                          
152
 The timing of the formal redistribution of land significantly understates the amount of state-
owned land redistributed in Cotopaxi in the 1960s and 1970s.  The long-range data reported in 
Chapter 8 provide a better picture.  
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open to indigenous peasant families and communities to secure state-owned land 
were therefore restricted to specific areas. The average amount of land 
redistributed was 7.3 hectares. However, as with the overall data, the average 
amount of land per recipient should not be confused with the average plot size as 
the redistribution of AS land included significant amounts of páramo, woodland, 
scrubland, and wasteland. For example, Hacienda Pesillo, which was 
redistributed to former workers on the estate, comprised approximately 2,350 
hectares of cultivated land and 7,000 hectares of páramo. (IERAC 1965-1985) 
Table 5.3 –Asistencia Social land redistributed via agrarian reform,                       
Highland Ecuador, 1964-1979 
Province Asistencia 
Social   
(hectares) 
Recipients  Average  size     
(hectares) 
Proportion of 
total*  
(%)  
Azuay 3,311 415 7.98 4.66 
Bolivar 220 33 6.66 0.31 
Cañar 12,672 693 18.29 17.84 
Carchi 5,282 874 6.04 7.44 
Chimborazo 27,036 3,154 8.57 38.06 
Cotopaxi 1,912 998 1.92 2.69 
Imbabura 2,040 341 5.98 2.87 
Loja 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Pichincha 18,541 3,219 5.76 26.10 
Tungurahua 18 22 0.83 0.03 
Total 71,033 9,749 7.29 100.00 
Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA. * Proportion of total of AS land redistributed 
between 1964 and 1979.  
The division and redistribution of AS haciendas varied across the sierra but 
tended to involve the redistribution of agricultural land to individuals (e.g. 
huasipungueros) as well as the transfer of agricultural and pastoral land to 
cooperatives. In general, the opportunities for members of extended huasipungo 
families (arrimados-apegados) and other hacienda workers (e.g. yanaperos) to 
secure land were greater on state-owned estates than privately owned haciendas 
but numerous peasants and agricultural workers remained marginalised or 
excluded.  
The most systematic and widespread conversion of AS haciendas into 
agricultural cooperatives took place in the northern highland canton of Cayambe 
where the concentration of state-owned land was dense, the estate workers well-
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organised, and the indigenous population high.
153
 The productivity of the land 
and the proximity of the canton to Quito made the region particularly important 
for the supply of agricultural produce to expanding domestic markets. The 
importance of the zone to the state was not only economic. The penetration of 
the PCE (via the FEI) and the extent of social unrest in the zone also made the 
region important on a political level. (Becker & Tutillo 2009 pp. 225-8) 
Following the general pattern, the division and redistribution of the land 
proceeded at a slow pace. While the time it took the IERAC to organise the 
division and sale of the haciendas slowed down redistribution, the response of 
the largely indigenous workers to the plans of the institute to convert sections of 
the estates into agricultural cooperatives also delayed the process. Highlighting a 
clear difference between the indigenous and state vision of land reform, the 
MAG draws attention to another source of conflict. 
“For its part, the FEI has consistently maintained the aspiration of an 
Agrarian Reform in which the cost of the land does not fall on the 
campesinos. By contrast, the IERAC has always insisted in translating 
the cost of the land to the beneficiaries, a characteristic that has 
defined the Ecuadorian Agrarian Reform model, a view based on 
law.”154 (1977c p. 50) 
Within this context, workers from various state-owned haciendas launched a 
series of strikes and invasions in 1965, 1966, and 1967 demanding “free reign” 
over the haciendas and the expulsion of the IERAC.
155
 (El Comercio 29/10/1966 
p. 14) (El Comercio 30/10/1966 p. 3) (Crespi 1971 pp. 235-6) (Becker & Tutillo 
2009 pp. 226-7) (MAG 1977c pp. 49-50) However, the military and civilian 
governments of the late 1960s refused to cede to their demands. Using military 
power to quell indigenous resistance, the IERAC proceeded with its strategy to 
                                                          
153
 See Crespi (1971), Furche (1980), Casagrande (1981), IERAC (1984), Ramón (1993), Ferraro 
(2004) and Becker (2008). 
154
 It is worth recalling that the LRAC implied state-owned land should be transferred to 
indigenous families and communities without cost but the supplementary legislation related to 
the division of AS haciendas provided the legal basis for charging indigenous peasants (see 
Chapter 4). The FEI therefore had some legal grounds for its demands even if those grounds had 
been removed by the military government (1963-66) shortly after the introduction of the LRAC. 
155
 See Crespi (1971), Prieto (1980), Clark (1998) and Becker (2007) regarding earlier conflicts 
on AS haciendas. 
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sell individual plots of land to huasipungueros and former hacienda workers and 
collective plots to agricultural cooperatives.  
The division of Hacienda Pesillo, which was one of the first AS estates to be 
divided and redistributed, sheds some light on the formation of cooperatives and 
the redistribution of state-owned land.
156
 (IERAC 1965-1985) (Crespi 1971 pp. 
233-5) (Ferraro 2004 pp. 55-56) (Becker 2008 pp. 139-40) (Becker & Tutillo 
2009 pp. 215-17) The process started in 1965 with the transfer of the hacienda to 
the IERAC and distribution of provisional (i.e. subject to possible resettlement) 
and definitive land titles to former huasipungueros and hacienda workers. This 
was followed by the formation of a number of agricultural cooperatives on the 
estate. The Simon Bolivar cooperative was one of the first to be established. The 
enterprise was operated and managed by former workers on the hacienda but 
IERAC retained overall control of the cooperative. Specifically, the enterprise 
was expected to “exploit the land in accordance with the plans elaborated by 
IERAC”. (IERAC 1965-1985) The institute also appointed an administrator to 
monitor the financial position of the enterprise on a weekly basis. The land sold 
to the cooperative in “collective form for technical and traditional reasons” was 
mortgaged for eighteen years with the cooperative obligated to pay equal annual 
instalments until the loan had been repaid.
157
 (IERAC 1965-1985) During that 
period, authorisation was required from IERAC if members of the cooperative 
wanted to sell or divide the land. The division and redistribution of the hacienda 
provided opportunities for indigenous peoples and families to secure access to 
the most productive zones of the hacienda as well as obtain communal 
ownership of the páramo. However, the IERAC retained a degree of control 
over the operation of the cooperatives and, as will be explained below, tensions 
emerged over access to the cooperatives and the price of land.  
With the redistribution of land and the creation of agricultural cooperatives 
proceeding at a slow and uneven pace in Cayambe, another cycle of indigenous 
protests and mobilisations erupted in 1969. Writing at the time, Crespi notes: 
“new concessions were won, but the haciendas still belong to the patrons.” (1971 
                                                          
156
 Some of the background information for this section was derived from personal 
communication with Emilia Ferraro who undertook ethnographic research in and around Pesillo 
in the 1990s.  
157
 The last payment was duly made in 1985. (IERAC 1965-1985) 
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p. 236) While indigenous pressure was unable to secure indigenous peoples with 
free reign over the haciendas, it was able to provide them greater control over 
the operation of the cooperatives and expand redistribution in the zone.
158
  
Reflecting the modest shift in the position of the state towards agrarian reform 
under the Velasco Ibarra government (see Chapter 4), Proyecto Cayambe was 
launched in 1970 to accelerate the redistribution of the state-owned haciendas 
and improve living conditions within the region. (IERAC 1970) (El Comercio 
17/08/1973 p.1) (MAG 1977c) (MAG 1977f) The first wave of the project 
included eight haciendas. One of the central objectives of the plan was to expand 
the amount of land available to former workers on the estates. Prior to the start 
of the programme the IERAC estimated that the average plot of former 
huasipungueros on the haciendas was 4.1 hectares and the overall average 
landholding was 2 hectares. The project aimed to increase the average 
landholding to 8 hectares for the 825 families expected to be integrated into the 
scheme. (IERAC 1970 p. 7) This involved the sale of individual plots to former 
workers as well as the sale of collective holdings to agricultural cooperatives 
which were established by IERAC. (Martínez 1995 p.11) In contrast to the 
overall pattern of land redistribution, the project involved former 
huasipungueros and arrimados-apegados. In 1974, MAG estimated that of the 
572 members of the cooperatives formed through the programme 210 were 
former huasipungueros and 362 were ex-arrimados-apegados. (1977c p. 45) 
However, many former workers were excluded from the programme and the 
land that many ex-huasipungueros and arrimados-apegados acquired was often 
too small to develop economic strategies based solely on agriculture. MAG 
emphasised this point in its evaluation of Proyecto Cayambe in the late 1970s.  
The institute reported that “a considerable number of campesinos remained at 
the margin of the project…which gave rise to the impoverishment of a good 
number of peasants and widespread migration among them, particularly 
arrimados, ex-huasipungueros, and landless workers not linked to the 
cooperatives”. (1977c pp. 42-3) Reinforcing this point the MAG attributed 
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 MAG noted in the late 1970s that “IERAC initially took responsibility for all of the 
production of the zone, constituting a type of state enterprise; however, that state enterprise has 
been slowly converted into self-managed cooperatives.” (1977b p. 52) What the MAG fails to 
acknowledge, is the role indigenous mobilisation performed in forcing the conversion from state 
enterprise to self-management. 
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temporary migration in the region to “a) the lack of land for arrimados; b) the 
insufficient size of the plot of land granted to ex-huasipungueros by IERAC; c) 
the small amount of labour that the cooperatives and local haciendas require; 
and, d) the general limited employment opportunities in the region.” (1977c p. 
42-3) Illustrating the lack of genuine space open to indigenous peoples to 
become involved in decisions about land redistribution, MAG noted “there has 
been no peasant participation in the design or implementation of the project.” 
(1977f p. 511) 
The uneven nature and limited reach of the project also caused divisions 
within and between local communities. (Martínez 1995 pp. 9-10) While the 
formation of cooperatives provided some indigenous peoples with opportunities 
to take a stake in the most productive zones of the region, others were largely or 
totally excluded. Cooperative membership was a contested process due to the 
limited amount of land available and the top-down manner in which the 
enterprises were formed.  Ecuarunari highlight the conflictive nature of the 
process: “The cooperatives did not resolve the basic problems of the campesinos 
but caused new conflicts between members and those who did not receive land.” 
(FIPRR 1993 p. 30) Furthermore, the cooperatives experienced numerous 
operational problems. In addition to receiving little credit and technical 
assistance, the price the cooperatives paid for the land often limited the 
economic viability of the enterprises. (MAG 1977f pp. 512-3) Indicative of this, 
the members of the Simon Bolivar cooperative requested the repayment for the 
purchase of the land be delayed twelve months in 1971 so the cooperative could 
purchase a tractor, fertilisers and other inputs. (IERAC 1965-1985) This 
illustrated one of the central weaknesses of the reform: the redistribution of land 
was largely determined by economic rather than social factors. In this sense, the 
operation of redistributive and market mechanisms practically coincided.  
The redistribution of AS haciendas elsewhere in the sierra took different 
forms but tended to have limited reach in terms of the number of families and 
communities involved and the amount of productive agricultural land 
distributed. For instance, the division of Hacienda Colta Monjas, which was 
located in Chimborazo, resulted in the redistribution of approximately 3,000 
hectares of land to 1,500 families but only 1,000 hectares were cultivable, 
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implying the general redistribution of family plots of less than one hectare (i.e. 
microfundia). (MAG 1977a p. 27) (IERAC 1984 p. 25) Meanwhile, the 
redistribution of Hacienda Guaypapungo in the southern province of Cañar 
involved the transfer of between 10,000 and 12,000 hectares of land to between 
160 and 225 families. (MAG 1977b p. 104) Spaces therefore emerged for 
indigenous peoples to secure land through the redistribution of state-owned 
haciendas but opportunities were restricted to a relatively small section of the 
indigenous population.  
5. Privately owned land 
Land reform legislation provided scope for the incorporation of privately owned 
land into the reform sector via reversion, negotiation, and expropriation. 
Indigenous families, communities, and organisations often used legal and extra-
legal methods to secure privately owned land, combining the lodging of land 
claims with the occupation of land, with the latter usually occurring as a result of 
the pace or the outcome of the former. While the data do not allow for precise 
conclusions to be drawn, IERAC and MAG sources indicate the bulk of the land 
was reverted and negotiated rather than expropriated (e.g. IERAC 1967; MAG 
1977a). The total amount of land redistributed via negotiation, reversion, and 
expropriation between 1964 and 1979 was approximately 162,906 hectares or 
40.9% of the total amount of land redistributed during the period (see Table 5.4 
below).  
The average amount of land redistributed (11.75 hectares) was significantly 
skewed upwards by the redistribution of páramo. For instance, approximately 
1,000 hectares of páramo was redistributed to a small indigenous community in 
the northern highland province of Cotopaxi in 1968.
159
  Reflecting the 
modernising orientation of agrarian reform, the opportunities for indigenous 
peoples to secure privately owned land were generally higher in areas where 
land utilisation and capitalist modernisation were weakest (e.g. Cañar, 
Chimborazo) and lower where land utilisation and capitalist modernisation were 
highest (e.g. Imbabura, Pichincha) (these points are explored in greater depth in 
Chapter 8). 
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 Information derived from personal communication with Tristan Partridge who undertook 
ethnographic research in Cotopaxi in the 2010s.  
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Table 5.4 –Privately owned land redistributed via negotiation, reversion & 
expropriation, Highland Ecuador, 1964-1979 
Province Negotiation, 
reversion, & 
expropriation      
(hectares) 
Recipients  Average  size     
(hectares) 
Proportion 
of total*  
(%)  
Azuay 6,630 415 15.98 4.07 
Bolivar 1,062 125 8.50 0.65 
Cañar 15,751 1,101 14.31 9.67 
Carchi 5,883 793 7.42 3.61 
Chimborazo 44,499 2,730 16.30 27.32 
Cotopaxi 18,952 828 22.89 11.63 
Imbabura 677 126 5.37 0.42 
Loja 46,828 4,865 9.63 28.75 
Pichincha 7,608 1,278 5.95 4.67 
Tungurahua 15,016 1,604 9.36 9.22 
Total 162,906 13,865 11.75 100.00 
Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA. * Proportion of total amount of land redistributed 
via negotiation, reversion, & expropriation between 1964 and 1979.  
In addition to land incorporated into the reform sector via negotiation, 
reversion, and expropriation around 33,000 hectares of privately owned land 
worked under precarious forms of land tenure (e.g. aparcería) were also 
redistributed in the sierra between 1970 and 1979.
160
 (IERAC-INDA) The legal 
basis for the redistribution of this land was provided by the agrarian laws the 
Velasco Ibarra government introduced in 1970 (see Chapter 4). Over one-third 
of the land was redistributed in the southern province of Loja.  The data do not 
allow for precise conclusions to be drawn but the legislative changes appear to 
have created space for some indigenous peoples to secure land in the provinces 
of Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, Imbabura, and Pichincha. Nearly 18,000 hectares of 
land was redistributed across these provinces between 1970 and 1979. The 
remainder of this section concentrates on the redistribution of privately owned 
land integrated into the reform sector via negotiation, reversion, and 
expropriation.  
Though not representative of the thousands of interventions that took place in 
the highlands in the 1960s and 1970s, three cases in the province of Chimborazo 
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 The remaining amount of land redistributed between 1964 and 1979 was transferred through 
the mestizo practice of arrimado-lojano in the southern province of Loja (see Chapter 3). 
(IERAC-INDA)  
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evaluated by MAG in the late 1970s shed some light on the redistribution of 
privately owned land to indigenous families and communities.  
The first case involved Hacienda Zula which stretched across approximately 
38,000 hectares of agricultural and pastoral land in the canton of Alausí. Prior to 
being sold to IERAC in 1966, the hacienda was owned by the Catholic Church 
and rented to landowning elites who operated the estate. The hacienda was 
organised along traditional lines with a large population of indigenous workers 
and a small group of mestizo foremen, administrators, and managers. The estate 
comprised 35,000 hectares of pastoral land (mainly páramo), 1,000 hectares of 
cultivable land, and 2,000 hectares of land that was unsuitable for agriculture or 
pasture. (MAG 1977a p. 27 & p. 42) The total amount of recorded land 
adjudicated by the IERAC was around 21,000 hectares. (IERAC 1984 p. 25) 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the division, redistribution, and sale of the estate 
proceeded in two phases. The first stage, which was initiated by the Catholic 
Church (under the auspices of the Bishop of Riobamba Leonidas Proaño), 
included the transfer of plots of around 1.75 hectares to 28 former 
huasipungueros in exchange for the services they had provided on the estate (i.e. 
the land was redistributed without cost) and the sale of agricultural land to 
former workers on the hacienda and to peasants from neighbouring 
communities. The second phase, which was overseen by the IERAC, involved 
the additional sale of land to former workers and to local peasants. The average 
size of the plots was between 4 and 5 hectares. Following the general trend, 
arrimados-apegados were largely excluded from the redistribution of the land 
which resulted in a number of them sharecropping sections of the plots of former 
huasipungueros and migrating on a temporary basis to secure income through 
wage labour. (MAG 1977a p. 44) The division of the hacienda also involved the 
formation of an agricultural cooperative which secured the most productive 
sections of the hacienda. The cooperative, which was promoted by the IERAC, 
comprised 28 former administrative, managerial and agricultural workers on the 
hacienda all of whom were mestizo. (MAG 1977a p. 44) (Quintero & Silva 1991 
pp. 155-7) MAG notes that the mestizo workers and management of the 
cooperative maintained “good, even personal, relations with the IERAC 
functionaries” and ethnic discrimination impeded “indigenous access to the 
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cooperative.” (1977a p. 41 & p. 51) The ethnic division of labour on the 
traditional estate was therefore reflected in the division and sale of the hacienda. 
The former indigenous workers on the estate and a number of neighbouring 
communities retained access to the páramo but were often left with small, 
marginalised plots of cultivable land (less than 1 hectare). The price the former 
workers paid for the land redistributed by the Catholic Church and the IERAC 
exacerbated the situation, constituting a “genuine economic burden” for the 
indigenous peasant population who struggled to earn sufficient income to repay 
the debt taken out to purchase land.
161
 (MAG 1977a p. 58) The Catholic Church 
therefore performed a dual role in the division and redistribution of the hacienda. 
On the one hand, land was transferred to a small group of indigenous families on 
seemingly favourable terms. On the other hand, religious authorities secured a 
high price for the hacienda which was then passed on to the former workers on 
the estate who purchased land from the IERAC.  
The second case involved a group of indigenous families of a “free” 
community (i.e. “external” community not integrated into a traditional hacienda) 
in the canton of Riobamba who formed a cooperative in 1968 in order to 
purchase sections of a local hacienda which was owned by the head of the 
regional branch of the IERAC.
162
 (MAG 1977a pp. 29-40) The community was 
described as a “minifundio comunal”, with 115 families (60 comuneros with 
titles to land and 55 arrimados-apegados, 600 people in total) sharing 45 
hectares of land. The cooperative was formed by 30 of the 60 comuneros. The 
sections of the land purchased by the cooperative totalled 700 hectares, 670 of 
which were pastoral land (primarily páramo), and 30 were cultivable. Irrigation 
was limited due to the failure of a neighbouring hacendado to grant permission 
to use an irrigation channel that passed through his property. The land was 
purchased in 1971, three years after the start of negotiations. The cultivable area 
was divided into small individual plots (< 1 hectare) and one collective plot (5 > 
6 hectares). The páramo was nominally divided between the members of the 
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 MAG argues IERAC overpaid the Catholic Church for the land, implying the overpayment 
was then passed on to the peasants who purchased the land via IERAC. (1977c) See Lyons (2006 
pp. 263-71).  
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 The regional head of the IERAC and the owner of the hacienda was Dr. Alfonso Cordero who 
the FEI later accused of supporting the attempts of local hacendados to acquire and sell land via 
IERAC. (El Espectador 05/06/1972 pp. 1-3)  
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cooperative but was used collectively. The organisation of the sale of sections of 
the hacienda provided increased opportunities for the members of the 
cooperative to secure a living through agricultural production and avoid 
temporary migration. However, as with the case of the agricultural cooperatives 
established on state-owned land, the price the cooperative paid for the land was 
“elevated”, which limited the profitability and undermined the viability of the 
enterprise. (MAG 1977a p. 38) Furthermore, the cooperative only included half 
of the comunero population, leaving the remaining members of the community 
restricted to working mini and microfundia. Tensions emerged within the 
community as a result. The cabildo established an association (i.e. first-grade 
organisation) to compete with the cooperative but was unable to secure land. 
MAG notes that the community was weakened and marginalised as a result of 
the establishment of the cooperative. (1977a p. 35) In sum, the division and sale 
of the hacienda provided opportunities for half of the community members to 
secure productive land but the remaining comuneros and arrimados-apegados 
were marginalised. The traditional organisational structure of the community 
was also weakened. The price the cooperative paid for land, as was common in 
the 1960s and 1970s, undermined the long-term economic viability of the 
enterprise.  
The third case, which gained a degree of notoriety in Chimborazo in the 
1970s, involved the reorganisation and redistribution of Hacienda Galte which 
was located in the canton of Guamote. (El Espectador 15/06/1972 pp. 1-3) 
(MAG 1977a pp. 1-19) (IERAC 1984 p. 25) (Sylva 1986 pp. 162-4) The 
hacienda stretched across approximately 11,000 hectares of high altitude land 
three quarters of which the MAG describes as a “desert in which sand is 
constantly turned over by the wind”. (1977a p. 3) The remaining section of the 
estate comprised land located in sloped and irregular zones as well as páramo. 
The MAG estimate the population linked to the hacienda in the late 1970s was 
around 2,000 people, the vast majority of whom the agency characterised as 
indigenous.
163
 With around 1,000 hectares of the hacienda considered to be 
cultivable, the MAG notes that there was “considerable demographic pressure” 
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 MAG describes the population as “typically indigenous”. The majority of the population, 
according to the ministry, were monolingual, speaking only Kichwa. (1977a p. 4)  
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on the land. (1977a p. 4) IERAC purchased the hacienda after the introduction of 
the LRAC.  Reflecting the ability of landowners to secure high prices for the 
land they sold to the IERAC (and the probable complicity of local state officials 
in the sale and purchase of Hacienda Galte), the MAG notes that institute had 
paid the owner an “excessive price” for the estate. (1977a p. 11) The collective 
organisation of the indigenous workers performed a crucial role in determining 
the outcome of the redistribution of the hacienda. Under pressure from the 
workers and the FEI, the institute dissolved the 158 huasipungo contracts that 
existed on the hacienda and redistributed approximately 3,000 hectares to the 
former huasipungueros without cost. The indigenous families were also 
provided with use of 2,000 hectares of páramo. The IERAC proposed the sale of 
the rest of the hacienda to the workers (approximately 7,500 hectares inc. 
páramo) at a similar price to the one the IERAC had paid the landowner. 
However, inspired by the FEI, the indigenous workers “emphatically and 
repeatedly” rejected the proposal.  (MAG 1977a p. 7) (Sylva 1986 pp. 161-5) 
Mirroring the disputes in Cayambe, the FEI demanded that the land be 
redistributed to the indigenous peasants without cost. The two parties failed to 
reach agreement and the land that had not been transferred to the indigenous 
workers was converted into a state-owned enterprise managed by the IERAC. 
The conflict continued throughout the 1970s. Suggesting the sale of the land at 
the price proposed by IERAC would be “ruinous” for the peasants, the MAG 
recommended the sale of the land to a cooperative formed of all of the former 
workers on the estate at a price significantly below the price the IERAC had 
paid. (1977a pp. 13-4) The remaining sections of the hacienda were redistributed 
to the peasant families in the late 1970s early 1980s. (IERAC 1984) The 
collective organisation of the indigenous families and communities was crucial 
in influencing the conditions under which land was redistributed, resisting the 
efforts of the IERAC to recover the full cost of the acquisition of the hacienda by 
charging elevated prices for the land.   
6. Summary: empirical and theoretical findings 
This chapter has analysed the redistribution of land to indigenous families, 
communities, and cooperatives in the 1960s and 1970s.  The analysis has shown 
redistribution proceeded at a slow pace and incorporated a small proportion of 
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the agricultural land surface of the highland region. Land reform accelerated and 
generalised the dissolution of huasipungo. While agrarian reform legislation 
provided indigenous families with a greater degree of protection than the private 
initiative undertaken between 1959 and 1964 (see Chapter 3), numerous 
landowners manipulated or ignored the legal framework. Relocation and 
eviction were widespread. The absence of specific provisions for arrimados-
apegados increased the pressure on the plots some indigenous families secured 
through the dissolution of huasipungo. One of the clear lines of conflict that 
emerged between the state and indigenous peoples was over the price of 
redistributed land. The IERAC generally attempted to charge elevated prices 
while indigenous peoples tried to lower the cost or demand the state redistribute 
land without cost.  
Indigenous pressure was required to activate and influence land 
redistribution. Regionally, the pressure indigenous and peasant movements 
exerted on the state in the early 1970s was reflected in the uptick in land 
redistribution in the late 1970s.  Locally, indigenous organisation and 
mobilisation was influential in expediting and expanding redistribution as well 
as improving the conditions under which land was transferred. The limited 
amount of land redistributed in Ecuador suggests the FAO’s assertion that 
“peasants did not have the organizational ability nor the decision-making power 
to implement agrarian reform” is true on a national level (see Chapter 2). (1980 
p. 92) Yet the analysis presented in this chapter has shown that organisation and 
mobilisation performed a crucial role in increasing the opportunities for 
indigenous families and communities to secure redistributed land in the highland 
region.  
The chapter has illustrated the importance of scrutinising the structure and 
operation of redistributive mechanisms (see Chapter 1). If within Polanyi’s 
framework redistribution is understood as “the state gathering goods and 
redistributing them according to individual needs, not according to prices”, then 
land redistribution was virtually non-existent in the highland region. (Topik 
2001 p. 89) The bulk of redistributed land was sold to indigenous peoples and 
the limited amount of land redistributed meant the individual (and collective) 
needs of indigenous peoples were infrequently met. The redistributive 
178 
 
mechanism practically coincided with the market mechanism.  These points 
highlight the importance of not automatically attributing particular 
characteristics to the forms of integration (e.g. equity to redistribution). 
Empirical analysis of processes and actors is required to reveal the impact and 
character of redistributive mechanisms. The problems indigenous peoples faced 
accessing land through land reform illustrates why the FEI and the FURA 
demanded representation within the state agencies involved in land reform (see 
Chapter 4). Indigenous and peasant participation in these bodies would not have 
been a panacea. But it would have had the potential to limit some of the 
problems associated with the redistributive form of integration (e.g. 
centralisation of power) and increase the spaces open for indigenous peoples to 
influence decision making over the use of land. The active roles indigenous 
peoples performed in land redistribution in the sierra provide support for 
Polanyi’s vision of social change in which human agency performs a central 
role. (Topik 2001 p. 85) 
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Chapter Six 
Land markets and indigenous peoples: activation and development 
(1964-1979) 
1. Introduction 
The analysis presented in the previous chapter demonstrated the direct impact of 
land reform in the 1960s and 1970s was limited: less than 10% of the 
agricultural land surface of the highland region was incorporated into the reform 
sector and redistributed to various sectors of the rural population. The indirect 
effect, however, was considerable, practically eliminating semi-feudalist 
practices, dismantling the traditional hacienda complex, and accelerating the 
capitalist modernisation of agriculture. One important feature of this 
transformation was the expansion of land markets. The increase of land market 
activity in the 1960s and 1970s has been noted by various authors.
164
 However, 
as noted in Chapter 2, the relationship between land reform, land markets, and 
indigenous peoples has been under-analysed. Moreover, little critical attention is 
given to the role land markets performed in developing countries in the 1960s 
and 1970s in the existing Polanyian literature.  
This chapter develops a new concept to explore the relationship between 
indigenous peoples and land markets. The concept draws an analytical 
distinction between two dimensions of the land market: activation and 
development. The former refers to the occasional engagement of actors within 
markets to secure land and the latter relates to the establishment of price-making 
markets through which the continuous circulation of land between various actors 
is channelled. The distinction between the two is based on two specific insights 
taken from Polanyi. First, land is a fictitious commodity that performs crucial 
non-economic functions. Second, the proliferation of private property rights does 
not necessarily translate into the expansion of land markets. The important point 
to be taken from these insights is that the widespread engagement of indigenous 
peoples in land markets should not be interpreted as the general incorporation of 
indigenous peoples into land markets. The chapter draws an analytical line 
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 See, for example, Preston (1976), Martínez (1984), Martínez (1985), Haney & Haney (1987), 
Forster (1989), Zevallos (1989), Thurner (1989), Zamosc (1994), Lentz (1997), and Waters 
(2007). 
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between activation and development to ensure engagement is not conflated with 
incorporation. The distinction also enables the opportunities and problems land 
markets created for indigenous peoples to be identified with greater clarity. In 
broad terms, the chapter argues that the activation of markets opened-up spaces 
for indigenous peoples to secure land while the development of price-making 
markets closed them down.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The second 
section provides a rough approximation of the potential reach of price-making 
land markets in the highland region in the 1960s and 1970s. The activation and 
development of land markets are then analysed in section three. The fourth 
section analyses the land distribution in the sierra in the 1960s and 1970s, 
concentrating on the impact of land reform and indigenous access to land. The 
empirical and theoretical findings of the chapter are summarised in section five.  
2.  The parameters of land markets in the 1960s and 1970s 
The 1974 national agricultural census provides an indication of the basic 
parameters of land markets in the highlands in the 1960s and 1970s.  The timing 
of the census is problematic as it does not allow changes that occured in the 
second half of the 1970s to be analysed (i.e. when the bulk of land was formally 
redistributed via agrarian reform). The inclusion of the lowland regions of 
highland provinces within the census further complicates the analysis. 
Nevertheless, the examination of the census enables the overriding land structure 
to be examined and the potential reach of price-making land markets to be 
approximated. 
The census indicates that a decade after the commencement of land reform 
two-thirds of agricultural units and the agricultural land surface were under 
private ownership in the highland region (see Table 6.1 below). Officially, 
landowners held titles to and enjoyed “full property rights” over the land 
included within this bracket. (INEC 1974 p. i-xiii) The potential for the 
development of price-making markets was therefore greatest within this 
category. 
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Table 6.1 – Land tenure, Highland Ecuador, 1974  
Land tenure Units % Land surface 
(hectares) 
% 
Privately owned 212,808 66.4 2,039,635 66.3 
Agrarian reform and colonisation 14,789 4.6 192,835 6.3 
State owned 3,395 1.1 91,614 3.0 
Communally owned 10,733 3.4 311,998 10.1 
Rented, mixed and other 78,954 24.5 441,666 14.3 
Total 320,679 100.0 3,077,748 100.0 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1974a).  
Comparing the 1954 and 1974 censuses suggests the private ownership of 
land broadened as land reform and capitalist modernisation advanced. The 
number of privately owned landholdings increased from 174,023 in 1954 to 
212,808 in 1974.
165
 However, the increase understates the widening of private 
ownership as the privately owned category excludes land redistributed via the 
IERAC (e.g. huasipungos).  The 1974 census groups these landholdings under 
“agrarian reform and colonisation”. The units classified within this bracket, 
which comprise individual and collective holdings, were established through 
land formally distributed to beneficiaries via agrarian reform and colonisation at 
the time of the census as well as the land that had been acquired and adjudicated 
but not titled by the IERAC. (INEC 1974 pp. i-xiii) This group comprised 
14,789 units which covered 192,835 hectares of land or 4.6% of the total number 
of landholdings and 6.3% of the total agricultural land surface.
166
  IERAC 
retained some regulatory oversight over the land included within this category. 
While the classifications of the 1974 census make precise conclusions 
impossible to draw, the data provide an insight into the type of land redistributed 
via agrarian reform between 1964 and 1973. Notably, 41% of the land was 
classified as woodland and scrubland while only 25% was cultivable. While 
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 Comparisons between the 1954 and 1974 censuses are offered as rough approximations. 
Differences in methodology and coverage make precise comparisons impossible. (Interview 13) 
One of the key methodological differences is the use of the “unidad de producción 
agropecuaria” (UPA) in the 1974 census. The UPA includes the plot (s) of land under the 
control of one agricultural producer (e.g. peasant, cooperative). One UPA can include multiple 
plots of land as long as the land is located within the same or neighbouring parish (i.e. one UPA 
does not necessarily equate to one unified landholding). The unit the 1954 census uses – the 
“explotación” - also includes the plot (s) of land under the control of one agricultural producer 
but is less systematic in its treatment of multiple plots than the 1974 census.  
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 The reglamento to LRA was not introduced until September 1974 so this category primarily 
reflects the land formally redistributed during the first decade of agrarian reform (this is 
indicated in the notes to the census which state the land relates to land transferred through the 
“application of Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colonización”). (INEC 1974 pp. i- iiix)  
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there are disparities between the census and land reform figures, the census data 
provide additional evidence of the limited amount of land redistributed during 
the first decade of agrarian reform and the delays in providing formal land 
titles.
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The private and state owned land acquired by the IERAC but awaiting formal 
adjudication and legalisation or being operated by the IERAC is classified under 
“state owned”. The land included in this group amounted to 91,614 hectares or 
3.0% of the agricultural land surface. Over half of this land was classified as 
woodland and scrubland, providing a further indication of the type of land 
ultimately redistributed via agrarian reform. The acceleration of the formal 
redistribution of land via agrarian reform and colonisation between 1975 and 
1979 suggests the modest/significant rebalancing from the “privately 
owned”/”state owned” categories to the “agrarian reform and colonisation” 
bracket in the late 1970s. While this included individual and collective land 
titles, the net effect is likely to have been the general diffusion of private 
property titles. The division of haciendas (outside of the reform sector) is likely 
to have reinforced this trend.  
The “communally owned” category relates to land controlled by cooperatives 
and communities. The data indicate 3.4% of total landholdings and 10.1% of the 
agricultural land surface was under communal control. Over 90% of the units 
and 15% of the land included within this category were usufruct landholdings 
(i.e. plots of communal land redistributed to community members to use but not 
transfer or sell). The prevalence of comunero landholdings reflects two basic 
factors: 1) the redistributive potential of some communities and 2) the pressure 
on communities to divide communal land.  The available evidence suggests the 
latter increased at the expense of the former during the late 1970s, leading to the 
fragmentation of communal land in some cases.
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  Nevertheless, the existence 
of usufruct rights as opposed to private property titles restricted the penetration 
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 IERAC-INDA data suggest the land formally distributed via agrarian reform and colonisation 
amounted to around 15.7% of the 1974 agricultural land surface of the highland region by the 
end of 1973 as opposed to the figure of 6.3% reported in the 1974 census. There are numerous 
explanations for the differences between the two data sets, including the administrative failings 
of state agencies (e.g. IERAC, INEC), differences in timing between the two data sets etc.  
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 See, for example, Sánchez-Parga (1984a) pp. 16-17 and Martínez (2002a) pp. 39-41. See also 
Forster (1989).  
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of land markets. The census provides some indication of the type and 
geographical characteristics of land under communal control. Following the 
basic pattern explained in the previous chapter, 47% of the land was páramo, 
indicating approximately half of the communal land base was located between c. 
3,300 to 5,000 a.m.s.l (the census indicates around 30% of the total amount of 
páramo in the highlands was under communal control). Only 12% of communal 
land was classified as cultivable and 14% was scrubland and woodland.  
The remaining landholdings are grouped under “rented, mixed and other”. 
This category includes land that was rented in cash as well as land that was 
sharecropped or worked under al partir, a practice which enabled landless or 
landpoor peasants to access land through informal redistributive mechanisms. 
(Sánchez-Parga 1984a pp. 17-18) (FAO 1995 pp. 75-6) (Lentz 1997 pp. 89-90) 
Land classified under sharecropping and al partir accounted for 52.6% of the 
units within this bracket. The imbalance between the proportion of units and 
percentage of land included indicate the prevalence of smallholdings within this 
group.  
2.1.  Land tenure and indigenous peoples 
The inclusion of al partir within the agricultural census draws attention to the 
numerous and varied customs and practices highland indigenous families and 
communities used to control and access land. The widespread existence of these 
embedded but mutable practices limited the reach of price-making land markets 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Obstacles were evident at the family and the community levels. Family plots 
were often divided and subdivided between family members and augmented or 
reduced through marriage or kinship.
169
 This involved the formal or informal 
transfer of the ownership of the land as well as the granting of usufruct rights 
through practices like al partir. Land tenures were therefore embedded within 
family and kinship networks which restricted the penetration and expansion of 
markets. The integration of families into communities added another layer of 
complexity as the control and distribution of land were mediated through 
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 See Sánchez-Parga (1984b) for a detailed analysis of the distribution of land through 
parentesco on a highland community. See also Ituralde (1980), Lentz (1997) and Martínez 
(2002a).  
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communal relations (to varying degrees).  (Pacari 1993 p. 401) The bulk of 
cultivable land within communities was owned at individual-family level but the 
ownership and control of these landholdings were embedded within communal 
customs and practices. While not representative of the highland region as a 
whole, these patterns were evident on the two communities I visited and 
interviewed in the central highland canton of Guamote. In both cases, the land 
the families had secured after the break-up of haciendas in the 1970s was only 
transferred between family and community members. (Interviews 10 and 11)  
Individual-family land was sometimes complimented by communal land. The 
bulk of communal land, as indicated by the census, was páramo. The high-
altitude grassland was used primarily as pasture but the cultivation of páramo 
became more common as the pressure on land located at lower elevations 
increased. Titles to communal land were held at the community or trans-
community level and usufruct rights to small plot were sometimes granted to 
community members, as indicated by the prevalence of comuneros in the 1974 
census.  The stock of communal land was unevenly distributed across highland 
communities. For instance, Martínez reports 250 of 1,318 highland communities 
owned communal land in the late 1970s. (2002a p. 41) Hence only a small 
proportion of highland communities had the potential to redistribute land 
between community members. Yet communal customs and practices still exerted 
influence over land tenure arrangements at the individual-family level even 
when communities had no access to communal land.  
The existence of these diverse customs and practices highlights the wider 
importance of land to indigenous families and communities in the 1960s and 
1970s. (Sánchez-Parga 1984a; 1984b pp. 164-181) (Rosero 1990 p. 34) (FAO 
1995 p. 44) Land performed social, cultural, political and economic functions; 
its value was derived from a combination of these factors; and, its use, control 
and distribution were embedded within family and community customs, 
practices, and networks. When indigenous families and communities secured 
land through the activation of the market the land tended to remain under 
indigenous control.
170
  In short, the circulation of land among indigenous 
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 This point is highlighted by Salomon who in relation to relatively prosperous indigenous 
families in the northern highland canton of Otavalo notes: “Land is alienable property in a sense 
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peoples tended to follow a different logic to the distribution of land within price-
making markets (where economic factors predominated). However, as will be 
explained in the next section, the gradual development of price-making markets 
had a considerable impact on the ability of highland indigenous families and 
communities to access land in the 1960s and 1970s.   
3. Land markets: activation and development 
The previous section provided a rough approximation of the potential reach of 
land markets in the highlands in the 1960s and 1970s and explained some of the 
constraints on the development of price-making markets. This section examines 
the engagement of indigenous families and communities with land markets. The 
principal argument advanced is that the activation of land markets opened-up 
spaces for indigenous families and communities to secure land while the 
development of land markets closed them down. The activation of land markets 
refers to the occasional engagement of actors within markets to secure land. The 
development of land markets relates to the establishment of price-making 
markets through which the continuous circulation of land between various actors 
is channelled.  
3.1. Socially and culturally embedded market transactions 
Before examining the engagement of indigenous peoples in land markets the 
nature of the market transactions between landowning elites and indigenous 
peoples should first be outlined. Following Polanyi, the interactions between the 
two groups were typically not the impersonal and atomised transactions 
imagined by neoclassical theorists. 
“[Land] transactions did not function according to the laws of the 
capitalist market; rather, they were embedded within a complex 
network of social relations: the offer, the price and the methods of 
payment depended to a large extent on the specific relations between 
the community buyers and the landowner.” (Lentz 1997 pp. 51-2) 
The social and cultural customs and practices land sales and purchases were 
embedded within performed important roles in determining the terms and 
                                                                                                                                                            
similar to the white understanding of property but its emotional and prestige value is so great that 
families almost never sell out.” (1981 p. 423) 
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conditions of land purchases. In some cases the personalised nature of the 
transaction worked in favour of indigenous peoples who were able to exploit 
their relationship with landowners to purchase land on relatively favourable 
terms (e.g. Thurner 1989; Waters 2007). In other cases the asymmetrical 
relations between landowning elites and indigenous peoples enabled the former 
to exploit the latter, with landowners taking advantage of the basic imbalance 
between supply and demand to drive-up prices and off-load land with little 
productive potential (e.g. Martínez 1984; Lentz 1997; Huarcaya 2012; Interview 
10). The limited impact of land reform on the economic interests of landowning 
elites ensured market transactions occurred within the context of extreme 
income and wealth inequalities. 
3.2. Opening and closing spaces 
The engagement of indigenous peoples in land markets in the 1960s and 1970s 
was not a new phenomenon but the extent of their involvement increased 
significantly in the wake of agrarian reform.  Opportunities to purchase land 
started to increase in the early 1960s as the upsurge of indigenous and peasant 
mobilisation and imminent introduction of agrarian reform encouraged 
landowners to fragment and divide their landholdings. The introduction of the 
LRAC and the concomitant strengthening of indigenous-peasant organisation 
accelerated this process. The arrival of the Rodriguez Lara military government 
in 1972, the upsurge in indigenous-peasant mobilisation, the rumour of radical 
agrarian reform, and the introduction of the LRA provided additional impetus in 
the early 1970s.  
Two cases examined by Waters highlight the heterogeneous opportunities that 
emerged for indigenous families and communities to purchase land in the wake 
of agrarian reform. The two communities were located in the canton of Salcedo 
in the northern province of Cotopaxi. The first case involved the division and 
dissolution of a traditional hacienda once owned by the former conservative 
president of Ecuador, Gabriel Garcia Moreno. (2007 pp. 131-34) Following a 
similar trajectory to other highland haciendas, the estate was divided and 
subdivided as it was passed-down through the family in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The five granddaughters of Garcia Moreno who held 
titles to the land in the 1950s and 1960s sold the majority of their portions of the 
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hacienda between 1961 and 1965 (i.e. when agrarian reform moved to the top of 
the political agenda). Providing an indication of the actors involved in the 
development of price-making land markets in the 1960s and 1970s, the bulk of 
the land was sold to a “new generation” of landowner (presumably mestizo or 
white). The rest was granted or sold to the indigenous families who had worked 
on the hacienda under semi-feudal practices (e.g. huasipungo). This took the 
form of the dissolution and transfer of huasipungos as well as the sale of land. 
The sale of the land appeared to take place at the individual-family level but the 
200 or so families were integrated into a single community. The precise details 
are not clear but Waters’ analysis suggests around 400 to 500 hectares of 
cultivable and irrigated land were purchased by the indigenous families between 
1964 and 1977 which, added to the land secured through the dissolution of 
huasipungo, implies the average plot size on the community was around 4 to 4.5 
hectares. (2007 p. 131) Notably, the community (along with a neighbouring 
community) also secured communal ownership of the 21,000 hectares of páramo 
originally integrated into the hacienda through negotiation with the IERAC in 
1981. (2007 p. 133) The families were therefore ultimately able to obtain access 
to large minifundia through the activation of the land market and significant 
tracts of páramo through the activation of agrarian reform.  
The indigenous families involved in the division of the second hacienda 
analysed by Waters were less fortunate. (2007 pp. 134-7) The estate was passed-
down through a prominent landowning elite family before being sold in the late 
1940s to “two urban partners” (presumably mestizo or white). Following the 
pattern explained in the previous chapter, the owners of the hacienda liquidated 
huasipungo through the relocation of the huasipungueros, creating a community 
on small plots of marginalised land. 
“A two-hectare village center was created and 27 parcels, totaling 
36.2 hectares, were transferred to 26 former huasipungueros. The 
parcels ranged in size from 0.3 to 1.9 hectares”. (2007 p. 135) 
The indigenous families then augmented the plots they obtained through agrarian 
reform with the purchase of 169 hectares of cultivable land in 1970 and the 
collective acquisition of 1,529 hectares of páramo in 1973. The indigenous 
peasants linked to the estate were therefore able to increase the amount of land 
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they received through agrarian reform through the activation of the land market. 
Yet, the cultivable land, which was located between 3,400 and 3,640 a.m.s.l, was 
unproductive, receiving “virtually no irrigation water” and “dominated by a 
heavy unproductive clay soil”. (2007 p. 135) The best quality land was retained 
by the hacendados who formed two haciendas, selling one (349 hectares) to a 
“veterinarian from the nearby city of Ambato”, and retaining the other (181 
hectares). (2007 p. 135) The outcome, Waters explains, was that the two 
haciendas monopolised “not only the better lower lands, but also the most 
productive higher elevation lands.” (2007 p. 135) On the one hand, the activation 
of the land market created opportunities for the indigenous families to secure 
small plots of unproductive cultivable land and large tracts of high-altitude 
pastoral land. On the other hand, the development of the land market restricted 
the possibilities of the indigenous families securing productive land as an urban 
professional purchased the best quality land at market prices.  While the outcome 
for the other community Waters analyses was more favourable for the indigenous 
families, a similar, if less stark, pattern emerged, with the rationalised haciendas 
that rose from the ashes of the traditional estate monopolising the most 
productive land located at lower elevations and the community situated on 
higher, albeit still productive, land.  
Lentz’s ethnographic study of an indigenous community in the canton of 
Colta in the central highland province of Chimborazo paints a similar, if more 
diverse, picture.  The diversity of outcomes among indigenous families was 
rooted in the land acquisitions some of them were able to make in the decades 
before the start of agrarian reform. While indigenous purchases of land began in 
the 1920s, the modernisation of the hacienda and the income indigenous workers 
earned from temporary work on coastal sugar plantations stimulated market 
activity in the 1950s. (1997 pp. 52-3) The land some indigenous families secured 
enabled them to limit their dependence on the patron (effectively converting 
themselves from huasipungueros into yanaperos). The build-up to agrarian 
reform accelerated the dissolution of the hacienda and increased the amount of 
land offered for sale on the market. (1997 pp. 54-9)  The landowner’s decision to 
liquidate huasipungos in advance of introduction of the LRAC facilitated his 
efforts to sell rather than grant land to huasipungueros. According to Lentz only 
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two huasipungueros received land in exchange for their labour on the hacienda, 
the rest (huasipungueros and arrimados-apegados) were evicted from their 
landholdings and sold alternative plots. The huasipungueros resisted but the 
“pro-terrateniente” stance of the labour inspector called in to mediate the dispute 
ensured the state backed the landowner. The apparent absence of the 
countervailing force of the FEI or another indigenous organisation seemed to 
work in favour of the landowner. Following the general pattern, the lands offered 
for sale were less productive and more marginalised than the huasipungo plots 
the labourers and their families had worked on the hacienda. One former estate 
worker recalls:  
“In the end the people started to buy but they did not sell those 
huasipungos in the pamba. Where we are now, on the slopes, around 
here and down there they started to sell.” (Lentz 1997 p. 54) 
The division of the hacienda accelerated after the introduction of the LRAC. 
Lentz estimates a quarter of the land offered for sale in the late 1960s was 
purchased by members of the community while the rest was bought by members 
of neighbouring communities and mestizos from the nearby village of 
Cajabamba. (1997 p. 56) However, the operation of the land market started to 
work against the community members in the late 1970s. The refusal of the 
indigenous families to work on the hacienda and the pressure they exerted on the 
landowner to sell them land (e.g. the threat of invasion) contributed to the 
decision of the hacendado to divest the remaining sections of the hacienda 
“pedazo a pedazo” (“piece by piece”). (1997 p. 57) But by that stage the 
landowner was able to offer land at significantly higher prices as the basic 
imbalance between supply and demand drove prices higher. Lentz estimates the 
prices the hacendado demanded for the remaining sections of the hacienda were 
fifty times higher than the prices secured in the 1960s while the wages the 
indigenous workers received were “scarcely” ten times higher. (1997 p. 57) With 
few or no savings, the indigenous families were effectively priced-out of the 
market i.e. the development of price-making markets closed-down spaces for 
indigenous peoples to obtain land, especially productive land.  
The situation Lentz reports was evident elsewhere in the highlands as 
landowners exploited the disparity between supply and demand to secure 
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elevated prices for land, sometimes pitting one buyer against another to drive-up 
prices (e.g. Martínez 1984; Thurner 1989; Huarcaya 2012). The escalation of 
land prices complicated indigenous efforts to purchase land elsewhere in the 
canton of Colta in the 1970s, according to Martínez. (1985 p. 136) While many 
of the indigenous families the author investigates were ultimately able to 
purchase small plots of land, he claims the upsurge in land market activity 
“benefitted the landowners who bowed to peasant demands but obtained 
significant earnings from the sale of their properties”. (1985 pp. 152-3) 
Indigenous peoples were therefore able to obtain land but at elevated prices. The 
obstacles in front of the indigenous families Martínez investigates in the 
northern canton of Cotacachi, Imbabura were greater. The price of land in the 
region effectively, if not totally, blocked indigenous efforts to purchase land as 
medium and large sized haciendas monopolised the best quality land. (1985 pp. 
154-4)  
Market prices were a clear obstacle to the indigenous families I interviewed 
on a small community (between 150-200 inhabitants) in the central highland 
canton of Guamote, Chimborazo. (Interview 10) Reflecting the failure of the 
state to implement the LRAC, the community explained that it was only during 
the build-up to the introduction of the LRA that local hacendados started to sell 
land on a significant scale. The upsurge of indigenous and peasant protests and 
mobilisations in Chimborazo rattled landowners and a “rumour that the 
huasipungueros were going to take the land from the hacendados” began to 
circulate. The introduction of the law and the escalation of unrest prompted 
landowning elites to start selling small parcels of land to local indigenous 
families, some of whom were able to buy a “cuadra, media cuadra”. The 
families on the community were initially offered small plots of pastoral land on 
the slopes of the valley (“las laderas”) for between 28,000 and 46,000 sucres (c. 
US$1,200 – 2,000) but the land was not suitable for cultivation. Instead they 
purchased small parcels of cultivable land located on the banks of the Rio 
Guamote, two hours walk along a rocky path from the town centre. The land 
cost approximately 80,000 sucres (c. US$3,500). The families pooled their 
limited resources (“fuimos a conseguir lo que teníamos en nuestras casas”), 
paying for the plots with a small deposit and a series of annual instalments. 
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Later, the elder of the community purchased a plot of land for 25,000 (c. 
US$1,100) sucres from one of the daughters of one of the local landowners by 
pooling the income he secured through wage labour and the economic resources 
of his extended family. He then paid for the land over a number of years (“así es 
como nos endeudamos y logramos pagar un pedacito de tierra”). Reflecting the 
general, if not universal, pattern in the highlands the indigenous families 
therefore purchased land individually but lived communally. The price of land 
on the market set definite limits on the quality and quantity of land they were 
able to purchase. Highlighting the economic imbalance between landowning 
elites and indigenous peoples, the elder’s mother was told the hacienda from 
which the families purchased land was worth 12 million sucres (c. US$520,000). 
The “indigenous people did not have the money” to buy the most productive 
zones of the haciendas so the owners divided their estates (“con mucha 
facilidad”) between family members. By way of example, the elder explained:  
“Dr Francisco Martínez…he took the section opposite called San 
Rosa and the sister Elena Martínez the section behind…another 
called Alfonso Martínez and the wives of some hacendados they took 
the section up to the bridge.”171 
The LRA regulatory framework therefore had little impact on the subdivision of 
the hacienda and the exchange of land (see Chapter 4). While páramo covered 
nearly 70% of the agricultural land surface of the canton of Guamote in the early 
1970s, the community was not located near tracts of the high-altitude grassland. 
The activation of the land market therefore left the community with small plots 
of marginal land on the slopes of the banks of the Rio Guamote, without access 
to páramo. The best quality land in the zone, which remained under the control 
of local elites in the 1960s and 1970s, was available to purchase on the market 
but at a price that far exceeded the economic capabilities of the indigenous 
families.  
In the case of the indigenous community I interviewed it was the indirect 
build-up of indigenous and peasant pressure that prompted landowners to sell 
land. Thurner illustrates the direct impact indigenous organisation and 
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mobilisation had on the activation and development of land markets. Noting a 
similar pattern to the one identified by Lentz, the author describes how 
indigenous workers on Hacienda Gatazo used the earnings they secured from 
working on coastal sugar plantations and “small commercial activities” to 
purchase land and reduce their independence on the patron in the decades before 
the start of agrarian reform. (2000 pp. 364-5) The introduction of the LRAC 
accelerated the “expansion of the peasant economy” as a new generation of 
indigenous leaders established a legally recognised community to “defend and 
expand its land at the expense of the hacienda”. (2000 p. 366) Indigenous 
families were therefore able to expand their landholdings through the activation 
of the land market and increase the amount of land under indigenous control.  
Events on the neighbouring Hacienda Culluctus followed a different 
trajectory. The estate was not divided until 1965 (i.e. a year after the introduction 
of the LRAC).  
“In that year, Culluctus was divided in equal parts and in 1972 [i.e. 
the year the Rodriguez Lara government came to power] each part 
was sold separately. One half went to the old mayoral and 
mayordomo while the other half was sold to a mestizo friend from a 
nearby village.” (2000 p. 367)  
As occured elsewhere in the highlands, the division, sale and purchase of the 
hacienda reflected the ethnic division of labour on the hacienda (see Chapter 3). 
The best quality land was purchased on the market by mestizos. The resistance 
and organisation of the indigenous peasants performed a crucial role in derailing 
the plans of one of the new landowners, however. The subsequent attempts of the 
hacendado to sell the pastoral land of the hacienda were blocked by indigenous 
families and communities who invaded the estate and ultimately secured 
communal ownership of around half of the land through the intervention of the 
IERAC. (2000 p. 348 & p. 368) While the development of price-making markets 
restricted the possibilities of indigenous families securing the most productive 
sections of the hacienda, collective indigenous action ultimately blocked the 
commodification of a large part of the pastoral land.  
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The above analysis shows the division of haciendas and the activation and 
development of land markets saw the exit of some landowners and the entrance 
of others. The shift illustrates the threat land reform posed to the traditional 
landowning elite as a social class and why traditional landowners vociferously 
opposed reform (see Chapter 3). Sylva’s analysis of the demise of traditional 
landowning elites in Chimborazo leaves little doubt that the change was forced 
by social and political rather than economic forces.  
“The provincial class of landowning elites postponed the 
transformation for as long as possible but the new correlation of 
forces…reduced the options open to the class to two: transform 
into capitalists or remain subject to the intervention of the peasant 
masses.” (1986 p. 145) 
The new class of owners of the medium and large size landholdings that emerged 
through the division and subdivision of traditional haciendas included the 
families of landowning elites, former hacienda administrators and managers, and 
business people and enterprises attracted to the profits available from agricultural 
production or land speculation. The evidence presented in this chapter indicates 
the bulk of the most productive land was circulated between these actors within 
price-making markets or transferred within family networks and offered for sale 
on the market at the right price. The protection agrarian reform provided for the 
private property rights of owners of productive land limited the possibilities of 
expropriation. The relocation of huasipungueros supported the efforts of 
landowning elites to retain the best quality land before offering it for sale on the 
market (see Chapter 5). Indigenous peasants were generally, if not universally, 
priced-out of the market for the most productive land. While the activation of the 
land market created opportunities for indigenous families and communities to 
secure marginalised land, the development of price-making land markets closed-
down spaces for them to obtain productive land. However, as will be explained 
in Chapter 9, the boundaries of price-making land markets were not fixed. 
Collective indigenous action once again activated land markets in the 1980s and 
1990s, creating new spaces for some indigenous peoples to secure land and 
reshaping the boundaries of price-making land markets in the sierra. 
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4. Land distribution in the 1960s and 1970s 
The distribution of land experienced significant changes in the 1960s and 1970s. 
While differences in coverage and methodology between the 1954 and 1974 
agricultural censuses preclude precise comparisons, a comparative analysis of 
the two data sets does provide a broad indication of changes in the structure of 
ownership between the two periods.  The principle changes are illustrated in 
Table 6.2 (below) and Figure 6.1 (below). 
Table 6.2 – Changes in land distribution between 1954 & 1974,                                
Highland Ecuador 
Unit size 
(hectares) 
Units %  
1954* 
Units % 
1974* 
Land %     
1954* 
Land %   
1974* 
< 1 32.2 34.4 1.4 1.6 
1 > 4.99 49.5 43.3 10.0 10.1 
5 > 9.99 8.6 9.2 5.1 6.3 
10 > 19.99 4.1 5.7 4.7 7.8 
20 > 49.99 3.0 4.4 7.3 13.8 
50 > 99.99 1.4 1.9 7.2 11.9 
100 > 199.99 0.5 0.6 5.9 7.6 
200 > 499.99 0.4 0.3 9.7 8.9 
500 > 999.99 0.1 0.1 7.6 6.7 
1000 > 2499.99 0.1 0.1 12.0 9.7 
2500 > 0.1 0.0 29.1 15.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1954) and INEC (1974a). *Percentage of total units/land. 
Three important patterns are discernible:
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1) The proliferation and division of minifundia (<5 hectares). The relative 
prevalence of minifundia (<5 hectares) remained broadly unchanged 
between 1954 and 1974, with landholdings below 5 hectares accounting 
for around 80% of landholdings and 12% of the land (see Table 6.2 
above). However, the number of units within this range increased. The 
growth of the number of landholdings at the lower end of the minifundia 
spectrum was rapid: units of less than one hectare (i.e. microfundia) 
increased 31% (see Figure 6.1 below). The number of highland peasant 
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 These broad patterns have been noted elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Bretón 2008b) (see 
Chapter 2). The analysis in this section provides new insight by considering the impact of land 
reform and land markets on the land distribution and examining the positions indigenous peoples 
occupied on the land distribution ladder.  Greater clarity is also provided on the impact of 
colonisation. The analysis presented in Chapter 9 provides further insights into these trends and 
patterns.  
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families who were unable to sustain their livelihoods through agricultural 
production alone therefore increased as the traditional hacienda complex 
unravelled and capitalist modernisation advanced. While land 
redistributed via agrarian reform is only partially reflected in the 1974 
census, the analysis undertaken in the previous chapter showed land 
redistribution performed a direct role in expanding the number of units 
within this sector (e.g. the average plot redistributed through the 
dissolution of huasipungo was 3.6 hectares). The lack of provision 
agrarian reform provided for the arrimado-apegado population was also 
crucial in increasing the number and reducing the size of landholdings at 
the lower end of the land distribution as land was subdivided within 
families.  
 
2) The rapid increase in the number of medium (10 > 100 hectares) and 
medium/large (100 > 200 hectares) sized farms (see Figure 6.1 above). 
Landholdings between 20 and 49.9 hectares experienced the strongest 
growth, increasing by 78% in terms of units and 92% in terms of land. 
Expansion was driven by a variety of factors. First, the threat of 
expropriation and the acceleration of capitalist development encouraged 
hacendados to divide and consolidate their landholdings which expanded 
the number of medium size farms (especially within the 100 > 200 
hectare range). Second, the fragmentation of haciendas created 
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Figure 6.1 - Changes in landholdings by size  between 1954 & 
1974 , Highland Ecuador  
Units* Land**
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1954) and INEC (1974a). * Change in number of units 
within size  category ** Change in amount of land within size category.  
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opportunities for some mestizo and indigenous peasant producers to 
ascend the land distribution by securing land through the market, 
agrarian reform, or a combination of the two mechanisms. Third, the 
expansion of cooperatives under agrarian reform increased the number of 
landholdings and the amount of land within the middle range.
173
 Fourth, 
the colonisation of the western lowland regions of highland provinces 
(especially Pichincha) increased the number of medium-sized farms 
classified within the sierra. The average size of land distributed via 
colonisation between 1964 and 1979 was 38 hectares (see Chapter 5), 
precisely within the range that experienced the most rapid growth 
between 1954 and 1974.
174
 The extent of settlement that took place in the 
lowland regions of highland provinces suggests colonisation was 
particularly important in expanding the number of middle range farms in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Conversely, the average amount of land distributed 
via colonisation strongly suggests the settlement of the western lowlands 
performed a negligible role in the expansion of landholdings at the lower 
end of the land distribution (<5 hectares).   
3) The rapid decline of extensive haciendas (1000> hectares). The number 
of units within this bracket dropped 57% while the amount of land 
declined 63% (see Figure 6.1 above). The fall in the number of extensive 
landholdings provides the clearest illustration of the dissolution of the 
traditional hacienda complex, the economic rationalisation of land, and 
the acceleration of capitalist modernisation of the agrarian structure, 
trends which accelerated after the introduction of the LRAC in 1964.   
While the fall in extensive haciendas (1,000> hectares) and rise in medium-
size farms (10 > 100 hectares) reduced land inequality in broad terms, the land 
distribution remained highly polarised (see Table 6.3 below). 
 
                                                          
173
 The 1974 census classifies the collective property of a cooperative or community as one unit. 
(INEC 1974 p. i-ix)  
174
 Extensive colonisation took place in highland provinces before the introduction of the LRAC. 
According to IERAC-INDA 87,642 hectares of land were distributed via colonisation between 
1954 and 1963. The average amount of land per recipient was 126 hectares. Colonisation 
therefore also had a notable impact on expanding the number of landholdings within the 100 > 
200 hectare range between the 1954 and 1974 censuses.   
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Table 6.3 - Land distribution, Highland Ecuador, 1974 
Unit size 
(hectares) 
Units Units as % of 
total 
Land surface 
(hectares) 
Land as % 
total 
< 1 109,220 34.4 49,758 1.6 
1 > 4.99 137,415 43.3 311,414 10.1 
5 > 9.99 29,078 9.2 194,321 6.3 
10 > 19.99 18,234 5.7 239,064 7.8 
20 > 49.99 13,817 4.4 423,339 13.8 
50 > 99.99 5,982 1.9 365,978 11.9 
100 > 199.99 1,837 0.6 231,944 7.6 
200 > 499.99 971 0.3 273,344 8.9 
500 > 999.99 314 0.1 207,467 6.7 
1000 > 2499.99 201 0.1 299,968 9.7 
2500 > 87 0.0 481,116 15.6 
Total 317,157* 100.0 3,077,723 100.0 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1974a). * Excludes 3,522 units listed as agricultural 
enterprises without land. 
The data indicate units of less than 5 hectares accounted for 77.7% of 
landholdings and 11.7% of land while units of more than 100 hectares accounted 
for 1.1% of landholdings and 48.4% of land.  Nearly half of the agricultural land 
surface was therefore incorporated into landholdings above the upper limit 
proposed by the FURA in 1973.
175
  The comparison between the 1954 and 1974 
censuses and the analysis presented in the previous sections indicates the 
emergence of new forms of land concentration as extensive haciendas 
fragmented and the number of medium and medium/large-sized landholdings 
increased. Land reform performed a crucial role in driving this change, 
promoting the economic rationalisation of land by linking private property rights 
to economic use and threatening the expropriation of unproductive and 
underutilised land. It did little, however, to rupture the polarisation of land 
ownership; prevent new inequalities emerging; or stop the proliferation of micro 
and minifundia.  
The evidence presented in this thesis indicates most indigenous peoples and 
families remained located at the lower reaches of the land distribution in the 
1970s (< 5 hectares). There were a number of exceptions. For example, drawing 
on fieldwork undertaken in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Belote & Belote 
report that in the southern highland canton of Saraguro: “Most nuclear families 
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 The extent of land concentration indicated by the 1974 census is accentuated by the inclusion 
of communal landholdings (e.g. páramo) within the upper ranges of the land distribution.  
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own more than 15 hectares of agricultural land in scattered plots.”176 (1981 p. 
451) The relative lack of pressure on land in the canton during this period was 
indicated during the discussion I had with the leaders of the FIIS. (Interview 7) 
Yet, the general pattern was the prevalence of minifundia among the indigenous 
population. The failure of redistributive and market mechanisms to provide 
widespread opportunities for indigenous peoples and families to climb the land 
distribution ladder and secure sustainable livelihoods through agriculture was 
indicated by the prevalence of minifundia (< 5 hectares) in zones with high 
indigenous densities. The relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.2 (below).
177
 The 
data show that minifundia were prevalent throughout the highland region, 
accounting for at least 60% of total landholdings in every province, but tended to 
be more common in zones with high indigenous densities. The relationship was 
strongest in Cañar, Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, Imbabura, and Tungurahua. The 
clearest outliers were the southern province of Azuay and the northern region of 
Pichincha.
178
 The factors behind the distribution of minifundia across the sierra 
were varied and complex. Yet, the data provide a broad indication of the failure 
of redistributive and market mechanisms to rupture the basic, though not 
universal, relationship between indigenous peoples and minifundia.
179
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 Casagrande reports a similar situation in Saraguro in the 1960s and 1970s (1981 p. 271). See 
Belote & Belote (1981) and Macas et al. (2003) for insight into the distinct development path 
followed by the Saraguros.  
177
 The limitations of the census and demographic data and the extreme variance within 
provinces mean the data presented in Figure 6.2 only provide a rough approximation of the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and minifundia. Considerable differences existed in the 
amount and quality of land indigenous peoples owned or accessed within each of the provinces.  
178
 The weakness of the relationship between the two variables in Pichincha is largely explained 
by the fact the census data refer to the whole province while the indigenous density data 
excludes the western lowland regions. (Zamosc 1995)  
179
 The fact the bulk of land redistribution took place between 1975 and 1979 needs to be taken 
into account when considering the strength of this relationship (see Chapter 5). However, a 
similar pattern is also apparent in the long-range data presented in Chapter 9.  
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5. Summary: empirical and theoretical findings 
This chapter has explored the relationship between land markets and indigenous 
peoples in the 1960s and 1970s. The analysis has shown that the market 
performed a greater role in the rural economy and indigenous peoples became 
more reliant on markets to obtain land. This was indicative of the larger role 
markets performed in the “provision of the daily necessities of life” in the rural 
highlands in the 1960s and 1970s (see Chapter 4). (Polanyi 1947*)  
Within the activation/development concept I elaborated based on Polanyi’s 
broad insights, the chapter has argued the activation of land markets opened-up 
spaces for indigenous peoples to secure land while the development of price-
making land markets closed them down.  The evidence presented in the chapter 
indicates the bulk of indigenous families and communities were priced-out of 
markets for the most productive land. The basic imbalance between supply and 
demand was exploited by some landowners who pitted one buyer against another 
to drive-up prices and off-load unproductive land. Collective organisation and 
mobilisation performed a crucial role in activating land markets and increasing 
the opportunities for indigenous families and communities to secure land.  
The analysis has reaffirmed the importance of analysing the implementation 
of decommodification mechanisms (see Chapters 1 and 5). The regulation 
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Minifundia as % of total landholdings** 
Figure 6.2 - Minifundia & indigenous peoples,                          
Highland Ecuador, 1974 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1974a) & Zamosc (1995).* Population of “predominantly 
indigenous area” as % of total rural population of the province in 1962 (Zamosc 1995 p. 23).  
**Minifundia = <5 hectares.  
200 
 
component of land reform placed few real constraints on the operation of land 
markets. Land reform legislation therefore implied a greater degree of 
decommodification than was actually achieved. Neale reports a similar finding 
in his brief but insightful analysis of double movements in rural India in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (1994 p. 157)  
The chapter has also investigated the distribution of land in the 1960s and 
1970s. The analysis has shed new light on the impact of land reform and 
colonisation on the land distribution and on indigenous access to land (see 
Chapter 2). Despite the significant changes that took place from the 1950s 
onwards, land distribution remained highly polarised in the 1970s. Combined 
with the analysis of land redistribution presented in Chapter 5, the evidence 
suggests the bulk of the indigenous population remained located at the bottom 
end of the distribution, owning or accessing plots of less than five hectares. In 
some cases indigenous families complemented their landholdings with 
communal access to páramo. However, access to the high-altitude grassland was 
restricted to a relatively small number of indigenous families and communities. 
New forms of land monopolisation emerged as extensive landholdings gave way 
to smaller, economically rationalised farms. The quality rather than the quantity 
of land became more important in determining the distribution and concentration 
of land, income, and wealth.  
Summarising the central double movement argument developed in Chapters 
4-6, the analysis has shown that during the 1960s and 1970s:  a) the role of land 
markets increased; b) the regulation of land markets was minimal; c) the 
redistribution of land was limited; d) the indigenous countermovement failed to 
transform land reform but performed a crucial role in widening opportunities for 
indigenous peoples to obtain land through market and redistributive 
mechanisms; and, e) commodification and decommodification and movement 
and countermovement took place simultaneously.  
The next three chapters develop this argument by analysing the double 
movement around land reform, land markets and indigenous peoples in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
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Chapter Seven   
Movements toward and against reform: political struggles over the 
design of land reform (1979-1994)  
1. Introduction 
The analysis of the first stage of land reform (1964-1979) presented in the three 
previous chapters highlighted the crucial role collective organisation and 
mobilisation performed in expanding spaces for indigenous peoples to obtain 
land but indicated neither redistributive nor market mechanisms provided them 
with widespread opportunities to secure productive land. Consequently, the bulk 
of the highland indigenous population remained trapped at the bottom of the 
land distribution with limited opportunities to develop sustainable economic 
strategies based on agricultural production alone.   
The double movement that emerged around land reform in the 1960s and 
1970s continued in the 1980s and 1990s as indigenous and peasant movements 
attempted to increase the regulation, redistribution and social control of land. 
This chapter explores the political struggle over the design of land reform, 
concentrating on indigenous and peasant attempts to transform land reform.  
Developing the argument started in Chapters 4-6, the chapter posits indigenous 
efforts to transform land reform were phases in a longer-term “offensive” 
struggle rather than “defensive” reactions to structural adjustment and neoliberal 
reform. Reflecting the radical reading of the double movement, the analysis also 
shows commodification and decommodification and movement and 
countermovement continued to take place at the same time.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. The second section 
provides the wider political and economic context by sketching the evolution of 
Ecuador’s political economy between 1979 and 1994. The third section explains 
the commodification and decommodification dimensions of the legislation that 
underpinned the second stage of land reform (1979-1994). The evolution of the 
organisational base of the countermovement is explained in section four. The 
fifth section examines indigenous efforts to transform land reform, focusing on 
the 1990 levantamiento, the programme advanced by the Coordinadora Agraria 
Nacional in 1993, and the contested introduction of the Ley de Desarrollo 
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Agrario in 1994. The main empirical and theoretical findings are summarised in 
section six.  
2. The evolution of Ecuador’s political economy in the 1980s and 1990s 
Ecuador experienced another period of profound political and economic change 
in the 1980s and 1990s as it stumbled towards neoliberalism.
180
 The change in 
the direction of economic policies started soon after the military relinquished 
power in August 1979.  The basis for the “return to democracy” was established 
in January 1978 when a new constitution was approved by referendum.
181
 
General elections were then staged between July 1978 and April 1979.
182
 Jaime 
Roldós, the candidate for the Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP), won a 
convincing victory at the second round of the presidential elections, beating the 
conservative candidate, Sixto Durán Ballén into a distant second. Pledging to 
pursue economic policies that combined growth with equity, Roldós secured the 
backing of the rural and urban poor as well as public sector workers and other 
middle-income earners. Faced with a fragmented field of parties and coalitions, 
the CFP also achieved strong representation within Congress, winning 29 of 69 
seats. The centre-left Izquierda Democrática (ID) was the second largest force in 
the legislature, securing 15 seats, while the leftists Movimiento Popular 
Democratico (MPD) and Frente Amplio de Izquierda (FADI) each won one seat. 
(Schodt 1987 p. 141) (Conaghan & Malloy 1994 p. 130) With the ID supportive 
of Roldós, the president seemingly had a strong political platform to introduce 
widespread reforms. However, divisions soon emerged within the CFP which 
stripped the president of support and reduced his ability to drive through 
legislative changes.
183
  
The problems Roldós faced in his first year in office set the tone for the next 
four years as the government lurched from one crisis to another. (Montúfar 2011 
pp. 51-55) Buffeted by rising overseas debt, escalating global interest rates and 
falling world oil prices the public finances and balance-of-payments started to 
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 See Appendix 3 for broad economic trends during the 1980s and 1990s.  
181
  The constitution did not come into effect until 1979 and is commonly referred to as the 1979 
constitution. (RO 800 1979) 
182
 The new constitution extended the franchise to illiterates which increased the size of the 
electorate and provided many indigenous peoples with the right to vote for the first time.  
183
 On the divisions that emerged within the CFP see Martz (1980) p. 67, Schodt (1987) pp. 139-
42, and Conaghan (1988) pp. 124-7. 
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weaken in 1981.  (CEPAL 1982 pp. 307-8) (Schodt 1987 p. 143) Economic 
conditions then deteriorated in 1982 and 1983 as the Latin American debt crisis 
engulfed Ecuador. The government, now with the former vice-president Osvaldo 
Hurtado at the helm following the sudden death of Jaime Roldós in 1981, 
introduced a series of structural adjustment policies between 1981 and 1983 as it 
attempted to shore-up the public finances, support the balance-of-payments, 
appease international investors, and secure funding from the IMF.
184
 Mirroring 
the policies introduced elsewhere in Latin America in the early 1980s, measures 
included reducing subsidies, increasing indirect taxes, raising import tariffs, 
cutting general public expenditure, and devaluing the national currency. 
(CEPAL 1982 p. 308) (Salgado 1987 pp. 135-7) (Schodt 1987 pp. 150-1) 
(Conaghan & Malloy 1994 pp. 112-3) (Bulmer-Thomas 2003 pp. 353-63)   
The introduction of structural adjustment policies brought the government 
into conflict with labour movements.  The FUT, which united the three main 
trade unions in 1975, called four general strikes between February 1981 and 
March 1983. (Corkill 1987 p. 143) Corkill’s account of labour mobilisation in 
the early 1980s indicates the tightrope labour movements walked during this 
period.  
“The demonstrable inability of the unions to sustain an indefinite 
strike or to maintain solidarity for more than 24 or 48 hours 
weakened their bargaining position and increased the pressure to 
compromise…the ever-present threat of military intervention inclined 
the union leadership to pragmatism.” (1987 p. 143) 
Indigenous and peasant movements adopted a similar stance, pressuring the 
government to accelerate land reform and improve living conditions for the rural 
poor but stopping short of outright confrontation (Sections 3-5 below). The 
overall thrust of agrarian policy shifted from agrarian reform to integrated rural 
development, accelerating the trend that had started in the late 1970s (see 
Chapters 2 and 4).  
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 The Roldós-Hurtado government entered into a standby agreement with the IMF in July 1983. 
(Acosta 2001 p. 371) (Salgado 1987 p. 135) 
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The conflicts and crises that had plagued the Roldós-Hurtado government 
provided an opportunity for the right to seize power at the 1984 presidential 
elections. Campaigning under the slogan “pan, techo y empleo” (“bread, housing 
and employment”), León Febres Cordero, the former president of the Cámara de 
Industrias, won a narrow victory against Rodrigo Borja, the centre-left 
candidate, in the second round of the elections.
185
 (Martz 1985 p. 71) (Conaghan 
& Malloy 1994 pp. 131-36) Supported by the Frente de Reconstruccón Nacional 
(FRN), a coalition of liberal, conservative, and nationalist parties which enjoyed 
the enthusiastic backing of the Cámaras de Producción, Febres Cordero had 
conducted an aggressive election campaign, linking centre-left and leftist 
candidates to the beleaguered Roldós-Hurtado administration and presenting his 
neoliberal economic programme as a pragmatic and non-ideological response to 
the crisis. (Martz 1985 pp. 70-72) (Schodt 1987 p. 153) (Montúfar 2011 pp. 64-
5) The FRN failed to secure strong support in Congress. Febres Cordero was 
able to garner sufficient support to drive through reforms in 1985 but was unable 
to retain control of Congress after the mid-term elections in 1986. (Conaghan & 
Malloy 1994 pp. 168-9)   The pace of neoliberal reform slowed as the political 
opposition regrouped, social opposition strengthened, and relations between the 
government and the military soured.
186
 Despite agreeing to austerity measures 
with the IMF, Febres Cordero accelerated public spending to shore-up support 
for his government, which placed strain on the public finances in 1987 and 
1988.
187
 (CEPAL 1985 p. 289) (CEPAL 1988 pp. 319-20) (Montúfar 2011 pp. 
101-6) (Kaplan 2013 pp. 160-1)  
The outcome of four years of conflict, crisis, and reform was a tentative step 
in the direction of neoliberalism. While “clear preference was given to market 
mechanisms and the goal of reducing direct and selective controls in the 
management of the economy”, only modest progress was made. (Salgado 1987 
p. 137) The government repressed labour movements and held the minimum 
wage below inflation to support the private sector and appease the IMF. (Corkill 
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 Under the 1979 constitution the president was only permitted to serve one term in office.  
186
 Febres Cordero faced a minor military revolt in 1986-7. See Martz (1988) and Conaghan & 
Malloy (1994 pp. 169-70).  
187
 The Febres Cordero government entered into three standby agreements with the IMF between 
1985 and 1988. (Acosta 2001 p. 371) Ecuador suffered a major earthquake in 1987 which placed 
additional strain on the government and public finances. 
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1987 p. 146) (CEPAL 1985 pp. 307-8) However, no meaningful labour reforms 
were enacted. Elsewhere, rural development and agrarian reform were stalled 
but not dissolved; import tariffs were lowered but not removed; public spending 
was reduced then increased; and, exchange rate liberalisation was implemented 
then reversed. (CEPAL 1986 pp. 308-12) (Conaghan & Malloy p. 159 & pp. 
179-81) 
Rodrigo Borja, the centre-left candidate, won the 1988 presidential elections 
on a mandate to stabilise economic conditions and pursue a centre-left economic 
programme. His party, the ID, secured the largest number of seats in Congress 
while the group most closely associated with the discredited Febres Cordero 
government, the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), performed poorly. The Borja 
government accelerated neoliberal reforms. (Vos 2000 pp. 12-13) (Beckerman & 
Solimano 2002 pp. 29-30) In addition to lowering trade protection and entering 
into agreements with the IMF, the regime introduced measures to attract FDI and 
liberalise labour markets. New flexible labour contracts were introduced; special 
employment exemptions for manufacturing firms were created; and, the 
minimum number of workers required to establish new trade unions was 
doubled. (RO 493 1990) (RO 817 1991) (ILO 2001) Supporting efforts to attract 
FDI, tame inflation, and placate the IMF, the government also held the minimum 
wage below inflation, reneging on its commitment to protect the purchasing 
power of formal sector workers.
188
 (CEPAL 1988 p. 319) The promise to 
reactivate land reform, a move which won Borja support from indigenous voters 
during the 1988 elections, was also broken. However, the government did create 
the Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe (DINEIB) to 
improve and widen the delivery of bilingual education. (Almeida 1992 p. 53)  
The continuation of the economic slump, the upsurge of social unrest, and the 
failure of the Borja government to fulfil its election pledges opened the door for 
the right to return to power in 1992. Faced with a debilitated and discredited 
centre-left, the right was able to dominate the second round of the elections, with 
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 The Borja government entered into two standby agreements with the IMF between 1989 and 
1991. (Acosta 2001 p. 371) 
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Sixto Durán Ballén defeating Jaime Nebot.
189
 Building on gains secured at the 
1990 mid-term elections, right-wing parties also secured a commanding position 
in the legislature. The political stage was set for a decisive move towards 
neoliberalism. The extent and pace of change was limited by social resistance 
and conflicts within the right. (Conaghan & Malloy 1994 pp. 228-9) (Zamosc 
2005 pp. 198-9) Yet the Durán Ballén government was still able to drive through 
neoliberal reforms.
190
 Trade liberalisation accelerated, privatisation advanced, 
public sector retrenchment deepened, and, as will be explained below, state-
directed land reform ended.    
3. Commodification and decommodification dimensions of the Ley de 
Reforma Agraria-Ley de Fomento y Desarrollo Agropecuario  
The final fifteen years of land reform (1979-1994) were underpinned by the 
legal framework the military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s bequeathed the 
civilian governments of the 1980s and 1990s: the LRA and LFDA. The former 
was introduced in 1973 by the reformist Rodriguez Lara government while the 
latter was promulgated by the conservative military triumvirate in 1979.  
The FAO argue at this stage land reform effectively finished and the “role of 
the state in relation to the intervention in the structure of 
property…[was]…gradually transferred to the market”. (1995 p. 25) Yet, as 
demonstrated in previous chapters, the market had assumed a progressively 
larger role in the distribution of land from the early 1960s and the role of the 
state in the redistribution of land was minimal. Moreover, as will be explained in 
the next chapter, indigenous peoples continued to secure land via agrarian 
reform in the 1980s and 1990s.  
While the shift was less radical than the FAO indicate, the new legal 
framework undoubtedly promoted a greater role for the market.  The principal 
means through which this achieved was the increased protection the LFDA 
provided for private property rights. Protection was provided in a number of 
areas. First, the legislation established a new measure of economic efficiency 
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 The PSC selected Jaime Nebot over Sixto Durán Ballén as presidential candidate. Shunned by 
the party he was instrumental in founding, Durán Ballén formed a new political party – the 
Partido Union Republicana (PUR) which sponsored his candidacy.  
190
 The Durán Ballén government entered into a standby agreement with the IMF in 1994. 
(CEPAL 1994-1995 p. 207) (Acosta 2001 p. 371)  
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which reduced the likelihood of expropriation. (Art. 82-3 RO 792 1979) Second, 
the law provided landowners with the right to receive favourable compensation 
for expropriated land which reduced the possibility of expropriation taking 
place, especially in the context of structural adjustment and neoliberalism. (Art. 
85 RO 792 1979) Third, reflecting indigenous and peasant attempts to 
implement agrarian reform from below (see Chapter 5), the legislation 
introduced punitive measures to prevent land invasions, including the stipulation 
that people involved in invasions would be excluded from participating in 
agrarian reform and colonisation. The IERAC was transformed into a quasi-
police authority.
191
 (Arts. 89-93 RO 792 1979) (Barsky 1988 pp. 250-1) (FAO 
2002 pp. 7-8) The heightened protection the law granted private property rights 
supported efforts of the state to promote agroindustry and the integration of 
agricultural producers into national and international markets.   The law 
supported this by channelling credit to agroindustrial enterprises; exempting 
agroindustrial production inputs from import duties; excluding “non-traditional” 
agricultural goods from export duties; and, promoting links between agricultural 
producers and consumers markets.  (Arts. 46-7 & 70-80 RO 792 1979) 
The greater protection the law granted private property rights weakened the 
redistributive potential of land reform. While the potential for expropriation 
remained, the criteria for proving the inefficiency and underutilisation of land 
became even more complicated. The possibilities of securing land through 
redistribution were further diminished after the insertion of “inafectabilidad” 
clauses into the LRA in 1982. The clauses shielded privately owned land from 
expropriation by delimiting “afectación” (see Chapter 4). The change gave 
landowning elites additional security over tenure and provided increased impetus 
for the development of price-making markets. (RO 304 1982) (FAO 2002 p. 7) 
The regulation agrarian reform imposed on land markets remained largely 
unchanged. That is, the IERAC was responsible for overseeing the sale and 
purchase of land within the reform and peasant sectors as well as overseeing the 
division of agricultural land. The revised framework provided even fewer 
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 Specifically, the law stated: “The owner of the invaded land will denounce the act to the 
Executive Director of IERAC or the respective Regional Director or Zone Director of the 
institution who will verify the acts within twenty-four hours and will, upon proving the invasion, 
organise the immediate removal of the invaders, counting on the support of the police.” (Act. 90 
RO 792 1979) 
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assurances against the monopolisation of land: the new definition of economic 
efficiency omitted references to monopolisation altogether. Lack of funding and 
high staff turnover continued to plague the IERAC and limit its ability to 
perform its regulative and redistributive functions.  
The weakness of the redistributive and regulative dimensions of the LRA-
LFDA was reflected in the 1979 constitution which obligated the state to protect 
the private property rights of proprietors of “efficient” landholdings and 
orientated agrarian reform towards “economic development” and redistributing 
“wealth and income”. No explicit reference was made to the redistribution of 
land and the colonisation of the western and eastern lowlands was offered as the 
primary mechanism to “equilibrate” the rural population. (Art. 51 RO 800 1979) 
Table 7.1 – Commodification and decommodification dimensions of the 
Ley de Reforma Agraria-Ley de Fomento y Desarrollo Agropecuario, 
1979-1994  
Dimension Key aspects 
Land  
commodification 
 Private property rights conditioned on economic use of land through 
“afectación”  
 Private property rights explicitly shielded through “inafectabilidad”   
 Proscription of semi-feudal practices (e.g. huasipungo) 
 Proliferation of private property titles  
 Bolstering of rural cadastres 
 Punitive measures to protect against land invasions and occupations 
Land  
decommodification 
 Redistribution of land already incorporated into the reform sector 
 Redistribution of unproductive land (e.g. páramo)  
 Redistribution of land in areas of “great demographic pressure” 
 Maximum and minimum limits on sizes of redistributed land: none 
 Maximum size of landholdings: none 
 Minimum size of landholdings: none 
 Transfer and division of landholdings: i) regulation of peasant and 
reform sectors and ii) regulation of division of rural landholdings 
 Monopolisation restrictions: weak and undefined 
Source: My own elaboration based on Ley de Reforma Agraria, RO  877, 18 July 1979, Ley de Fomento y 
Desarrollo Agropecuario, RO 792, 15 March 1979; Decree 144, RO 48, 30 July 1981; Decree 1081, RO 
304, 11 August 1982. 
To sum up, the LRA-LFDA continued to promote the commodification and 
decommodification of land but the balance between the two was tipped even 
further towards commodification (see Table 7.1 above).   The legislative changes 
reduced the spaces open for indigenous families and communities to secure land 
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which provided fresh incentive for indigenous movements to attempt to 
transform land reform.  
The next section sketches the organisation base from which indigenous 
peoples engaged in this struggle. Indigenous and peasant attempts to transform 
agrarian reform under structural adjustment and neoliberalism are then 
examined.  
4. The evolution of the indigenous countermovement  
The communal base of the indigenous countermovement continued to expand in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1979 and 1992, the number of registered 
communities in the highland region increased by 291, taking the total number to 
1,574. (Zamosc 1995 pp. 90-94) Zamosc indicates the growth of communities 
was strongest in regions with high indigenous population densities, continuing 
the pattern that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (see Figure 7.1 below).
192
  
While the number of registered communities continued to grow, communities 
faced numerous challenges.  The scarcity of land; the acceleration of migration; 
the introduction of new cultural practices; the widening of income and wealth 
disparities between individuals and families; and, the emergence or 
strengthening of alternative forms of organisation (e.g. associations) presented 
serious challenges.
193
 Yet, as illustrated by the 1990 and 1994 levantamientos 
(Section 5 below), communities continued to provide a powerful base from 
which to challenge commodification.   
The proliferation of communities continued to support the scaling-up of 
indigenous organisation. The return to democracy provided additional impetus 
as state repression decreased and the opportunities to organise increased. 
Sánchez-Parga reports the existence of seventy-five second-grade and provincial 
indigenous and peasant organisations in the sierra in the late 1980s. (1989 pp. 
249-68) The prevalence of the organisations varied across the region. The 
provinces with the highest concentration were Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, Imbabura, 
and Tungurahua, indicating a positive relationship with the distribution of 
communities. It was in the 1980s that many of the provincial indigenous 
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 The data refer to the number of registered communities in each province not the actual 
number of communities that existed.  
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 See Martínez (1992a; 2002a) and Navas (1998).  
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organisations that started to take shape in the 1970s became fully formed (e.g. 
Movimiento Indígena y Campesino de Cotopaxi (MICC), Confederación del 
Movimiento Indígena de Chimborazo (COMICH)).
194
 (Interview 9) (MICC 
2003) The shift from land reform to integrated rural development saw the state 
step-up its efforts to establish links with the second-grade and provincial 
indigenous organisations. For example, according to Sánchez-Parga, the Unión 
de Comunidades para el Desarrollo (Imbabura), Unión de Organizaciones 
Campesinas del Norte de Tungurahua (Tungurahua), Unión de Organizaciones 
de Penipe (Chimborazo), and Federación de Comunidades de Pungala 
(Chimborazo) were established – or restructured - to facilitate the delivery of 
rural development projects. (1989 pp. 249-68)  The policy shift contributed to 
the development of indigenous organisations with diverse ideologies, strategies, 
and objectives at the local level.
195
 Rivalries between organisations affiliated 
with different indigenous and peasant movements also caused divisions at the 
local level in some cases. For instance, in the southern highland canton of 
Saraguro the Federación Interprovincial de Indígenas Saraguros (FISS), which 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, was affiliated with FENOC-I while the 
Coordinadora de Organizaciones del Pueblo Kichwa de Saraguro 
(CORPUKIS), which developed in the 1980s, was linked to CONAIE (via 
Ecuarunari).
196
  Illustrating the lack of influence some cabildos were able to 
exert over community members, the division between the two organisations was 
evident within communities, with some families supporting the FIIS and others 
following the CORPUKIS. (Interview 7) While the two organisations cooperated 
on certain issues, they were “often critical of or even hostile to each other”. 
(Macas et al. 2003 pp. 226-7)  
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 For insights into the evolution of second-grade and provincial indigenous organisations in the 
1980s and 1990s see Korovkin (1997), Bebbington and Perrault (1999), MICC (2003), 
Bebbington (2004), Huarcaya (2012), and Cervone (2012).   
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 See, for example, Bebbington (1992) pp. 21-22 and Korovkin (1997) pp. 40-2.  
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 FENOC changed its name in 1988 to the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones 
Campesinas-Indígenas (FENOC-I) then again in 1999 to the Confederación de Organizaciones 
Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras (FENOCIN).   
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The same was broadly true at the regional and national levels. The 
Confederación de las Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) 
integrated the three principal indigenous movements of the coast (COICE), 
sierra (Ecuarunari), and oriente (COFENIAE) into one national – or 
plurinational – movement when it was established in 1986. The movement, 
which was estimated to represent around 70% of the national indigenous 
population in the late 1980s, became a powerful voice for indigenous concerns. 
(Andolina et al. 2009 p. 28) The rise of the CONAIE limited the influence of the 
FENOC-I. Nevertheless, the peasant movement continued to perform important 
roles in land struggles at the local and national levels. (Zamosc 1994 pp. 47-8) 
(Becker 2008 pp. 158-9) (Huarcaya 2012 pp. 240-2) The CONAIE and FENOC-
I collaborated on certain issues but divisions between them precluded the 
development of a durable national indigenous-peasant movement which, as will 
be explained below, ultimately facilitated the efforts of the governments of the 
1980s and 1990s to end land reform.  
Alliances continued to perform an important role in the operation of the 
indigenous countermovement in the 1980s and 1990s.  CONAIE integrated 
Ecuarunari into a national indigenous movement and strengthened the links 
between highland and lowland indigenous organisations and movements. 
Building on the changes that occurred in highlands in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
scaling-up of indigenous organisation at the national level supported the 
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strengthening of indigenous identity. Through this process, as Yashar notes, 
“indigenous people developed ethnic identities that referred not only to their 
local Indian communities but also to a more transcommunity indigenous 
identification.”197 (2006 p. 203) The tighter links the highland indigenous 
movement established with the lowland indigenous movement supported its 
efforts to transform land reform as issues related to land were also of central 
importance to lowland indigenous peoples, especially in the Amazonian region 
where colonisation had caused widespread social dislocation and environmental 
degradation.
198
 While land performed different economic, cultural and social 
functions for highland and lowland indigenous peoples, the demands of highland 
and lowland indigenous movements converged on certain issues (e.g. the 
protection of communal land). CONAIE also provided a stronger platform for 
indigenous organisations and movements to establish transnational alliances 
with indigenous and peasant movements, NGOs, and international development 
agencies. (Jackson & Warren 2005 pp. 551-3) (Yashar 2006 pp. 203-4) 
(Andolina et al. 2009 pp. 31-35) However, reflecting the change in direction of 
agrarian policies from the late 1970s onwards, the work of NGOs and 
international development agencies was primarily geared towards rural 
development rather than land reform. The same was broadly true of religious 
activists and organisations, even if some continued to support the efforts of 
indigenous families and communities to resolve land disputes and secure land. 
Leftist political parties (e.g. the MPD) were more inclined to challenge issues 
related to economic and political power. However, while leftist parties supported 
indigenous and peasant attempts to transform land reform, they lacked the 
political power to influence the legislature (see Section 2). Trade unions also 
continued to support the efforts of indigenous and peasant movements to force 
the state to expand the regulative and redistributive dimensions of land reform. 
But the organised labour movement weakened in the 1980s and 1990s as 
unemployment and informal employment increased.   
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 Lentz describes an analogous process in which “the awareness of belonging to a group 
‘nosotros’ [‘us’], which was initially defined at the local level, has transformed into a feeling of 
belonging to a large community of indigenous peoples.”  (2000 p. 226) 
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 See Rudel (1993), Perrault (2003) and Sawyer (1997; 2004).  
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To sum up, building on the platform established in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
indigenous countermovement continued to strengthen in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The formation of CONAIE in 1986 provided a powerful platform for indigenous 
peoples to challenge the elite and the state. However, the scaling-up of 
indigenous organisation was not without strains and tensions. Rivalries between 
the CONAIE and FENOC-I were evident at the local and national levels while 
the move to integrated rural development contributed to the emergence of 
second-grade indigenous organisations with distinct ideologies and objectives.  
The next section examines the attempt of the countermovement to transform 
land reform under structural adjustment and neoliberalism, concentrating on the 
indigenous-peasant proposal tabled in 1993 and the introduction of Ley de 
Desarrollo Agrario in 1994.  
5. Indigenous and peasant efforts to transform land reform  
The return to democracy created space for indigenous movements to demand the 
regulation of land markets, the expansion of land redistribution, and the 
participation of indigenous and peasant involvement in the implementation of 
land reform. The situation confronting the bulk of the highland indigenous 
population provided a powerful incentive for indigenous movements to continue 
the struggle for land reform.   
“Our fundamental problem is that the majority of us have a small 
parcel of land that does not yield enough to support our families nor 
satisfy our most basic needs. If our parents or we were able to secure 
a huasipungo or plot of land, we or our children do not even have a 
puñado [handful] of land. This obligates us to work for a low salary, 
temporarily in some cases; permanent in others…What land are we 
going to leave our children? None! We cannot divide our land 
anymore.” (Ecuarunari 1984 p. 16) 
With the spectre of the military returning to power looming, indigenous 
movements stopped short of launching a “decisive action for the fight for land” 
in the early 1980s. (Ecuarunari 1984 p. 13) However, efforts were made to force 
the Roldós-Hurtado government along the path of radical reform. Indigenous, 
peasant, and leftist organisations called for the repeal of the LFDA in 1979 but 
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the correlation of forces within Congress provided them with little hope of 
overturning the law.  (Barsky 1988 pp. 280-1) (Ecuarunari 2012 p. 6) Ecuarunari 
and FENOC then organised a 10,000 people strong mobilisation in Quito in 
1980 to raise pressure on the government and convened the Primer Encuentro 
Nacional Campesino Indígena in 1982 to demand “agrarian reform with peasant 
control”. (Becker 2008 p. 164) (Ecuarunari 2012 p. 8-9) Shortly afterwards 
Ecuarunari called for “a real redistribution of land that ends the monopoly of the 
few and redistributes land to us in associative and collective form without cost.” 
(Ecuarunari 1984 p. 17) The movement also declared “we must demand that the 
sizes of landholdings are limited.” (Ecuarunari 1984 p. 17) However, despite 
committing to continue agrarian reform “under existing legislation”, the Roldós-
Hurtado government moved in the opposite direction and introduced legislative 
changes which provided greater protection for private property rights (see 
Section 3 above).  (Schodt 1987 pp. 138)  (Barsky 1988 pp. 284-7)  
5.1. The 1990 levantamiento and the (re) opening of the land reform 
debate 
The spaces for the indigenous movements to demand comprehensive land 
reform narrowed in the mid-1980s as the conservative Febres Cordero 
government pursued an overtly pro-business agenda and supported the efforts of 
landowning elites to repress peasant demands. (Rosero 1990) (Dubly & Granda 
1991) The pledge of the incoming centre-left president, Rodrigo Borja, to tackle 
agrarian issues raised hope among the indigenous and peasant population but his 
government failed to act decisively on agrarian reform. (Rosero 1990) (Cervone 
2012) Decades of frustration, suffering, and resistance came to a head in in May 
and June 1990 when CONAIE spearheaded a levantamiento which crippled the 
highlands and rocked the state and the elite.
199
  
The mobilisation comprised two interrelated stages. The first phase involved 
the occupation of the iconic Santo Domingo Church in Quito by approximately 
two hundred indigenous peasants from various highland provinces. (El 
Comercio 31/05/1990 p. A-1) The protestors demanded “the resolution of land 
conflicts, the end of repression, evictions, and the persecution of peasant 
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215 
 
organisations, the cancellation of peasant debts with FODERUMA, and the 
dismissal of the functionaries of the CRA who have distributed land in favour of 
landowning elites.” (Hoy 30/05/1990 p. 7A) (El Comercio 31/05/1990 p. A-1) 
Two days into the occupation the Borja government asked the protestors to leave 
the church in order to start negotiations but they refused as “their demands had 
not been attended to on similar occasions” and they had “forever been deceived” 
by the state. (El Comercio 01/06/1990 p. A-1) The occupation, which included 
hunger strikes, lasted several days. The second phase involved the blocking of 
roads and the staging of protests across the highland region. (Hoy 05/06/1990 p. 
1 & p. 8) (El Comercio 05/06/1990 p. A-1) (El Comercio 08/06/1990 p. A-1)  
The communal base of the highland indigenous movement, as Zamosc notes, 
performed a pivotal role in the mobilisation.   
“The overriding point is that it was primarily the community-based 
local and regional organizations that took the initiative and coordinated 
popular participation”. (1994 p. 53)  
Baltazar Umajinga, one of the founders of the second-grade indigenous 
organisation Unión de Cabildos de Zumbahua (UNOCIZ) and president of the 
Movimiento Indígena y Campesina de Cotopaxi (MICC), also highlights the 
crucial role local-level indigenous organisations performed in organising the 
mobilisation: “The planning of the uprising lasted one month…we worked hard 
communicating between the communities.” (Quoted in MICC 2003 pp. 82-3) 
The fact the uprising was driven by the bases of the indigenous movement 
indicates the severity of the situation most indigenous families and communities 
faced.  
The widening of the uprising was accompanied by the broadening of the 
demands of the protestors. CONAIE made sixteen demands which included the 
redistribution and legalisation of land in “forma gratuita”; the cancelation of 
debts with state agencies; and, the recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational 
state. The indigenous movement also demanded the resolution of a number of 
land conflicts (the conflicts are examined in Chapter 8). (El Comercio 
(19/06/1990) p. A-5) (Hoy 05/06/1990 p. A8) (Navarro et al. 1996 p. 279) 
According to Martínez “the problem of the land” was the “central point of 
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conflict”.200 (1992b p. 74) Zamosc, by contrast, posits structural adjustment and 
economic conditions as the principal factors behind the levantamiento.  
“The connection is unmistakable. In content, the 1990 levantamiento 
paralleled what appeared in other Latin American countries as “IMF 
riots”, a display of popular protest induced by the profound impact of 
the economic slump and adjustment policies of the 1980s. The shock 
was particularly painful in the Ecuadorian Sierra because the reforms 
of the 1970s had improved the situation of the peasants 
somewhat”.201 (1994 pp. 52-3) 
Zamosc is right to draw attention to the impact of structural adjustment on 
indigenous families and communities. The macroeconomic downturn of the 
1980s exacerbated the precariousness of the lives of the bulk of the rural 
indigenous population as unemployment increased, real wages plunged, prices 
escalated, and consumer demand slumped. Reducing the levantamiento to an 
“IMF riot” is problematic, however, as it understates the “offensive” character of 
the uprising i.e. collective action orientated towards creating laws, policies, and 
institutions that have never been established (see Chapter 1). The demand to 
create a plurinational state was a clear indication of this dimension of the 
mobilisation. The lands conflicts at the heart of uprising were also rooted in the 
basic failings of land reform (see Chapter 8). Events in the wake of the 1990 
levantamiento provide a clearer indication of the offensive character of 
indigenous mobilisations in the 1990s. The next section briefly examines 
landowning elite responses to the 1990 levantamiento. The land reform proposal 
indigenous and peasant movements presented in the wake of the mobilisation is 
then examined.   
5.2. Elite attacks on land reform in the wake of the 1990 levantamiento 
Echoing earlier periods of heightened indigenous-peasant mobilisation (e.g. 
1960-63, 1970-73), landowning elites responded to the escalation of indigenous 
mobilisation by intensifying their attacks on land reform. A report published in 
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  See Walton ([1989] 2001) for details of IMF-related protests in Latin America in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  
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El Comercio the day before the start of the 1990 levantamiento shows the 
campaign against land reform was underway before the outbreak of the uprising. 
Under the heading Agrarian Reform Has Obstructed Rational Production the 
article declared: 
“The legal situation of the agricultural landowner is fragile and 
uncertain…the idea that land should be redistributed among peasants 
remains in the minds of technicians and planners. The thesis of land 
redistribution persists which induces a permanent social demand for 
the appropriation of land under the premise of unjust distribution”. 
(El Comercio 28/05/1990 p. A-10)  
The campaign against agrarian reform and the defence of private property 
intensified as the levantamiento spread. In an open letter to Rodrigo Borja 
entitled In Defence of Private Property and Agricultural Production, the 
Cámaras de Agricultura de la Primera Zona declared: 
“The agricultural producers of Highland Ecuador…request that the 
national government urgently and energetically enforce the law to re-
establish legal normality in the country…Without security over 
investment and respect for private property no-one can dedicate their 
daily activities to the production of food, contributing to the decline 
of inflation and the betterment of the lives of all Ecuadorians.” (El 
Comercio 08/06/1990 p. B-9)  
The initial declarations of the Cámaras de Agricultura in defence of private 
property and capitalist agricultural production were followed by more emphatic 
demands to bring land reform to a close. Indicating the important role the wider 
network of the Cámaras de Producción performed in the offensive, the Cámara 
de Industriales de Pichincha announced: 
“While the latent process of agrarian reform persists the promotion of 
a real rural development with modern production enterprises and the 
development of agroindustry is not possible…the time has arrived to 
end the process of agrarian reform.” (El Comercio 13/06/1990 p. A-
9) 
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Calls to dismantle land reform were supported by the spread of myths about the 
reform and the misrepresentation of indigenous demands. Writing a series of 
opinion pieces in El Comercio, Alejandro Carrión, long-term critic of Ecuadorian 
land reform, was at the forefront of this effort. Responding to CONAIE’s 
demand for the free redistribution and legalisation of land to indigenous peoples, 
Carrión incorrectly asserted:  
“The ‘free distribution of land’ has been undertaken by all 
governments since the promulgation of the Ley de Reforma Agraria, 
the liquidation of huasipungo, the expropriation and the reversion of 
privately owned land that has been transferred to people, 
communities and peasant cooperatives.”  (El Comercio 19/06/1990 p. 
A-4)  
Manipulating and misrepresenting CONAIE’s demands, Carrión also attempted 
to use the levantamiento to widen ethnic divisions and weaken support for 
indigenous protestors by denouncing the “the racist affirmations of ‘only the 
indios have rights to land’ in a republic in which the constitution grants that right 
to all Ecuadorians and not only those who belong to the aboriginal race.” (El 
Comercio 11/06/1990 p. A-4) The influence landowning elites were able to exert 
over mainstream media continued to provide a valuable weapon in their attacks 
against the redistribution and regulation of land.   
One of the paradoxical effects of the 1990 levantamiento was thus to create a 
platform for landowning elites and agroindustrialists to exert greater pressure on 
the state to end land reform. Crucially, in contrast to earlier periods of heightened 
indigenous-peasant mobilisation, the current of mainstream economic ideas 
flowed unequivocally in the same direction, with the “neoliberal consensus” 
calling for the removal of market restrictions, the reduced involvement of the 
state in the economic sphere, and the expansion of the role of the private sector in 
directing economic change. Within a wider policy framework orientated towards 
agroindustrial production, market liberalisation, and foreign direct investment, 
the economic case for land reform had become difficult to sustain. Whereas 
reform had provided a mechanism for the state to accelerate capitalist 
modernisation in the 1960s and 1970s, it had become an impediment to capitalist 
upgrading in the 1980s and 1990s.   
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The conservative Durán Ballén (1992-96) government and the correlation of 
forces within the legislature provided landowning and agroindustrial elites with a 
favourable political environment to escalate their attempts to end agrarian reform 
and liberalise the agriculture sector.  (FAO 1995 p. 25) (Bretón 1997 p. 68) 
(Sawyer 2004 pp. 152-8) (Zamosc 2005 pp. 195-7)  Mirroring earlier periods of 
heightened agrarian debate and conflict, albeit under very different conditions, 
various draft agrarian laws were tabled between 1992 and 1994, including 
proposals advanced by Instituto de Estrategias Agropecuarios (IDEA), a think 
tank linked to the Cámaras de Agricultura and USAID, the Executive branch of 
the Durán Ballén government, and the Coordinadora Agraria Nacional (CAN), a 
network of indigenous-peasant organisations spearheaded by the CONAIE.
202
  
5.3. The Coordinadora Agraria Nacional (CAN): the indigenous-peasant 
positive programme 
The CAN advanced the indigenous-peasant vision of agrarian reform. Following 
a nation-wide consultation with agricultural producers and organisations, the 
CAN submitted its proposal - Ley Agraria Integral del Ecuador – to Congress in 
June 1993, with the support of the MPD. (CAN 1993a; 1993b) Coming twenty 
years after the FURA attempted to force the Rodriguez Lara military 
government along the path of radical agrarian reform, the CAN proposal was the 
next meaningful attempt of indigenous and peasant movements to increase the 
regulation, redistribution, and social control of land. The proposal responded to 
three basic factors: i) the continuation and intensification of the agrarian crisis; 
ii) the deficiencies of the existing and pre-existing agrarian reform and rural 
development framework; and, iii) the efforts of landowning elites to end land 
reform and liberalise the agriculture sector. 
The proposal was far-reaching and wide-ranging, including provisions linked 
to the environment, water, food sovereignty, credit, technical assistance and the 
redistribution and regulation of land (see also Table 7.3 below).
203
 (CAN 1993a) 
It recognised the role of the state in the regulation and redistribution of land but 
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 The CAN included a number of indigenous and peasant organisations, including the FENOC-
I and the near-defunct FEI, but was dominated by the CONAIE.  
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 This section is limited to the analysis of the aspects of the proposal that relate to the use, 
control, and distribution of land. The proposal includes many other important and interesting 
dimensions, the majority of which resonate with Polanyi’s thinking.  
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also aimed to create space for the genuine participation of a broad group of social 
actors in the direction and application of land reform. The overriding orientation 
of the proposal was indicated in the preamble which declared “organised rural 
civil society should perform a lead role in putting the Ley Agraria into motion” 
and “the state should perform a very specific function: administer the law in a 
fair, agile, and appropriate manner.” (1993a p. 2) The roles the state and society 
were expected to perform in regulating the use, control and distribution of land 
were based on the belief that “the market does not have the capacity to rationalise 
access to land in Ecuador”. (1993a p. 2) Echoing Polanyi, the programme 
recognised a role for the market in the rural economy but one that was subject to 
social and political control. Hence it was in almost direct opposition to the 
market-based land reform model promoted by the World Bank.
204
  
The CAN aimed to create a new bureaucratic structure which provided space 
for indigenous and peasant engagement in the implementation of land reform. 
(Arts. 3-11 1993a) The programme proposed the inclusion of one indigenous 
representative, one peasant representative, and one representative of the Cámaras 
de Agricultura within the Comisión Técnica-Consultora (CTC), the institution 
charged with the task of evaluating expropriation claims and establishing the 
price of redistributed land. (Arts. 11 & 48 1993a) In addition, representatives of 
indigenous and peasant organisations and movements were also assigned a 
prominent role in the selection of the Director Ejecutivo of the Instituto 
Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria (IERA) – the new agrarian reform institute the 
programme aimed to establish. The Director Ejecutivo was to be responsible for 
directing agrarian reform and establishing and overseeing the regional branches 
of the IERA. The call for the inclusion of indigenous representatives within the 
IERA connected with the initial efforts of the indigenous movement to establish 
a plurinational state in Ecuador, following the tabling of the demand at the 1990 
levantamiento. The proposal was therefore part of a wider project to transform 
the state and the relationship between the state and society. 
The IERA was expected to fulfil three basic functions: 1) expedite changes in 
the ownership of land; 2) adjudicate and legalise land in favour of indigenous 
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communities and indigenous and peasant organisations; and, 3) accelerate 
agrarian reform and rural development. (Art. 5 1993a)  Cognizant of the lack of 
resources IERAC had received from 1964 onwards (see Chapter 2), the CAN 
established very clear guidelines for financing the IERA, including the 
redirection of revenues secured from oil and mining and foreign direct 
investment. (Arts. 17 & 18 1993a) Recognising the growing number of 
international agencies that had emerged in the 1980s and 1990s to promote 
indigenous issues, the programme also explicitly permitted the IERA to reach 
agreements with overseas institutions to raise additional funds.   
Establishing clear revenues streams was particularly important as the 
programme assigned the IERA and the state with central roles in financing land 
redistribution. The guidelines the programme proposed were a radical departure 
with previous frameworks. Reflecting the high economic cost indigenous 
families and communities had to pay to secure land through land reform (see 
Chapters 5 and 8), the proposal stipulated that 90% of the price of the 
adjudicated land be covered by the state and 10% by the recipients.
205
 (Art. 43 
1993a) The owner of the expropriated land was entitled to receive cash payment 
based on the current cadastral value and the price negotiated through the CTC. 
(Arts. 28 & 29 1993a) The economic burden of redistribution was therefore 
expected to fall primarily on the state rather than the recipient.  
Whereas the conditions the proposal established for the financing of 
redistribution were novel, the provisions the programme provided for the 
expropriation of land were taken from the LRA. (Arts. 19-27 1993a) Hence the 
primary grounds for expropriation were the “inefficient” and “underutilisation” 
of land, the indirect management of the landholding, the use of “precarious” 
tenure arrangements, and the existence of “great demographic pressure”. Private 
property rights were conditioned on the economic use of land via “afectación”. 
The clearest rupture with the existing framework was the omission of articles 
related to “inafectabilidad” which were used in the 1980s and 1990s to shield the 
private property rights of landowning elites and capitalist enterprises (see 
Chapter 8). In short, the programme included similar grounds for expropriation 
                                                          
205
 Indicating the link between the 1990 levantamiento and the CAN, the CONAIE and the Borja 
government discussed the possibility of the state covering a proportion of the price of 
redistributed land in the aftermath of the uprising. (Navarro et al. 1996 p. 28)  
222 
 
as the LRA but increased the likelihood of expropriation materialising by 
bolstering the economic capacity of the IERA and increasing the influence of 
indigenous and peasant organisations within land reform agencies. Moreover, the 
bulk of the cost of redistribution was expected to be shouldered by the state 
rather than the beneficiary.  
In addition to attempting to expand the redistributive reach of agrarian reform, 
the CAN proposal also aimed to tighten restrictions on the distribution of land 
and the operation and reach of land markets. The transfer of minifundia was 
prohibited other than to neighbours, family members, or co-owners; the division 
of land under 10 hectares was restricted; and, the fragmentation of páramos, land 
redistributed via the IERA, and land owned by cooperatives and associations was 
forbidden. (Arts. 33-9 1993a) Explicit recognition of traditional customs and 
practices was also included within the proposal. (Arts. 106-14 1993a) For 
instance, the programme stipulated the usufruct of land was not for “one 
moment” equivalent to the acquisition of land and the “alienation” of communal 
land was proscribed.  (Arts. 112-3 1993a)  Clear preference for the redistribution 
of land to indigenous and peasant communities and organisations rather than to 
individuals was also expressed. (Arts. 40-2 1993a) The CAN therefore aimed to 
put in place measures orientated towards protecting and increasing communal 
control of land.  
While the CAN proposal provided a basis to increase the regulation, 
redistribution and social control of land, the proposal was limited in a number of 
areas. The political and economic environment the CAN emerged within clearly 
limited the ambition of the proposal. With the neoliberal orthodoxy being 
broadly, if not wholeheartedly, supported by right-wing and centre-left political 
parties in Ecuador as well as the bulk of international agencies and overseas 
governments, the potential for the CAN securing political support for a radical 
land reform programme was limited. The CAN seemingly attempted to make the 
proposal more palatable to a wider audience by employing language which 
chimed with the neoliberal orthodoxy and utilising aspects of previous or 
existing agrarian reform laws. The former was in evidence in the preamble 
which “emphasised the need to modernise peasant economies” and convert 
peasant producers into “dynamic actors of development”. (1993a pp. 1-2) The 
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latter was reflected in the expropriation clauses, the absence of limits on the size 
of landholdings, and the lack of meaningful restrictions on the ownership of 
land.  
To sum up, the CAN proposal was a clear break with the existing and pre-
existing land reform framework. Exhibiting broad continuity with the FURA 
proposal of the early 1970s, the programme aimed to increase the regulation of 
land markets, expand the redistribution of land, increase communal control of 
land, and create genuine space for the participation of indigenous and peasant 
organisations in the agencies responsible for regulating and redistributing land. 
The CAN therefore aimed to tip the balance of land reform firmly towards 
decommodification.   
5.4. The 1994 levantamiento and the contested end of land reform 
Presented with a programme that represented the interests of indigenous and 
peasant families and communities (i.e. the CAN proposal), the conservative 
Durán Ballén government (1992-96) elected to advance an agrarian bill that 
promoted the interests of landowning elites, national capitalist enterprises, and 
transnational corporations.
206
 (Hoy 13/05/1994 p. A-4) (Waters 1995 pp. 7-8) 
(FAO 1995 pp. 76-7) (Sawyer 1997 pp. 291-302) (Sawyer 2004 pp. 152-209) 
Drawing inspiration from the proposal developed by the IDEA, the executive 
branch of the government sent its agrarian development proposal – the Ley de 
Ordenamiento del Sector Agrario - to Congress as a matter of urgency in early 
May 1994. (Hoy 06/05/1994 p. A-6) (Hoy 17/05/1994 p. A-5)  
The decision of the Durán Ballén administration to promote a law that was the 
antithesis of the CAN proposal prompted CONAIE to reject the law and demand 
Congress “study and approve” the CAN programme. (Hoy 06/05/1994 p. A-6) 
(Sawyer 2004 p. 154) In the event, the executive proposal was rejected by 
Congress but voting was driven by political infighting between factions of the 
right rather than concern over issues raised by the CONAIE (see Section 2 
above). The original executive proposal provided the basis for the hastily 
redrafted law – the Ley de Desarrollo Agrario (LDA) – which was approved by 
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 See Treakle (1998) for insight into the external pressure exerted on the government. See also 
Chapter 2.  
224 
 
Congress in early June. (El Comercio 03/06/1994 p. A-1 & 04/06/1994 p. A-1) 
The legislation was understandably well received by the president of the 
Cámaras de Agricultura, Hernán Fernández de Córdova, who declared the law 
“contains what the business, indigenous and coastal peasant agricultural sectors 
hoped for and responds to the aspiration of everyone involved in the ownership 
of land, security and investment.” (El Comercio 04/06/1994 p. A-1) The 
leadership of CONAIE adopted the opposite position. Luis Macas, the 
charismatic president of the movement, claimed the legislation would lead to the 
“monopolisation of land in the hands of a few” and demanded Sixto Durán 
Ballén veto the law. (El Comercio 04/06/1994 p. A-1 & p. 3) The CONAIE then 
held a meeting in the central highland city of Riobamba to discuss what action 
the movement would take if the president approved the legislation. (El Comercio 
09/06/1994 p. A-1) Raising the spectre of another indigenous levantamiento, 
Luis Macas proclaimed: 
“We are not going to remain with our arms crossed, knelt on our 
knees, we will demonstrate our capacity to fight.” (El Comercio 
09/06/1994 p. A-1)  
The possibility of the CONAIE launching another uprising was not enough to 
deter Sixto Durán Ballén from approving the LDA in mid-June. (El Comercio, 
14/06/1994 p. A-1) (RO 461 1994) CONAIE’s reaction was twofold: i) register a 
formal complaint with the Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales (TGC)
207
 and 
ii) launch a nationwide levantamiento – the “Movilización por la Vida” - which 
swept across the highland and Amazonian regions of the country in late June.  
(El Comercio 15/06/1994 p. A-1 & B-5) (El Comercio 24/06/1994 p. A-1) (Hoy 
24/06/1994 p. A-1) (Guerrero 1996 pp. 13-17) (MICC 2003 pp. 91-2) (Zamosc 
2005 pp. 195-9) 
The twin-pronged attack forced the Durán Ballén government to negotiate 
with the CONAIE and other indigenous movements over the content of the LDA. 
The negotiations, which took place within a commission formed by the 
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 The TGC declared the LDA unconstitutional in late June 1994 on the grounds the rapid 
drafting of the law had broken political conventions (i.e. not because of the content of the law). 
(El Comercio 24/06/1994 p. A-1) (Hoy (24/06/1994 p. A-1) The Supreme Court of Justice 
overturned the TGC decision in late July 1994, providing a constitutional basis for the revised 
version of the LDA which was passed into law some days later. (El Comercio 27/07/1994 p. A-
1) (Sawyer 1997 p. 305) 
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government, lasted more than two weeks and included the president, various 
branches of the state, representatives of the Catholic Church,  indigenous and 
peasant movements (e.g. CONAIE, FENOC-I) and Cámaras de Agricultura.
208
 
(El Comercio 27/06/1994 p. A-1) (Hoy 27/06/1994 p. A-1) (Waters 1995 pp. 8-
9) (Guerrero 1996 p. 36) The government and the CONAIE started from distinct 
negotiating positions: the former offered to reform the LDA through the issuance 
of supplementary legislation while the latter demanded the legislation be 
repealed and a new law that took into account the CAN proposal be drafted.  (El 
Comercio 22/06/1994 p. A-7) (Guerrero 1996 p. 15) (García 2003 p. 205)  
The government employed the familiar tactics of “divide and rule” to weaken 
CONAIE’s position and create divisions within the CAN. Sixto Durán Ballén 
spoke directly with leaders of FENOC-I before the start of the official 
negotiations and convinced them to support his proposal to reform rather than 
repeal the law. (El Comercio 22/06/1994 p. A-7) (Hoy 22/06/1994 p. A-6) 
(Sawyer 2004 p. 185) Hence the government was able to exploit the divisions 
that had been apparent within the wider indigenous and peasant movement since 
the formation of Ecuarunari and the radicalisation of FENOC in the early 1970s 
(see Chapter 4). Splintering the principal organisations integrated into the CAN 
enabled the president to declare that “the whole world is not in agreement with 
the CONAIE” and strengthen his attempt to use the LDA as the foundation for 
the revised legal framework. (Hoy 22/06/1994 p. A-6) Issuing a veiled threat of 
military force, the president achieved his objective and the commission began to 
revise the law in late June.  (Sawyer 1997 pp. 351-2) Once the parameters of the 
negotiations had been established, the commission worked through the 
legislation article by article and chapter by chapter.
209
 (El Comercio, 13/07/94 p. 
A-1) The revised version of the LDA was then resubmitted to Congress and 
passed into law in August 1994. (El Comercio 30/07/1994 p. A-1) (RO 504 
1994) 
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 Both CONAIE and FENOC-I complained that the composition of the commission was 
unevenly weighted towards the government with more than twenty state officials and only a 
handful of indigenous and peasant representatives. (El Comercio 28/06/1994 p. A-1) (Hoy 
28/06/1994 p. A-1) See Sawyer (1997 pp. 348-52). 
209
 On the negotiations see Guerrero (1996) and Sawyer (1997; 2004).   
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Table 7.2 – Overview of principal changes to the                                      
Ley de Desarrollo Agrario, June-July 1994  
Dimension Article* Revision/addition Example* 
Objective of 
law 
2 Revised to include elements 
related to food sovereignty & 
environmental protection. 
“…guarantee to feed all 
Ecuadorians …within a 
framework of sustainable 
management of natural 
resources”. 
Agrarian 
policies 
3 Amended to include i) 
increased protection for 
communal property; ii) 
recognition of the right of 
indigenous, montubios & 
afroecuatorianos to increase 
their income through 
agricultural production; and 
iii) explicit reference to 
agrarian reform. 
“…the perfection of agrarian 
reform, providing credit, 
technical assistance & 
protection to those who were 
beneficiaries [of agrarian 
reform] & to those who access 
land in the future through the 
application of this law.” 
Social 
function of 
land 
20 Modified to include reference 
to food sovereignty. 
“…land performs its social 
function when…it guarantees 
to feed all Ecuadorians”.  
Land 
invasions & 
occupations 
 
23 & 31 Amended to reduce role of 
INDA in the involvement of 
the investigation & 
denouncement of land 
invasions & occupations.  
“…in the case of invasions & 
occupations of land the 
dispositions included in the 
Constitution of the Republic & 
other relevant laws will be 
applied.”  
Communities 
& communal-
owned land 
24 Revised to i) increase the 
proportion of community 
members required to divide 
communal land and/or convert 
communities into alternative 
forms of organisation from 
simple majority to two-thirds; 
and, ii) proscribe the 
fragmentation of páramos. 
“…the division of páramos is 
prohibited”. 
Expropriation 
of land 
32 Augmented to include 
expropriation on grounds of 
“great demographic pressure” 
& modified to reduce unused 
periods from three to two 
years. 
“…privately owned land can 
be expropriated…when the 
landholding is subject to great 
demographic pressure”. 
Water use & 
control 
42-46 Modified to restrict the 
possible privatisation of water. 
“…water is a national resource 
of public use & as such is 
inalienable.” 
Source: My own elaboration based on RO 461 (1994) & RO 55 (1997). * Article (s) & passage of 
revised law.   
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Table 7.2 (above) summarises the principal revisions brought about through 
the negotiation process.
210
 The table shows that indigenous and peasant 
negotiators were able to force a significant number of revisions. Echoing the 
CAN proposal, the changes related to two broad areas: 1) the protection of 
communal resources (e.g. Arts. 24 & 42-46) and 2) the commitment to agrarian 
reform (e.g. Arts. 3 & 32).  
The most important change in relation to this investigation related to the 
division of communal land. While fragmentation was permitted, the threshold for 
communal approval was raised from a simple to a two-thirds majority. Moreover, 
the division of páramos was proscribed, which provided protection for the 
communal land indigenous communities had retained or secured under land 
reform. Nevertheless, as Bretón notes, the overriding orientation of the law 
remained firmly titled towards the liberalisation of agriculture and the “real 
fundamental differences were minimal”, particularly in relation to the use and 
distribution of land. (1997 pp. 71-2) (Sawyer 2004 pp. 208-9)  
Comparing the LDA and the CAN proposal provides a clearer indication of 
the gap between the indigenous-peasant and state-elite visions of land reform and 
rural development. Waters claims: 
“In essence, the mobilization showed that indigenous proposals for 
agrarian reform legislation emerged as the yardstick against which 
other proposals would be measured. The attempt by landowner 
associations, conservative politicians, and the government to bypass 
that proposal ultimately failed”. (1995 p. 15) 
Yet, as Table 7.3 indicates, the approved version of the LDA was far removed 
from the CAN proposal in relation to the mechanisms it put in place to regulate 
and redistribute land.
211
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 Emphasis is given in Table 7.2 to issues related to the use, distribution, and control of land.  
211
 Table 7.3 also focuses on issues related to the use, distribution, and control of land. The other 
aspects of the law and proposal are not reported and compared.  
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Table 7.3 – Comparative analysis of the Ley de Desarrollo Agrario and 
the CAN agrarian proposal, 1993-1994 
No. Dimension CAN* LDA** 
1 Role of market Marginal & constrained  Central & expanded  
2 Expropriation of land Ten grounds including the 
expropriation of land due to 
“great demographic 
pressure”.  
Four grounds including the 
expropriation of land which 
does not fulfil its “social” 
functions on the grounds of 
“great demographic 
pressure”.  
3 Expropriation value Based on current cadastral 
value plus investments. 
Based on market value. 
4 Payment for redistributed 
land 
90% assumed by the state 
& 10% by recipient. 
100% assumed by recipient.  
5 Regulation of division & 
distribution of privately 
owned land 
Division of landholdings 
less than 10 hectares 
restricted; authorisation to 
divide landholdings above 
10 hectares; transfer of 
minifundia limited; & 
division of redistributed 
land proscribed. 
None.  
6 Regulation of communal 
land 
Division of communal land 
prohibited.  
Division of communal land 
permitted with two-thirds 
community approval except 
páramo & forest. 
7 Indigenous-peasant 
involvement within 
agrarian reform/ 
development institute  
Two indigenous & peasant 
representatives within 
Comisión Técnica-
Consultora & indigenous & 
peasant influence over 
appointment of the 
Director Ejecutivo of the 
IERA.  
Two indigenous, peasant, & 
afroecuatoriano 
representatives within 
Consejo Superior of INDA. 
8 Financing of land 
reform/development 
institute  
Revenues streams from i) 
oil & mining; ii) 
ecotourism; iii) import & 
export duties; & iv) foreign 
direct investment 
No specific revenue streams 
stipulated.  
Source: My own elaboration based on CAN (1993a), RO 524 (1994), & RO 55 (1997). * Proyecto de 
Ley Agraria Integral del Ecuador (CAN 1993a)  ** Ley de Desarrollo Agrario (RO 55 1997) & 
Reglamento General de la Ley de Desarrollo Agrario (RO 524 1994).  
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The starkest difference related to the role assigned to the market. In effect, the 
programmes started from opposite positions. Whereas the CAN proposed a 
marginal and constrained role for the market, the LDA promoted a central and 
enlarged function.  The organisational composition of the IERA and the INDA 
also provides clear evidence of the fundamental differences between the two 
programmes.  Though the LDA created space for indigenous and peasant 
representation within the INDA, the committee indigenous and peasant 
representatives were integrated into was vested with little power (see below). The 
CAN proposal, by contrast, placed indigenous and peasant representatives within 
the body charged with the task of establishing prices for expropriated land and 
influencing expropriation claims. Comparing the financing of the IERA and the 
INDA reveals additional differences. While the CAN proposal established clear 
and significant revenue streams for the financing of IERA, the LDA provided no 
clear sources of funding for INDA.  
Briefly considering the commodification and decommodification dimensions 
of the LDA provides a further indication of the difference between the law and 
the CAN proposal.   
Commodification was promoted in a variety of ways. First, the legislation 
emphatically and enthusiastically liberalised the market for privately owned land: 
“The sale and purchase and transfer of privately owned agricultural land are free 
and require the authorisation of no-one.” (Art. 35 RO 55 1997) While the change 
was significant, it was less radical than implied because of the failure of the 
IERAC to regulate the transfer and division of land under land reform.  (FAO 
1995 p. 77) Second, the legislation increased protection for private property 
rights by effectively ruling out the possibility of expropriation. The primary 
means through which this was achieved was the reduction and modification of 
the expropriation clauses, the dilution of the “social” functions of land, and the 
removal of the concept of afectación. (Arts. 20, 21 & 32 RO 55 1997) Third, 
following the policy proscriptions of international institutions in the 1980s and 
1990s (e.g. World Bank), the law placed increased emphasis on land titling. 
(Arts. 26, 38 & 39 RO 55 1997) (Interview 15) Fourth, notwithstanding the 
important revisions introduced during the negotiations, the law opened the door 
to the fragmentation and commodification of communal land (excluding. 
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páramo).
212
 (Art. 24 RO 55 1997) (Martínez 1998 pp. 180-1) (Navas 1998 pp. 
190-5)  
Decommodification was primarily limited to the regulation of communal land. 
The law eliminated the role of the state (via the IERAC) in regulating the transfer 
and division of privately owned land and effectively closed the state 
redistribution mechanism opened by the LRAC in 1964. While the “great 
demographic pressure” clause inserted into the final version of the legislation 
was similar to the article included in the LRA, as Bretón also notes, the clause 
was only applicable to land that failed to perform its “social” function. (Arts. 19-
21 RO 55 1997) (Bretón 1997 p. 71) The vagueness of the “social” functions of 
land rendered the clause virtually meaningless. In the unlikely event a legal basis 
was established for the expropriation of privately owned land, the landowner was 
entitled to receive the “commercial value” in cash prior to expropriation, which 
placed further brakes on expropriation and provided additional assurances for 
landowning elites and capitalist enterprises. (Art. 33 RO 55 1997) (FAO 2002 p. 
8) (Nieto 2004 p. 100)  
The space the LDA created for representatives of indigenous and peasant 
organisations within the Consejo Superior of INDA should be seen in light of the 
limited regulative and redistributive dimensions of the law. (Art. 30 RO 524 
1994) (Art. 4 RO 745 1995) (Art. 29 RO 55 1997) Indigenous and peasant 
movements achieved their long-standing demand of securing representation 
within the institute responsible for overseeing – or “perfecting” - agrarian reform 
but only when the institute was incapable of performing the task and the Consejo 
Superior was toothless.  Decisions related to the expropriation of land were taken 
by the Director Executivo and Directores Distritales rather than the Consejo 
Superior. (Art. 11 RO 745 1995) (Art. 33 RO 55 1997) Waters suggests the 
granting of authority to the Directores Distritales was a positive step as at that 
local level “presumably, local indigenous voices could be better heard”. (1995 p. 
9) However, the organisational structure of INDA appeared to be designed to 
work in the opposite direction: to limit the power of the national committees 
which included indigenous and peasant representatives.   
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 The window the LDA opened to fragment communal land legally was only momentary. 
Under continued pressure from the CONAIE, the 1998 constitution proscribed the division of 
communal land. (Art. 84 RO 1 1998)  
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To sum up, indigenous and peasant pressure forced numerous revisions to the 
LDA but the approved legislation was far removed from the proposal the CAN 
submitted to Congress in 1993 (via the MPD). The gap between the law and the 
proposal is crucial for understanding the nature of the 1994 levantamiento. While 
the levantamiento was launched after the approval of the LDA, the failure of the 
Durán Ballén government to consider the CAN proposal was central to 
indigenous grievances. From this angle, the mobilisation appears as largely 
“offensive” (i.e. attempting to transform the existing framework) rather than 
primarily “defensive” (i.e. aiming to protect the existing framework).  
6. Summary: empirical and theoretical findings 
This chapter has analysed the political struggle over the design of land reform 
during the 1980s and 1990s, concentrating on indigenous and peasant attempts 
to transform land reform legislation.  
The analysis has shown the legislative framework the military dictatorships of 
the 1970s bequeathed the civilian governments of the 1980s provided increased 
protection for private property rights and limited the possibilities of land 
redistribution.  Despite the pressure indigenous and peasant movements exerted 
on the Roldós-Hurtado administration to accelerated agrarian reform, the 
government travelled in the opposite direction and introduced legislative 
changes that strengthened the protection of private property rights. Reforms 
introduced in the 1980s therefore weakened land reform but the overriding legal 
framework that underpinned the last fifteen years of the reform was established 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The winding down of land reform in the 1980s was one factor behind 
CONAIE’s decision to launch the 1990 levantamiento. The economic slump of 
the 1980s was another. However, drawing on the defensive/offensive framework 
(see Chapter 1), this chapter has argued interpreting the uprising as a response to 
structural adjustment masks the “offensive” character of the mobilisation. The 
chapter has made a similar claim about the 1994 levantamiento which was 
orientated towards transforming rather than protecting existing laws, policies 
and institutions. 
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The political struggle over the LDA provides clear support for Polanyi’s 
assertion that sectors of society will mobilise to prevent or limit fictitious 
commodification. The CAN programme explicitly rejected the commodity view 
of land and proposed a framework that would subject the market to social and 
political control. The Durán Ballén government’s decision to ignore the proposal 
and introduce a law that travelled in the opposite direction prompted the 
CONAIE to launch another levantamiento. While the decommodification 
potential of the final version of the LDA was limited, the CONAIE was able to 
introduce some important measures which limited land commodification (e.g. 
protection of communal land). Silva also recognises the Polanyian nature of the 
1994 levantamiento. (2009 pp. 164-66) However, while noting the limitations of 
the land reform of the 1960s and 1970s, he places greater emphasis on the 
defensive rather than offensive character of the uprising, claiming the 
mobilisation was the “crest of the second wave of anti-neoliberal contention”. 
(2009 p. 164) Silva also draws a different conclusion over the scale of the 
revisions to the LDA, claiming the changes “substantially decommodified” land 
and other resources. (2009 p. 166) The reading of past events, as will be 
explained in Chapter 10, has a considerable bearing on how current 
developments in Ecuador are interpreted.       
The conflict over the LDA also presents some challenges to Polanyi. The 
struggle brings the thorny issue of power relations to the fore. The ability of the 
CONAIE to force the government to revise the LDA illustrated the political 
power indigenous peoples had accumulated through decades of collective 
organisation and mobilisation. However, the extent of the revisions and the 
orientation of the new agrarian regime also demonstrated the limits of that 
power. Universal suffrage had clearly not transformed the Ecuadorian state into 
the “organ of the ruling million” and the economic and political power of 
landowning elites continued to impede efforts to promote decommodification 
(see Chapters 1 and 4).  
While the CAN was unable to translate its vision of land reform into law, 
collective organisation and mobilisation were able to widen the spaces open to 
indigenous peoples to secure land through land reform and land markets in the 
1980s and 1990s. The opportunities that emerged for indigenous families and 
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communities to obtain land during the period are examined in the next two 
chapters. 
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Chapter Eight  
Land redistribution and indigenous peoples (1979-1994) 
1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the redistribution of land to indigenous families and 
communities during the period 1979-1994. The analysis reveals basic 
continuities in the implementation of land reform and the important role 
indigenous organisation and mobilisation performed in expediting and 
expanding land redistribution. In doing so, the chapter sheds additional light on 
the operation of the double movement and the character of the 1990 and 1994 
levantamientos. The chapter also provides a detailed overview of land 
redistribution in the highland region between 1964 and 1994. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The second 
section gives a snapshot of agrarian reform between 1980 and 1994 to provide 
an indication of the extent and pace of land redistribution under structural 
adjustment and neoliberalism. The third section explores the implementation of 
the redistributive component of land reform in the 1980s and 1990s by the 
analysing a selection of cases opened or resolved during the period. The land 
conflicts that provided the backdrop for the 1990 levantamiento are also 
discussed. The fourth section examines the overall reach of land redistribution in 
the highland region, explaining the principal patterns that emerged over three 
decades of reform. The main empirical and theoretical findings of the chapter are 
summarised in section five.  
2. Snapshot of land redistribution in the 1980s and 1990s 
The opportunities for indigenous peoples to obtain land via agrarian reform 
gradually diminished between 1980 and 1994.
213
 Whereas approximately 
399,213 hectares were redistributed to around 50,000 beneficiaries between 
1964 and 1979 (see Chapter 5), roughly 181,750 hectares were transferred to 
around 20,000 recipients between 1980 and 1994. Figure 8.1 (below) shows the 
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 This chapter covers the period 1979-1994 but the land reform data presented in this section 
relate to the period 1980-1994 to avoid overlap with the figures reported in Chapter 5.  
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total amount of land redistributed by the type of intervention during the two 
periods.
214
  
 
The chart reveals a crucial difference in the composition of land redistribution: 
redistribution was spread between the various types of intervention between 
1964 and 1979 but concentrated in the reversion, negotiation, and expropriation 
of privately owned land between 1980 and 1994.
215
 While the amount of 
privately owned land redistributed in the 1980s and 1990s partly reflected the 
lags in transferring land incorporated into the reform sector in the 1960s and 
1970s, the shift highlights the dilemma the state faced under structural 
adjustment and neoliberalism: the continuation of redistribution became 
increasingly reliant on the incorporation of privately owned land into the reform 
sector. Rather than traverse this path, as noted in the previous chapter, the 
civilian governments of the 1980s and 1990s increased the protection for private 
property rights and attempted to divert the indigenous and peasant population 
along the road of integrated rural development.  
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 The data in Figure 8.1 refer to the period 1964-1993 as figures for 1994 are not available for 
the type of intervention. (IERAC-INDA) 
215
 Chiriboga (1984a) reports a similar finding at a national level between 1964 and 1984.  
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Figure 8.1 - Land redistribution by type of intervention, 
Highland Ecuador, 1964-1979 & 1980-1993 
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Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA. A = Reversion, negotiation & 
expropriation; B = Asistencia Social; C = Huasipungo + precarious tenure (inc. arrimado 
lojano). 
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The rate of redistribution provides some indication of the orientation of the 
governments of the 1980s and 1990s towards reform and the opportunities open 
to indigenous and peasant families, organisations, and movements to obtain land 
(see Figure 8.2 above).
216
 The land redistributed under the Roldós-Hurtado 
government (1979-84) included land not formally redistributed in the 1970s (see 
Chapter 2). However, the relatively high rate of redistribution also reflected the 
new spaces that emerged for indigenous and peasant families and communities 
to seek the resolution of existing land claims and make new demands for the 
land. Opportunities to obtain land then decreased as the conservative Febres 
Cordero government (1984-88) mothballed agrarian reform. (Salgado 1987 p. 
142) (Rosero 1990 pp. 34-5)  
Redistribution picked-up slightly in the opening years of the Borja 
government. The data suggest the 1990 levantamiento forced the government 
and the IERAC to address some outstanding land claims and disputes (i.e. 
indigenous mobilisation momentarily expanded the redistributive dimension of 
land reform). However, the state response was timid and redistribution declined 
again in 1991 and 1992 as the government channelled indigenous demands for 
land through the FEPP, a religious NGO (see Chapter 9).  
Data collated by Rosero provides an indication of the attitude of the Borja 
government towards reform. (1990 p. 41 & pp. 68-69) Utilising the 
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 The data presented in Figure 8.2 only provide an approximation of the actual rate of 
redistribution (see Chapter 5).  
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Figure 8.2 - Land redistributed via agrarian reform by year, 
Highland Ecuador, 1980-1994 
Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA. 
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inafectabilidad clauses inserted into agrarian reform legislation in the early 
1980s, the IERAC provided explicit protection for 14,761 hectares of land 
between August 1988 and July 1990 while the institute incorporated 7,564 
hectares of land into the reform sector during the same period (see Table 8.1 
below). Of the total amount of land incorporated into the reform sector only 296 
hectares was expropriated, the rest was reverted to the IERAC. Greater emphasis 
was therefore placed on protecting rather than challenging private property 
rights. Notably, President Rodrigo Borja attempted to conceal the limited 
progress his government had made on reform in the wake of the 1990 
levantamiento. Visiting indigenous communities in Chimborazo and Tungurahua 
in June 1990, the president proclaimed:  
“From the first day my government began to search for solutions to 
every indigenous problem…one and half million hectares have been 
transferred to peasants through agrarian reform…the small amount of 
money the government has we are redistributing equally to everyone 
without privileges”. (Quoted in El Comercio 12/06/1990 p. A-1) 
The president went on to pledge to work to resolve the problems of indigenous 
peoples and treat them like “brothers and human beings with the same rights and 
the same obligations.” (Quoted in El Comercio 12/06/1990 p. A-1) However, his 
declarations on land reform had little foundation, making his promise to treat 
indigenous peoples with respect particularly hollow.
217
 While the IERAC 
distributed approximately 1,635,100 hectares of land between 1988 and 1990, 
1,571,887 hectares was via colonisation and only 63,233 hectares was via land 
reform (only around half of which was redistributed in the highland region). 
(IERAC-INDA)  
The Borja government set the stage for the winding-down and the effective 
closure of the state redistribution mechanism under the conservative Durán 
Ballén government (1992-96). 
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 Selverston-Scher (2001) pp. 63-4 reports that she was told a similar story by the Director of 
IERAC (see Chapter 2). The analysis presented in this chapter indicates most of the land disputes 
to which the director referred were resolved in the lowlands through colonisation rather than 
highlands through land reform.  
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Table 8.1 – Reversion, expropriation & protection of privately owned              
land,  Highland Ecuador,  August 1988 to July 1990 
Province Reversion 
 
Expropriation  Reversion + 
Expropriation  
Protection  Balance*   
Azuay 392 112 504 3,856 -3,352 
Bolivar 276 7 283 307 -24 
Cañar 722 - 722 193 529 
Carchi 51 - 51 871 -820 
Chimborazo 1,122 134 1,256 1,303 -47 
Cotopaxi 1,474 39 1,513 1,604 -91 
Imbabura 52 - 52 1,425 -1,373 
Loja 1,290 - 1,290 83 1,207 
Pichincha 1,862 5 1,867 5,118 -3,251 
Tungurahua 28 - 28 - 28 
Total 7,268 296 7,564 14,761 -7,197 
Source: My own elaboration based on Rosero (1990 p. 41 & pp. 68-69).  I modified the figures reported 
above to correct for the errors in the published data acknowledged by Rosero (1990 p. 64). Hectares of 
land. Discrepancies are due to rounding. * Balance = (Reversion + Expropriation) – Protection.  
3. Land claims, conflicts and redistribution  
Following the pattern that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, the collective 
organisation and mobilisation of indigenous peoples were required to activate 
the redistributive dimension of agrarian reform in the 1980s and 1990s. While 
the opportunities to secure land progressively diminished as structural 
adjustment and neoliberalism advanced, highland indigenous families, 
communities and organisations were still able to secure land through state 
redistribution. The drawn-out nature of land redistribution, which was partly due 
to the cumbersome land reform bureaucratic structure, ensured many of the 
claims that were lodged in the opening decades of the reform were not resolved 
until 1980s and 1990s.  Nevertheless, new claims were also submitted. Data 
reported by Korovkin provide a broad indication of the pace at which indigenous 
families and communities lodged land claims from the early 1970s to the early 
1990s. Summarising the land claims submitted to the IERAC in Chimborazo 
(i.e. the province with the largest indigenous population in the sierra), the author 
reports 97 claims were lodged between 1971 and 1977, 104 between 1978 and 
1984, and 75 between 1985 and 1991 (up to August). (1997 p. 29) Efforts to 
secure land through land reform therefore progressed at a relatively steady, if 
moderating, pace over two decades.  
239 
 
Legal and extra-legal methods continued to be employed to activate land 
redistribution. Successful land claims, which often started with attempts to 
purchase land directly from the landowner to avoid state involvement, typically 
went through various overlapping stages: the lodging of the land claim; the 
initial assessment of the IERAC; the processing of the claim; the judgement of 
the CRA and IERAC; the occupation of the land; the renegotiation of the 
demand with the IERAC; and, the eventual redistribution of land. (Martínez 
1985b p. 170) (Rosero 1990 pp. 49-50) (Martínez 1992 p. 73) (Vallejo 1996 p. 
146) (Cervone 2012 pp. 139-43) Throughout, landowner repression was often 
employed to attempt to break the spirit of the claimants and protect private 
property i.e. landowners frequently used legal and extra-legal methods to 
attempt to block land redistribution.   
The employment of legal and extra-legal methods to attempt to activate and 
block land redistribution is highlighted by two cases Thurner analyses in the 
central highland canton of Colta, Chimborazo.
218
 (Thurner 1989; 2000) The first 
case involved the battle for control of a small but productive plot of land located 
on the remnants of Hacienda Gatazo, a privately owned hacienda which had 
been extensively subdivided through the family and the market in the decades 
before and after the introduction of the LRAC. (1989 pp. 13-20) The plot of land 
under dispute in the early 1980s was cultivated, irrigated, and covered 20 
hectares. Following the pattern noted above, the community at the centre of the 
land struggle, which was historically linked to the hacienda through semi-feudal 
practices, attempted to purchase the land before filing a demand for 
expropriation with IERAC in 1983. (1989 p. 21) The community members had 
organised a strike prior to lodging the expropriation claim, leaving the land 
virtually unused in the early 1980s. Using the personal relationships they had 
developed with the landowners and the financial resources they had accumulated 
through small-scale agricultural production, two relatively affluent members of 
the community broke ranks and attempted to purchase the plot of land in 1984. 
The cabildo of the community stopped the sale by committing more resources to 
the expropriation case, pressuring the IERAC to resolve the land claim, and 
organising the occupation and cultivation of the land. Thurner implies a twofold 
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 See Chapters 5 and 6 for earlier developments on the haciendas and communities Thurner 
analyses.  
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motivation for the land invasion: 1) tactical (i.e. to block the sale of the plot); 
and, 2) economic (i.e. to work the land to pay for the legal fees associated with 
the expropriation case and the possible purchase of the land). (1989 pp. 21-2 & 
pp. 27-9)   Mirroring the land disputes channelled through the IERAC in the 
1960s and 1970s, the price the landowners demanded for the land was a 
significant barrier to the settlement of the claim. The commodity view of land, as 
Thurner indicates, filtered through to the redistribution component of agrarian 
reform.  
“The gap between IERAC’s standard estimated value and the price 
demanded by the heirs, who cited market values to justify their 
demands, was enormous.” (1989 p. 21, emphasis added) 
Four years after the land claim was initially lodged, the IERAC and the CRA 
rejected the demand. The community continued to pursue the claim with the 
IERAC before agreeing to purchase the land directly from the landowners in the 
late 1980s, having given up on land reform. (1989 p. 22 & p. 36)  
The outcome of the land claim pursued by a nearby community on the 
remnants of Hacienda Culluctus was more favourable, even if the dispute was 
far from conflict-free. (Thurner 1989; 2000) The subdivision of the landholding 
in the decades after the introduction of the LRAC left indigenous families with 
tenuous legal rights to the páramo they had collectively used for pasture in the 
decades before and after the dissolution of the hacienda in the mid-1960s. The 
decision of the owner of half of the hacienda to sell sections of páramo in 1983 
brought that sharply into focus. The families grouped into a community, 
submitted a claim for the expropriation of 250 hectares of the páramo with 
IERAC, and then occupied the land.  The landowner responded by hiring “off-
duty rural police to carry out threats against the ‘invaders’”. (1989 p. 24)  Two 
indigenous protesters were killed. The death of the peasants seemingly expedited 
the land claim and the 250 hectares of páramo was redistributed to the 
community in 1983. The landowner, Thurner notes, received less than market 
value for the páramo but remained the owner of “over 500 hectares of the 
hacienda’s best land”. (1989 p. 24) 
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Huarcaya’s analysis of the ultimately successful attempt of a group of 
indigenous families and communities to force the expropriation and 
redistribution of Hacienda Quinchuquí, a collection of landholdings that 
stretched across approximately 700 hectares of good quality land in the northern 
highland canton of Otavalo (Imbabura), highlights the protracted and contested 
nature of land redistribution.
219
 (2012 pp. 203-69) The first demand for 
expropriation was made in 1977 on the grounds that the owner of the hacienda 
continued to use outlawed semi-feudalist practices (yanapa) to operate the 
estate. (2012 pp. 234-5) Following the LRA, the members of the eight 
communities involved in the land claim channelled their demand through a pre-
cooperative which was established to make the expropriation claim. The IERAC 
and the CRA rejected the demand in 1978. (2012 p. 243) While some members 
of the pre-cooperative left after the decision, the majority remained, lodging 
another claim in 1978 on the grounds of “great demographic pressure”. (2012 p. 
245)  
The landowner adopted a variety of tactics to block or limit the second claim, 
including the repression of claimants and the offer to settle the dispute “out of 
court” by selling sections of the hacienda to the pre-cooperative at elevated 
prices. Concurrently, the hacendado started to sell plots of land to affluent 
indigenous artisans from nearby communities and villages. (2012 pp. 249-51) In 
doing so, the landowner established alliances with indigenous groups who 
supported his efforts to block expropriation. In effect, two rival indigenous 
groups emerged: peasant families integrated into the pre-cooperative who 
wanted to secure the hacienda through redistribution and artisan producers who 
wanted to purchase sections of the hacienda through the market.  The rivalry 
between the two groups manifested in violent confrontations in 1980 and 1981 
after members of the pre-cooperative occupied sections of the hacienda and the 
hacendado supported the efforts of the rival group to expel them forcefully.  
While the return to democracy in 1979 failed to halt landowner and police 
repression, conditions under the Roldós-Hurtado government proved more 
conducive for the members of the pre-cooperative to attempt to force the 
expropriation of the hacienda. With the case receiving considerable media 
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 Some of the details included within the analysis of this case are based on personal 
communication with Sergio Huarcaya in 2012.  
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coverage, the CRA ruled in favour of the claimants in 1981 and around one third 
of the hacienda (approximately 235 hectares) was sold to the pre-cooperative via 
the IERAC in 1983, nearly seven years after the initial claim was lodged.
220
  
In addition to illustrating the various stages claims tended to pass through and 
the lengthy battles indigenous peoples had to fight to secure land through 
agrarian reform, Huarcaya’s analysis also draws attention to the crucial role 
activism, networks and alliances performed in indigenous struggles over land, 
spreading knowledge of land reform legislation and providing indigenous 
peoples with the knowhow to make expropriation demands. This was evident on 
numerous levels. Having learned about the LRA from a neighbouring 
community which had successfully forced the expropriation and redistribution of 
sections of a local hacienda, the leaders of the pre-cooperative began to 
communicate the details of the law to members of other communities. 
Highlighting the lack of effort the state invested into communicating and 
implementing land reform, Huarcaya notes most of the members of the 
community were completely unaware agrarian reform legislation even existed. 
(2012 p. 230) Illustrating the important role alliances with other social groups 
performed in activating land redistribution, the members of the pre-cooperative 
then received support from FENOC and leftist lawyers who helped them build a 
case for expropriation. Huarcaya notes the FENOC “provided legal and public 
relations support, writing letters to state authorities and newspapers, getting 
leaders out of prison, and building coalitions with other organizations.” (2012 p. 
240) Representatives of the leftist political parties and coalitions MPD and FADI 
also visited the communities and the lawyer of the pre-cooperative was a 
member of the MPD. (2012 pp. 241-2)   
One important point emerges from the case which illuminates a wider feature 
of land reform from 1973 onwards: indigenous awareness and understanding of 
reform started to spread as legal obstacles to the implementation of reform began 
to increase. The injustice and frustration this engendered were important factors 
behind the 1990 levantamiento. The CONAIE’s declarations at the uprising 
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 By the time sections of the hacienda were transferred to the pre-cooperative it comprised 233 
members (i.e. around one hectare per member of the cooperative). Following the general trend in 
the highlands, once the loan secured to purchase the sections of the hacienda was repaid the land 
was divided between the members.  
243 
 
captured this sentiment: “Efforts have been exhausted through legal channels: 
the people have the say”.221 (Quoted in Navarro et al. 1996 p. 279)  
The time, energy, and resources indigenous peoples invested into land claims 
is highlighted by the attempts of a small community in the northern highland 
province of Imbabura to secure redistributed land. In the early 1980s, the 
community lodged a claim with the IERAC to expropriate the “nearly 
abandoned” Hacienda Tunibamba on the grounds of “great demographic 
pressure”. (Martínez 1992b p. 73) The hacienda stretched across 123 hectares of 
land. State agencies (e.g. MAG, IERAC) acknowledged the existence of “great 
demographic pressure” on numerous occasions. However, despite the persistent 
demands the community made on the IERAC, the institute failed to redistribute 
the land. (Martínez 1992b p. 73) (Rosero 1990 p. 74)  The community, Martínez 
notes, were left with little option but to occupy the hacienda. (1992b p. 73) 
Following the 1990 levantamiento, the land was eventually adjudicated to the 
community, enabling the families to increase the size of their landholdings from 
0.5 to 1.6 hectares (the average plot size between the approximately 60 families 
integrated into the community).
222
 (Martínez 2002b p. 97) (Rosero 1990 p. 61) 
(Dubly & Granda 1991 pp. 90-91)  
The Hacienda Tunibamba case was one of a number of the land conflicts that 
provided the immediate backdrop for the 1990 levantamiento. Collating data 
from the CONAIE, human rights organisations, legal advocates for indigenous 
organisations, and IERAC archives, Rosero reports the existence of 111 
unresolved land conflicts in the highland region in 1990.
223
 (1990 pp. 47-51) 
Cross-referencing figures collated by Rosero and data reported by the Cámaras 
de Agricultura indicates land conflicts were scattered across the highlands but 
concentrated in regions with high indigenous densities (e.g. Chimborazo, 
Cotopaxi, and Imbabura) (see Figure 8.3 below).
224
 (El Comercio 28/05/1990 p. 
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 See also Martínez (1992b p. 73).  
222
 See Pacari (1993) p. 399 for a vivid depiction of the “great demographic pressure” facing a 
group of indigenous families and communities in the province of Chimborazo in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
223
 As Rosero (1990) and Cervone (2012) note, not all conflicts were between peasants and 
elites, some were inter-peasant disputes.  
224
 The Cámara de Agricultura data only refer to the northern highland provinces and are 
therefore not representative of the region as a whole (the figures exclude possible conflicts in 
Azuay, Cañar, and Loja).  
244 
 
A-10)  Three additional points emerge from the data that shed light on the nature 
of the land conflicts and the operation of the countermovement.  (Rosero 1990 p. 
48 & pp. 73-93) First, communities performed a significant role in the land 
claims. Of the 111 cases, 63 involved communities and 37 involved associations. 
Only two involved cooperatives. The prominent role communities performed in 
the land disputes indicates the essentially collective nature of the indigenous 
fight for land, reinforcing the points made elsewhere in this thesis. Second, land 
conflicts were registered throughout the highlands but multiple disputes were 
recorded in some parishes and cantons.
225
 While numerous factors influenced the 
location of disputes, the concentration of conflicts within certain zones suggests 
the wider existence of patterns similar to the ones Huarcaya identifies i.e. the 
spread of awareness, knowledge and knowhow between families and 
communities at the local level.  Third, the two most frequent grounds provided 
for expropriation were “great demographic pressure” and “abandonment”.226 
While no precise conclusions can be drawn from the aggregate data, the nature of 
the claims hints at the legitimacy of indigenous land demands, especially as the 
rate of population growth in regions with high indigenous densities was generally 
elevated.  
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 For example, three conflicts were reported in the parish of Gonzalez Suarez, Otavalo 
(Imbabura) and three incidents were reported in the parish of Cangahua, Cayambe (Pichincha).   
226
 Rosero does not provide the grounds for expropriation for all of the land conflicts (probably 
due to the failings of the underlying IERAC data). The above observation only relates to the 
cases for which grounds for expropriation are provided.  
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Figure 8.3 - Reported land conflicts, Highland Ecuador, 1990 
Camara de Agricultura* CONAIE et al**
Source: My own elaboration based on * El Comercio, 28/05/1990 p. A-10 and ** Rosero (1990) p. 48.  
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The analysis of the specific outcomes of the land conflicts is outside the 
boundaries of this investigation.
227
 However, as noted above, the response of the 
Borja and Durán Ballén governments was limited. The 1990 levantamiento 
forced the resolution of some land conflicts but land redistribution remained on a 
downward curve until agrarian reform was drawn to a close in 1994. The FEPP 
assisted land purchase scheme, which is examined in the next chapter, resolved 
some existing land conflicts but numerous disputes remained partially or totally 
unresolved. El Comercio reported that there were over 2,000 land conflicts 
ongoing in the highland region in June 1994. (El Comercio 04/06/1994 p. A-3) 
Over 1,200 cases were reported in the region covered by the Región Central 
Oriental branch of IERAC, which included the highland provinces of Bolivar, 
Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, and Tungurahua as well as the eastern lowland province 
of Pastaza, 1,012 of which were categorised as being investigated and 200 listed 
as having been resolved. (El Comercio 04/06/1994 p. A-3) While the sustained 
and concerted efforts of indigenous families, communities, organisations, 
movements increased the amount of land redistributed, land conflicts remained 
commonplace and issues related to the distribution of land remained unresolved 
in many areas.  
The next section evaluates the overall reach of three decades of land 
redistribution in the highland region and the basic patterns that emerged between 
land redistribution and indigenous peoples.  
4. Overview of land redistribution between 1964 and 1994 
The total amount of land redistributed in the highland region between 1964 and 
1994 was roughly 580,962 hectares or 12.2% of the 2000 agricultural land 
surface. Table 8.2 (below) provides a breakdown of land redistribution across 
the ten highland provinces. The general patterns outlined in Chapter 5 for the 
period 1964-1979 were also evident for the period 1964-1994. Most land was 
redistributed in the southern province of Loja (26.8%), the central province of 
Chimborazo (20.9%) and the northern provinces of Pichincha (12.7%) and 
Cotopaxi (12.1%). Over 70% of the total amount of land redistributed was done 
so within these four provinces. The amount of land redistributed in relation to 
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 See Cervone for insight into the outcome of a small number of land conflicts in Chimborazo. 
(2012 pp. 139-43) 
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the agricultural land surface was greatest in Chimborazo (25.7%), Cañar 
(19.0%), and Loja (15.7%).   
Table 8.2 –Land redistributed via agrarian reform by province,                                         
Highland Ecuador, 1964-1994  
Province IPD* Land 
redistribution 
(hectares) 
Average 
amount per 
recipient   
(hectares) 
Proportion of 
total land 
redistribution 
(%) 
Proportion of 
land surface 
** 
(%) 
Azuay 24.94 29,884 9.98 5.15 4.88 
Bolivar 27.86 16,684 11.08 2.87 4.38 
Cañar 55.31 49,005 13.32 8.44 18.98 
Carchi 0.00 17,335 5.15 2.98 9.95 
Chimborazo 66.35 121,349 8.23 20.89 25.74 
Cotopaxi 53.06 70,465 8.68 12.13 15.41 
Imbabura 49.38 14,595 5.03 2.51 5.15 
Loja 6.05 155,734 10.98 26.81 15.65 
Pichincha
228
 42.57 73,441 5.10 12.65 7.93 
Tungurahua 37.64 32,471 6.33 5.59 15.91 
Total 37.85 580,962 8.18 100.00 12.20 
Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA, Zamosc (1995) & INEC (2000). * IPD = 
Indigenous Population Density - population of “predominantly indigenous area” (API) as % of total rural 
population of the province/region in 1990 (Zamosc 1995 p. 23). ** % of total agricultural land surface in 
2000.  
Figure 8.4 (below) shows the relationship between the relative amount of land 
redistributed and the relative size of the indigenous population, using the API in 
1990 as an indicator of the indigenous population of the ten highland provinces. 
The general, if not universal, relationship between the relative amount of land 
redistributed and the relative size of the indigenous population was stronger 
between 1964 and 1994 than between 1964 and 1979 (see Chapter 5).
229
 On a 
broad level, the strengthening of the relationship was due to a) the general 
increase in indigenous population densities in the 1980s and 1990s and b) the 
relative increase in the amount of land redistributed in provinces with high 
indigenous population densities under structural adjustment and 
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 See Chapter 5 for comments on important differences between the indigenous population 
density and land reform data in relation to Pichincha.  
229
 The breakdown of the relationship for Imbabura is explained by a variety of factors. These 
include: the absence of state-owned land; the prevalence of relatively productive farms (which 
remained outside the reach of agrarian reform); and, the potential for small-scale agricultural 
producers to secure income through artisan production (which allowed for increased engagement 
in land markets and decreased reliance on agrarian reform). The breakdown of the relationship 
for Pichincha is largely explained by the disconnection between the indigenous population and 
agrarian reform data (see Chapter 5).  
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neoliberalism.
230
  These two factors indicate the desire of indigenous peoples to 
remain in the rural highlands and attempt to secure land through agrarian reform. 
Within tight parameters, the data suggest indigenous peoples were relatively 
successful in achieving this goal. However, as the cases analysed within this 
thesis have indicated (e.g. MAG 1997c; Thurner 1989; Waters 2007), the overall 
stock of land redistributed to indigenous peoples included a considerable amount 
of páramo.  
 
Figure 8.5 (below) provides additional support for this observation. The data 
indicate páramo performed a particularly important role in Chimborazo, the 
province where the relationship between the relative size of the indigenous 
population and the relative amount of land redistributed was the strongest. The 
data also suggest páramo performed important roles in Tungurahua, Cotopaxi, 
and Cañar, provinces with relatively high indigenous population densities.
231
 
The redistribution of the high-altitude grassland exaggerates the reach of land 
reform as large tracts of the land were redistributed collectively to a relatively 
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 Zamosc reports the population of API as % of the total rural highland population increased 
from 35.4 to 37.9 between 1962 and 1990. On provincial level, notable increases were registered 
in Chimborazo (from 60.0 to 66.4), Cotopaxi (from 46.1 to 53.1) and Cañar (from 50.6 to 55.3). 
The most notable decrease was recorded in Tungurahua (from 43.6 to 37.6).  
231
 The agricultural land surfaces of Pichincha and Cañar include a significant amount of land 
located in the western lowlands so páramo accounts for a larger proportion of the highland zones 
of these provinces than indicated in Figures 8.5.  
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Land redistribution as % of agricultural land surface** 
Figure 8.4 - Indigenous peoples & land redistribution,            
Highland Ecuador, 1964-1994 
Source: My own elaboration based on  IERAC-INDA, INEC (2000) & Zamosc (1995). *Population of 
“predominantly indigenous area” as % of total rural population of the province in 1990 (Zamosc 1995 
p. 23). ** Land redistribution between 1964 and 1994 as % of  provincial agricultural land surface in 
2000.    
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small number of communities.  Moreover, while the páramo performed crucial 
roles in the economic strategies and cultural practices of indigenous families and 
communities, the topographic and environmental characteristics of the land 
placed definite constraints on its use. (Martínez 2002a) (Mena et al. 2011) 
(Interviews 16 and 17) The data provide additional support for the claim that the 
land redistributed in the sierra was among the most marginalised and least 
productive in the region and the space open for indigenous families and 
communities to secure productive land was limited.  
 
The data presented in Table 8.3 (below) shows land redistribution by type of 
intervention.232 Examining the data at this level sheds further light on the 
implementation of land reform in the highland region between 1964 and 1994 
(see Chapter 2).
233
  
The first group (A) includes privately owned land that was incorporated into 
the reform sector via reversion, negotiation, and expropriation.  The land 
classified in this group accounted for 52% of the total amount of land 
redistributed in the highland region.  While the aggregate data do not allow for 
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 IERAC-INDA does not report land redistribution by type of intervention in 1994. Table 8.3 
therefore relates to the period 1964-1993 and the combined total amount of land redistribution 
reported in the table does not correspond to the total reported in Table 8.2.   
233
 Table 8.3 follows the categories reported by IERAC-INDA with the exception of arrimado 
lojano which is grouped under “precarious forms of tenure” to improve the presentation of the 
data.  
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Land redistribution as % of agricultural land surface** 
Figure 8.5 - Páramo & land redistribution,                              
Highland Ecuador, 1964-1994 
Source: My own  elaboration based on IERAC-INDA & INEC (2000) . * Paramo as % of  provincial  
agricultural land surface  in 2000. ** Land redistribution between 1964 and 1994 as % provincial  agricultural 
land surface in 2000.    
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precise conclusions to be drawn, various sources indicate the bulk of privately 
owned land was incorporated into the reform sector through reversion and 
negotiation rather than expropriation (e.g. MAG 1977c; Martínez 1985; Rosero 
1990). The figures indicate the spaces open to indigenous peoples to secure 
privately owned land varied across the highlands. Possibilities were greatest in 
the central and southern provinces (e.g. Cañar, Chimborazo) and lowest in the 
northern regions (e.g. Cotopaxi, Imbabura), indicating spaces were generally 
widest in regions where the capitalist modernisation of agriculture was weakest 
and the quality of land was poorest.
234
 The data provide additional support for 
the claim land reform and land commodification posed greater threats to 
traditional rather than modernising landowning elites (see Chapters 2 and 3).  
Table 8.3 – Land redistributed via agrarian reform by type of 
intervention, Highland Ecuador, 1964-1993 
Province A* %** B* %** C* %** D* %** 
Azuay 20,999 70.6 3,438 11.6 27 0.1 5,287 17.8 
Bolivar 12,293 74.2 265 1.6 998 6.0 3,022 18.2 
Cañar 27,048 55.2 18,645 38.1 0 0.0 3,301 6.7 
Carchi 6,915 39.9 6,343 36.6 1,881 10.9 2,195 12.7 
Chimborazo 71,684 59.2 27,774 22.9 3,039 2.5 18,677 15.4 
Cotopaxi 27,065 38.6 17,911 25.6 5,317 7.6 19,758 28.2 
Imbabura 3,792 26.0 2,042 14.0 2,669 18.3 6,069 41.7 
Loja 74,908 48.1 0 0 80,710 51.9 0 0 
Pichincha 24,055 32.9 25,348 34.7 6,752 9.2 16,941 23.2 
Tungurahua 30,785 95.2 540 1.7 197 0.6 804 2.5 
Total 299,543 51.7 102,306 17.7 101,589 17.5 76,054 13.1 
Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA. A = Reversion, negotiation & expropriation; B = 
Asistencia Social; C = Precarious tenure (inc. arrimado lojano); and, D = Huasipungo. * Hectares of land. 
** % of total land redistribution by province and total.  
The second group (B) comprises state-owned land that was administered by 
the AS in the decades prior to the introduction of the LRAC. The land included 
within this category accounted for 18% of the total amount of land redistributed 
in the highland region. While the redistribution of AS haciendas created spaces 
for indigenous peoples to obtain land, opportunities were restricted to a 
relatively small number of families and communities (see Chapter 5). 
Opportunities for indigenous peoples to secure state-owned land were further 
limited by the fact the entire stock of AS land was seemingly not redistributed 
via the IERAC. While the unreliability of the data caution against drawing firm 
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 Chiriboga (1984a) reports a similar pattern between 1964 and 1984 (see Chapter 2). 
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conclusions, the figures suggest around 30,547 hectares of land were not 
redistributed by the time agrarian reform drew to a close in 1994 (see Table 8.4 
below).
235
  
Table 8.4 –Asistencia Social land redistributed via agrarian reform, 
Highland Ecuador, 1964-1994 
Estimated stock 
(hectares   
Redistributed via agrarian reform  
(hectares)         
Not redistributed 
(hectares)  
<1964 1964>1979 1980>1994 1964>1994 1964>1994 
132,853 71,033 31,273 102,306 30,547 
Source: My own elaboration based on CIDA (1965) p. 112 & IERAC-INDA.   
The third group (C) includes land redistributed through the dissolution of 
arrimado lojano after the introduction of the LRAC and the eradication of other 
semi-feudal practices after the introduction of the LATPA. The land accounted 
for 18% of the total amount of land redistributed in the highland region. The 
majority of the land within this category was redistributed to mestizo peasants in 
the province of Loja.  However, the redistribution of land worked under other 
forms of precarious tenure is likely to have provided some opportunities for 
indigenous peoples to secure land, especially in provinces with high indigenous 
densities (e.g. Chimborazo, Cotopaxi).  
The fourth group (D) comprises land redistributed through the dissolution of 
huasipungo after the introduction of the LRAC (see Table 8.5 below). The land 
accounted for 13.1% of the total amount of land redistributed, the bulk of which 
was transferred to indigenous families in the opening years of reform (see 
Chapter 5). The important points to recall about the redistribution of the land are 
as follows. First, the relocation of indigenous families to less productive land 
was widespread i.e. the conversion of usufruct rights into private property rights 
was rarely one-to-one. Second, the circumvention of the law was commonplace, 
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 The estimated amount of non-redistributed land reported in Table 8.4 appears conservative. 
MAG-IERAC-JUNAPLA recorded the total stock of AS hacienda land as 169,767 hectares in 
the mid-1970s. (1977 p. 51) The agencies also reported “ex-Asistencia Social landholdings exist 
which still have not been transferred to the IERAC.” (1977 p. 51) There are a number of possible 
explanations for the apparent failure of the IERAC to redistribute all of the land. The 
unreliability and inconsistency of the data may account for some of the shortfall. It is possible, 
for example, that redistributed land was not registered by IERAC or was listed under another 
category (e.g. huasipungo, arrimado lojano). However, administrative and data issues are 
unlikely to account for the entire shortfall. The time IERAC took to divide, redistribute and sell 
AS estates and the value of the most productive sections of the haciendas suggest some of the 
land was sold to landowning elites, agricultural enterprises, or urban developers rather than 
redistributed to indigenous and mestizo peasant families and communities.   
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providing landowning elites with opportunities to evict huasipungueros or sell 
them land on the market i.e. numerous indigenous families were excluded from 
this component of land redistribution. Third, agrarian reform legislation 
provided no explicit provisions for the arrimado-apegado population which 
meant members of indigenous families were often integrated into the plots of 
land ex-huasipungueros.   
Table 8.5 – Redistribution of huasipungos,  Highland Ecuador, 1964-1994 
Province Huasipungo   
(hectares) 
Recipients Average  size     
(hectares) 
Proportion of 
total* (%)  
Azuay 5,287 1,431 3.69 6.9 
Bolivar 3,022 314 9.62 3.9 
Cañar 3,301 912 3.62 4.3 
Carchi 2,195 916 2.40 2.9 
Chimborazo 18,677 4,441 4.21 24.6 
Cotopaxi 19,758 4,054 4.87 26.0 
Imbabura 6,069 1,275 4.76 8.0 
Loja 0 0 0.00 0.0 
Pichincha 16,941 4,937 3.43 22.3 
Tungurahua 804 560 1.44 1.1 
Total 76,054 18,840 4.04 100.0 
Source: My own elaboration based on IERAC-INDA. * Proportion of total amount of huasipungo land 
redistributed between 1964 and 1994.  
5. Summary: empirical and theoretical findings 
This chapter has examined the redistribution of land to indigenous families and 
communities between 1979 and 1994 and provided a global overview of land 
redistribution between 1964 and 1994. In doing so, the chapter has shed new 
light on the role indigenous peoples performed in land reform and the overall 
reach of the reform in the highland region (see Chapter 2).  
The analysis has shown that the redistribution of land continued to proceed at 
a slow pace and the opportunities for indigenous peoples to secure land steadily 
diminished as land reform drew to a close. Continuing the trend that emerged in 
the 1960s and 1970s (see Chapter 5), indigenous organisation and mobilisation 
was required to obtain the relatively small amount of land that was redistributed 
i.e. social pressure was required to activate the redistribution component of land 
reform.  Cross-referencing land reform and sociodemographic data indicated the 
impact of land redistribution was greatest in regions with high indigenous 
population densities. The relationship was stronger for the period 1964-1994 
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than 1964-1979 suggesting indigenous peoples were relatively successful in 
securing land in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the analysis has also indicated 
the total stock of land redistributed to indigenous peoples between 1964 and 
1994 included a significant amount of páramo. The significant role páramo 
performed within land redistribution provides basic support for the assertion that 
agrarian reform provided few opportunities for indigenous families and 
communities to secure productive land. The geographic distribution of 
redistributed privately owned land lends additional support to this claim, with 
opportunities to secure land greatest in regions where capitalist modernisation 
was weakest and land quality was poorest.  
The difficulties indigenous peoples experienced attempting to secure land and 
the relatively small amount of land redistributed illustrates why the CAN 
attempted to include indigenous and peasant representatives within the bodies 
charged with the task of assessing expropriation claims, eliminating the CRA, 
creating mechanisms to lower the cost of securing redistributed land, and 
ensuring land reform received adequate funding (see Chapter 7). The analysis 
provides further support for the claim that careful consideration must be paid to 
the structure and implementation of decommodification mechanisms when 
investigating social, political and economic issues through a Polanyian lens.  
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Chapter Nine 
Land markets and indigenous peoples: activation and development 
(1979-1994) 
1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the opportunities that emerged for indigenous peoples to 
secure land through the market under structural adjustment and neoliberalism. 
Remaining within the activation/development framework elaborated in Chapter 
6, the analysis shows that collective organisation and mobilisation continued to 
create spaces for indigenous peoples to obtain land in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
boundaries of price-making land markets shifted as increased amounts of land 
came under indigenous control in some zones. In other areas, however, 
indigenous families and communities remained locked-out of the markets for the 
most productive land.  
The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. The second section 
estimates the basic parameters of land markets in the highland region, using the 
2000 agricultural census as an indicator of the land tenure structure. The 
activation and development of land markets under structural adjustment and 
neoliberalism are then analysed in section three. The fourth section examines the 
FEPP assisted land purchase scheme which performed an important role in the 
activation of land markets in the early 1990s. The distribution of land in the 
highland region in 2000 is analysed in section five. The principal empirical and 
theoretical findings of the chapter are summarised in section six. 
2. The parameters of land markets in the 1980s and 1990s 
The 2000 agricultural census provides an indication of the basic parameters of 
land markets in the 1990s and 2000s.
236
 The analysis is hampered by the 
inclusion of the western lowland zones within the highland region and the lack 
of detail in certain areas.
237
  Nevertheless, examining the census data enables the 
evolution of land tenure to be investigated, the overriding land structure to be 
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 To avoid repetition the sources used for this section are INEC (1974a), INEC (2000a), and 
INEC (2000b) unless otherwise stated.  
237
 The 2000 census also only reports a limited amount of data at the regional level (see Chapter 
1). The small differences between the regional totals reported in Table 9.1 and 9.3 are due to 
differences in the underlying data. The 2000 census also includes less detail than the 1974 census 
in other areas (e.g. communal land).  
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examined, and the potential reach of price-making land markets to be 
approximated. 
Table 9.1 – Land tenure, Highland Ecuador, 2000  
Land tenure Units % Land surface 
(hectares) 
% 
Privately owned  409,346 72.1 3,544,508 74.4 
Communal and cooperative 5,119 0.9 286,892 6.0 
Occupied  19,087 3.4 157,989 3.5 
Rented, sharecropped and al partir 12,146 2.1 68,220 1.4 
Mixed and other 121,921 21.5 704,722 14.8 
Total 567,619 100.0 4,762,331 100.0 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (2000a) & INEC (2000b).  
The data indicate three quarters of the agricultural land surface (3,544,508 
hectares) was under full private ownership (i.e. titled land under individual or 
corporate ownership) (see Table 9.1 above). Landowners within the “privately 
owned” category had the right to determine the use and transfer of land. The 
category includes landowners who secured land through the family and the 
market as well as beneficiaries of land reform and colonisation. The inclusion of 
the latter group reflected the liberalisation of the reform sector after the 
introduction of the LDA in 1994 (i.e. beneficiaries of agrarian reform no longer 
required authorisation to transfer land). The potential for the development of 
price-making markets was greatest within this bracket.   
Comparing the 1974 and 2000 censuses suggests the potential boundaries of 
price-making land markets broadened from the 1970s onwards, continuing the 
trend that emerged between 1954 and 1974 (see Chapter 6). The number of 
privately owned titled landholdings increased from 212,808 to 409,346 and the 
proportion of privately owned land rose from 66% to 74%.
238
 Numerous factors 
contributed to the relative and absolute  increase: i) the basic protection agrarian 
reform legislation granted private property rights (especially after 1979);  ii) the 
continued fragmentation of small, medium, and large-sized landholdings; iii) the 
absolute growth of the rural population; iv) the colonisation of the western 
lowland regions of highland provinces; v) the proliferation of private property 
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 The 1974 and 2000 censuses both use the UPA as a measure of agricultural units which 
makes the comparison between the two censuses more reliable than the comparison between the 
1954 and 1974 censuses (see Chapters 1 and 6). However, comparisons between the 1974 and 
2000 censuses remain approximations of actual changes in the agrarian structure between the 
two time periods.  
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titles through agrarian reform and land titling programmes; and, vi) the division 
of communally owned land.  
The last factor was reflected in the amount of land under communal control in 
2000. Whereas 311,948 hectares (10% of the agricultural land surface) was 
included within this bracket in 1974, 286,892 hectares (6% of the agricultural 
land surface) was incorporated in 2000.  The land included in this category 
comprised community and cooperative owned land which was worked 
collectively or allocated to community members to work individually (i.e. 
comuneros). A variety of factors contributed to the division and reduction of 
communally owned land between the two censuses: i) the overriding pressure on 
land; (Haney & Haney 1987 pp. 126-30) (Martínez 2002a) ii) the ambiguity and 
limitations of the legal framework related to the division of communal land 
(especially before 1994); (Martínez 1998 pp. 180-81) (Navas 1998) iii) the 
pressure state agencies exerted on some communities to fragment communal 
land (e.g. páramo); (Forster 1989) iv) the desire of some peasants to divide 
communally owned land, especially cooperatives. (Interview 1)  (Navarro et al. 
1996)  
The remaining 25% of units and 20% of land were classified under 
“occupied”, “rented, sharecropped and al partir”, and “mixed and other”. The 
first category includes land worked by producers who did not have legal title to 
the land or who worked it without a formal rental agreement. The bracket 
includes producers who worked land with or without the consent of the 
landowner. The second category includes land worked by producers with written 
or verbal rental contracts as well as farmers with sharecropping or al partir 
agreements. Studies undertaken in the sierra suggest al partir was more 
prevalent in the region than indicated by the census, highlighting the informal 
mechanisms peasants continued to use to access land (e.g. FAO 1995; Lentz 
1997; Martínez 2002a). The third bracket includes land that fell outside of the 
other categories (e.g. land that was in the process of being transferred through 
inheritance) as well as land that was under more than one of the tenures covered 
by the census. The “occupied” and “mixed and other” categories provide an 
indication of the amount of land that was untitled and outside the reach of formal 
land markets at the time of the census. (FAO 2002) (Interviews 12 and 15) 
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Indigenous customs and practices continued to limit the expansion of price-
making markets in the highland region (see Chapter 6). That is, in most cases 
economic and non-economic (e.g. cultural, social, spiritual) factors continued to 
influence the value and distribution of land and the circulation of land between 
indigenous peoples continued to follow a different logic to the distribution of 
land within price-making markets. The non-commodity view of land remained 
widespread. “For indigenous people”, Maria Andrade of CONAIE noted in the 
wake of the 1990 levantamiento, “land is not a business but life and the resource 
upon which we totally depend.” (Hoy 09/08/1990 p. A-3) Echoing this view, the 
FAO note “the influence of indigenous culture and networks of traditional 
knowledge that govern land transactions in the zone.” (2002 p. 5) The agency 
also reports that: 
“In indigenous-peasant communities…the indigenous view of land 
influences the transactions that they undertake, they do not only 
involve the exchange of one good for another, but exchanges within 
the community and only between members of the same community.” 
(1995 p. 44)  
The pattern of exchanges the FAO describes was not universal (nor immutable). 
It was, however, broadly representative of the transactions that took place within 
the community I interviewed in Guamote, Chimborazo. (Interview 10) Land 
sales and purchases had occurred when members of the community migrated but 
only between members of community and land was most commonly acquired 
through inheritance.  
The next section traces the activation and development of land markets under 
structural adjustment and neoliberalism. The FEPP assisted land purchase 
programme, which performed an important role in widening indigenous access 
to land in the early 1990s, is then examined.  
3. The activation and development of land markets under structural 
adjustment and neoliberalism 
The extent to which land markets opened-up (via activation) and closed-down 
(via development) spaces for indigenous families and communities to obtain 
land continued to be contested under structural adjustment and neoliberalism. 
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Indigenous organisation and mobilisation continued to perform a crucial role in 
widening opportunities to purchase land. On a local level, the pressure 
indigenous families and communities exerted on landowners increased the 
amount of land available on the market. Thurner notes, for example, that land 
sales to indigenous peasants in Colta, Chimborazo were “the indirect result of 
the social and political threats of invasion and expropriation made concrete in 
labor indiscipline and other forms of local resistance.”  (1989 p. 29) On a wider 
level, the 1990 levantamiento also encouraged landowners to sell land. The FAO 
indicate, for example, the uptick in land market activity registered in Colta, 
Chimborazo in 1990 and 1991 was the result of the “conmoción” (“upset”) 
caused by the uprising. (1995 p. 51) (Interviews 1 and 2) However, at the same 
time, the economic downturn of the 1980s and 1990s complicated indigenous 
efforts to purchase land. On the one hand, the rise in unemployment and decline 
in real wages limited the possibilities of indigenous peoples rechanneling 
income secured from wage labour into land purchases. On the other hand, the 
increase in the price of agricultural inputs and the decline in demand for 
agricultural produce reduced the income indigenous families obtained from 
market production.  
The impact of the economic slump on the income of indigenous families was 
compounded by the escalation of land prices in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
FENOC capture the general panorama facing indigenous and mestizo peasants in 
the early 1980s: 
“Taking advantage of the scarcity of productive land, the 
understandable desire of the peasant to acquire land, and the 
demographic pressure in certain minifundistas zones, landowners 
have attempted to sell their land at the precio de oro [price of 
gold]…The growing disequilibrium between the price of land and the 
income of the minifundistas progressively diminishes the possibilities 
of a transformation”. (1984 p. 9) 
Land prices were driven higher by a variety of factors. First, the basic imbalance 
between supply and demand, which was exacerbated by the continued growth of 
the rural population, placed general upward pressure on prices in most regions. 
(Forster 1989 p.119) (Thurner 1989 pp. 21-30)  (Korovkin 1997 p. 36) (Martínez 
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2002 p. 99) Second, the LRA-LFDA strengthened the protection of private 
property rights which increased the value of privately owned land. (Thurner 
1989 p. 24) (Vallejo 1996 p. 180) Third, urbanisation drove land prices higher in 
areas close to expanding towns and cities. (RO 48 1981) (Rosero 1990 pp. 61-2) 
Fourth, the speculative tactics of landowning elites escalated prices in some 
cases. (Korovkin 1997 p. 36) Fifth, the entrance of new economic actors and the 
development of the agroexport sector triggered rapid price increases in certain 
zones.  
The development of the agroexport sector in the sierra had a significant 
impact on land markets. Historically, as noted in Chapter 3, agricultural export 
production in Ecuador was concentrated on the coast while production for the 
domestic market was concentrated in the sierra. The geographic boundaries of 
the agroexport sector expanded in the 1980s and 1990s as the state encouraged 
the production of “non-traditional” exports (e.g. flowers). Revisions to land 
reform legislation also lent support to agroexporters. The increased protection 
the LRA-LFDA granted private property rights gave national and international 
investors greater assurances over their investments. The introduction of the LDA 
then provided additional impetus by liberalising the market for privately owned 
land and practically eliminating the possibility of expropriation.
239
  
The promotion of agroexport, the liberalisation of trade and capital flows, and 
the modification of agrarian legislation had a particularly big impact in the 
northern provinces of Cotopaxi, Imbabura, and Pichincha. Highly productive 
land, favourable climatic conditions, and good links with overseas markets made 
the region particularly appealing for agroexporters. The starkest illustration of 
the development of primary export production in the zone was the proliferation 
of flower producers. The northern highland region is located on the equator at 
zero or close-to-zero degrees latitude which makes it particularly well suited to 
the production of flowers (e.g. roses). Its topographical characteristics are also 
favourable, especially at lower elevations where the land is flatter, temperature 
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 Tellingly, the limited grounds the law provides for expropriation is noted by the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative. (USTR 2010 p. 31) 
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higher, and irrigation securer.
240
 Flower producers started to operate in the zone 
in the late 1980s as national and overseas investors realised the productive 
potential of the zone at a time when barriers to investment were falling and 
overseas markets were expanding.
241
 (FAO 1995 pp. 62-3) Having grown at a 
moderate pace in the 1980s, flower production expanded at a rapid rate in the 
1990s, becoming one of Ecuador’s most important export sectors by the end of 
the decade. (Korovkin 2004 pp. 87-91) Elevated land prices and considerable 
capital requirements precluded the involvement of peasant producers within the 
sector.  The only spaces open to peasant families to engage in flower production 
were as wage labourers on plantations. (Korovkin 2004 pp. 91-106) (Rubio 2008 
pp. 67-9)  
 
Flower plantations fitted within the pattern of rationalised medium-sized 
landholdings that developed under land reform (see Figure 9.1 above). While 
some covered over 200 hectares, most ranged between 10 and 50 hectares. 
Crucially, the land incorporated into the flower sector was among the most 
productive in the highland region. The basic pattern that emerged was the 
monopolisation of the most productive land located at lower elevations by 
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 The considerable demands flower production places on water supplies was one of the factors 
that stimulated the growth of CODEMIA, a powerful indigenous-peasant water committee that 
regulates irrigation water in and around the canton of Cayambe. (Interview 5) 
241
 Background information on the flower sector is derived from the informal discussions I had 
with flower producers in the canton of Cayambe in 2010 and 2011 as well as interviews with 
indigenous organisations, NGOs, and water committees in the region. (Interviews 3, 4, 5, 8 & 
16) Personal communication with Emilia Ferraro, who undertook ethnographic research in the 
zone in the 1990s, is also drawn upon.  
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Figure 9.1 - Flower plantations by size of landholding,          
Cotopaxi, Imbabura & Pichincha, 2000  
Source: My own elaboration. based on INEC (2000a).   
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flower producers (national, overseas and international enterprises) and the 
restriction of peasant producers (mestizo and indigenous) to the most 
marginalised zones at higher elevations. Summarising the situation in the canton 
of Cayambe in 1988-1992, the FAO provide a glimpse of the structure of the 
land market in zones where flower plantations emerged:   
“On one side there is the good quality land to which only national 
and overseas enterprises have access…The other market is the 
peasant market for land of medium and low quality…Because of 
elevated prices the peasants cannot purchase land in the valley and 
the businesspeople are not interested in the land at higher elevations”. 
(FAO 1995 p. 54) 
The interviews I conducted with indigenous organisations and NGOs in the 
canton of Cayambe support the pattern the FAO describe.  (Interviews 3, 4, 5, 8 
and 16) César Andrango, the president of the Unión de Organizaciones 
Populares de Ayora y Cayambe (UNOPAC), a second-grade indigenous-peasant 
organisation that comprises fifteen communities and 950 families, said the 
expansion of the flower sector had “totally changed the mode of living” in the 
region. (Interview 16) Members of nearly every family his organisation 
represented worked in the flower plantations at some stage. The shift saw 
indigenous men and women working Monday to Saturday in the flower 
plantations and having little time to spend working the land.
242
 The price of land 
in the region limited the possibilities of plantation workers redirecting income 
into land purchases. Fernanda Vallejo, who worked in Cayambe for the rural 
development NGO, Heifer, also emphasised that it was impossible for peasant 
producers to purchase land in the most productive zones due to elevated prices. 
(Interview 4) Fausto Sanaguano, who had previously worked in Cayambe for the 
same NGO, reported a similar situation.  (Interview 3) In short, the development 
of price-making markets and the expansion of primary export production closed-
down the spaces open to indigenous peoples to acquire land.  
The next section examines the role the religious NGO, FEPP, performed in 
the activation of land markets. The section shows opportunities to secure land 
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 See Korovkin (2004), Rubio (2008) and Deere & Contreras (2011). 
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through the activation of market remained but the development of price-making 
markets limited the possibilities of indigenous peoples securing land in certain 
zones.  
4. FEPP assisted land purchase scheme (1990-1995) 
The Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP), an Ecuadorian NGO 
linked to progressive sectors of the Catholic Church, performed a significant role 
in the activation of the land market in the wake of the 1990 levantamiento.
243
 In 
economic terms, the NGO transformed latent indigenous demand into effective 
demand by providing interest bearing loans to communities and organisations to 
purchase land on the market.  
The FEPP first supported indigenous efforts to obtain land in the 1970s when 
it provided a loan to indigenous families and communities to purchase land after 
their attempt to secure land via the IERAC had failed.
244
 The NGO continued to 
provide loans on an ad hoc basis in the 1980s before considerably expanded its 
operations in the early 1990s. The shift was a result of four interrelated factors: i) 
the availability of fresh revenue streams to fund the operation of the NGO; ii) the 
continuation of the land crisis; iii) the inability of peasants to secure land via the 
market or the IERAC; and, iv) the upsurge in rural conflicts, unrest, and protests.  
The importance of the 1990 levantamiento was emphasised during the 
interview I conducted with Alonso Vallejo, the General Coordinator of the FEPP, 
Chimborazo. (Interview 1)  The basic impact was twofold. On the one hand, the 
uprising increased the desire of the NGO and the Borja government to respond to 
the demands of indigenous families and communities (even if, as explained in the 
previous chapter, the state response was weak). On the other hand, the 
levantamiento encouraged landowning elites to offer land for sale on the market 
in the face of heightened indigenous pressure. The impact of the mobilisation 
was particularly strong in the province of Chimborazo. For example, according 
to Vallejo, the uprising persuaded landowning elites in Guamote to sell the 
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 My analysis of FEPP is restricted to the role the NGO performed in supporting indigenous 
attempts to secure land between 1990 and 1995. Refer to Navarro et al. (1996) and Bretón 
(2008a) for wider analyses of the NGO. See also Cervone (2012).  
244
 Cervone indicates the FEPP supported indigenous efforts to secure land via agrarian reform in 
1970s. (2012 p. 76) However, the NGO did not perform a formal role within the reform. 
(Interview 1) 
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remaining sectors of their haciendas. (Interview 1) Luis Alberto Tuaza, who 
worked and conducted research in Guamote in the 1990s, also told me 
indigenous pressure was a crucial factor behind the decision of landowning elites 
to sell the remnants of their haciendas. (Interview 2) The FAO, as noted, also 
report a notable increase in land market activity as a result of the levantamiento 
in the neighbouring canton of Colta. (1995 p. 51) Echoing developments in 1972 
and 1973, indigenous mobilisation therefore activated land markets in the 
province and increased the spaces open to indigenous peoples to secure land.  
The fresh revenue streams the FEPP obtained to expand its loan operations 
sprung from a controversial source:  the Catholic Church’s purchase of tranches 
of Ecuador’s overseas debt on international bond markets.245 (Navarro et al. 1996 
pp. 51-63) The Conferencia Episcopal Ecuatoriana (CEE) reached agreement 
with the Borja government in late 1990 (i.e. some months after the 
levantamiento) to purchase $US28 million of discounted overseas debt, convert 
the debt into sucres (via the Banco Central del Ecuador), and invest the funds 
into social programmes in Ecuador. (Navarro et al. 1996 pp. 280-1) One of the 
five schemes agreed between the government, the CEE and the BCE was the 
Programa Nacional de Servicios Integrados las Comunidades Indígenas. The 
programme comprised two elements: i) the provision of loans to indigenous, 
mestizo and afroecuatoriano peasants to purchase and legalise land;
246
 and, ii) the 
funding of rural development programmes. The initiative received the equivalent 
of US$10 million of funding, US$6 million of which was channelled into the 
purchase and legalisation of land and US$4 million was dedicated to rural 
development programmes. (Navarro et al. 1996 p. 62) 
The framework that underpinned the land purchase scheme was formulated by 
the FEPP, CEE, and BCE. However, the Cámaras de Agricultura and the 
CONAIE influenced the design of the framework. The former channelled its 
demands through the BCE, the agency with ultimate responsible for overseeing 
the use of the funds channelled through the FEPP.  Landowning elites also 
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 The source of funding was controversial as religious activists and social movements had 
questioned the legitimacy of Ecuador’s overseas debt, the bulk of which was accumulated by the 
military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s.  
246
 On a national level, the FEPP classify 61% of the total number of people who purchased land 
through the programme as indigenous. (Vallejo 1996 p. 167) The proportion of indigenous 
beneficiaries is likely to have been higher in the highland region than in the country as a whole.  
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visited the offices of FEPP to seek assurances over the programme. (Navarro et 
al. 1996 p. 74) The pressure the Cámaras de Agricultura exerted over the BCE 
was reflected in the inclusion of the following clauses with the regulatory 
framework: i) the proscription of the use of funds to purchase land that had been 
“invaded” in the previous five years;247 ii) the “free and voluntary” agreement of 
the landowner to sell land; and iii) the purchase of land at “market prices without 
subsidies”. (Navarro et al. 1996 p. 73) The latter directed its demands through 
the FEPP and the CEE. The pressure the CONAIE exerted over the FEPP and the 
CEE was reflected in the inclusion of the leaders of the movement within the 
Comisión Tripartita, the committee charged with the task of overseeing and 
promoting the land purchase initiative. (Navarro et al. 1996 pp. 85-6)    
Notwithstanding the influence of the CONAIE, the FEPP programme 
resembled the “willing seller” “willing buyer” market-based agrarian reform 
model in which the distribution of land is channelled through the market and the 
principal role of the state is to provide loans to fund the purchase of land at 
market prices.  (Deininger & Binswanger 1999) (World Bank 2003) The FEPP 
effectively performed the role of the state within the assisted purchase scheme. 
Three basic conditions were set on the provision of loans: i) loans were only 
granted to communities, associations, cooperatives etc. (i.e. not to individuals); 
ii) recipients of credit were obligated to work the land collectively until the loan 
was repaid; and, iii) borrowers were obliged to contribute at least 10% of the cost 
of the land purchase. (Interview 1) (Navarro et al. 1996 pp. 89-93) 
Table 9.2 (below) summarises the FEPP assisted land purchases undertaken 
in the highland region between April 1990 and July 1995. The programme 
involved 5,204 people who purchased a combined total of 27,232 hectares of 
land.  Indicative of the broad shift from state to private initiatives under 
neoliberalism, the total surpassed the total amount of land that was redistributed 
in the highland region via IERAC between 1990 and 1994. (IERAC-INDA)  
The following sections explain the principal features and outcomes of the 
programme. 
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  This restriction was subsequently relaxed, according to the FEPP. (Navarro et al. 1996 p. 65)  
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Table 9.2 – FEPP assisted land purchases, Highland Ecuador,                                       
April 1990- July 1995 
Province Organisations Members %* Land 
(hectares) 
%** Average  
(hectares) 
Azuay 2 215 4.13 17 0.06 0.08 
Bolivar 19 725 13.93 1,963 7.21 2.71 
Cañar 6 126 2.42 474 1.74 3.76 
Chimborazo 51 1,896 36.43 17,258 63.37 9.10 
Cotopaxi 20 975 18.74 5,028 18.46 5.16 
Imbabura 9 716 13.76 976 3.58 1.36 
Loja 4 37 0.71 60 0.22 1.62 
Pichincha 4 110 2.11 1,326 4.87 12.05 
Tungurahua 10 404 7.76 130 0.48 0.32 
Total 125 5,204 100.00 27,232 100.00 5.23 
Source: My own elaboration based on Navarro et al. (1996) p. 142. * Members as % of total. ** Land as 
% of total.  
4.1. Land prices  
Land purchases were based on market prices. This position, which was insisted 
on by the Cámaras de Agricultura, was seemingly unquestioned by the FEPP. 
(Interview 1) The distribution of land at market prices was not a radical departure 
from land reform as landowning elites generally secured high prices for land sold 
to the IERAC which the institute then typically passed on to the recipients of the 
land (see Chapters 5 and 8). The approach was a significant departure from the 
CAN proposal, however, which placed the economic burden of the distribution 
of land on the state rather than the recipient (see Chapter 7).  
While the FEPP accepted the market price of land as the barometer of the real 
value of land, the NGO negotiated with landowners to lower prices. The peasant 
organisations involved in the land purchase also performed a role within the 
negotiation process. The FEPP claim that on a national level an average 
reduction in price of 28% was secured through negotiation. (Vallejo 1996 p. 177) 
However, the discount the FEPP report was between the “offered” and “agreed” 
price which does not equate to a reduction between the “market” and “agreed” 
price. That is, landowners are likely to have started negotiations by demanding 
above market prices. The largest discounts were secured in Chimborazo, 
suggesting prices were driven down by the strength of indigenous organisation 
and scale of indigenous mobilisation, factors which also enabled indigenous 
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families and communities to secure more favourable outcomes under land reform 
in some cases (see Chapter 5).  
Notwithstanding the price reductions secured through negotiation, the 
acceptance of the market price of land as the real value of land had a number of 
important consequences. First, the operation of the programme took place in the 
context of rapidly increasing land prices which enabled landowners to receive 
elevated prices. (Vallejo 1996 p. 179) The scheme therefore provided a useful 
mechanism for landowners to realise substantial returns on land. Second, the 
programme appeared to place upward pressure on land prices which increased 
the cost of purchasing land through the scheme and complicated the attempts of 
indigenous peoples not involved in the programme to obtain land. (Rosero 1990 
pp. 61-2) (FAO 1995) (Vallejo 1996 pp. 180-1) Third, the economic cost of 
securing land through the scheme was elevated. This dissuaded some indigenous 
families and communities from participating in the programme and saddled 
indigenous peoples who did participated with relatively high levels of debt. 
(Vallejo 1996 p. 169) The FEPP, according to Vallejo, experienced very few 
problems with the repayment of loans and many peasant organisations cleared 
their debts in advance of schedule. (Interview 1) Bretón claims, however, the 
elevated cost of land sometimes reduced the viability and cohesion of the 
organisations as members temporarily migrated to secure income to repay loans.  
(2008b pp. 194-6) Fourth, the price of land limited the reach of the programme, 
especially in the northern sierra where the most productive and best situated land 
was located. Indicating the impact of export agriculture on land markets, Vallejo 
notes:  
“In the province of Imbabura the land market is restricted and the prices 
are very high, especially in areas where enterprises that produce flowers 
for export markets are located.” (1996 p. 164)  
The average price of a hectare of land purchased through the FEPP office 
responsible for the province of Imbabura (where flower exporters operated) was 
over four times higher than the average price of land purchased through the 
branch responsible for the province of Chimborazo. (Vallejo 1996 p. 178) The 
former purchased 3.3% of the total amount of land acquired through the FEPP 
programme but absorbed 11.5% of total funds whereas the latter purchased 
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59.4% of land but absorbed 54% of funds.
248
 (Vallejo 1996 p. 161) Consistent 
with the activation/development framework, the development of price-making 
markets limited the opportunities for indigenous peoples to obtain land in certain 
zones.   
4.2. Land characteristics  
The FEPP paid considerable attention to the type of land purchased through the 
scheme, something the IERAC failed to do in most cases. (Interview 1) The 
credit indigenous peoples were able to access through the scheme enabled them 
to purchase good quality land in some cases. For example, Alonso Vallejo 
explained to me that the sections of the haciendas landowning elites decided to 
sell in Guamote were located along the floor of the valley. Indigenous families 
and communities, who owned marginal land located at higher elevations, had 
spent decades “looking down” on the most productive land in the zone. 
(Interview 1) The credit supplied by the FEPP enabled them to secure the land 
that had remained out their reach under land reform.  Nevertheless, as indicated 
above, on a broader level the bulk of the most productive and the best situated 
land in the highland region remained out of the programme’s reach.249 Nearly 
two-thirds of the land purchased through the scheme was located in Chimborazo 
where the land was typically less productive and more remote than land located 
in Cotopaxi, Imbabura and Pichincha (see Table 9.2). Echoing land reform, the 
land channelled through the FEPP also included a significant amount of páramo. 
For example, the majority of 10,950 hectares of land acquired by Asociación de 
Pomacocho in the canton of Alausí, Chimborazo comprised páramo. (Interview 
1) (Vallejo 1996 p. 152) (Rosero 1990 p. 84) This single transaction accounted 
for over one-third of the total amount of land purchased through the scheme in 
the highland region between 1990 and 1995. The acquisition skews upward the 
average amount of land purchased per participant (see Table 9.2).  If the 
transaction is stripped out of the Chimborazo data the average amount of land 
purchased in the province drops from 9.1 to 3.4 hectares. The bulk of 
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 The figures reported by Vallejo relate to the entire FEPP programme and do not therefore 
correspond with the data reported in Table 9.2.   
249
 On a national level, FEPP classified 10% of the land purchased through the scheme as “highly 
productive” and 61% as “medium quality”. (Vallejo 1996 p. 193)  
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transactions yielded an average of less than 3 hectares per person, with 
participants securing an average of less than 1 hectare in numerous cases.  
4.3. Land purchases and land conflicts 
The land purchased through the scheme was concentrated in provinces where the 
intensity of land conflicts was greatest (e.g. Chimborazo, Cotopaxi), illustrating 
the basic link between the expansion of FEPP operations and the upsurge in rural 
unrest in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  (Interview 1) (Vallejo 1996 p. 215) The 
programme had the greatest impact resolving or easing conflicts in the province 
of Chimborazo. (Bretón 2008a p. 196) The basic reason for the level of success 
in the province was twofold: indigenous pressure was strongest and the price of 
the land was within the reach of the programme. While the FEPP had less 
success in resolving land conflicts elsewhere in the highlands, the organisation 
still had an important impact in alleviating or eliminating tensions in certain 
cases. (Vallejo 1996 p. 146 & p. 154) In stark contrast to land reform, the speed 
with which the FEPP negotiated sales and provided loans contributed to the 
alleviation of tensions and conflicts. 
4.4. Communal versus individual ownership 
Collective organisation was a precondition for participating in the scheme. 
(Interview 1) Credit was only extended to communities, associations or 
cooperatives and involvement in the scheme was conditioned on agreement to 
work the land collectively until the loans had been repaid.  Resembling the 
pattern that emerged under land reform (see Chapters 5 and 8), the FEPP note 
that new organisations were sometimes formed within existing communities as 
not all of the members of the community were willing or able to participate in the 
scheme. (Vallejo 1996 p. 169) The amount and price of land were obstacles for 
the wider involvement of indigenous peoples within the programme. 
Generational factors were also important as older members of communities 
tended not to participate in the scheme. (Vallejo 1996 p. 169) (Martínez 1998 pp. 
178-9) The FEPP programme therefore contributed to the diversification of local-
level indigenous organisations (see Chapter 7). (Zamosc 1995) (Vallejo 1996 pp. 
145-57) (Martínez 1998 pp. 177-83) 
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Virtually all of the organisations involved in the scheme divided the land 
purchased through the FEPP after repaying their loans. (Vallejo 1996 pp. 209-11) 
(Interview 1) While this clearly surprised the FEPP, the move was in keeping 
with the basic pattern of indigenous landownership in the highlands, which, with 
the exception of páramo, was concentrated at the individual-family rather than 
community level. Inheritance was given as one of the principal reasons for 
wanting to divide land, indicating the importance of the family unit. Notably, the 
FEPP do not report that decisions to fragment land were based on the desire to 
sell the land on the market. (Vallejo 1996 pp. 209-11) Alonso Vallejo 
emphasised this point during our discussion. (Interview 1) He told me that in 
“very few cases” had indigenous peoples decided to sell land and when land was 
exchanged it had been transferred to family members - a “brother” or “uncle” - 
not to “outsiders”. Tellingly, according to Vallejo, decisions to fragment land 
were based on the desire of indigenous peoples to work the land in accordance 
with “their own forms of organisation” which were based on the “principles of 
reciprocity and redistribution”. (Interview 1) Thus, following the pattern 
described in this thesis, the land tended to remain under indigenous control and 
worked under traditional customs and practices after being purchased on the 
market.  
To sum up, the FEPP performed a crucial role in activating land markets and 
opening spaces for indigenous peoples to secure land. Indigenous pressure and 
mobilisation was a crucial factor behind the decision of the FEPP to introduce 
the assisted land purchase scheme and the decisions of landowning elites to offer 
sale on the market. However, the best quality land in the sierra remained out of 
the reach of most participants i.e. the development of price-making land markets 
closed down spaces for indigenous peoples to secure land, especially in zones 
where agroexporters operated. Notwithstanding price reductions secured through 
negotiation, the use of the market price as a barometer for the real value of land 
limited the reach of the programme and ensured the cost of accessing land for 
participants in the scheme was elevated. 
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5. Land distribution in the 1980s and 1990s 
The land distribution experienced significant changes in the sierra in the 1980s 
and 1990s.
250
  The best indicator of the land distribution during this period is the 
2000 agricultural census which was the first national survey published after the 
1974 census. Comparing the two censuses suggests the three basic trends that 
emerged between 1954 and 1974 continued between 1974 and 2000 (see Chapter 
6). That is, i) smallholdings proliferated and fragmented; ii) medium-size farms 
expanded; and iii) extensive landholdings declined.  This section examines these 
trends in greater detail. The positions indigenous peoples occupied within the 
land distribution is then approximated.  
 
1) The proliferation and fragmentation of minifundia. Continuing the trend 
that started to accelerate after the introduction of the LRAC, the total 
number of minifundia increased sharply between 1974 and 2000, rising 
by 73% or 179,259 units (see Figure 9.2 above). The gap between the 
growth of units and the expansion of land within this range points 
towards the continued fragmentation of smallholdings. This was reflected 
in the continued growth in the number of units at the bottom end of the 
minifundia spectrum: units of less than 1 hectare (i.e. microfundia) 
increased by nearly 100%. The expansion in the number of smallholdings 
varied markedly across the highlands (see Figure 9.3 below). Growth 
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 To avoid repetition the sources used for this section are INEC (1974a), INEC (2000a), and 
INEC (2000b) unless otherwise stated.  
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Figure 9.2 - Changes in landholdings by size  between         
1974 & 2000,  Highland Ecuador 
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Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1974a) & INEC (2000a). 
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was strongest in the central and northern provinces of Chimborazo, 
Cotopaxi, and Tungurahua. The analysis presented in the previous 
chapter indicates land reform continued to perform a direct role in 
proliferating landholdings at the lower end of the land distribution. The 
average amount of land participants in the FEPP scheme secured suggest 
the majority of them also remained within the lower tier of the land 
distribution, although some may have secured sufficient land to climb 
into higher brackets. On a general level, the data indicate that neither 
redistributive nor market mechanisms provided widespread opportunities 
for peasant producers to climb the land distribution ladder.  
 
2) The proliferation of medium-size landholdings. Units within the middle 
range of the land distribution also experienced rapid growth (see Figure 
9.2 above). Numerous factors influenced this expansion, including the 
subdivision of traditional haciendas, the colonisation of the western 
lowland regions of highland provinces, and the emergence of medium-
size capitalist enterprises orientated towards the export market (e.g. 
flower producers - see Figure 9.1). Growth of medium-sized units was 
registered across the highlands. However, the relative amount of 
landholdings varied significantly across the highlands. The provinces 
with the highest proportion of landholdings within the 10 > 49.9 range – 
the group which experienced the strongest growth between 1974 and 
2000 - were Bolivar, Carchi, Loja, and Pichincha (see Figure 9.4 below). 
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Figure 9.3 - Growth of smallholdings between 1974 & 2000, 
Highland Ecuador 
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Source: My own elaboration based on  INEC (1974a) & INEC (2000a).  
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3) The decline of extensive landholdings. The number of extensive (200 > 
hectares) units increased between 1974 and 2000 but at a much slower 
rate than small and medium-sized units (see Figure 9.2 above).
251
 
Furthermore, the total amount of land within this range increased at a 
slower rate than the total number of units which indicated the further 
fragmentation of extensive landholdings. The highest concentration of 
units within this range was in the provinces of Pichincha and Loja where 
large tracts of land were utilised for cattle and dairy farming. A 
significant number of landholdings within the 200 > hectare range 
comprised páramo, especially in the central highland provinces of 
Pichincha, Cotopaxi, Chimborazo and Tungurahua.  
5.1. Estimating the positions indigenous peoples occupied within the land 
distribution 
The overriding distribution of land in the sierra remained highly polarised in 
2000. Table 9.3 (below) shows minifundia accounted for 75% of units and 12% 
of the land surface while extensive landholdings accounted for 0.4% of units and 
30% of the land surface.
252
 However, the expansion of medium-sized 
landholdings increased the importance of units in the middle range of the land 
distribution, especially within the 10 > 49.99 hectare bracket.  
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 The largest land distribution bracket in the 2000 agricultural census is 200 > hectares.  
252
 As a proportion of landholdings above 200 hectares were under communal control in 2000, 
the census data accentuates the actual degree of land inequality in the highland region.  
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Figure 9.4 - Medium-size landholdings, Highland Ecuador, 
2000 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (2000a). Medium-size landholdings (10>49.99 
hectares) as % of total landholdings.  
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Table 9.3 - Land distribution, Highland Ecuador, 2000 
Farm size 
(hectares) 
Units Units as % of 
total 
Land surface 
(hectares) 
Land as % of 
total 
< 1 217,000 38.23 83,106 1.75 
1 > 1.99 92,144 16.23 122,115 2.56 
2 > 2.99 56,735 10.00 131,477 2.76 
3 > 4.99 59,926 10.56 222,152 4.66 
< 5 425,805 75.02 558,850 11.73 
5 > 9.99 58,417 10.29 394,197 8.28 
10 > 19.99 38,744 6.83 517,097 10.86 
20 > 49.99 29,376 5.18 873,843 18.35 
50 > 99.99 9,612 1.69 632,864 13.29 
100 > 199.99 3,517 0.62 453,614 9.53 
200 >  2,152 0.38 1,331,862 27.97 
Total 567,622 100.00 4,762,331 100.00 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (2000a). 
The analysis presented in this and previous chapters suggest the bulk of 
highland indigenous families remained at the lower end of the land distribution 
(i.e. < 5 hectares). The 2000 census provides support for this claim. Table 9.4 
(below) shows the prevalence of microfundia (< 1 hectare) and minifundia (< 5 
hectares) in each of the highland provinces in 1974 and 2000. The data illustrate 
a number of important points. First, minifundia were the most common form of 
landholding in each of the highland provinces, ranging from 51% of 
landholdings in Loja to 94% of units in Tungurahua. Second, the prevalence of 
minifundia exhibited a high degree of continuity between 1974 and 2000. Only 
in Loja, where the proportion of smallholdings dropped from 70% to 51%, was 
the relative size of the minifundia population significantly reduced. Third, 
minifundia were more prevalent in provinces with high indigenous population 
densities.
253
 The positive relationship between the two variables is illustrated in 
Figure 9.5 (below). The relationship was strongest in the provinces of Cañar, 
Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, and Imbabura but also discernible in Tungurahua. 
Conversely, as Figure 9.6 (below) illustrates, medium-size landholdings (10 > 
49.99 hectares) were more prevalent in regions with low indigenous densities. 
The two patterns are reflected in the growth of small and medium size 
landholdings reported in Figures 9.3 and 9.4 (i.e. growth of small/medium 
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 Using different data and classifications, Zamosc reports a similar pattern between indigenous 
peoples and smallholdings in the highland region in the early 1990s (see Chapter 2). (1995 pp. 
33-43)
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landholdings was higher/lower in regions with high/low indigenous population 
densities). Taken together, the data suggest the number of indigenous peoples 
involved in the expansion of small/medium landholdings was higher/lower than 
for the rural population as whole. Fourth, the relative size of the microfundia 
population increased in most provinces as well as in the region as a whole. The 
prevalence of microfundia was also above average in each of the provinces with 
high indigenous population densities. The picture painted by the census was 
reflected in the interviews I conducted with indigenous organisations and 
communities. For example, the average size of the landholding of the 950 
families integrated into the UNOPAC was around one hectare, according to the 
president of the organisation, César Andrango. (Interview 16)  
Table 9.4 – Prevalence of minifundia & microfundia,                                                    
Highland Ecuador, 1974 & 2000 
Province IPD* Minifundia**   
(<5 hectares) 
Microfundia ** 
(<1 hectare) 
1974 2000 1974 2000 
Azuay 24.94 87.04 80.42 45.82 43.03 
Bolivar 27.86 66.34 57.80 23.23 15.06 
Cañar 55.31 83.06 77.78 47.65 37.29 
Carchi 0.00 62.58 55.77 14.22 15.38 
Chimborazo 66.35 80.86 83.62 28.41 36.98 
Cotopaxi 53.06 77.32 80.11 33.60 37.15 
Imbabura 49.38 79.44 77.63 40.13 49.03 
Loja 6.05 70.06 51.43 18.99 15.30 
Pichincha 42.57 60.86 64.69 29.27 39.41 
Tungurahua 37.64 92.73 94.04 53.02 66.03 
Average 37.85 73.39 72.33 30.80 35.47 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1974a), INEC (2000a) & Zamosc (1995). * IPD = 
Indigenous Population Density - API population as % of total rural population of the province/region in 
1990.  (Zamosc 1995 p. 23) ** Landholdings of <1 and <5 hectares as % of total landholdings.  
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Combining the land redistribution data reported in the previous chapter and 
microfundia-minifundia data presented in this chapter indicates land 
redistribution tended to have a larger impact in provinces with high indigenous 
population densities and microfundia-minifundia tended to be more prevalent in 
provinces with high indigenous population densities.  Using a different dataset 
and time period, Zamosc reports a similar pattern. (1995 pp. 37-43) He notes 
“despite the greater reach of agrarian reform the predominantly indigenous 
cantons are characterised by a greater degree of minifundismo”. (1995 p. 42) 
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Minifundia as % of total landholdings** 
Figure 9.5 - Minifundia & indigenous peoples,                         
Highland Ecuador, 2000 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (2000a) & Zamosc (1995).* Population of 
“predominantly indigenous area” as % of total rural population of the province in 1990 (Zamosc 
1995 p. 23).  ** Minifundia = < 5 hectares.  
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Medium-size landholdings as % of total units** 
Figure 9.6 - Medium-size landholdings & indigenous peoples, 
Highland Ecuador, 2000 
Source: My own elaboration based on  INEC (2000a) & Zamosc (1995).* Population of 
“predominantly indigenous area” as % of total rural population of the province in 1990 (Zamosc 1995 
p. 23).  **Medium-size landholdings = 10>49.9 hectares.  
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However, Zamosc overlooks one of the reasons for the positive relationship 
between the two variables: the significant amounts of páramo redistributed in 
zones with high indigenous population densities (see Chapters 5 and 8). On an 
aggregate level land redistribution in these zones tended to comprise small plots 
of cultivable land and large tracts of páramo. One of the consequences of this 
was the increased pressure indigenous families and communities placed on the 
páramo in the decades after the introduction of agrarian reform.
254
 The 
overexploitation of the high-altitude grassland caused environmental damage 
and social conflicts in some cases. For example, the overuse of the páramo for 
pasture in Cayambe threatened irrigation and created tensions between 
communities. The second-grade indigenous and peasant organisation UNOPAC 
ultimately persuaded a number of local communities to limit the grazing of 
animals but the members of the communities were unable to secure increased 
access to land at lower elevations to compensate for the reduced use of the 
grassland which placed significant strain on their economic strategies. 
(Interviews 16 and 17)  
The 2000 census provides another indication of the position highland 
indigenous peoples occupied in the land distribution. The census includes data 
which indicate the ethnicity of agricultural producers (see Table 9.5 below).
255
 
Unfortunately, the data are at the producer rather than landowner level (i.e. the 
producer was not necessarily the landowner). Nevertheless, they provide a 
further indication of indigenous access to land. A number of points can be drawn 
from the table. First, the data show indigenous producers were more 
concentrated at the lower end of the land distribution (< 5 hectares) than all 
ethnic groups combined. Excluding Cañar, that was the case in each of the 
highland provinces as well as in the region as a whole. Second, the average size 
of landholdings worked by indigenous producers was smaller than the average 
size of landholdings worked by all ethnic groups combined.  With the exception 
of Carchi (where only a handful of producers who self-identified as indigenous 
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 On changes in the use and control of páramo see Mena et al. 2011. See also Forster (1989), 
Navas (1998) and Martínez (2002a).   
255
 The ethnicity of the producer was determined by self-identification on the day of the census.  
(Interview 13) The census includes the following ethnic groups: “mestizo”, “white”, 
“indigenous”, “black”, and “other”. For simplicity, the data reported in this section are restricted 
to indigenous producers and total producers. 
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were located), that was the case in all of the highland provinces as well as in the 
region. Third, indigenous engagement in agriculture varied across the highlands 
but was elevated in most provinces and in the region as whole. Indigenous 
producers accounted for 28% of all agricultural producers while indigenous 
peoples accounted for around 15% of the total rural population.
256
 On a basic 
level the data point towards the important role land and agriculture performed 
within the economic strategies of highland indigenous families at the turn of the 
millennium, reinforcing the points made throughout this thesis about the strong, 
though by no means fixed, links between indigenous peoples and land.  
Table 9.5 – Indigenous producers by size of landholding,                 
Highland Ecuador, 2000 
Province IPD* Indigenous 
producers 
** (%) 
Total 
minifundia 
producers 
*** (%) 
Indigenous 
minifundia 
producers 
*** (%) 
Total     
average 
landholding 
(hectares) 
Indigenous 
average 
landholding 
(hectares) 
Azuay 24.94 10.31 81.54 88.05 6.15 4.83 
Bolivar 27.86 23.58 58.19 66.47 9.56 7.27 
Cañar 55.31 30.36 79.08 78.15 6.78 6.60 
Carchi 0.00 0.50 55.34 71.74 13.01 15.35 
Chimborazo 66.35 65.94 82.95 85.91 5.33 4.12 
Cotopaxi 53.06 36.17 80.28 80.62 6.31 5.58 
Imbabura 49.38 45.28 76.14 88.05 8.81 3.29 
Loja 6.05 6.88 50.25 68.48 15.72 7.82 
Pichincha 42.57 19.13 64.50 75.27 13.43 6.38 
Tungurahua 37.64 24.14 93.45 95.09 2.78 3.08 
Average 37.85 27.57 75.15 83.59 8.04 4.81 
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (2000a) & Zamosc (1995).  * IPD = Indigenous Population 
Density - API population as % of total rural population of the province/region in 1990. Zamosc (1995) p. 
23. ** Indigenous producers as % of total producers within province. *** Landholdings of less than 5 
hectares as % of total landholdings within province.  
To sum up, the three broad patterns of land distribution that emerged in the 
decade before and after the start of land reform continued in the 1980s and 
1990s. That is, a) the proliferation and fragmentation of minifundia advanced; b) 
the number of medium-size units increased; and c) the relative abundance of 
extensive landholdings decreased. By cross-referencing demographic and census 
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 Table 9.5 shows a strong relationship between the indigenous producer data and the 
indigenous population density figures calculated by Zamosc. The largest difference is evident in 
Pichincha, a province, which, as previously explained, Zamosc adjusts to exclude subtropical 
regions in the western lowlands (see Chapter 3). The general strength of the relationship between 
the two variables indicates the robustness of Zamosc’s data and provides support for their use 
within this thesis. 
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data, the section has indicated the bulk of highland indigenous producers 
remained at the bottom end of the land distribution (< 5 hectares). The findings 
are consistent with the analysis presented in this investigation i.e. neither 
redistributive nor market mechanisms provided widespread opportunities for 
highland indigenous peoples to climb the land distribution ladder. However, 
these broad patterns should not be overstated. The diversity of the indigenous 
population and the agrarian structure of the highlands and the unevenness of the 
socioeconomic transformation the region experienced between the 1960s and 
2000s caution against making sweeping generalisations. In some cases, the 
combination of land reform, the activation of land markets, and the 
strengthening of indigenous organisation enabled indigenous families to obtain 
sufficient land to pursue sustainable economic strategies based on agricultural 
production alone. In some areas (e.g. Guamote, Chimborazo) the combination of 
these factors enabled indigenous peoples to take ultimate control of the majority, 
if not all, of the agricultural land surface. The ultimate success indigenous 
peoples enjoyed in gaining control of land in these regions suggest the 
“economic defeat” Korovkin described in the 1990s was called too early (see 
Chapter 2). (1997 p. 27)  However, this was only possible through decades of 
resistance, struggle, and sacrifice which took their toll on the land and the 
environment (e.g. through the overexploitation of páramo), the socioeconomic 
development of indigenous peoples (e.g. through the economic resources 
committed to secure land), and the cohesion of indigenous communities (e.g. 
through temporary and permanent migration). Moreover, numerous indigenous 
families were left with marginal plots of land in areas where the bulk of the land 
came under indigenous control as well as in zones where landowning elites and 
capitalist enterprises monopolised the bulk of the best quality land. Thousands of 
others “exited” the rural economy completely under land reform, migrating 
permanently to towns and cities rather than facing a precarious and uncertain 
future in the countryside.
257
 Finally and crucially, the land distribution data 
points toward the generalisation of minifundia and microfundia across the sierra, 
illustrating the precarious situation the bulk of highland peasants faced at the 
turn of the millennium irrespective of their ethnic group.   
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 See Kramkowski (1989) for insight into indigenous peoples and families who permanently 
migrated in the wake of land reform.  
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6. Summary: empirical and theoretical findings 
This chapter has analysed the relationship between land markets and indigenous 
peoples and the evolution of land tenure and land distribution in the highland 
region in the 1980s and 1990s. The analysis has cast new light on indigenous 
struggles over land and the position indigenous peoples occupied in the land 
distribution at the turn of the millennium (see Chapter 2). The chapter has also 
provided a fresh perspective on the operations of the FEPP in the early 1990s.  
Remaining within the activation/development concept, the chapter has argued 
the activation of land markets opened-up spaces for indigenous peoples to obtain 
land while the development of price-making markets closed them down. In 
broad terms, the pattern that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s was similar to the 
one that developed in the 1960s and 1970s:  activation provided opportunities 
for indigenous peoples to secure marginal land while development restricted 
possibilities for them to obtain productive land. However, the FEPP assisted land 
purchase scheme provided a small number of indigenous peoples with 
opportunities to obtain land that had previously been out of their reach. The 
chapter explained that the direct and indirect pressure indigenous peoples 
exerted over landowners performed a crucial role in this process. The boundaries 
of price-making land markets shifted as increased amounts of land came under 
indigenous control in certain areas (e.g. Guamote). However, in other areas (e.g. 
Cayambe) indigenous peoples remained locked-out of the market for the most 
productive land. The emergence of the agroexport sector restricted the 
opportunities for indigenous peoples to secure land, especially in the northern 
highland provinces of Cotopaxi, Pichincha, and Imbabura. However, the 
development of price-making land markets had already severely restricted the 
possibilities of them securing land in these zones. Viewed in historical 
perspective, the agroexport sector therefore reinforced an existing trend rather 
than established a completely new pattern of land concentration. The general 
panorama supports Polanyi’s assertion that markets are contested spaces which 
are constructed and reconstructed by social and political as well as economic 
forces.  
The analysis of the 2000 agricultural census data has provided support for the 
claim that neither redistributive nor market mechanisms provided widespread 
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opportunities for indigenous peoples and families to climb the land distribution 
ladder.  Minifundia were more prevalent in provinces with high indigenous 
population densities while medium-size landholdings were more widespread in 
provinces with low indigenous densities. The analysis of the ethnic breakdown 
of agricultural producers recorded in the 2000 census pointed in the same 
direction. However, the data also indicated the general prevalence of minifundia 
across the highland region, showing the challenges the bulk of the rural poor 
faced regardless of their ethnic group.  
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusion: empirical, theoretical and methodological dimensions 
1. Introduction 
This thesis started by claiming Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” concept 
provides a rich framework to examine the change in the direction of economic 
policies in Latin America over the last three decades. This was not a novel 
claim. Numerous authors have drawn on the double movement to explore social, 
political and economic change in Latin America since the 1980s.  The originality 
of the central argument I have developed in this thesis stemmed from adopting a 
radical reading of the concept and asking whether it was possible that some of 
the double movements witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s were phases in longer-
term struggles linked to the role markets perform within societies.  I set out to 
answer this question by examining the evolution of land reform, land markets, 
and indigenous mobilisation in Highland Ecuador between 1964 and 1994. The 
short answer this thesis has provided is the double movement around land 
reform, land markets, and indigenous peoples started in the 1960s and 1970s and 
continued in the 1980s and 1990s. Commodification and decommodification and 
movement and countermovement took place simultaneously throughout the 
period under investigation. Within the limits of a single case-study, the thesis 
has provided support for reading the double movement as an essential 
contradiction in modern capitalist societies.  
This chapter summarises the main empirical and theoretical insights that have 
emerged out of the analysis and considers the implications of the research for 
contemporary developments in Ecuador. The next section summarises the 
contributions the thesis has made to our understanding of Ecuadorian land 
reform. The fresh light the thesis has shed on the use and reading of the double 
movement is then explained in section three. The last section examines current 
struggles over land and natural resources in Ecuador, concentrating on the 
attempt of indigenous and peasant movements to bring the use and distribution 
of land under social control. The section provides insight into one of the issues 
discussed in Chapter 1: the extent to which contemporary Latin American states 
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have alleviated tensions related to the commodification of land. Possible avenues 
of future research are signposted throughout the chapter.  
2. Land reform, land markets and indigenous mobilisation  
The empirical investigation has focused on Ecuadorian land reform. The topic 
has received a significant amount of scholarly attention (see Chapter 2). The 
fresh insights I have provided have come from examining the whole cycle of 
land reform, focusing on the relationship between land reform and indigenous 
peoples, and investigating land reform through a Polanyian lens. This section 
summarises the main contributions the thesis has made to the existing literature, 
focusing on the key points related to i) the political struggle over the design of 
land reform; ii) the implementation of land reform, and iii) the relationship 
between land reform and land markets.  
2.1. Political struggles over the design of land reform 
The thesis has provided fresh insight into indigenous and peasant attempts to 
transform land reform (Chapters 4 and 7). Within a Polanyian framework, I 
characterised this struggle as an attempt to increase the social control of land in 
the face of escalating commodification. Efforts to create room for indigenous 
and peasant participation in agencies responsible for regulating and 
redistributing land and to expand and protect communal ownership of land were 
integral parts of this struggle. This element of the study involved the 
examination of the land reform proposals tabled by the FURA (1973) and CAN 
(1993) and the comparative analysis of these proposals and the laws introduced 
by the Rodriguez Lara (1972-76) and Duran Ballén (1992-96) governments. The 
analysis provided fresh insight into the imprint indigenous and peasant 
movements were able to leave on the legislation: considerable differences 
between the proposals and the laws were apparent on both occasions. The 
findings indicate the state’s failure to take seriously indigenous and peasant 
demands from the 1960s to the 1990s. I placed the 1990 and 1994 indigenous 
levantamientos within this long-term political struggle. In doing so, I 
emphasised the “offensive” as opposed to “defensive” character of the 
mobilisations. This interpretation contrasts with authors who characterise the 
uprisings as reactions to structural adjustment and neoliberal reform (e.g. 
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Zamosc 1994; Silva 2009). The offensive/defensive framework I developed to 
examine indigenous struggles over land might provide researchers with a useful 
tool to gauge the political implications of the demands of social movements in 
Ecuador and elsewhere in Latin America.  
In addition, the thesis has provided a detailed analysis of the content and 
evolution of land reform legislation between 1964 and 1994, casting new light 
on the political struggle over reform and the orientation and design of the 
programme (Chapters 4 and 7).  
2.2. Implementation of land reform 
The thesis has provided greater clarity on land redistribution in the highland 
region and the role indigenous peoples performed in the process (Chapters 5 and 
8). The investigation involved the detailed analysis of official land reform data 
and the close examination of a number of local-level cases between 1964 and 
1994.  
One of the principal points that emerged from the analysis was sustained and 
concerted indigenous pressure was required to activate the redistributive 
component of land reform. The limited amount of land incorporated into the 
reform sector in the highland region provides some support for Dorner’s claim 
that as “long as people whose interests are threatened by reform hold power, 
they will find ways of assuring that legislation will be ineffective.” (1992 p. 35) 
But the thesis has also demonstrated that collective organisation and 
mobilisation can force states to implement legislation and reduce imbalances in 
economic and political power. On a wider level, the findings support Borras and 
McKinley’s observation that the impact of land reforms often hinges on the 
degree of pressure exerted from below. (2006 p. 3)  
The analysis has provided a clearer picture of the land redistributed in the 
highland region between 1964 and 1994, plugging the gap in the literature for a 
detailed long-range study. The thesis illustrated that the resettlement and 
eviction of huasipungueros was widespread. The data indicated the average plot 
huasipungueros received was around four hectares but the lack of provisions 
provided for arrimados-apegados meant the land was often subdivided within 
families (Chapters 5 and 6). The analysis of the redistribution of huasipungos 
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showed land reform performed a direct role in proliferating minifundia in the 
highland region. The thesis illustrated the redistribution of state-owned land was 
a contested process. Conflicts revolved around the price of the land, the 
agricultural cooperatives formed through land reform, and the lack of land 
available for redistribution (Chapter 5). The lack of space open to indigenous 
families and communities to secure state-owned land was accentuated by the 
apparent failure of IERAC to redistribute the entire stock of land between 1964 
and 1994 (Chapter 8).  
Cross-referencing land reform and sociodemographic data revealed a positive 
link between the amount of land redistributed and the density of the indigenous 
population at the provincial level (Chapter 8). Using a different dataset, time 
period and methodology, Zamosc (1995) reports a similar finding at the canton 
level. I have provided additional insight into the issue by indicating the types of 
land redistributed to indigenous peoples. The total stock of land included a 
significant amount of páramo which helps explain why the amount of land 
redistributed and the prevalence of minifundia were both elevated in indigenous 
zones.  The prominent role páramo performed in land reform also partly 
explains the increase in the average amount of land redistributed in the 1960s 
and 1970s that other studies have reported (e.g. Cosse 1980; Barsky 1988) (see 
Chapter 2).  
2.3. Land reform and land markets 
Within a Polanyian framework, I examined the commodification and 
decommodification dimensions of the land reform legislation introduced 
between 1964 and 1994 (Chapters 4 and 7). The analysis indicated that the 
decommodification potential of land reform was at its greatest in 1973 when the 
LRA was introduced. Legislative changes introduced in the 1970s and 1980s 
then eroded the decommodification potential of the law. Overall the thesis 
argued land reform performed a larger role in commodifying rather than 
decommodifying land. The investigation of the evolution of land markets under 
land reform supported this claim (Chapters 6 and 9).  
Drawing on Polanyi’s insights, I developed a new concept to examine the 
relationship between land markets and indigenous peoples. The concept draws 
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an analytical line between the “activation” and “development” of land markets. 
The former refers to the occasional engagement of actors within markets to 
secure land while the latter relates to the establishment of price-making markets 
through which the continuous circulation of land between actors is channelled. 
The analysis indicated the activation of markets opened-up spaces for 
indigenous peoples to secure land while the development of price-making 
markets closed them down (Chapters 6 and 9). Collective organisation and 
mobilisation increased the opportunities for indigenous peoples to purchase land 
and reshaped the boundaries of price-making markets. The upsurge in 
indigenous mobilisation in the early 1970s and early 1990s highlighted this 
point. I placed the FEPP assisted land purchase scheme, which emerged in the 
wake of the 1990 levantamiento, within this long-term struggle to obtain land 
(Chapter 9). The analysis showed the programme supported indigenous efforts to 
purchase land, especially in the central highland province of Chimborazo. It met 
with less success in the northern highland provinces, however, where the 
expansion of the agroexport sector complicated indigenous attempts to secure 
land.  This highlighted the general problems the development of agroexport 
sector created for indigenous peoples in these zones. 
My analysis of the links between indigenous peoples and land markets 
supports Polanyi’s claim that markets are contested spaces which are constructed 
and reconstructed through social and political as well as economic forces.  The 
factors behind the (re) construction of land markets elsewhere in Latin America 
is one area that warrants further investigation.
258
 The influence of remittance 
flows on land market activity and development is one possible topic.
259
 The role 
indigenous and peasant organisation and mobilisation have performed in 
widening spaces for the rural poor to purchase land is another potentially fruitful 
area of research.  
The thesis has also illustrated the benefits of investigating land reform 
through a Polanyian lens. The approach brings issues related to land regulation 
and land markets to the fore and cautions against reducing land reform to land 
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 See Topik (1999) for a Polanyian summary of historical research undertaken in Latin America 
on market construction.   
259
 I found anecdotal evidence of remittance flows influencing the dynamics of land markets 
during visits to Cañar and Saraguro between 2009 and 2011.  
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redistribution. The redistribution of land is crucial but the regulation of the use, 
ownership and exchange of land is also vital. The approach suggests, for 
example, a regulatory component should be added to the redistributive land 
reform model Borras and McKinley propose. (2006 pp. 3-4) Extending Polanyi, 
the thesis has also demonstrated careful consideration must be paid to the 
structure of the agencies charged with the task of regulating and redistributing 
land. Without overlooking the possibility of co-optation, creating space for 
social movements to influence the design and implementation of land reform has 
the potential to strengthen regulation, increase redistribution, and decrease social 
and political tensions.
260
   
In addition to the insights the thesis has provided into these three areas, it has 
also cast new light on the distribution of land in the highland region (Chapters 6 
and 9). Clarity has been provided on the changes the land distribution 
experienced from the 1950s onwards. The principal patterns that have been 
noted elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Breton 2008b) have been explored in 
greater depth. The thesis has also offered a broad indication of the positions 
indigenous peoples occupied in the land distribution at the turn of the 
millennium (Chapter 9). Cross-referencing census and sociodemographic data 
indicated minifundia were more prevalent in provinces with high indigenous 
densities. The examination of the ethnic breakdown of the agricultural producers 
reported in the 2000 agricultural census pointed in the same direction. The data 
also indicated the level of indigenous engagement in agriculture, illustrating the 
crucial role land continued to perform in the economic strategies of indigenous 
peoples.  
3. The reading and use of the double movement  
One of the theoretical aims of this study was to illustrate the merits of reading 
the double movement as an essential contradiction in capitalist societies. This 
interpretation sees capitalism evolve through a continuous and simultaneous 
process of commodification and decommodification, movement and 
countermovement (Chapter 1).  The evolution of land reform, land markets and 
indigenous mobilisation between 1964 and 1994 provides basic support for this 
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  See Borras (2007) pp. 68-79 and Bretón & Kay (2007) pp. 120-1. 
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reading. The indigenous countermovement that emerged in the 1960s failed to 
convert its vision of land reform into law but performed a crucial role in 
expanding the opportunities for indigenous peoples to obtain land through 
market and redistributive mechanisms. Casting historical events in this light 
suggests the rolling back of neoliberal reforms will not be sufficient to appease 
countermovements and conflicts over fictitious commodification will remain 
prominent features of the political landscape unless more radical steps are taken 
(Section 4 below).  
The support I have provided for a radical reading of the double movement is 
based on the empirical investigation of an important but specific sector of the 
Ecuadorian economy (i.e. land), a particular region (i.e. sierra) and a certain 
social group (i.e. indigenous peoples). The limits of the case study and the 
peculiarities of the trajectory of Ecuador’s political economy must be taken into 
account when considering the wider appeal of the reading of the double 
movement this thesis has offered (see Chapter 1). Nevertheless, the study has 
provided a starting point to reconsider double movements in Latin America and 
explore the possible consequences for contemporary social, political and 
economic debates.  
 While lending support to a radical reading of the double movement, the 
thesis also illustrated the failure of the concept to capture the complexity of 
state-society relations. This point has been noted by numerous authors (e.g. 
Levien 2007; Winders 2009; Burawoy 2010). My analysis has highlighted some 
of the challenges countermovements face gaining protections from the market 
and stressed the need to integrate power relations into the double movement 
framework.  The thesis has illustrated the political power indigenous peoples 
accumulated through decades of collective organisation and mobilisation but has 
also indicated the limits of that power. The legislative outcome of the battle over 
the LDA in 1994 provided the clearest illustration of this point (Chapter 7). The 
CONAIE forced the Durán Ballén government to revise the legislation but failed 
to convert its vision of land reform into law. While this investigation focused on 
domestic actors and events, the role foreign forces (e.g. USAID, IDB) performed 
in the conflict shows countermovements have to overcome external as well as 
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internal obstacles to increase decommodification (Chapters 2 and 7).
261
  The 
barriers countermovements face in Latin America and the tactics they have 
employed to overcome or mitigate them is another topic that warrants further 
investigation.
262
   
One important point that has emerged from this thesis is countermovements 
have a crucial role to perform in the design and implementation of laws and 
policies. Forcing states to introduce measures that promote decommodification 
is one part of a longer and wider struggle. Taking a broader view of the activities 
of countermovements also ensures important gains are not overlooked. While 
indigenous peoples were unable to achieve the legislative outcome they had 
sought, they were able to win important battles on the ground by forcing the 
state to implement land reform and pressuring landowners to sell them land.  
Using the double movement to investigate land reform also indicated the line 
between the two sides of the concept is not as clear empirically as it is 
theoretically. The role traditional highland landowning elites performed in the 
political struggle over land reform in the 1960s and 1970s highlighted this point 
(Chapter 4). They appeared on both sides of the double movement 
simultaneously, resisting commodification on the one hand while opposing 
regulation and redistribution on the other. The point highlights the tensions and 
contradictions that can emerge when exploring social, political and economic 
change through a Polanyian lens.  How these tensions play out empirically and 
what lessons can be learned theoretically is another potentially fruitful area of 
research.  
The thesis has illustrated the benefits of breaking-down the double movement 
into its constituent parts and examining struggles that emerge around specific 
economic issues and involve particular social groups. Following this approach 
has the potential to unearth important struggles that might be overlooked in the 
search for wider conflicts and transformations.  Narrowing the lens of the double 
movement also allows for the careful examination of the commodification and 
decommodification dimensions of laws and policies, both in terms of their 
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 See Robinson (1999) and Stewart (2006) for comments on the constraints transnational and 
global forces place on contemporary countermovements.  
262
 See Levien (2007) for insights from India.  
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design and implementation. The need to take into account implementation - as 
stressed throughout this thesis - is particularly important. Failure to do so can 
lead to the exaggeration of the decommodification potential of laws and policies. 
The analysis of the implementation of decommodification mechanisms and the 
factors that have supported or prevented enforcement (cultural norms, state 
capacity, perceived legitimacy of mechanisms, elite power, social movement 
strength etc.) is another area that merits further investigation. The single or 
comparative case study of specific mechanisms or struggles offers the greatest 
potential for this kind of research.  
Insight has also been provided into the use and interpretation of the “forms of 
integration” concept. Building on the work of other Polanyian scholars (e.g. 
Schaniel & Neale 2000; Sandbrook 2011), I highlighted the importance of not 
attributing normative values to particular forms of integration a priori (e.g 
equity to redistribution). The thesis has argued that if in Polanyi’s framework 
redistribution is understood as “the state gathering goods and redistributing them 
according to individual needs, not according to prices”, land redistribution was 
practically non-existent in the highland region (Chapters 5 and 8). (Topik 2001 
p. 89) The bulk of redistributed land was sold to indigenous peoples and the 
limited amount of land redistributed meant their individual and collective needs 
were rarely met. Moreover, sustained indigenous pressure was required to put 
the redistributive mechanism into practice. Empirical analysis of processes, 
actors and outcomes is required to reveal the impact and character of 
redistributive mechanisms or regimes. Indigenous struggles over land showed 
close attention should be paid to the agencies charged with the task of 
redistribution (and regulation) and the conflicts that emerged around them. 
Indigenous and peasant movements attempted to gain representation within the 
bodies responsible for redistributing and regulating land throughout the period 
under investigation (Chapters 4 and 7). The point, as will be explained below, 
remains central to indigenous and peasant concerns in Ecuador.  
Viewing land reform through a Polanyian lens has also highlighted some 
tensions within the forms of integration framework. The thesis showed that 
redistribution accelerated as well as contained commodification. The role 
redistribution (and reciprocity) perform in supporting and restraining 
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commodification has been widely acknowledged but less attention has been paid 
to the role one form of integration can perform in expanding another.  
4. Implications of the research for contemporary developments in 
Ecuador: countermovements under Rafael Correa 
It was argued in the opening chapter of this thesis that while the changes most 
Latin American governments have introduced over the last decade have been 
generally, if not wholly, successful in preventing the (re) formation of broad-
based countermovements, struggles over the commodification of land have 
remained prominent features of the social, political and economic landscape. 
This section provides support for that claim by briefly examining the conflicts 
that have emerged in Ecuador since Rafael Correa came to power in 2007, 
focusing on the latest attempt of indigenous and peasant movements to bring the 
use and distribution of land under social control. The section starts by sketching 
the principal features of the Correa economic programme, before examining the 
struggles that have emerged around land and natural resources. The section 
finishes by considering some of the implications of recent developments in 
Ecuador for debates over the use and reading of the double movement. 
4.1. The principal features of the Correa economic programme 
Rafael Correa came to power on the back of a decade of social, political, and 
economic disorder.
263
 The president claims the political movement he 
represented at the 2006 presidential elections proposed a “revolution, understood 
as a radical and rapid change in the existing structures of Ecuadorian society”. 
(Correa 2012 p. 90) While the political and economic path Rafael Correa has 
followed has been neither revolutionary nor radical, his governments have 
broken with the neoliberal orthodoxy in a number of directions.  The 2008 
constitution promotes a greater role for the state in regulating and directing the 
economy, managing the use of natural resources, protecting the environment and 
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 Rafael Correa won the 2006 presidential elections in the second round and took office in 
2007. The introduction of a new constitution in 2008 permitted him to compete in two further 
elections (the constitution allows the head of state to seek re-election once). He won both 
elections (2009 and 2013) in the first round. Rafael Correa is precluded from participating in the 
2017 presidential elections but his party, Alianza País, is currently attempting to amend the 
constitution to allow him to seek re-election again and remain in office indefinitely.  
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provisioning public goods.
264
 The partial nationalisation of the oil sector; the 
renegotiation of tranches of Ecuador’s public overseas debt; the strengthening of 
tax collection; and the opening of credit lines with China have bolstered the 
state’s fiscal capacity. Public spending on health, education, development, and 
infrastructure has increased. No attempt has been made to establish universal 
welfare programmes but cash transfers schemes have been enhanced and 
extended. Social security coverage has broadened. Minimum wage hikes have 
contributed to significant real wage increases for formal sector workers. Public 
sector employment has increased as the state has expanded. Free-trade 
agreements have been eschewed and import tariffs have been introduced on 
selected goods to protect domestic industries and bolster the balance-of-
payments. Price controls on a range of agricultural goods have also been 
introduced. Unemployment has declined, inflation has remained subdued, and the 
number of people living in poverty has fallen. In short, regulation and 
redistribution have increased; the state’s role in directing the economy has 
expanded; and, socioeconomic conditions have improved.  
4.2. Wither countermovements?    
Using Silva’s broad barometer, the countermovement that emerged in Ecuador 
under neoliberalism has seemingly achieved its objective.  To recall, he claims 
“dominant protests movements sought to reform neoliberal capitalism, 
demanding a return to the mixed economy and a larger welfare role for the state, 
rather than to replace it with an alternative “socialist” or other model.” (2009 p. 
3, emphasis retained) It is true that under prevailing economic conditions the 
establishment of a model consistent with the one Silva describes has been 
sufficient to prevent the (re) formation of a broad-based countermovement.
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Yet the political and economic model the Correa government has introduced has 
done little to address issues related to land and land related struggles have 
continued unabated (see Table 10.1 below). 
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 Following decades of indigenous pressure, the 2008 constitutional also declares Ecuador a 
plurinational state. To recall, the CONAIE demanded the construction of a plurinational state at 
the 1990 levantamiento (Chapter 7). See Sawyer (1997; 2004), Jameson (2011) and Becker 
(2011; 2012b). 
265
 The work of Karl Polanyi has been cited in the policy statements of Alianza País (e.g.  
Programa del Gobierno, 2013-2017: 35 Propuestas para el Socialismo del Buen Vivir, Alianza 
País p. 71). 
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Table  10.1 – Summary of principal mobilisations related to land, food, 
and natural resources, Ecuador, 2009-2014 
Mobilisation Date Main issue (s) Principal 
organisations 
Policy/legislative 
outcome 
Various protests 
and 
mobilisations 
(marches, 
protests, hunger 
strikes etc.) 
January 
2009 
Introduction of 
Ley de Minera  
Environmental 
organisations 
and CONAIE  
Approval of Ley de 
Minera and 
acceleration of 
large-scale mining 
sites. 
Various 
mobilisations 
(marches, 
protests, 
blockades etc.) 
September 
2009 to 
May 2010 
Proposed 
introduction of 
Ley de Aguas 
CONAIE and 
water 
committees  
Suspension of 
discussions over the 
Ley de Aguas in the 
National Assembly.  
Protest at 
ALBA summit 
in Otavalo 
June 2010 Extractivism, 
exclusion from 
ALBA summit, 
government 
attacks on 
indigenous 
leaders 
CONAIE No outcome. 
Submission of 
the Ley 
Orgánica de 
Tierras y 
Territorios to 
National 
Assembly  
March 
2012 
Ley de Tierras y 
Territorios 
Red Agraria 
Nacional (RAN) 
Proposal accepted. 
Discussions over 
Ley de Tierras 
scheduled to take 
place in National 
Assembly in July 
2014.    
Marcha 
Plurinacional 
por el Agua, la 
Vida,  y la 
Dignidad 
(Zamora 
Chinchipe to 
Quito) 
March  
2012 
Expansion of oil 
and mining 
frontiers, Ley de 
Aguas, Ley de 
Tierras, food 
sovereignty and 
criminalisation of 
social protest. 
CONAIE  Provisional 
agreement reached 
to undertake 
prelegislative 
consultation on Ley 
de Aguas.  
Water protest 
(Quito) and 
Marcha por el 
Agua, la Vida,  
y la Dignidad  
(Zamora 
Chinchipe to 
Quito)  
May-July 
2014  
Expansion of oil 
and mining 
frontiers, Ley de 
Aguas, Ley de 
Tierras, food 
sovereignty and 
criminalisation of 
social protest. 
CONAIE and 
water 
committees 
Ongoing. 
Source: My own elaboration based on local press coverage and personal observation in Ecuador between 
2009 and 2011. 
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Widening land commodification to include natural resources (as Polanyi 
advocates), reveals conflicts around various issues. The extraction of non-
renewable natural resources has been a significant source of contention.
266
 
Increased state control of the oil sector has not seen a reduction in oil 
exploration and exploitation. Rather the government has intensified oil activity 
by opening up new concessions in the southern Amazonian region and planning 
the development of the fields previously integrated into the Yasuní/ITT 
environmental intiative (see Chapter 1). The government has also accelerated the 
development of the mining sector by creating a state-owned mining enterprise, 
ENAMI, and inviting overseas companies to develop medium and large scale 
mining sites in the highland and lowland regions (albeit within a legal 
framework that technically enables the state to secure a relatively large share of 
mining revenues).  Indigenous, peasant and environmental movements have 
resisted extractivism by organising local protests, staging national marches, 
challenging the constitutional basis of extractivist laws and policies, and, in the 
case of Yasuní/ITT, attempting to force a national referendum on the issue (see 
Chapter 1).
267
   
Water has also been a source of tension. The Correa government’s attempt to 
force a new water law through the National Assembly in 2009 and 2010 stalled 
after the CONAIE orchestrated a series of marches, blockades, and protests 
against the proposal. The CONAIE argued the law aimed to increase state 
control of water which threatened the communal practices, customs and 
organisations indigenous and peasant communities use to regulate the resource. 
Following the conclusion of the Marcha Plurinacional por el Agua, la Vida y la 
Dignidad in March 2012 (see Table 10.1), agreements were made between the 
CONAIE and the government to undertake a prelegislative consultation on the 
issue. While the right for indigenous communities to be consulted prior to 
legislative changes which affect their collective rights is enshrined in the 2008 
constitution, indigenous mobilisation was required to put the right into 
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 For critical reflections on extractivism in Ecuador see Acosta (2009a). See also Bebbington 
(2012).  
267
 See, for example, Sigue la pugna por Sur Oriente, La Hora, 05/12/2012, Los indígenas 
comienzan su marcha contra la política minera de Correa, El País, 08/03/2012 and En Quito y 
Cuenca las protestas contra la explotación del Yasuní toman fuerza, El Comercio, 28/08/2013.  
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practice.
268
 Extending one of the arguments developed in this thesis, the struggle 
illustrates the crucial role social movements can perform not only in pressuring 
states to enforce laws and policies but also in forcing them to implement 
international agreements and constitutional declarations.  
The prelegislative consultation, which involved workshops and discussions 
with indigenous and peasant communities, organisations and movements took 
place in 2013 and 2014. The process enabled indigenous and peasant 
communities and movements to influence the legislation. However, the law 
approved in the National Assembly in June 2014 still promotes a greater role for 
the state in the regulation of water.
269
 The legislation creates space for 
indigenous and peasant participation (via the Consejo Intercultural y 
Plurinacional del Agua) but concentrates decision making within state agencies 
(via the Autoridad Unica del Agua and Agencia de Regulación y Control del 
Agua).
270
 While sectors of the indigenous movement and population have 
supported the law, the leadership of CONAIE has stated its intention to contest 
it. The concentration of power within the state and the lack of space provided for 
indigenous representation remain central sources of contention.
271
 One of the 
central lines of conflict over land reform has therefore been evident in the 
struggle over water.  
Land has been a further source of conflict. The Correa regime has pledged to 
oversee a “Revolución Agraria” but has shown little interest in tackling issues 
related to the use, control, and distribution of land.
272
   Land titling has been 
accelerated (SIG Tierras) and land redistribution has taken place in isolated 
cases (Plan Tierras) but little effort has been invested into promoting a new land 
law or stimulating a debate over the role land performs in the economy and 
                                                          
268
 The right is derived from the ILO Convention 169 which Ecuador ratified in 1998. Prior to 
the recent struggle, little effort had been made to put the right into practice. See ILO (2009 p. 
42). 
269
 The law – Ley Orgánica de Recursos Hídricos, Usos y Aprovechamiento del Agua –was 
awaiting approval from President Rafael Correa at the time of completing this thesis (July 2014).  
270
 President Rafael Correa created the Agencia de Regulación y Control del Agua two months 
before the law was approved in the National Assembly. See RO 236 (2014) and Un decreto se 
adelanta a la Ley de Recursos Hídricos, El Comercio, 10/06/2014. 
271
 See, for example, Asamblea aprobó la Ley de Aguas, El Comercio, 24/06/2014 and 
Ecuarunari anticipa que no acatará la nueva norma, El Universo, 26/06/2014. 
272
 See Plan Nacional Para el Buen Vivir: 2009-13 and the Programa del Gobierno 2013-2017: 
35 Propuestas para el Socialismo del Buen Vivir.  See Herrera (2007) and Brassel et al. (2008) 
for contemporary debates over land reform in Ecuador. 
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society. The agrarian policy line the Correa regime has pursued has diverged 
from the 2008 constitution which calls for a more radical change in the direction 
of land policies. The regulation and redistribution of land are key features of the 
agrarian model outlined in the constitution. The concept of “food sovereignty” - 
a framework of policies and practices orientated towards ensuring sustainable 
food sufficiency across society – is at the centre of this model.273 (Art. 281) To 
achieve food sovereignty the constitution declares it will be the responsibility of 
the state “to promote redistributive policies that provide the peasantry with 
access to land, water and other productive resources”. (Art. 281) Food 
sovereignty and land redistribution are therefore seen as two sides of the same 
coin.
274
 The implicit assumption is food sovereignty is impossible within the 
existing distribution of land and state intervention is required to alter the land 
distribution.
275
  
“The state will regulate the use of and access to land…A national 
land fund, established by law, will regulate the equitable access to 
land for campesinos and campesinas…the latifundio and the 
concentration of land are prohibited.” (Art. 282) 
Six years after the constitution was approved, the Correa government has 
failed to introduce the legislation required to put these declarations into practice 
and the LDA, the law introduced at the height of neoliberalism in Ecuador (see 
Chapter 7), remains in effect. The lack of interest the Correa regime has shown 
in tackling issues related to the use, control and distribution of land has been a 
source of frustration for indigenous and peasant movements. Echoing earlier 
episodes of agrarian conflict and debate (see Figure 10.1 below), pressure has 
come from below to expand the regulation and redistribution of land. The 
clearest indication of this came in March 2012 when the Red Agraria Nacional 
(RAN) – a coalition of indigenous and peasant movements – submitted the 
Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de Tierras y Territorios to the National Assembly in 
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 Food sovereignty has been at the centre of the work of the influential transnational peasant 
movement, La Via Campesina. See Clark (2013) and Peña (2013) on food sovereignty in 
Ecuador.  
274
 On the link between land redistribution and food sovereignty see Courville et al. (2006). See 
also United Nations (2010).  
275
  The 2000 agricultural census remains the best indicator of land distribution in Ecuador (see 
Chapter 9).  
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Quito.
276
 (RAN 2012) (Interview 14) A full analysis of the proposal is outside 
the boundaries of this investigation but a cursory glance at some of its principal 
features provides a gauge of the current demands of indigenous and peasant 
movements. The clearest indication of the Polanyian nature of the current 
struggle comes with the explicit demand for the social control of land.  
“The organisations that represent the productores and productoras, 
comunas, communidades, pueblos and nacionalidades, 
afroecuatorianos, and montubios will be represented in the 
implementation of this law on various levels to ensure the efficient 
execution of the regulations. This reflects the fact that land is not a 
commodity subject only to the rule of the market but also to the 
control of society.” 277 (Art. 5 RAN 2012, emphasis added)  
The RAN proposes the establishment of three principal mechanism of social 
control. The first, the Asamblea Plurinacional e Intercultural de Soberanía 
Alimentaria, provides a forum for a broad spectrum of rural actors to discuss and 
propose measures and policies orientated towards the achievement of food 
sovereignty. (Art. 58 RAN 2012) The second, the Fondo Nacional de Tierras, 
regulates the use, control, and distribution of land. (Arts. 65-75 RAN 2012) One 
of its central objectives is “to promote the equitable access to land and adopt 
measures orientated towards preventing the concentration and monopolisation of 
land.” (Art. 67 RAN 2012) The steering committee of the fund includes state 
officials as well as representatives of various sectors of rural society including 
landless workers, afroecuatorianos, indigenous peoples, peasant communities, 
montubios, and female agricultural producers. The third, Comisiones Cantonales 
de Tierras y Territorios, support the implementation of the law at the local level. 
(Arts. 76-77 RAN 2012)  
The RAN therefore follows the FEI (1966-72), the FURA (1972-3), and the 
CAN (1993-4) in attempting to carve out spaces for genuine social involvement 
in the regulation and redistribution of land. However, the RAN proposal 
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 The main peasant organisation within the RAN is the FENOCIN which is affiliated to La Via 
Campesina.  
277
 The Spanish is retained to capture the inclusive spirit of the RAN proposal, particularly the 
explicit reference to female as well as male agricultural producers (“productores” and 
“productoras”). Montubios are coastal peasants and farmers.  
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surpasses previous efforts both in terms of the mechanisms proposed to increase 
social control and the actors involved in the process. For example, the explicit 
inclusion of female representatives within the land fund (as well as the other 
features of the proposal geared towards supporting rural women) is entirely new. 
Other important features of the proposal include upper limits on the size of 
private landholdings; limits on foreign ownership; new social and environmental 
functions of land; expropriation on the grounds of poverty; progressive land 
taxes; and new forms of land tenure.  
To sum up, the proposal aims to increase the decommodification of land and 
create room for the participation of various rural actors in the design and 
implementation of land policies. One important point to stress in relation to the 
argument developed in this thesis is that the RAN proposal is not merely 
attempting to overturn the neoliberal framework but create a new agrarian model 
that includes important measures that have never been established in Ecuador  
i.e. the RAN is primarily “offensive” rather than “defensive” in orientation. 
 
The preceding analysis begs the question why the Correa regime has failed to 
support a new land law and make a more decisive break with the agrarian 
policies of past regimes.
278
 While a full answer to this question is outside the 
boundaries of this investigation, a brief look at some of the factors behind the 
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 A new land law is scheduled to be debated in the National Assembly in July 2014.  
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regime’s stasis sheds some light on the agrarian debate and the obstacles facing 
countermovements in Latin America.    
The Correa regime has had sufficient support within the National Assembly 
to introduce a new land law since the approval of the 2008 constitution which 
suggests other factors have been at play.
279
 The relative weakness of indigenous 
and peasant movements and the complex relationship between the movements 
and the government have been important factors. Rafael Correa came to power 
at a time when the CONAIE was relatively weak. The movement’s brief and 
costly association with the Gutierrez government (2002-5) damaged its 
credibility and created internal divisions. Correa’s arrival sent state-indigenous 
relations into flux.
280
 Whereas the neoliberal economic policies of previous 
regimes provided indigenous movements with a clear point of attack, the 
heterodox policies of the Correa regime have proved harder to contest. The 
policy line the government has followed has won it support from a number of 
indigenous peoples and leaders. Some members of CONAIE have advocated a 
close relationship with the government while others have demanded a hostile 
position. Similar strains have emerged within Pachakutik – the political arm of 
CONAIE which was established in 1996. The government’s use of repressive 
tactics and state propaganda has further weakened indigenous movements (see 
Chapter 1). Cracks have also widened within the broader indigenous and peasant 
movement as other indigenous and peasant organisations have renegotiated their 
relationships with the state. The FENOCIN, which remains the largest cross-
ethnic peasant movement in Ecuador, has maintained relatively cordial relations 
with the government. Divisions between the CONAIE and the FENOCIN have 
precluded full cooperation on important issues. Notably, the RAN includes the 
latter but excludes the former. While the CONAIE has indicated its willingness 
to collaborate with the RAN and has demanded the Correa regimes deliver a 
genuine “Revolución Agraria”, the movement has taken a less active role in 
pushing for a new land law. (Charupi 2012) (CONAIE 2012) To some extent 
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 Alianza País failed to win an absolute majority in the National Assembly at the 2009 elections 
but the government would have been able to count on the support of the MPD and Pachakutik if 
it had attempted to introduce a progressive new land law. The party won an overwhelming 
majority at the 2013 elections. Since then the government has had the potential to introduce 
legislative changes (and constitutional reforms) without cross-party support.  
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 See Ospina Peralta & Lalander (2012) and Becker (2011; 2012a) on relations between the 
Correa government and indigenous movements.  
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this reflects the battles indigenous communities, organisations, and movements 
won in certain areas of the highlands and lowlands during earlier land struggles 
(see Chapters 4 to 9). The complexity of the land situation (e.g. intra-ethnic 
inequalities), the absorption of indigenous labour into the agroexport sector (e.g. 
flower plantations), and the emergence of a new generation of indigenous 
leaders have also contributed to the relative lack of pressure the CONAIE has 
exerted.
281
 The absence of a powerful broad-based indigenous and peasant 
movement capable of exerting significant pressure on the state has enabled the 
government to sidestep issues related to the use, control, and distribution of land, 
avoid serious confrontations with landowning elites and multinational 
corporations, and leave the primary export model broadly intact. The 
concentration of power within the state and the executive has been another 
barrier. Indigenous and peasant demands for the establishment of mechanisms 
that provide genuine space for indigenous and peasant participation are at odds 
with the government’s desire to increase state control of the economy and 
society. The outcome of the current debate will provide an indication of how 
much power the president and the government are willing to cede to social actors 
and movements. The new water law suggests the regime will follow past 
governments and reject indigenous and peasant demands for full involvement in 
the bodies responsible for regulating and redistributing land.  
What light do these struggles shed on debates over the reading and use of the 
double movement?   
On a basic level, the conflicts support Polanyi’s assertion that sectors of 
society will organise and mobilise to prevent or restrict fictitious 
commodification. The RAN proposal provides a clear illustration of this basic 
tendency while resistance to extractive industries lends further support. The 
continuation of struggles linked to land commodification in Ecuador provides 
additional support for reading the double movement as a basic contradiction in 
capitalist societies. While in the context of the global commodity boom the 
Correa regime has been successful in raising living standards, alleviating social 
tensions, and securing electoral support, struggles related to fictitious 
commodification have remained widespread. The analysis presented above, 
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which only provides a basic picture of a complex situation, suggests more 
radical measures will be required to appease countermovements linked to the 
commodification of land.   
The current conjuncture also indicates the benefits of splintering the double 
movement into its constituent parts and investigating narrower struggles over 
commodification. While there is value in examining the possibilities of 
countermovements emerging which have the potential to transform entire 
economies, there is also merit in investigating countermovements which have 
the potential to transform sectors of economies and relations between states and 
societies. Following this approach has the potential to reveal important struggles 
that might be overlooked in the search for transformations of the magnitude 
Polanyi describes.  
Contemporary developments also present some challenges to Polanyi’s 
concepts. The water dispute, as noted in Chapter 1, does not fit neatly within the 
double movement framework. While the struggle shows sectors of society will 
mobilise to protect access to natural resources and preserve traditional customs 
and practices, the central concern for indigenous movements and water 
committees has been the state not the market. Thus one of the solutions to the 
market within the double movement has been one of the problems for 
indigenous peoples.  Indigenous leaders fear the centralisation of decision 
making within state agencies will undermine communal customs, practices and 
organisations and give the state greater potential to allocate water to different 
uses and actors (e.g. mining firms, flower plantations). Manuel Castillo, the 
president of the powerful local-level water committee CODEMIA, voiced many 
of these concerns during the interview I conducted with him in 2010. (Interview 
5) He argued the constitution and international agreements obligated the Correa 
administration to respect and promote communal forms of organisation and 
stated the primary concern of indigenous organisations was the larger role the 
state was expected to perform in the new water regime. Manuel said indigenous 
communities, organisations and movements were fighting to ensure communal 
customs and practices were maintained, respected and promoted. The new law 
responds to some of the concerns indigenous organisations and movements 
raised against the original proposal. However, as explained above, the legislation 
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still promotes greater state control of water. The issue is not that Polanyi does 
not provide the theoretical tools to explore and understand communal customs 
and practices but the interface between the state and community is not clear in 
the double movement framework.
282
 The water conflict shows the bolstering of 
the state has the potential to threaten as well as support communal organisation. 
The relationship between state and communal control of fictitious commodities 
is a topic that demands further investigation.  
The tactics the Correa regime has employed to weaken indigenous 
movements provides further evidence of the failure of the double movement to 
capture the complexity of state-society relations. Clientilism, co-optation, 
repression, and propaganda are some of the weapons the government has 
employed to undermine the attempts of indigenous movements to prevent or 
limit commodification. The prominent role Rafael Correa has performed in the 
political economy also draws attention to issues associated with regimes based 
on state redistribution. While the redistribution of oil revenues has improved 
living conditions for lower and middle income groups, it has also supported the 
centralisation of power within the executive and the state. Providing space for 
genuine social participation in agencies, committees, and institutions responsible 
for regulation and redistribution has the potential to alleviate some of the 
problems associated with the concentration of power.  The extent to which 
reconfiguring the state to provide space for genuine social engagement has the 
power to assuage problems associated with fictitious commodification is another 
area that merits further research. The analysis I have presented in this thesis 
suggests the possibilities of states tackling issues related to commodification 
without sustained and concerted social pressure are very slim indeed.  
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Appendix 2: Administrative map of Ecuador 
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Appendix 3: Economic trends - Ecuador  
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Figure 11.1 - Economically active population, Ecuador,              
1962 & 1974 
Agriculture & fishing Manufacturing
Communal, social & personal services Retail, wholesale & hospitality
Other Construction
Source: My own  elaboration based on INEC (1962) & INEC (1974b).  
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Figure 11.2 - Economic growth & inflation, Ecuador,      
1970-1979 
Real economic growth Consumer price inflation
Source: My own elaboration based on IMF Database.  
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Figure 11.3 - Economically active population, Ecuador,              
1982 & 1990 
Agriculture & fishing Manufacturing
Communal, social & personal services Retail, wholesale & hospitality
Construction Other
Source: My own elaboration based on INEC (1982) & INEC (1990a).  
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Figure 11.4 - Real economic growth, Ecuador, 1970-2000 
Source: My own elaboration based on IMF Database.  
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Figure 11.5 - Consumer price inflation, Ecuador, 1980-2000 
Source: My own elaboration based on IMF Database.  
